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 Introduction
In 1930, B. Duyts, an accountant from the Dutch village of Loosdrecht, 
decided he had had enough. For years he had petitioned the municipality to 
improve the cycling route he used every day for getting to work, to no avail. 
There was an improvised path, but it was in poor condition, alongside a sand 
road; heavy lorries carrying tree trunks made it unsuitable for cycling. A 
well-paved separate cycling path, inaccessible to motorized vehicles, would 
make his commute safer and more pleasant. If the government would not 
build it, Duyts decided he could do it himself. He organized some neighbors 
and together they asked the town for a small subsidy to purchase paving 
material and wooden poles. They then improved the path by paving it and 
used the poles to separate it from the road, preventing cars and lorries from 
swerving onto the cycling path.1 Duyts even placed signs at the beginning 
of the path banning motorized vehicles.
If Duyts thought this would be the end of his problems, he was wrong. 
Confusion broke out among local municipalities, the province of Noord-
Holland, and provincial public works. Did Duyts have the authority as a 
private citizen to declare a part of this road an exclusive cycling path? Could 
this new cycling path be recognized as official? And if so, which government 
agency would be responsible for its maintenance? His municipality declined 
to take up this task. This infuriated Duyts, who argued that mobility was 
a right that was being denied to him and the other cyclists who used his 
street, Raaweg: like all citizens, they paid numerous taxes “and so like other 
citizens they could claim a right to a decent road rather than a quagmire.”2 
The town advised Duyts to f ind someone willing to maintain the path. 
This exasperated him: had he not done more than his fair share already by 
improving the path? Now it was up to local authorities to take responsibility 
and do their part in facilitating cycling traff ic. As he wrote: “After all the 
trouble I have gone to already, it is not clear to me what further steps I could 
take to set up an arrangement regarding maintenance.” After all, Duyts 
stressed “that I, together with the Raaweg residents, have carried out repairs 
only as an absolute necessity” – could the authorities not show a little more 
initiative and willingness to help commuting cyclists?3
1 Archives Noord-Holland (NHA), Archive Provincial Public Works Noord-Holland (553), inv. 
no. 307.
2 NHA 553, inv. no. 307, letter B. Duyts to mayor and aldermen Hilversum, October 8, 1930.
3 NHA 553, inv. no. 307, letter B. Duyts, undated, around January 1931.
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Citizens like Duyts played an important role in Dutch cycling govern-
ance. They were actively involved by organizing interest and action groups, 
lobbying the government to acknowledge their rights. While legally on the 
same footing, not all citizens of the state are treated the same way. Some 
groups have a higher status than others. Historically, policymakers and 
engineers in many countries accorded motorized travelers as a group higher 
status and privileges than cyclists. It is in this sense that the word citizen 
is used throughout Cycling Pathways: The Politics and Governance of Dutch 
Cycling Infrastructure, 1920-2020. In the Netherlands, as I will show, the 
political appreciation of cyclists as citizens with rights (to infrastructure, 
safety, comfort, and so on) was stronger than elsewhere. Had Duyts lived 
today, he could have commuted by bicycle almost anywhere along the many 
cycling-friendly and government-maintained roads in the Netherlands. Over 
nearly a hundred years, an extensive cycling network has been constructed 
in the Netherlands, for both recreational and utilitarian purposes. Today, 
constructing cycling infrastructure is considered a public good and a state 
task. As the 1930 episode shows, that was not always the case. What changed? 
How did providing for cyclists become a state task? Which actors shaped 
cycling policies and how did they do so? Cycling Pathways uncovers this 
governance process to shed light on the status of Dutch cyclists, both on 
the road and in policymaking from the 1920s to today.
Over the past few years, cycling has become considered the key to a 
sustainable and livable future for cities. International experts and scientists 
like urban planners John Pucher and Ralph Buehler praise Dutch cycling as 
a success story – even a cyclists’ paradise – and an example of a pathway to 
a more sustainable transport system.4 Dutch engineers and planners share 
their knowledge about planning for cyclists all over the world.5 As they are 
among the world’s most experienced cycling planners, this seems to make 
sense. On closer inspection, however, it is rather surprising. If Dutch experts 
are to help engineers in other countries, this presupposes that they know 
how to progress from these humble beginnings to a fully-fledged cycling 
system or network. This assumes historical knowledge about what led to 
this outcome. However, little has been written on the emergence of the 
Netherlands as a “cyclists’ paradise.”
How can the Dutch export their cycling knowledge to policymakers across 
the globe when so little is known about which government policies formed 
4 John Pucher and Ralph Buehler, “Making Cycling Irresistible: Lessons from The Netherlands, 
Denmark and Germany,” Transport Reviews 28, no. 4 (2008): 495-528.
5 For instance, through the Dutch Cycling Embassy: https://www.dutchcycling.nl/en/.
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the Dutch cycling system? What role did the engineering community and 
social movements play? Should we ascribe a central role to non-governmental 
actors that tried to put cycling on the agenda? These questions need answers 
if we want to explain how the Netherlands became a nation of cyclists. 
And yet, historians have hardly focused on what is often considered one 
of the quintessential Dutch features. In fact, cycling is so mundane in the 
Netherlands that its history is not considered a serious issue of study. This 
project f ills a knowledge gap important to both an international audience 
interested in boosting cycling levels and a Dutch audience wanting to 
understand how cycling became so deeply ingrained in everyday practices.
Studies of the history of urban cycling in the Netherlands are available, 
but none have covered the role of provincial and national governmental 
actors. While cycling activism has been studied, the role of citizens in 
social movements building expertise and political leverage requires further 
elaboration. Cycling Pathways addresses this gap by providing long overdue 
insights on mobility governance as a product of the interplay between 
engineering norms and ideology, politics, social movements, and users. 
This process of the mutual shaping of daily mobility in the Netherlands over 
the past century is central to this study. It shows the signif icant long-term 
consequences of mobility policies on aspects ranging from street design to 
the modal split and spatial planning. One of the insights of history – and 
mobility history in particular – is that decisions taken in the past often 
have far-reaching and unforeseen consequences. This mechanism is often 
referred to as path dependence: when decisions are built into concrete or 
asphalt, the results become hard to remove or modify.6 A reflection on such 
policy choices made by various actors in the past, and the reasons behind 
them, can help us understand the present and shed some light on what 
(not) to do in the future.
The bigger question Cycling Pathways raises is: Why did the Netherlands 
become such a successful cycling country? Multiple factors explain this. As 
I explain in more detail below, Adri Albert de la Bruhèze, Frank Veraart, 
Martin Emanuel, and Ruth Oldenziel have proposed f ive key variables: 
spatial structure and morphology, the availability of mobility alterna-
tives, the cultural status of cycling, government traff ic policy, and the 
influence of social movements.7 Given my ambition to discuss a long time 
6 James Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society 29, no. 4 
(2000): 507-48.
7 Ruth Oldenziel, Martin Emanuel, Adri Albert de la Bruhèze, and Frank Veraart, eds., Cycling 
Cities: The European Experience (Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of Technology and 
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period (1920-2020), I limit myself to a focus on two interrelated factors: 
government traff ic policy and the influence of organized citizens in social 
movements. Together, these shape the division of road space – in particular, 
cycling infrastructure. While cycling infrastructure may not be a suff icient 
condition for a successful cycling country, research suggests that it is a 
necessary condition in today’s settings.8 In high-automobility contexts, 
a combination of traff ic-calming and traff ic-separating measures are 
needed to make cycling broadly accessible to citizens. Historically, the 
distribution of road space and the provision of cycling space – sometimes 
seen as neutral and technical problems – are in fact political projects. 
The car’s dominant place on our streets is the outcome of a contested and 
long-term process in which other modes of transport were denied access to 
the road. Politicians, policymakers, and engineers have governed – and still 
govern – this process, as have user-citizens organized in social movements 
and the media. Despite opposition, in many countries pro-car interests have 
managed to bar cyclists and pedestrians almost completely from the road; 
in many cases there is also little to no investment in separate infrastructure 
for these road users. The story of the Netherlands is different – Cycling 
Pathways addresses why.
My main research question is: to what extent has Dutch cycling govern-
ance since 1880 contributed to the success of the Netherlands as a cycling 
country? Two aspects of this research question, cycling and governance, 
need further elaboration and form persistent themes. The f irst is the term 
cycling itself. It suggests a uniformity that does not exist. Cyclists form a 
heterogenous group, consisting of (partly overlapping) different usage types. 
Utilitarian cycling (from commuters to school going kids) is a different activ-
ity from recreational or sports cycling; urban cycling can be distinguished 
from suburban or rural practices. Age, gender, and social class also form 
dividing lines. Historically, not all these groups have received equal attention 
from policymakers, engineers, and activists. By studying policies for these 
different groups, made at multiple government levels over more than a 
century, this project goes further than existing cycling and mobility history.
To operationalize my main question, I ask a number of sub-questions. 
First, which actors were involved in cycling governance throughout the 
research period? Second, how did they frame cycling as a public good? 
Rachel Carson Center for Environment and Society, 2016).
8 Paul Schepers et al., “The Dutch Road to a High Level of Cycling Safety,” Safety Science 92 
(2017): 264-73; John Pucher and Ralph Buehler, “Safer Cycling Through Improved Infrastructure,” 
American Journal of Public Health 106, no. 12 (2016): 2089-91.
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Third, how did these actors interact to shape cycling policies? And f i-
nally, what were the main cycling policies resulting from this coalition? 
These questions, requiring extensive archival research, form the main 
empirical contribution of the project. To answer these questions, a series 
of roughly chronological chapters will discuss the actor coalitions around 
specif ic types of cycling, and the cycling policies and funding streams 
they organized.
Introducing Cycling Governance
As the opening story of the Dutch cyclist and accountant suggests, the 
political appreciation of cycling has changed enormously over the past 
century. Moreover, social advocacy and state support for cycling developed 
in different ways in different countries, leading to vastly different material 
infrastructures. Together with other developments – the rise of automobil-
ity, competition with public transit, growing commuter distances, and 
changing cultural appreciation for cycling – politics and governance are 
key factors that shape cycling. But how do these political transformations 
take place at the level of everyday governance and policymaking? That is 
the question I study here. To demand a state role in cycling governance, 
cycling advocates need to make the case for cycling infrastructure as a public 
good. After agreeing that some form of cycling infrastructure provision is 
a state task, there are still multiple steps between that acknowledgement 
and realizing infrastructure. Engineering norms and the coordination 
and division of responsibilities between different state bodies must be 
agreed. This process, from abstract political claim-making to implementing 
concrete policies, forms the topic of this book. The concepts of governance 
and public good that will help me answer these questions on a theoretical 
level are elaborated below.
Governance is a broad concept that has generated a vast amount of 
scholarship in recent decades. The issue of governance has been inspired 
by the declining role of nation-states and their governments since the 
1980s and the growing role of supranational organizations, market parties, 
and civil society. Governance theories use the term steering to allude to a 
society-centered view, as opposed to a state-centered one. This is apt for 
the analysis of the political and administrative processes that have shaped 
Dutch cycling, in which a key argument is that non-state actors played an 
important role. According to public administration scholar Walter Kickert, 
at the most basic level, governance is “the mutual steering relations between 
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State and society.”9 A more elaborate def inition, applied specif ically to 
science and technology, comes from sociologists Susana Borrás and Jakob 
Edler, who consider governance “the way in which societal and state actors 
intentionally interact in order to transform [socio-technical and innovation] 
systems, by regulating issues of societal concern, def ining the processes 
and direction of how technological artefacts and innovations are produced, 
and shaping how these are introduced, absorbed, diffused, and used within 
society and economy.”10 Given its relatively recent rise to prominence and 
frequent theoretical application to developments since the 1980s, why is 
governance a suitable concept with which to analyze a history stretching 
back to the early 1900s? According to Kickert, “the concept of governance 
may be a novel theoretical invention of modern political and administra-
tive sciences but the empirical phenomenon existed before.”11 Similarly, 
political scientist Jeremy Richardson reminds us that “nonhierarchical 
styles of government are not at all new. Governments of all persuasions have 
always consulted and often bargained with a range of private actors in the 
formulation and implementation of public policy.”12 Two other prominent 
scholars of governance, Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes, have also noted that 
the idea of “a monolithic state in control of itself” is a myth. It obscures 
“the reality of diverse state practices that escaped the control of the center 
because they arose from the contingent beliefs and actions of diverse actors 
at the boundary of state and civil society. The state is never monolithic and 
it always negotiates with others.”13 This is especially true of the Netherlands, 
as Kickert argues that “steering by a strong central State has hardly ever 
existed in the Netherlands. Governance has almost always been a matter 
of deliberation, persuasion, and compromise.”14 In retrospect, the powerful 
role the state and its institutions could assume in the 1950s and 1960s seems 
to have been the exception rather than the rule.15
9 Walter J.M. Kickert, The History of Governance in the Netherlands: Continuity and Exceptions 
(The Hague: Elsevier Overheid, 2004), 10.
10 Susana Borrás and Jakob Edler, “Introduction: On Governance, Systems and Change,” in 
The Governance of Socio-technical Systems: Explaining Change, eds. Susana Borrás, and Jakob 
Edler (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014), 14.
11 Kickert, The History of Governance in the Netherlands, 7.
12 Jeremy Richardson, “New Governance or Old Governance? A Policy Style Perspective,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Governance, ed. David Levi-Faur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 312.
13 Mark Bevir and R. Rhodes, The State as Cultural Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 93.
14 Kickert, The History of Governance in the Netherlands, 8.
15 Walter J.M. Kickert, “Beneath Consensual Corporatism: Traditions of Governance in the 
Netherlands,” Public Administration 81, no. 1 (2003): 121-23.
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How then did providing cycling infrastructure become a governmental 
task? As Part I, “Roots,” shows, this was never a foregone conclusion. What 
the state deemed part of its tasks varied over time and depended on what 
was regarded as a public good – a point also observed by sociologists.16 
According to sociologist Rhys Williams: “Everyone is in favor of the public 
good, but just what constitutes that public good – or more accurately, whose 
public good is to be promoted – is a matter of political contention.”17 With 
regard to mobility, historians have convincingly shown how policymakers 
across the world saw the promotion and facilitation of automobility as a 
public good requiring extensive state intervention and funding. Cyclists 
also demanded infrastructure and provisions. The status of cycling 
infrastructure as a public good, however, has been far more precarious 
throughout the twentieth century. Cyclists and cyclists’ organizations 
have had to f ight for this status. To quote Williams again: “Movements 
use particular constructions of the public good to frame public politics 
in ways that benef it their agenda. By talking about the public good in a 
particular way, movements simultaneously legitimate their involvement 
and solutions, while casting aspersions on their opponents’ positions. 
The discursive struggle is part of all public politics; a vision of the public 
good is a valuable tool in this process.”18 Indeed, countless arguments for 
constructing cycling infrastructure as beneficial to society as a whole and 
cyclists in particular came to the fore in the Netherlands. Together, they 
presented a case that was suff iciently convincing to justify state funding 
and coordination.
My approach consists of tracing two long-term processes. The f irst is this 
(discursive) struggle to frame cycling as a public good. It pertains to the f irst 
two sub-questions: who is involved in cycling policy, and how do these key 
stakeholders frame cycling and consequently the government’s role? Cycling 
Pathways shows how state engineers, national and local politicians, and 
citizens (organized in social movements), throughout the history of cycling 
regarded particular types of cycling (recreational) as a public good, while 
ignoring others (utilitarian). The second process is the actual governance 
or steering process. This addresses the third and fourth sub-questions: what 
policy coalitions were established to govern cycling, and what policies did 
16 Kevin Morrell, “Governance and the Public Good,” Public Administration 87, no. 3 (2009): 
538-56.
17 Rhys H. Williams, “Constructing the Public Good: Social Movements and Cultural Resources,” 
Social Problems 42, no. 1 (1995): 124-44, 124.
18 Ibid., 126.
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they introduce? In other words, once some state role in cycling became 
accepted, how was this support translated into concrete policies? According 
to cycling historian James Longhurst, we can also term this the distinction 
between politics and policies: politics are “the rhetoric and mechanisms by 
which groups and individuals come to power,” whereas policy refers to “the 
deliberations, decisions, and actions of government in pursuit of a shared 
goal or public good.”19 To analyze the policies put in place, I take inspiration 
from political sciences, that is, the Policy Arrangement Approach.20 From 
the perspective of this theory’s proponents, the concepts in the policy 
arrangement approach serve as a heuristic framework that sensitizes us to 
certain processes and actors in governance. Accordingly, the four elements 
of the approach recur implicitly throughout each chapter but do not shape 
the actual structure of the chapters.
The proponents of the Policy Arrangement Approach def ine policy 
arrangements as “the temporary stabilization of the organization and 
substance of a policy domain at a specif ic level of policy making.”21 Specif ic 
policy arrangements can explain how long-term processes of political change 
led to actual policy measures: it is the link that may clarify the functioning 
of a given policy network through four analytical lenses. One concerns the 
content or substance (the discourse) within the network. The other three 
concern organization, specif ically focusing on the actors, their resources 
and power, and the rules of the game.
Substance is analyzed in terms of policy discourse, which refers to 
“concepts, ideas, views, buzzwords and the like, which give meaning to a 
19 James Longhurst, Bike Battles: A History of Sharing the American Road (Seattle/London: 
University of Washington Press, 2015), 12.
20 Scholars studying the development of Dutch nature governance pioneered the Policy Ar-
rangement Approach to governance. There are parallels between nature and cycling governance: 
both are policy areas dealing with issues that are local in scale, but still subject to rules and 
processes formed on a provincial, national, and international scale. In addition, local attempts to 
place nature protection on the political agenda resemble the cycling activists’ struggle in many 
ways: often a relatively small and powerless group was up against large vested interests (the 
agricultural lobby in the case of nature protection, the car lobby in the case of cycling activism). 
Several scholars have fruitfully applied this approach to Dutch environmental policy. See: Jan 
van Tatenhove, Bas Arts, and Pieter Leroy, eds., Political Modernisation and the Environment: 
The Renewal of Environmental Policy Arrangements, Environment & Policy, vol. 24 (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 2000); in particular “Policy Arrangements,” 53-69; also Bas Arts and Pieter Leroy, eds., 
Institutional Dynamics in Environmental Governance, Environment & Policy, vol. 47 (Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2006). On applying the theory: Rikke Arnouts, “Regional Nature Governance in the 
Netherlands: Four Decades of Governance Modes and Shifts in the Utrechtse Heuvelrug and 
Midden-Brabant” (PhD diss., Wageningen University, 2010).
21 Arts, Tatenhove, and Leroy, “Policy Arrangements,” 54.
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policy domain.”22 Often, one discourse will dominate a policy arrangement 
challenged by competing discourses. These discourses can have varying 
levels of specif icity: “Consistency, elaboration, operationalization, and 
coherence, however, are not essential features of discourse.” On the contrary, 
“the vaguer a policy discourse … the more open it is to different interpreta-
tions, the greater its mobilizing capability, and the more impressive its 
consensus-building ability.”23
Scholars analyze actors through the lens of so-called policy coalitions. 
These consist “of a number of players who share interpretations of a policy 
discourse or resources, in the context of the rules of the game.”24 Power and 
resources refer to the actors’ access to resources that can help them influence 
political decisions or frame public debates and agendas. Power can also be 
seen as a more hidden phenomenon that creates a hierarchy of dependent 
relations among actors. Importantly, knowledge can also serve as a source 
of power and legitimacy. Finally, the rules of the game refer to the more 
informal, unwritten norms and political culture governing the interaction 
of stakeholders. Within these policy arrangements, change in time occurs 
either through conscious actions by actors within the network (agency) or 
through the influence of external factors beyond their control (structure).
The authors working with the policy arrangements approach prefer to 
approach the agency-structure issue through Giddens’s concept of struc-
turation.25 This concept tries to balance agency and structure, without 
giving primacy to either. Duality of structure is the idea that actors cannot 
act outside certain structures, but that they simultaneously shape and (re)
produce them. As Marleen Buizer states in her book on local initiatives in 
nature policy: “Duality of structure means that there is a reciprocal relation-
ship between actor and structure in which actors are neither powerless 
subjects of structure, nor powerful enough to change structure according 
to their wishes.”26 Actors within the cycling governance coalition made 
contingent choices, but also operated in a landscape of (path-dependent) 
constraints. We need to take a long-term perspective to understand this. 
22 Ibid., 56. Italics in original.
23 Ibid., 64.
24 Ibid., 57.
25 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cam-
bridge: Polity Press, 1984). The debate on agency and structure is fundamental in history. For a 
collection of essays, see Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, eds., Does Technology Drive History? 
The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press, 1994).
26 Marleen Buizer, “Worlds Apart: Interactions Between Local Policy Initiatives and Established 
Policy” (PhD diss., Wageningen University, 2008), 19.
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While it is possible to concentrate purely on the survival of urban cycling 
after 1970, studying the cycling policies of the 1950s and 1960s helps us to 
understand the structures in which activists and engineers operated in 
Dutch cities from the 1970s onwards. We cannot, in turn, understand the 
1950s and 1960s without investigating the roots of cycling policies in the 
1920s. Earlier choices, often contingent and sometimes with unintended 
consequences, shaped the long-term development of cycling and cycling 
governance. One concept often invoked to study this process of foreclosure 
is path dependency.
The long timescale of this project allows me to investigate the long-term 
effects of certain policy choices, and the possible feedback mechanisms 
that create path dependent processes. As a policy domain, mobility and 
spatial planning produce mobility patterns and physical infrastructures 
like cycle paths which are so deeply embedded that changing them is both 
diff icult and expensive.27 Initial choices, albeit contingent and small, can 
in the long run have signif icant and almost unavoidable consequences.28 
According to historian James Mahoney, path dependency is often used 
loosely, becoming little more than the truism that “earlier events affect later 
possibilities and foreclose certain options.”29 For a process to be properly 
called path-dependent, it has to be very hard to change at a later stage 
because of earlier choices. Positive feedback processes increase the cost of 
unmaking earlier decisions.30
So, the question is, can we explain the endurance of cycling with such a 
path-dependent process through a historical analysis? Did the large presence 
of cyclists in the Netherlands early on in history set in motion a positive cycle 
when planners provided for cyclists, leading to higher levels of cycling that in 
turn encouraged more pro-cycling policies?31 The opposite may also be true. 
Where cycling levels are low, a vicious circle emerges: planners who believe 
27 Anique Hommels, Unbuilding Cities: Obduracy in Urban Sociotechnical Change (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2005); Anique Hommels, “Studying Obduracy in the City: Toward a Productive 
Fusion between Technology Studies and Urban Studies,” Science, Technology, & Human Values 
30, no. 3 (2005): 323-51.
28 The classic example is the QWERTY keyboard: once a contingent choice, changing it now 
is nearly impossible: Paul A. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” American Economic 
Review 75, no. 2 (1985): 332-37.
29 Mahoney, “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” 509.
30 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 21.
31 Martin Emanuel, “Moments of Unsustainability: Planning, Path Dependence, and Cycling 
in Stockholm,” in Cycling and Recycling: Histories of Sustainable Practices, eds. Ruth Oldenziel 
and Helmuth Trischler (New York/Oxford: Berghahn, 2016), 101-21.
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cycling is on the decline do not invest in it; cycling subsequently becomes 
less attractive and the number of cyclists drops, which is used to justify 
withholding further support. Put differently, a self-reinforcing process in 
environments with both high and low cycling levels may become so ingrained 
in existing institutions that it is too costly to change. At the same time, 
emphasizing the constraints historical factors placed on actors may obscure 
that there is always room for agency as in Giddens’s concept of structuration.
This historical study allows us to test ideas about path dependency. As 
I will show, the early stages of systematic roadbuilding in the 1920s and 
1930s included a strong emphasis on parallel but separate cycling paths and 
f ierce debates about cyclists’ rightful place and the relationship between 
drivers and cyclists. Each group had different standpoints, and different 
outcomes were possible. As we will see, ultimately, traff ic separation was 
the contingent solution. What path-dependent properties did this choice 
develop over the following decades? Path dependency theory suggests the 
need for a close look at the early, formative stage of Dutch roadbuilding 
policies (a “critical juncture” in theoretical terms), since so many of the later 
choices and developments could only take place within the limited range 
of possibilities left by these choices. It is also an open question whether 
engineers and policymakers were (or felt) compelled to continue catering 
to cyclists in the 1950s and 1960s, when the facilitation of automobility 
occupied the political center stage. Is there indeed a path dependency 
pattern here which made cycling relatively secure in the Netherlands, or 
was there a real danger of cycling disappearing almost entirely as it did in 
other European countries at this time?
To close this section on governance, some introductory remarks about 
the historical traditions and context of Dutch politics are in order. First, 
the Dutch political system has a decentralized tradition of local autonomy: 
lower provincial and municipal governments have a signif icant amount of 
independence. Twentieth-century national policymakers could not exert a 
great deal of influence on urban mobility planning. Taxation, which is largely 
centralized, is one crucial exception. The national government controls the 
distribution of funding as one of its most consequential means of steering 
policy at a local level. Financial decentralization only took place in the 1990s 
when the national government awarded an infrastructure budget to lower 
governments as a lump sum, which local communities could spend as they 
saw f it. Until that time, the Ministry of Public Works decided how much 
money each province received as a road budget. Further division meant 
that lower government levels could still spend this road budget on cycling 
facilities. These road budgets were limited and had to be supplemented with 
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occasional subsidies. While the national government took a strong role in the 
highway network from the early twentieth century, its focus on cycling came 
and went. When the state paid attention, it generated a signif icant boost for 
local governments. As it turns out, historically the structural, long-term, 
and sustained attention necessary to create good cycling conditions f irst 
came from the provinces and municipalities.32
A second characterization political scientists and historians often apply 
to the Netherlands is that of a “consensus-driven, neo-corporatist system.”33 
Society is seen to consist of different groups (corpora) whom certain people 
or organizations represent. Distinct from state (or fascist) corporatism, 
neo-corporatism is “explicitly a democratic model of bottom-up interest 
representation, hence the adjective ‘neo’.”34 Characteristic of this model is 
that “the State recognizes a limited number of interest associations, involves 
them in the decision-making and commits them, grants them privileges 
and delegates the execution of certain public tasks to them.”35 Indeed, as 
governance scholars Rudy Andeweg and Galen Irwin note: “The existence 
of strong, well-organized interest groups is an important precondition for a 
corporatist model of policy-making to work.”36 This recognition is more or 
less informal, although in the Dutch context it has become common for the 
government to subsidize action groups – a measure of public recognition. 
State off icials deliberate with these representatives of social groups to reach 
policy solutions which take into account as many interests as possible.37 
32 Rudy B. Andeweg and Galen A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, 2nd edition 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
33 Caspar F. van den Berg, “Dynamics in the Dutch Policy Advisory System: Externalization, 
Politicization and the Legacy of Pillarization,” Policy Sciences 50, no. 1 (2017): 63-84, here 64; Frits 
van der Meer, Jos Raadschelders, and Toon Kerkhoff, “Van nachtwakersstaat naar waarborgstaat: 
proliferatie en vervlechting van het Nederlandse openbaar bestuur in de lange twintigste eeuw 
(1880-2005),” in Duizend jaar openbaar bestuur in Nederland: van patrimoniaal bestuur naar 
waarborgstaat, eds. Pieter Wagenaar, Toon Kerkhoff, and Mark Rutgers (Bussum: Coutinho, 
2011), 221-90.
34 Kickert, The History of Governance in the Netherlands, 38.
35 Ibid.
36 Andeweg and Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, 150.
37 Adriejan van Veen, “From Neo-Corporatism to Regulatory Governance: Interests, Expertise, 
and Power in Dutch Extraparliamentary Governance, c. 1900-2018,” in Information and Power in 
History: Towards a Global Approach, eds. Ida Nijenhuis Nijenhuis, Marijke van Faassen, Ronald 
Sluijter, Joris Gijsenbergh, and Wim de Jong (London: Routledge, 2020), 85-102; Erik Schrijvers 
and Stefan Couperus, “Voorbij verkiezing en parlement. Alternatieve representatie in Nederland 
na 1870,” in Omstreden democratie. Over de problemen van een succesverhaal, eds. Remieg Aerts 
and Peter de Goede (Amsterdam: Boom, 2013), 67-88; Ido de Haan, “Verplaatste democratie? 
Politieke representatie in functionele organen,” in Omstreden democratie, 89-107.
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This search for consensus and compromise is often seen as a hallmark of 
Dutch political culture. Indeed, the political development of consensus 
and compromise in the cycling policy domain is analyzed in this book. At 
the same time, one consequence of this system where state off icials and 
interest groups work closely together is “the fragmentation of policy-making 
into various ‘Iron Triangles’, ‘policy networks’ or ‘policy communities’.” 
Relatively isolated policy networks tend to focus “on a particular policy 
area without much attention to the full range of government activities.”38 
Relatively informal arrangements, personal contacts, and unwritten rules 
are often quite central to these networks.39
Third, the consensus-driven nature of Dutch politics is often analyzed 
as the “polder model.”40 The term refers to the low-lying nation’s historical 
battle against water. The outside threat required people to work together, 
although the term’s applicability to this policy domain is contested.41 Politi-
cal science scholarship uses the concept to analyze economic policy and 
the negotiations between state, employers, and unions about wage and 
industrial policies. The question of whether the tensions between labor 
and capital are characterized by consensus-seeking rather than conflict 
is a hotly contested argument among political scientists. Nevertheless, we 
can say that “in a broader political science sense, neo-corporatism as State 
co-operation with interest groups certainly did exist in the Netherlands.” 
This is in line with an age-old tradition of “pragmatism, tolerance and 
consensus.”42 Accommodating different interests by minutely negotiating 
policy choices and distributing costs and benefits more or less equally over 
society are characteristic of Dutch politics.
Regarding the workings of the national state bureaucracy, political scien-
tists describe the Dutch governance system as heavily compartmentalized. 
Most ministries, in cooperation with society’s interest groups, form sectoral 
policy domains which struggle to communicate with other domains.43 For 
infrastructure policy in general, this means that communication between 
38 Andeweg and Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, 158.
39 Rivke Jaffe and Martijn Koster, “The Myth of Formality in the Global North: Informality-
as-Innovation in Dutch Governance,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 43, 
no. 3 (2019): 536-68.
40 A classic work is Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy 
in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).
41 Milja van Tielhof, “Op zoek naar het poldermodel in de waterstaatsgeschiedenis,” Tijdschrift 
voor geschiedenis 122, no. 2 (2009): 148-61.
42 Kickert, The History of Governance in the Netherlands, 12.
43 Andeweg and Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, 149-63.
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mobility, spatial planning, and recreation domains (all connected to cycling 
in different ways) did not always occur. In practice, this meant that different 
ministries governed and funded different types of cycling infrastructure. 
There are downsides and upsides to this dispersed governance system. Below 
the national level, the province is generally regarded as far less important 
than either the national state or the municipality. Both in terms of budget 
and personnel, the provincial level is quite small compared to the national 
and local level.44 That said, the province plays a key role in mobility policy: 
traff ic formed the largest item in the provincial budget until about 1980, 
and has remained a signif icant item since. The provinces also maintain 
their own provincial public work departments. While for many policy 
f ields the province might be more or less ignored, in mobility policy it has 
had a signif icant role historically. In the f irst half of the twentieth century, 
national policymakers increasingly believed the province or region was 
the appropriate level for cycling governance – though the national state 
did consider automobility its mandate. Since the 1950s, provinces indeed 
took up this task to varying degrees and have remained signif icant in this 
domain. Applying these political science insights, I explore the multi-level 
nature of cycling governance.
Taking Stock of Cycling History
How does cycling feature in historical scholarship? Historians of innovation 
have extensively studied the governance of (mobility) technologies like the 
bicycle as the friction between the experts or system-builders on the one 
hand and users on the other. In the seminal Making Europe book series, 
which analyzes European history of technology, this is one of the key lines of 
conflict.45 Historians have discredited the popular narrative of omnipotent 
inventors who can shape the world exactly as they envision. The manifold 
44 Theo A.J. Toonen, “Dutch Provinces and the Struggle for the Meso,” in The Rise of Meso 
Government in Europe, ed. L.J. Sharpe (London: Sage, 1993), 117-53; Michiel S. de Vries, “Institutional 
Fleecing: The Slow Death of Dutch Provinces,” Public Organization Review 4, no. 4 (2004): 295-315.
45 See f irst three volumes: Ruth Oldenziel and Mikael Hård, Consumers, Tinkerers, Rebels: The 
People Who Shaped Europe, vol. 1, Making Europe (New York/Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013); Martin Kohlrausch and Helmuth Trischler, Building Europe on Expertise: Innovators, 
Organizers, Networkers, Making Europe, vol. 2 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Per 
Högselius, Arne Kaijer, and Erik van der Vleuten, Europe’s Infrastructure Transition: Economy, 
War, Nature, Making Europe, vol. 3. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); the other volumes 
are also important. On the entire series: Eda Kranakis, “Writing Technology into History,” 
Technology and Culture 62, no. 1 (2021): 212-40.
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ways users shape technological objects and systems are well documented. 
Innovation sociologists Trevor Pinch and Nelly Oudhoorn’s How Users Matter 
is one of the premier works in this tradition.46 By tinkering with objects, by 
using them in different ways than intended, or even by not applying certain 
technologies, technology users can exert their influence. A significant amount 
of this literature focuses on how users shape the design and construction of 
particular technical objects like bicycles or cars.47 Wiebe Bijker famously 
used the bicycle as an example of his SCOT approach.48 This book does 
not focus on the bicycle as a technical object, but on how cycling citizens 
organized in social movements shaped cycling as a socio-technical system.
Users and non-state actors play a major role in shaping this socio-technical 
cycling system. Much institutional, legal, and f inancial power, however, 
lies with engineers and experts. Historians of technology have extensively 
studied technocracy – the idea that engineers and experts’ supposedly 
neutral and value-free scientif ic approach can solve all kinds of (social) 
problems.49 There is a consensus that engineers’ approach to technology is 
not neutral: at no stage in the engineering process can we speak of a purely 
technical approach. According to Michel Callon, engineers should always 
also be seen as sociologists whose technological work is driven by a certain 
view of society.50 Globally, automobility dominated their view of mobility 
for much of the twentieth century.51 When the changing cultural climate of 
46 Nelly Oudshoorn and Trevor Pinch, eds., How Users Matter: The Co-Construction of Users 
and Technologies (London: MIT Press, 2003).
47 Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch, “Users as Agents of Technological Change: The Social Construc-
tion of the Automobile in the Rural United States,” Technology and Culture 37, no. 4 (1996): 763-95.
48 Wiebe E. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical Change 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).
49 On technocracy in roadbuilding, see Johan W. Schot and Vincent Lagendijk, “Technocratic 
Internationalism in the Interwar Years: Building Europe on Motorways and Electricity Networks,” 
Journal of Modern European History 6, no. 2 (2008): 196-217; Dick van Lente and Johan W. Schot, 
“Techniek als politiek: ingenieurs en de vormgeving van de Nederlandse samenleving,” in 
Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw – Deel VII – Techniek en modernisering, balans van 
de twintigste eeuw, eds. Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze, Harry Lintsen, Arie Rip and Johan Schot 
(Zutphen: Walburg Pers/Stichting Historie der Techniek, 2003). On the extensive European 
network of road engineers and planners, see Frank Schipper, “Driving Europe: Building Europe 
on Roads in the Twentieth Century” (PhD diss., TU Eindhoven, 2008).
50 Michel Callon, “Society in the Making: The Study of Technology as a Tool for Sociological 
Analysis,” in The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology 
and History of Technology, eds. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1987), 83-103.
51 On conflicts between users and system-builders, see Peter Norton, Fighting Traffic: The 
Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008).
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the late 1960s and 1970s made cyclists more daring in voicing their demands, 
the system-builders had to acknowledge the gap between their vision of 
mobility and that of a large group of users. How did Dutch cyclists manage to 
address this knowledge gap between engineering models and daily practice?
Cycling Pathways studies the clash between road engineers and road 
users, specifically cyclists. Most traff ic experts simply knew very little about 
how cyclists behaved, why they made certain (route and mode) choices, and 
had no insight into how they could improve cycling conditions and safety. 
Historian David Arnold has called traff ic a manifestation of the “everyday 
state.”52 Writing on British colonial policies in India, Arnold notes that “the 
world of urban planning was often far removed from the reality of life on the 
streets and the fractured modernity it represented.”53 In the Dutch context, 
particularly since the 1960s, when critique of technocratic governance 
resonated and a more egalitarian social structure emerged – known by 
political scientists as the era of de-pillarization – this allowed lay persons 
like cyclists to influence urban planners and engineers. In other national 
contexts where this was not possible, cyclists could still use the bicycle in 
subversive ways to evade government control but did not have the power 
to change the planning and design of streets and road space.54
Until a few decades ago, historians writing on transport focused on one 
modality in one specif ic country, often centered around trains, cars, and 
airplanes; they dealt with the inventors and manufacturers of these machines 
and were less concerned with how these transport technologies shaped 
people’s lives and the political processes involved. Since then, the focus has 
shifted when new approaches to technology (SCOT, Actor-Network Theory, 
and others) made an inroad into transport history – as did the mobility 
studies by John Urry and Mimi Sheller.55 This led mobility historian Gijs 
Mom to call for a move from this traditional transport history to a mobility 
history, or an “integrated transport history,” which examines the interaction 
between mobility modes and applies new methodological approaches.56 
52 David Arnold, “The Problem of Traff ic: The Street-Life of Modernity in Late-Colonial India,” 
Modern Asian Studies 46, no. 1 (2012): 120.
53 Ibid., 130.
54 David Arnold and Erich DeWald, “Cycles of Empowerment? The Bicycle and Everyday 
Technology in Colonial India and Vietnam,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 53, no. 4 
(2011): 971-96.
55 Mimi Sheller and John Urry, “The New Mobilities Paradigm,” Environment and Planning 
A: Economy and Space 38, no. 2 (2006): 207-26; Peter Norton, “Urban Transport and Mobility,” 
Technology and Culture 61, no. 4 (2020): 1197-211.
56 State of the art in transport history: Gijs Mom, “What Kind of Transport History Did We Get?: 
Half a Century of JTH and the Future of the Field,” The Journal of Transport History 24, no. 2 (2003): 
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The approach opened up the possibility of studying non-motorized forms 
of transport like walking and cycling that scholars had ignored. Indeed, 
marginalized mobility groups like cyclists and pedestrians have received 
a boost in recent years, not least because of the rising interest in transport 
or mobility justice issues.57
In 2008, Gijs Mom and Ruud Filarski wrote an authoritative and thor-
oughly documented history of Dutch mobility. Yet the authors still focused 
on car use and the railroads, the development of their infrastructures, and 
the conflict between motorized and public transport in the Interbellum.58 
While acknowledging the strong role of “slow modes” of transport in the 
Netherlands, they did not analyze their emergence.59 They characterized the 
emergence of the Dutch automobile system in the f irst half of the twentieth 
century as the outcome of an interplay of multiple actors with different 
goals and visions rather than a systematically planned effort. Mom and 
Filarski also argued that the car did not oust other forms of mobility in the 
Netherlands like in the US, where automobility took over pedestrianism, 
cycling, and public transit. The Dutch government did support railway 
121-38; Gijs Mom, “The Crisis of Transport History: A Critique, and a Vista,” Mobility in History 
6, no. 1 (2015): 7-19. For the debate on what a new mobility history should entail: Kevin Hannam, 
Mimi Sheller, and John Urry, “Editorial: Mobilities, Immobilities and Moorings,” Mobilities 1, 
no. 1 (2006): 1-22; Colin Michael Divall, Peter Lyth, and Gijs Mom, “Towards a Paradigm Shift? A 
Decade of Transport and Mobility History,” in Mobility in History: The State of the Art in the History 
of Transport, Traffic and Mobility, eds. Gijs Mom, Gordon Pirie, and Laurent Tissot (Neuchatel: 
Alphil, 2009), 13-40; Colin Divall, “Mobilizing the History of Technology,” Technology and Culture 
51, no. 4 (2010): 938-60; Peter Merriman, “Mobilities, Crises, and Turns: Some Comments on 
Dissensus, Comparative Studies, and Spatial Histories,” Mobility in History 6, no. 1 (2015): 20-34; 
Gijs Mom, “Mao or Merriman? On Pitjantjatjara and Other Mobilities – A Response,” Mobility 
in History 6, no. 1 (2015): 35-39.
57 Karel Martens, Transport Justice: Designing fair transportation systems (London: Routledge, 
2016); Aaron Golub, Melody L. Hoffmann, Adonia E. Lugo, and Gerardo F. Sandoval, Bicycle 
Justice and Urban Transformation: Biking for all? (London/New York: Routledge, 2017); Mimi 
Sheller, Mobility Justice: The Politics of Movement in an Age of Extremes (London: Verso, 2018); 
Mimi Sheller, “Theorising Mobility Justice,” Tempo Social 30, no. 2 (2018): 17-34.
58 Gijs Mom and Ruud Filarski, Van transport naar mobiliteit: de mobiliteitsexplosie [1895-2005] 
(Zutphen: Walburg Pers /Stichting Historie der Techniek, 2008); Ruud Filarski and Gijs Mom, Van 
transport naar mobiliteit: de transportrevolutie [1800-1900] (Zutphen: Walburg Pers /Stichting 
Historie der Techniek, 2008); Ruud Filarski, “The Emergence of the Bus Industry: Dutch Transport 
Policy During the Interwar Years,” Transfers 1, no. 2 (2011): 61-82. As follow-up, a large international 
research network studied car mobility and truck transport vs public transportation networks 
and the coordination problems for national governments in the Interbellum. The bicycle did 
not have a prominent place, despite its importance: Bert Toussaint, “Using the Usable Past: 
Reflections and Practices in the Netherlands,” in Transport Policy: Learning Lessons from History, 
eds. Colin Divall, Julian Hine, and Colin Pooley (Farnham: Ashgate, 2016), 21-22.
59 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 397.
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transport and inland navigation, which otherwise might not have survived.60 
Does this argument also apply to cycling?
A key point of contention concerned the issue of governance: who was 
responsible or had authority over parts of the system? This question also 
recurs in scholarship on the history of spatial and urban planning in the 
Netherlands. In the 1920s, planners claimed the region was the appropri-
ate scale for planning. Municipalities, however, jealously guarded their 
autonomy and did not work with their neighbors. The national government 
was reluctant to legally enforce this regional cooperation.61 According to 
planning historians Andreas Faludi and Arnold van der Valk, a measure 
of uniformity existed in Dutch planning, despite the absence of top-down 
hierarchical governance: “rule and order is not imposed from above, it per-
vades the Dutch way of doing things.”62 They argue that ideas and informal 
documents are as important as the legal status of off icial plans.63 Thus, it is 
crucial to heed the planning discourse. Extending this analysis to cycling 
means asking how engineers discussed cycling and its place in governance. 
In other words: who was regarded as responsible for governing cycling and 
who was regulating or facilitating cycling? Was this lack of a centralized, 
top-down approach also typical of cycling? And if so, can this uniformity 
be created through shared policy beliefs?
Cycling Pathways is not the f irst work to discuss cycling history. Although 
a relatively new f ield, growing numbers of studies are emerging in the 
past decade. The existing cycling history gravitates towards cultural ap-
proaches (cycling as a form of leisure and sociability) and focuses on the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century.64 This might have to do with an 
“elitist bias” in the sources, as when cycling becomes a mundane, everyday 
activity, it is harder to f ind traces in archives and published sources.65 
60 Ibid., 390-93.
61 Hans van der Cammen and Len de Klerk, Ruimtelijke ordening: van grachtengordel tot 
Vinex-wijk (Utrecht: Spectrum, 2003), 118-19.
62 Andreas Faludi and Arnold van der Valk, Rule and Order: Dutch Planning Doctrine in the 
Twentieth Century (Dordrecht: Springer, 1994), 8.
63 Ibid., 61.
64 For overviews, Harry Oosterhuis and Manuel Stoffers, “‘Ons populairste vervoersmiddel.’ De 
Nederlandse f ietshistoriograf ie in internationaal perspectief,” BMGN – Low Countries Historical 
Review 124, no. 3 (2009): 390-418; Harry Oosterhuis, “Bicycle Research between Bicycle Policies and 
Bicycle Culture,” Mobility in History 5 (2014): 20-36; Harry Oosterhuis, “Ingebakken gewoonte of 
buitenissige liefhebberij?” Sociologie 11, no. 1 (2015): 3-30; Harry Oosterhuis, “Cycling, Modernity 
and National Culture,” Social History 41, no. 3 (2016): 233-48.
65 Oosterhuis, “Cycling, Modernity and National Culture,” 235. For an interesting case on 
cycle paths for workers in north Sweden’s forests, see: Anna-Maria Rautio and Lars Östlund, 
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For certain countries, notably Italy, France, Spain, and Belgium, cycling 
historiography extends beyond this early focus but then concentrates on 
vibrant professional cycling cultures (related to national identity) without 
discussing the long history of everyday utility cycling.66 As sociologists 
Colin Pooley, Jean Turnbull, and Mags Adams argue in their book on eve-
ryday twentieth-century mobility in the UK, this is unjustif ied. Everyday 
mobility might be a mundane activity, it is also a highly important one 
given the amount of time we devote to it, its frequency, and what it costs 
the environment (pollution), the economy (congestion), the government 
(costs of policies), society and culture (stress, alienation, lack of leisure), 
and individuals (time, health).67 Cycling has been a key utilitarian mode of 
transport since at least the 1920s and requires the long view which I provide 
here. The rise, fall, and resurgence of cycling is a century-long story. Unlike 
most studies of cycling history, this book takes a perspective that stretches 
from the late nineteenth century to the present.
Scholars discussing utilitarian cycling in the twentieth century emphasize 
its marginalization by policymakers favoring the car. They demonstrate the 
“‘Starvation Strings’ and the Public Good: Development of a Swedish Bike Trail Network in the 
Early Twentieth Century,” Journal of Transport History 33, no. 1 (2012): 42-63.
66 For France: Hugh Dauncey, French Cycling: A Social and Cultural History, (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 2012); Hugh Dauncey and Geoff Hare, eds., The Tour de France 1903-2003: A 
Century of Sporting Structures, Meanings and Values (London: Routledge/Cass, 2003); Hugh 
Dauncey and Geoff Hare, “The Tour de France: a Pre-Modern Contest in a Post-Modern Context,” 
The International Journal of the History of Sport 20, no. 2 (2003): 1-29, and Philippe Gaboriau, 
“The Tour de France and cycling’s Belle Epoque,” 57-78. Another publication by Gaboriau pays 
utilitarian cycling some attention: Philippe Gaboriau, “Les trois âges du vélo en France,” Ving-
tième Siècle. Revue d’histoire 29, no. 1 (1991): 17-34. For Belgium: Stijn Knuts and Pascal Delheye, 
“Identiteiten in koers: Roeselaarse wielrenners als kopmannen van lokale, regionale en (sub)
nationale identiteiten, 1900-1960,” Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis/ Revue Belge 
de Histoire Contemporaine 41, no. 1-2 (2011): 167-214; Stijn Knuts and Pascal Delheye, “Cycling 
in the City? Belgian Cyclists Conquering Urban Spaces, 1860-1900,” International Journal of the 
History of Sport 29, no. 14 (2012): 1942-62; Stijn Knuts and Pascal Delheye, “Connecting City and 
Countryside? Faces of Cycling Mobility in Belgium, 1890-1914,” Dutch Crossing 37, no. 3 (2013): 
240-59. For Italy: Stefano Pivato, “The Bicycle as a Political Symbol, Italy, 1885-1955,” International 
Journal of the History of Sport 7, no. 2 (1990): 173-87; Stefano Pivato, “Italian Cycling and the 
Creation of a Catholic Hero. The Bartali Myth,” International Journal of the History of Sport 13, 
no. 1 (1996): 128-38. For Spain: Bernat López, “Sport, Media, Politics and Nationalism on the Eve 
of the Spanish Civil War: The First Vuelta Ciclista a España (1935),” The International Journal of 
the History of Sport 27, no. 4 (2010): 635-57; Bernat López, “The Failed Vuelta Ciclista a España 
of 1913 and the Launching of the Volta a Catalunya (1911-1913): Centre Versus Periphery in the 
Struggle for the Governance of Cycling in Early Twentieth-Century Spain,” Sport in History 30, 
no. 4 (2010): 547-69.
67 Colin Pooley, Jean Turnbull, and Mags Adams, A Mobile Century? Changes in Everyday 
Mobility in Britain in the Twentieth Century (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 9-10.
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various national contests with regard to political traditions and engineering 
policies. Studies on cycling in the US show this marginalization in convincing 
ways.68 Historians like Peter Norton in Fighting Traffic, James Longhurst in 
Bike Battles, or Zack Furness in One Less Car show how American traff ic 
policy forcefully pushed cycling aside – a clear contrast with the more accom-
modating and consensus-seeking approach to road space distribution in the 
Netherlands. Germany chose the middle path, establishing multiple initiatives 
around cycling path construction in the f irst half of the twentieth century, 
but not encouraging it to coalesce into a national culture as it did in the 
Netherlands.69 Denmark’s political traditions and cycling culture seem closest 
to those of the Netherlands, but a national account beyond Copenhagen is 
still lacking.70 For other countries, publications on cycling history are few and 
68 On Canada and The United States: Glen Norcliffe, The Ride to Modernity: The Bicycle in 
Canada, 1869-1900 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); Norton, Fighting Traffic; Zack 
Furness, One Less Car: Bicycling and the Politics of Automobility (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 2010); Christopher W. Wells, Car Country: An Environmental History (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 2012); Lorenz Finison, Boston’s Cycling Craze, 1880-1900: A Story of Race, 
Sport, and Society (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2014); Longhurst, Bike Battles; 
Evan Friss, The Cycling City: Bicycles and Urban America in the 1890s (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2015); Evan Friss, On Bicycles: A 200-year History of Cycling in New York City 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2019). Longhurst covers American cycling, which he 
argues was resilient enough to survive the strongly car-centred policies of the 1900s. See also 
Bruce Epperson, “The Great Schism: Federal Bicycle Safety Regulation and the Unraveling of 
American Bicycle Planning,” Transportation Law Journal 37, no. 2 (2010): 73-118; Bruce Epperson, 
Bicycles in American Highway Planning: The Critical Years of Policy-Making 1969-1991 (Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland & Company, 2014).
69 Verein Deutscher Fahrrad-Industrieller, Festschrift zum Vierzigjährigen Bestehen des Vereins 
Deutscher Fahrrad-Industrieller e.V. 1888-1928 (Berlin: Verein Deutscher Fahrrad-Industrieller, 
1928), 88-98; Burkhard Horn, “Vom Niedergang eines Massenverkehrsmittels – Zur Geschichte 
der Städtischen Radverkehrsplanung” (Master Thesis, Gesamthochschule Kassel, 1990); Volker 
Briese, Besondere Wege für Radfahrer. Zur Geschichte des Radwegebaus in Deutschland von den 
Anfangen bis 1940 (Unpublished manuscript, Paderborn, 1993); Thomas Fläschner, “Stahlroß auf 
dem Aussterbe-Etat: zur Geschichte des Fahrrades und seiner Verdrängung in den 50er-Jahren,” 
Eckstein – Journal für Geschichte 9 (2000): 4-22; Anne-Katrin Ebert, Radelnde Nationen: Die 
Geschichte des Fahrrads in Deutschland und den Niederlanden bis 1940 (Frankfurt: Campus 
Verlag, 2010); Thomas Fläschner, “Zum Gebrauch des Rades gezwungen: Fahrradkultur in 
Saarbrücken zwischen 1885 und 1939,” in Saarbrücken in Fahrt: 125 Jahre Automobil an der Saar, 
eds. Hans-Christian Herrmann and Ruth Bauer, Veröffentlichungen des Stadtarchivs Saarbrücken, 
vol. 1 (Marpingen-Alsweiler: Edition Schaumberg, 2011), 184-221. I am very grateful to Thomas 
Fläschner and Burkhard Horn for sharing their work.
70 Trine Agervig Carstensen et al., “The Spatio-Temporal Development of Copenhagen’s Bicycle 
Infrastructure, 1912-2013,” Geografisk Tidsskrift-Danish Journal of Geography 115, no. 2 (2015): 
142-56; Martin Emanuel, “Making a Bicycle City: Infrastructure and Cycling in Copenhagen 
since 1880,” Urban History 46, no. 3 (2019): 493-517; Walther Knudsen and Thomas Krag, På cykel 
i 100 år – Dansk Cyklist Forbund 1905-2005 (Copenhagen: Dansk Cyklist Forbund, 2005); Marie 
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far between.71 Most scholarship explains why once thriving cycling cultures 
disappeared in the mid-1900s. The belief in the modernity of driving and the 
outdatedness of cycling typically explain why policymakers neglected cyclists. 
Yet the larger question is why cycling levels, while following international 
trends, remained so much higher in the Netherlands, even when automobility 
levels eventually became as high there as elsewhere (see f igure 1).
Explaining the historical development of cycling is a complex affair 
involving multiple causal factors. Rather than providing simplistic mono-
causal explanations, as the American bicycle historian Bruce Epperson 
has emphasized, “clear cause-and-effect-explanations have proven elusive” 
and there is more to explaining cycling levels historically than one might 
think.72 Simple explanations pointing to the (flat) morphology of the Dutch 
Kåstrup, “Hverdagens beskedne demokrati – Analyser af cyklen som symbol på danskhed” 
(Master thesis, University of Copenhagen, 2007).
71 On Ireland: Erika Hanna, “Seeing Like a Cyclist: Visibility and Mobility in Modern Dublin, 
c. 1930-1980,” Urban History 42, no. 2 (2015): 273-89. On Sweden: Rautio and Östlund, “‘Starvation 
Strings’ and the Public Good.” For Finland: Tiina Männistö-Funk, “The Crossroads of Technology 
and Tradition: Vernacular Bicycles in Rural Finland, 1880-1910,” Technology and Culture 52, no. 4 
(2011): 733-56.
72 Epperson, Bicycles in American Highway Planning, 59. Also arguing that geographical 
conditions only partly explain cycling levels, Trine Agervig Carstensen and Anne-Katrin Ebert, 
Figure 1 Cycling trends as part of the modal split in fourteen European cities/areas from 1920 to 2015, in 
percentages. By Frank Veraart in Cycling Cities: The european experience, 13.
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landscape and the shorter distances traveled are not suff icient either: even 
between Dutch cities, cycling levels vary considerably. In their review of the 
historiography of Dutch cycling, historians Harry Oosterhuis and Manuel 
Stoffers note the cycling scholarship’s suggestions that policy choices made 
decades earlier often explain differences in present cycling levels. Addition-
ally, the interaction between policy and cultural perceptions of cycling are 
key explanatory factors.73
The f irst and most rigorous explanation of why cycling levels diverged so 
much internationally after very similar rates in the early 1900s, comes from 
the single most important source on which my project builds: Adri Albert de la 
Bruhèze and Frank Veraart’s pioneering work on cycling history, Fietsverkeer 
in praktijk en beleid in de twintigste eeuw (“Cycling Traff ic in Practice and 
Policy in the Twentieth Century,” published in 1999). They study the historical 
evolution of cycling levels and practices in nine European cities over a century, 
to explain the high Dutch level of cycling: Amsterdam, Eindhoven, Enschede, 
and the South-East-Limburg agglomeration within the Netherlands, as well 
as Antwerp, Manchester, Copenhagen, Hannover, and Basel. Through the 
painstaking collection of statistical data and other qualitative methods, the 
authors reveal very high cycling levels until roughly the 1950s, when they 
dropped sharply. In some countries cycling almost disappeared, while in 
others such as the Netherlands, cycling levels were still respectable even 
at their lowest point, around 1970: some 20-25 percent in most Dutch cities. 
Since the 1970s, cycling levels have stabilized or even risen again.
According to Albert de la Bruhèze and Veraart, there are four major causal 
factors: (1) spatial structure: suburbanization and increased commuting 
shape people’s mobility options. Increasing distances to work limit the 
potential for cycling if public transit is lacking and cars are the only alterna-
tive. In countries with good public transit, these long distances can still be 
negotiated using bike-train combinations, though this requires investment 
in bicycle parking facilities at stations; (2) availability of mobility alternatives 
such as public transit and the car: wage growth influences car ownership 
and use, as does car tax and the status of car ownership; (3) cycling’s place in 
traff ic policy: to what extent authorities are interested in cycling at all, and 
if so, whether and how they promote it; and (4) cultural perceptions of the 
bicycle: important in that cycling and driving have different connotations: 
if cycling is perceived as low-status or old-fashioned, this will limit the 
“Cycling Cultures in Northern Europe: From ‘Golden Age’ to ‘Renaissance’,” in Cycling and 
Sustainability, ed. John Parkin (Bingley: Emerald, 2012), 23-58.
73 Oosterhuis and Stoffers, “‘Ons populairste vervoersmiddel’,” 400.
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amount of people willing to cycle, as well as authorities’ support. This is what 
happened historically in many Western countries and is now happening 
across the globe in growing economies where the car is a sign of status and 
progress.74 A recently added f ifth actor is the role of social movements in 
demanding more space for cyclists and their (Dutch) success in working 
with the government to achieve this. As widespread as social unrest over 
car-centric cities was in the 1970s, relevant research is still in its infancy. 
Harald Engler notes in a recent article on German protest movements 
“resistance towards the car-friendly city … is still under-researched.”75
The addition of social movements as a factor came from a major new 
impetus in cycling history research when a wider group of researchers led 
by Ruth Oldenziel took up Albert de la Bruhèze and Veraart’s work and 
worked with them to create a new, updated, and expanded publication 
in English: Cycling Cities: The European Experience (2016). Along with the 
extended explanatory framework, new cities were added: Utrecht, Enschede, 
Malmö, Stockholm, Budapest, and Lyon.76 Since then, more cities have 
shown an interest in their own cycling history and commissioned further 
books. To date these include Rotterdam, The Hague, Arnhem/Nijmegen, 
and Maastricht, as well as a growing number beyond the Netherlands, 
such as Munich and Johannesburg.77 Together, these researchers have done 
invaluable work exploring neglected forms of everyday mobility through 
74 Ruth Oldenziel, “Mode of the Past or Promise for the Future? Cycling in China and the 
Sustainability Challenge, 1955-Present,” Zeithistorische Forschungen/Studies in Contemporary 
History 14, no. 3 (2017): 465-86. In a colonial context, cycling had a subversive potential as 
low-technology transport mode that escaped regulations. See Arnold and DeWald, “Cycles of 
Empowerment?”
75 Harald Engler, “Social Movement and the Failure of Car-friendly City Projects: East and 
West Berlin (1970s and 1980s),” Journal of Transport History 41, no. 3 (2020): 353-380, here 354. 
For German resistance to car-centric cities: Astrid Mignon Kirchhof, “For a Decent Quality of 
Life”: Environmental Groups in East and West Berlin,” Journal of Urban History 41, no. 4 (2015): 
625-46; Annika Levels, “(Re-)claiming Urban Streets: The Conflicting (Auto)mobilities of Cycling 
and Driving in Berlin and New York,” The Journal of Transport History 41, no. 3 (2020): 381-401.
76 Oldenziel et al., Cycling Cities: The European Experience.
77 Eric Berkers and Ruth Oldenziel, Cycling Cities: The Arnhem and Nijmegen Experience 
(Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of Technology, 2017); Eric Berkers, Frans Botma, and 
Ruth Oldenziel, Cycling Cities: The Hague Experience (Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of 
Technology, 2018); Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze and Ruth Oldenziel, Cycling Cities: The Munich 
Experience (Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of Technology, 2018); Erik Berkers, Frank 
Schipper, Patrick Bek and Ruth Oldenziel, Cycling Cities: The Rotterdam Experience (Eindhoven: 
Foundation for the History of Technology, 2019); Njogu Morgan, Cycling Cities: The Johannes-
burg Experience (Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of Technology, 2019); Eric Berkers, 
“Fietsgebruik en -beleid in Maastricht en Parkstad in historisch perspectief,” (Eindhoven: TU 
Eindhoven/Stichting Historie der Techniek, 2017).
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comparative analysis across cities worldwide. The focus is on cities – and 
as this is a relatively new f ield of research, many questions remain.
Taking a national approach, my research asks, to what extent has Dutch 
cycling governance since 1920 contributed to the success of the Netherlands 
as a cycling country? Building on the governance and politics of cycling 
scholarship, which takes the city as its point of departure, I also investigate 
how policymakers at provincial and national levels have influenced cycling 
policies in the Netherlands. Historian Anne-Katrin Ebert also identif ied this 
gap in her review of Cycling Cities, stating that “the historical intertwining of 
urban and national policies is not investigated in any systematic way in this 
volume.”78 I respond to Ebert’s call by investigating the intertwining of this 
multi-level dynamic of governance. I also take into account the important 
role of non-state actors in shaping policy. Like Cycling Cities, but unlike 
many other studies of cycling history, I study a timescale from the early 
1900s to the present. My goal is to elucidate the dynamics between different 
governance levels and thus enrich the picture these authors sketched of 
cycling governance at the city level. My work on the intricacies of Dutch 
cycling governance examines two of the Cycling Cities project’s explanatory 
factors: cycling’s place in traff ic policy and the role of social movements. The 
concept cycling governance captures both. Given the important historical 
role of social movements in Dutch cycling history, I consider these factors 
together rather than in isolation. When relevant for my analysis, I discuss 
other explanatory factors in the Cycling Cities comparative model. Engineers, 
policymakers, and politicians’ cultural perception of cycling partly explains 
their political choices.79 Traff ic policies also include other transport modes 
linked to cycling policies. Finally, spatial planning is closely related to traffic 
planning and will feature in certain case studies.80 There is still much work 
to do, and this book can only cover part of that ground.81
78 Anne-Katrin Ebert, “Review of: Ruth Oldenziel, Martin Emanuel, Adri Albert de la Bruhèze, 
Frank Veraart eds., Cycling Cities: The European Experience,” The Journal of Transport History 
39, no. 1 (2018): 128-30.
79 A good example is Martin Emanuel’s “Constructing the Cyclist: Ideology and Representations 
in Urban Traff ic Planning in Stockholm, 1930-70,” The Journal of Transport History 33, no. 1 (2012): 
67-91.
80 On the integration of spatial and transport planning: Gijs Mom, “The Emancipation of the 
Urban View: Dutch Spatial Planning in an International Context (1920-1950),” in Builders and 
Planners: A History of Land-Use and Infrastructure Planning in the Netherlands, eds. Jos Arts, et 
al. (Delft: Uitgeverij Eburon, 2016), 73-137; Gijs Mom, “The West and the Rest: The Green Heart 
and the Breakthrough of Spatial Planning (1950-1982),” in Builders and Planners, 143-99.
81 See forthcoming books by Patrick Bek and Jan Ploeger, who both provide crucial new 
perspectives on commuter patterns and the spatial aspects of mobility.
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Other Dutch cycling works deserve a mention in this introduction. 
Particularly important are Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel’s articles on 
Dutch bicycle tax and cycling path construction.82 They apply the contextual-
ized approach also used here, by looking at cycling policy in the context of 
mobility policy and the governance of other modes of transport, through 
comparisons with car policies. Crucial in the bicycle tax debate was the 
alleged status of the bicycle as a luxury good, or the very definition of what 
constituted a public good, as in the American debate on bicycle taxes around 
1900 that James Longhurst has rescued from oblivion.83 For Longhurst, these 
debates raging continuously, from the introduction of the bicycle in the late 
1860s up to the present, revolved around seeing the street and road space as 
an “exhaustible resource” and should be considered “attempts to support or 
delegitimize competing interest-group claims to an exhaustible resource.”84 
In the Dutch case, Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel emphasize the class 
dimensions of this struggle. Upper-class drivers literally marginalized the 
working-class cyclist.85 Cyclists – of all classes and types – were forced to 
pay a bicycle tax that was used to build roads (for a small elite) on which 
these cyclists were no longer welcome.
This analysis is closely linked to the Foucauldian analysis of cycling by 
sociologist Jennifer Bonham and Peter Cox, who consider cycling paths 
a way to marginalize cyclists. These paths force cyclists to squeeze into 
a mobility system that is planned from the driver’s perspective and only 
grudgingly gives in to other road users’ demands.86 Albert de la Bruhèze 
and Oldenziel emphasize how traff ic separation favored car users in the 
interwar period when cyclists were dominant and cars in the minority, but 
nevertheless, “policymakers, traff ic engineers, and urban planners were all 
82 Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze and Ruth Oldenziel, “Who Pays, Who Benef its? Bicycle Taxes 
as Policy Tool, 1890-2012,” in Cycling and Recycling: Histories of Sustainable Practices eds. Ruth 
Oldenziel and Helmuth Trischler (New York/London: Berghahn, 2015), 73-100. Ruth Oldenziel 
and Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze, “Contested Spaces: Bicycle Lanes in Urban Europe, 1900-1995,” 
Transfers 1, no. 2 (2011): 29-49. On the Dutch bicycle tax between 1926 and 1941, see F.H.M. 
Grapperhaus, Over de loden last van het koperen fietsplaatje. De Nederlandse rijwielbelasting 
1924-1941 (Franeker: Uitgeverij Van Wijnen, 2006); Anja Lelieveld, “Het plaatje met of zonder 
gaatje,” De oude fiets 1992, no. 2 (1992): 1-8; Otto Beaujon, “De Franse f ietsbelasting,” De oude 
fiets 1997, no. 3 (1997): 4-6.
83 James Longhurst, “The Sidepath Not Taken: Bicycles, Taxes, and the Rhetoric of the Public 
Good in the 1890s,” Journal of Policy History 25, no. 4 (2013): 557-86; Longhurst, Bike Battles.
84 Longhurst, Bike Battles, 20.
85 Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel, “Who Pays, Who Benef its?,” 74-75.
86 Jennifer Bonham and Peter Cox, “The Disruptive Traveller? A Foucauldian Analysis of 
Cycleways,” Road and Transport Research 19, no. 2 (2010): 42-54.
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convinced, even though bicycle use was booming in most cities, that cars 
would inevitably be the dominant mode of transport in the future.”87 The 
analysis of marginalized non-motorized road users is also studied historically 
from the pedestrian perspective.88
To explain cycling’s unique position in the Netherlands, historian Ebert, 
who compared Dutch and German cycling history in her important study 
Radelnde Nationen, points to the role of the tourist organization ANWB 
(Algemene Nederlandsche Wielrijders-Bond – “Dutch Cyclists’ Association”), 
an association that started as a cyclists’ club in 1883, before becoming an 
interest group for both car drivers and cyclists around 1920, then evolv-
ing into a defender of drivers in the present day. She argues that because 
the ANWB was the only cycling organization in the Netherlands, it could 
convincingly claim to represent all cyclists. This gave it the political clout 
that the divided German organizations never achieved. During the formative 
period of Dutch roadbuilding, in the 1920s and 1930s, the organization 
strongly advocated traff ic separation as being in the interest of both drivers 
and cyclists. According to Ebert, the existence of the bicycle tax was a key 
bargaining chip in these debates, and the powerful ANWB used it to claim 
investments in cycling paths.89 This important argument will be discussed 
in Chapter 2.
Cycling’s cultural status is also important in Cycling Cities, yet strikingly, 
while cycling is seen as typically Dutch, cultural-historical studies of this 
phenomenon are still lacking. The only major contribution is an article 
by sociologist Giselinde Kuipers, who coined the phrase “inconspicuous 
87 Oldenziel and Albert de la Bruhèze, “Contested Spaces,” 37.
88 For an introduction to the topic, Colin Pooley et al., “Introduction: historical perspectives 
on pedestrians and the city,” Urban History, 1-7. For case studies: Martin Emanuel, “Controlling 
Walking in Stockholm during the Inter-War Period,” Urban History 48, no. 2 (2021): 248-65; Peter 
Norton, “Persistent Pedestrianism: Urban Walking in Motor Age America, 1920s-1960s,” Urban 
History 48, no. 2 (2021): 266-89; Peter Norton, “Street Rivals: Jaywalking and the Invention of 
the Motor Age Street,” Technology and Culture 48, no. 2 (2007): 331-59; Joe Moran, “Crossing 
the Road in Britain, 1931-1976,” The Historical Journal 49, no. 2 (2006): 477-96; Muhammad M. 
Ishaque and Robert B. Noland, “Making Roads Safe for Pedestrians or Keeping Them Out of the 
Way?,” The Journal of Transport History 27, no. 1 (2006): 115-37. See also Martin Emanuel, Frank 
Schipper, and Ruth Oldenziel, eds., A U-Turn to the Future: Sustainable Urban Mobility since 1850 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2020).
89 Anne-Katrin Ebert, “When Cycling Gets Political: Building Cycling Paths in Germany and 
the Netherlands, 1910-40,” Journal of Transport History 33, no. 1 (2012): 123-26; Frank Veraart, 
“Fietspaden. Van gerieflijke paden tot f ietsbeleid,” Verkeerskunde 60, no. 5 (2009): 23-24. On the 
ANWB’s involvement in cycling path construction, see Hans Buiter, “Als een spin in het web: 
de ANWB en de Nederlandse rijwielpadenverenigingen,” Tijdschrift voor historische geografie 
1, no. 2 (2016): 76-86.
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consumption” to explain why the Dutch did not immediately adopt higher-
status cars when these became affordable.90 By continuing to cycle, Dutch 
citizens, so goes the argument, displayed qualities like being down to earth 
and modest, which are valued more than conspicuous displays of wealth. 
This is also why the Dutch royal family and leading politicians like to have 
their photo taken on bicycles. I will not go into detail here, but it will become 
clear how deeply ingrained cycling was and is in Dutch mobility practices 
and cultural representations. Cycling’s relationship with national identity 
surely deserves further research. Similarly, whether people have mobility 
alternatives affects cycling levels – like the late diffusion of car ownership 
in the Netherlands, coupled with limited public transit. These factors will 
only feature tangentially in my research.
My research contributes to cycling historiography by furthering our 
understanding of the long-term development of cycling governance, that 
is, the way state actors and non-state actors like user advocacy groups 
and social movements shaped cycling infrastructure and traff ic policies 
in the Netherlands. Uniquely, I adopt a multi-level rather than an urban 
perspective. Albert de la Bruhèze and Veraart have already acknowledged 
the role of traff ic policy. Their project was – by design – limited to urban 
governance. This implies that urban cycling, a successful local form of 
transport, is also governed locally. Particularly in a small, densely networked 
country like the Netherlands, the question is whether regional or even 
national governance has also shaped cycling. Investigating these national 
and provincial policymakers and engineers presents a new multi-level 
perspective on Dutch cycling governance. National government’s control 
of transport budgets is only one example of why it matters to study higher 
government levels. In addition, Cycling Cities’ 2016 edition added the major 
claim that social movements were crucial in putting urban cycling on the 
agenda. There is hardly any scholarship on the origins and methods of these 
movements, nor their relations with the Dutch government. Scholars focus 
on other forms of Dutch activism but mobility- and cycling-related activism 
have not been given their due.
Unlike most studies (except Cycling Cities), the present work broadens 
the chronological scope to long-term developments. While many studies 
only focus on the late nineteenth century or cycling’s revival since the 1970s, 
90 Giselinde Kuipers, “De f iets van Hare Majesteit: Over nationale habitus en sociologische 
vergelijking,” Sociologie 6, no. 3 (2010): 3-26; Giselinde Kuipers, “The Rise and Decline of National 
Habitus: Dutch Cycling Culture and the Shaping of National Similarity,” European Journal of 
Social Theory 16, no. 1 (2013): 17-35.
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this study looks at the crucial decades in between to explain the persistence 
and resilience of a large and vibrant cycling culture – the breeding ground 
for the cycling activism that in turn set off cycling’s urban revival in the 
Netherlands.
My argument is f irst that cycling in the Netherlands has received a larger 
space in traffic policy than in other countries, partly because interest groups 
and social movements played a greater governance role than elsewhere. 
This might be attributed to the Dutch polder model, a compromise and 
consensus-seeking political tradition. Second, I argue that national and 
provincial politicians and engineers have also been crucial at various 
times. The new archival material I explore corroborates and ref ines claims 
about the influence of social movements. Analyzing the political dynamics 
between governmental agencies and non-governmental organizations, as 
well as the role of social movements of cycling, is crucial to understanding 
the historical success of Dutch cycling as a daily practice. Where Albert de 
la Bruhèze and Veraart primarily studied how urban utilitarian cycling was 
governed, this study substantially broadens the perspective to show how 
different types of cycling (urban, suburban, interurban, and rural, as well 
as utilitarian and recreational) were shaped at different levels at different 
times. This also allows us to see how much of the cycling governance up to 
the 1970s ignored urban cycling. To do all this, we need to scour the archives 
for new sources.
Locating Cycling Governance: Sources and Methods
Reconstructing the dual process of cycling advocacy and governance requires 
archival and published sources. For cycling advocacy, the main arguments 
are typically expressed in journals, newspapers, and if successful, end up 
in Parliament and other representative bodies. These published sources, 
as well as the records of Parliament form one important source. Second, 
the ensuing governance process, the implementation of cycling policies, 
involves negotiation between different state actors as well as between 
state and non-state actors. Correspondence between these groups as well 
as records of meetings allow us to observe this process up close. Cycling 
Pathways relies on extensive archival research, often in archives not earlier 
consulted, or not specif ically focused on cycling policies.91
91 Citations from Dutch archival and policy documents have been translated into English by 
the author.
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To trace the sources methodologically, the f irst step was to identify 
potentially relevant archives, given the scant previous research on provincial 
and national cycling politics. Using archive inventories, I located many docu-
ments in multiple Dutch archives, as shown in the full list in the bibliography. 
Given the focus on a variety of actors and their interaction, the main sources 
are institutional archives of national, provincial, and local public works 
departments, as well as those of non-governmental organizations like the 
ANWB and Cyclists’ Union. In line with Dutch political traditions, these 
NGOs closely cooperated with governmental actors in state committees 
and through correspondence. The records of these meetings and letters 
between key actors provide valuable insight into their policy beliefs about 
cycling and cycling governance.
A main source of information was the Dutch National Archives (NA). This 
is where the records of Dutch ministries including Public Works are kept. 
Particularly useful were records of the Committee of Consultation on Roads. 
Given the consultation culture in the Netherlands, these committees with 
many different stakeholders, provide great insight into the considerations 
behind mobility and cycling policy. Provincial and municipal archives are also 
of the utmost importance. Given the tendency to assign cycling governance 
to lower levels of government, these archives contain a lot of material on 
the actual construction of cycling infrastructure. Provincial archives are a 
particularly rich source of information as provinces developed plans and often 
served as intermediaries between municipal and national government, trying 
to smoothen procedures and reduce friction. Municipal archives are the best 
place to find evidence of the street-by-street transformation of cities over the 
twentieth century – f irst into roads for cars, then after the 1970s into spaces 
where cyclists, pedestrians, and other non-motorized user groups regained 
some space. The archives of activist groups and social movements are in dif-
ferent locations. Those of the Cyclists’ Union are at the International Institute 
of Social History (IISH), although regional archives have the information on 
local branches and Dooievaar (see Chapter 6). Other action groups or NGOs 
have their records at the IISH or the National Archives. The ANWB has its 
own extensive in-house archive, which I have also consulted.
Other sources are parliamentary documents and records.92 Cycling 
featured regularly in Dutch parliament debates at various times. One such 
92 Parliamentary documents are indicated with their off icial dossier numbers, parliamentary 
records as Handelingen [I or II for upper house/lower house, followed by parliamentary year, 
meeting number, date, page]. These records are digitized and accessible at https://zoek.of-
f icielebekendmakingen.nl/uitgebreidzoeken/historisch.
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occasion was in the 1920s for creating road policies linked to the bicycle tax. 
The rising popularity of mopeds in the 1950s was another example. Since 
the 1970s, many politicians – and the social groups pushing them – have 
put pressure on the state to invest more in local cycling policies. Besides 
plenary meetings, MPs meet in smaller committees dedicated to specif ic 
topics with the minister and high off icials. The Permanent Committee for 
Public Works (Vaste Commissie voor Verkeer en Waterstaat) is a great source 
for more in-depth discussions of political trade-offs in mobility policy than 
the plenary meetings and I use them extensively, particularly in Chapter 7.
Besides unpublished archive material, journals and newspapers are a 
key source of information. The ANWB’s trade journals, leading in the f ield, 
contain many articles by top Dutch engineers. I have studied all the volumes 
of the ANWB’s roadbuilding journal Wegen (“Roads,” 1925-present) and its 
traff ic engineering journal Verkeerskunde (“Traff ic Engineering,” published 
under different names since the early 1950s). While car infrastructure clearly 
dominates these journals, many pages are dedicated to cycling. In addition, 
I consulted the numerous Cyclists’ Union journals, published nationally 
and by local branches. I have found many details otherwise lost in the 
archives through articles digitized in the unsurpassed national newspaper 
database Delpher. It contains some 120 million pages, including 15 million 
in newspapers from 1618 to 2005 (representing 15 percent of published 
newspapers), as well as hundreds of different magazines.
Semi-structured background interviews also played a signif icant role.93 
These were conducted between 2018 and 2020 with (former) activists, 
consultants, and engineers to gain new insights and triangulate archival 
f indings.
I used the source material methodologically in a process akin to coding. 
While studying archival documents, I made extensive notes of documents 
and passages relevant to my research purposes, especially governance 
processes. My qualitative analysis did not involve software, but the material 
was marked according to categories, such as material pertaining to national, 
provincial, or local policymakers, non-governmental actors, or design norms, 
f inances, and so on. The outcome of this analysis is a narrative that attempts 
to reconstruct the governance process behind Dutch cycling infrastructure. 
The thematic development “follows the actors,” as in Actor-Network Theory. 
This means critically and ref lexively constructing, but not replicating 
93 Organized with Matthew Bruno and Letícia Lindenberg Lemos. See forthcoming article: 
“Mobility Protests in the Netherlands of the 1970s: Activism, Innovation, and Transitions,” 
Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions.
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their interests and biases. The focus is therefore mainly on national and 
provincial politics. This approach is at odds with the dominant development 
in historical research, which increasingly values transnational narratives 
over national histories. In mobility history, the transnational circulation 
of roadbuilding expertise and lobbying are for instance well documented 
and crucial to understanding national road networks. The focus on cycling 
in international networks such as the road engineering association PIARC 
is much more limited. This research explores and tries to understand the 
unique Dutch cycling trajectory. While some transnational dimensions exist, 
comparative approaches, still adopting the nation as point of departure, 
can further clarify the Dutch case. However, as cycling history at the urban 
level is now reasonably well understood, the next step is to ask to what 
extent regional and national governance also impacted this local mode of 
transport, before extending even further to transnational developments. As 
this step has proven to be more than enough for one project, it is therefore 
practical to keep to the national level for the time being.
The book discusses the period between 1880 and 2020 in three sections. 
Part I covers 1880 to 1950, when the bicycle transformed from an elite recrea-
tional to a cheap mass utilitarian vehicle. Part II covers the crucial decades 
between 1950 and 1970, when cycling all but disappeared in many countries 
but remained quite f irmly entrenched in the Netherlands. Part III covers 
the revival of urban cycling since the 1970s. Throughout, whenever possible, 
I make comparisons with cycling policies outside the Netherlands. The 
conclusions summarize the empirical f indings in terms of the governance 
theories introduced here.
Chapter 1, “Citizen Power: From Bourgeois Clubs to Governance Ground-
breakers” – like Chapter 6 – puts social actors at the forefront. The crucial 
role of non-governmental tourist organization ANWB in framing cycling as 
an all-Dutch activity and its subsequent lobbying for cycling infrastructure 
heralded the arrival of Dutch cycling culture. I use new material from the 
ANWB archives to corroborate – and nuance – the scholarship’s main 
conclusions far more extensively than elsewhere. As a system-builder, the 
ANWB established close ties to government agencies, coordinated private 
attempts at recreational cycling path construction, and lobbied to use the 
proceeds of the bicycle tax for constructing non-urban cycling infrastructure. 
This last aspect provided the reason for the national government to become 
more involved in cycling governance, as discussed in Chapter 2, “A Contested 
Compromise: National Government Supports Commuter Cycling.” The 
central principle of Dutch road engineering was traff ic separation (between 
cars and bicycles) on major routes outside cities. This conviction existed to an 
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extent already around 1920, reinforced by the bicycle tax. Though the effect 
was unintentional, this tax boosted cycling infrastructure. Urban cycling 
was in mixed spaces, largely beyond the control of non-local policymakers. 
Two particular aspects of cycling governance here are new. First, using 
parliamentary records, I examined whether politicians considered cycling 
as contributing to ordinary Dutch citizens’ mobility and quality of life. 
Second, using engineering committee records, I was able to determine how 
the political debate about cycling’s status and the bicycle tax was translated 
into engineering norms and practices for cycling infrastructure.
After World War II, as Part II argues, two crucial decades followed in 
which the Dutch trajectory diverged from international trends. While the 
1950s and 1960s saw the demise of cycling in other countries due to uncom-
promising pro-car policies, the Netherlands kept some space for bicycles. 
The chapters question how governance practices in the Netherlands enabled 
cycling infrastructure and cycling (engineering) knowledge to endure 
alongside growing car use. Chapters 4 and 5 primarily deal with utilitarian 
cycling outside the city, while Chapter 3, “A Right to Recreation: Provincial 
Policymakers Design Cycling Networks,” focuses on recreational cycling 
infrastructure. Connected to the story about providing non-governmental 
recreational cycling infrastructure in the f irst chapter (“Citizen Power”), 
it discusses the growing provincial involvement in recreational cycling, 
another episode in Dutch cycling governance which has received little 
attention so far. At a time when policy attention centered on cars, it was an 
important area where cycling governance persisted. Chapter 4, “Popular or 
Outdated? National Policymakers’ Ambivalence about Bicycles,” then asks 
how the cycling policies initiated in the 1920s and implemented throughout 
the 1930s lived on in the 1950s and 1960s, seen in the scholarship as the period 
of car-centered planning. Path dependency is a key topic in this chapter. In 
Chapter 5, “An Accident of History: How Mopeds Boosted Dutch Cycling 
Infrastructure,” a new vehicle enters the fray, the moped – fundamentally 
challenging the notion of traffic separation through separate infrastructures 
as well as the distinction between recreational and utilitarian cycling paths. 
Popular across Europe, its controversial classif ication as a type of bicycle 
meant it had to use existing Dutch cycling infrastructure. What were the 
consequences of this decision for Dutch cycling (infrastructure)?
Part III shifts to urban cycling governance. Since national and provincial 
policymakers and non-governmental actors rarely interfered in urban 
cycling before the 1970s, the earlier chapters in this book have less to say 
about urban cycling. With increasing pressure on this type of cycling due 
to rising automobility threatening historic city centers, and the growth of 
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new (urban) social movements, a new coalition emerged whose goal was to 
promote urban cycling again. The multi-level governance of this process, 
which activists played a signif icant role in shaping, is central to part III.
Chapter 6, “Citizen Expertise: Urban Activism Shapes Local Cycling 
Policy in the 1970s,” discusses the origins of these social movements and 
their action strategies. How did these groups function in dialogue with a 
relatively accessible civil service at city level? And how successful were 
user-developed and lay expertise methods in transforming city streets that 
had become exclusively car spaces? While Chapter 6 shows how citizens 
forced these developments on the government, Chapter 7, “Catching Up: The 
State Acknowledges Urban Cycling as Public Good, 1975-1990,” investigates 
in more detail how cycling policies responded and came about within a 
complex governmental bureaucracy. Consisting of multiple ministries as 
well as powerful local actors, the decentralized Dutch system created both 
opportunities and friction for politicians and engineers. Finally, Chapter 8, 
“Self-Evident: Mainstreaming Cycling Policy and Practice since 1990,” brings 
this long-term story to the present by summarizing the past thirty years of 
cycling governance. Providing a bird’s eye perspective on recent develop-
ments, placed in the context of a long time span of cycling governance, it 
completes our journey through more than a century of Dutch cycling policies 
and practices and connects the past to the present.

Part I
Roots : How Commuter and Recreational Cycling 
Became a Dutch Public Good, 1880s-1940s
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Cycling was a highly popular activity throughout the industrializing world 
in the f irst half of the twentieth century, until its international trajectories 
diverged. Many cities, as historians Adri Albert de la Bruhèze and Frank 
Veraart show, set their sights on automobility and shunned cycling, thereby 
marginalizing urban cyclists in traff ic policy.1 These cyclists often formed a 
majority, yet had to give up their space to a minority of car drivers. This also 
occurred in the Netherlands, but a political compromise gave Dutch cyclists 
back some space in the form of separated cycling paths. Primarily serving 
suburban commuter cycling, cycling paths were strongly and enduringly 
embedded in policymaking. Although studies on road policies and the 
tourist organization ANWB illustrate Dutch engineers’ and politicians’ 
particular attention to non-urban cycling, both commuter and recreational, 
which resulted in a resilient cycling culture that survived the rise of the 
car after the 1950s, this commitment to providing infrastructure for some 
groups of cyclists is not yet fully understood; nor do we understand why it 
was stronger in the Netherlands than in other countries. Can alternative 
policies explain Dutch cycling’s resilience and prominent role in mobility 
throughout the twentieth century?
Between the two world wars, a policy coalition of lobby groups and 
national engineers embedded cycling in Dutch politics and road stand-
ardization more forcefully than elsewhere. Non-governmental organiza-
tions played a signif icant role: for decades, citizen initiative was the sole 
driving force behind cycling governance. These citizen initiatives became 
intertwined with national and local government and remained relevant 
when state involvement in road policies grew after 1920. The f irst chapter 
shows how Dutch cycling clubs – like those elsewhere in the industrial 
world – were the f irst to initiate cycling policies. Supported by additional 
archival research, it brings together the existing scholarship on mobility and 
political science from a cycling advocacy perspective. An account of Dutch 
cycling policies would be incomplete and misleading without discussing 
their non-governmental origins. Uniquely, Dutch clubs retained a strong 
position, allowing them to f ind the middle ground between automobility 
and cycling practices in government policy.
1 Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze and Frank Veraart, Fietsverkeer in praktijk en beleid in de twintigste 
eeuw: overeenkomsten en verschillen in fietsgebruik in Amsterdam, Eindhoven, Enschede, Zuidoost-
Limburg, Antwerpen, Manchester, Kopenhagen, Hannover en Basel (Den Haag: Ministerie van 
Verkeer en Waterstaat, Directoraat-Generaal Rijkswaterstaat, Hoofdkantoor van de Waterstaat, 
Directie Kennis / Stichting Historie der Techniek, 1999).
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To explain how Public Works engineers and lobbyists reached this com-
promise, typical of the Dutch political “polder model” culture, Chapter 2 
discusses the Dutch national government’s involvement in cycling policy 
in the 1920s and 1930s. International research shows how many thousands 
of (working-class) cyclists in many countries battled with a small but 
exceedingly powerful group of upper-class car drivers with commercial 
interests, who were lobbying for car-centric traff ic policies. The class-
driven car coalition often marginalized cycling and made life harder for 
(working-class) cyclists. This political struggle had a different outcome 
in the Netherlands, not least because the Dutch (upper) middle class also 
kept on cycling. National politicians, engineers, and lobby groups reached 
a political compromise over bicycle taxation, initially to offset the national 
deficit, then diverted to build highways and cycling paths alongside national 
and provincial roads. Most road funding came from cyclists’ taxes. The 
cycling paths they got in return were a peace offering, a contingent develop-
ment with long-lasting effects. The system of traff ic separation still shapes 
Dutch infrastructure today. For much of the twentieth century, however, 
this cycling infrastructure typically ended at the city limits as provincial 
and national engineers had no authority within the urban built-up area. 
This traff ic separation model created path dependencies shaping cycling 
infrastructure outside cities, and eventually, after the 1970s, within Dutch 
cities as well. From an international perspective, Dutch cycling politics 
found a compromise in the f ight for road space and funding. Lobby groups 
played an important role in Dutch consensus-driven political culture and 
influenced this outcome.2 The proportion of Dutch cyclists remained high 
because cars had their own road space, not obstructing or endangering 
cyclists.3 This continuous commitment to an engineering model of traff ic 
separation – and with it the building of separate cycling lanes – is one reason 
why cycling survived alongside car growth. By investigating the long-term 
consequences of this model and distinguishing the urban from the rural 
and suburban, I demonstrate the specif ic implementation of this traff ic 
model in time and place by different stakeholders.
The political contest over cycling infrastructure took place in a context 
of dramatic changes in mobility. Internationally, f irst bicycles in the 1890s, 
2 For intermediary groups’ role in diffusion of technologies: Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze 
and Ruth Oldenziel, “Theorizing the Mediation Junction for Technology and Consumption,” in 
Manufacturing Technology, Manufacturing Consumers: The Making of Dutch Consumer Society, 
eds. Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze and Ruth Oldenziel (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2009), 9-39.
3 Ibid., 17.
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then cars in the 1950s, became increasingly affordable. And we should not 
overlook the role of public transit to explain why citizens did or did not opt 
for individual mobility modes like cycling. In Belgium, a well-developed 
network of local railways formed a powerful competitor for the bicycle, 
much more so than for their Dutch neighbors. Belgian workers had a 
mobility alternative to commute.4 By contrast, in the Netherlands, the 
underdeveloped and expensive public transit along with the slow adoption 
of the car, the ANWB’s cultural promotion of the bicycle, and the political 
status of (non-urban) cycling, explain why for many people the premier 
mobility option was the bicycle.
Cycling advocates may have touted the wide diffusion and use of bicycles 
already around 1900, but bicycles only gradually became a truly mass phe-
nomenon. In 1899, only 2 percent of the Dutch population owned a bicycle,5 
before cycling spread socially in the next decade.6 The ANWB, originally 
a cycling advocacy group, calculated that there was 1 bicycle for every 53 
Dutch citizens in 1899, jumping to 13 in 1908, and 2 by 1940. The cheapest 
bicycles still cost a monthly median income in 1910, but cheap imports, 
competition, and increasing homegrown production made bicycles ever 
more affordable.7
Dutch bicycle ownership followed international trends at f irst. By con-
trast, the nation’s car ownership – even when engineers and politicians 
claimed a spectacular future increase in car use and lobbied for a quick and 
comprehensive redesign of the road network – lagged behind other European 
countries. In 1930, only 9 in 1,000 citizens in the Netherlands had a car, fewer 
than in Switzerland and Belgium. In the 1930s, when German car ownership 
rose quickly from 8 to 30 cars per 1,000 residents, the increase in Dutch car 
ownership was modest, from 9 to 11 cars – even when compared to the rise 
4 Greet de Block, David de Kool, and Bruno de Meulder, “Paradise Regained? Crossing Borders 
Between Planning Concepts in the Netherlands and Belgium (1830-2012),” in Builders and 
Planners: A History of Land-Use and Infrastructure Planning in the Netherlands, eds. Jos Arts et 
al. (Delft: Uitgeverij Eburon, 2016), 17-67.
5 Sue-Yen Tjong Tjin Tai, Frank Veraart, and Mila Davids, “How the Netherlands Became a 
Bicycle Nation: Users, Firms and Intermediaries, 1860-1940,” Business History 57, no. 2 (2015): 
265.
6 ANWB archive, inv. no. 1660. Dutch bicycle tax statistics (1899-1908) show 2-, 1-, and half-
guilder tariffs, exemptions based on house rental values, and a greater number of lower categories, 
demonstrating that cycling was spreading to different classes. The lowest tax category increased 
by 775 percent, versus 387 percent for the middle and 165 percent for the full rate.
7 Tjong Tjin Tai, Veraart, and Davids, “How the Netherlands Became a Bicycle Nation,” 268. 
In 1935, bicycles cost on average 30 guilders, half the price they were in 1922: J.B.D. Derksen and 
A. Rombouts, “The Demand for Bicycles in the Netherlands,” Econometrica 5, no. 3 (1937): 299.
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in another small country like Belgium (from 12 to 19).8 Driving was obvi-
ously still a highly exclusive elite prerogative – despite the disproportional 
attention devoted to cars by engineers and the media. Cyclists were less 
fortunate. Still, in the f irst half of the twentieth century, Dutch national 
and provincial policymakers came to recognize cyclists’ rights – largely for 
opportunistic reasons. The provision of cycling infrastructure, advocated 
for by the ANWB and justif ied by the bicycle tax, became solidly embedded 
in Dutch engineering norms, laying the groundwork for a path dependent 
process. In this f irst part, I set out to show how cycling put down roots 
between 1880 and 1950.
8 Ruud Filarski in cooperation with Gijs Mom, Shaping Transport Policy: Two Centuries of 
Struggle between the Public and Private Sector: A Comparative Perspective (The Hague: SDU 
Uitgevers, 2011), 91. They suggest one reason was the relatively high car tax.
1 Citizen Power: from Bourgeois Clubs 
to Governance Groundbreakers
“Cycle tracks will abound in Utopia, sometimes following beside the great 
high roads, but oftener taking their own more agreeable line amidst woods 
and crops and pastures.” With this quote from H.G. Wells’ 1905 novel A 
Modern Utopia, Dutch civil servant Jan Dirk Christiaan van Dokkum charac-
terized a dream that he thought had become reality in the Dutch Gooi region 
around 1920.1 Located southeast of Amsterdam and north of Utrecht, it was 
a wealthy region with an attractive landscape of waterways, sand dunes, 
heath, and woodlands. Many shared his sentiment: when Dutch historian 
Pieter Geyl lived in London in the 1920s, he had only taken to walking; back 
in the Netherlands, he talked about his love for cycling around Utrecht, 
where he became a professor in the 1930s. Initially, the historian had not 
planned to buy a bicycle, however, his colleague Willem Kernkamp said: 
“Not buying a bicycle? That is one of the greatest pleasures one can have 
here!” After he and his wife duly bought bicycles which they “used almost 
only for rides outside the city,” Geyl had to admit “it is almost impossible 
to say how invigorating [verkwikkend] this has been for me.”2 He enjoyed 
touring alongside the canals and lakes.
Enjoying the Dutch landscape by bicycle was possible thanks to the many 
cycling paths – free of cars, pedestrians, horses, and other obstacles – allow-
ing cyclists to appreciate formerly inaccessible nature. Such infrastructure 
was not the work of the government, however. In 1920, the state did not 
yet consider constructing cycling infrastructure of any type a public task. 
Bourgeois citizen organizations were the ones constructing recreational 
cycling infrastructure. Well-connected politically, yet with only minimal 
help from local authorities, these clubs built extensive networks of cycling 
paths for their leisure. Intended for bourgeois recreation, however, the paths 
unintentionally also provided shorter connections for commuter cyclists – a 
fact the leisure clubs came to eagerly exploit in the following decades when 
making their case for public funding.
1 J.D.C. van Dokkum and D.J. van der Ven, Ons mooie Nederland: Het Gooi (Amsterdam: J.M. 
Meulenhoff, 1921), 84-97.
2 Pieter Geyl, Ik die zo weinig in mijn verleden leef: Autobiografie 1887-1940, edited and annotated 
by Wim Berkelaar, Leen Dorsman, and Pieter van Hees (Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 2009), 
291.
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Historians Frank Veraart and Anne-Katrin Ebert have asked how the 
ANWB managed to put cycling on the political agenda. Based on the organi-
zation’s records and archival material from the government’s perspective, 
I expand on the ANWB’s well-researched role building and supporting the 
automobile system for its cycling advocacy. My archival exploration confirms 
the ANWB’s political role on governmental committees, its gatekeeping 
role in producing knowledge about cycling governance. Untapped archival 
material sheds light on the network-building role of ANWB-affiliated cycling 
path organizations. These constituted an important and successful citizen 
governance model, which (provincial) government agencies only incorpo-
rated in the mid-twentieth century. Since the 1880s, citizen organizations 
had clearly been key actors, shaping Dutch cycling policy for some forty years 
before the government formulated its policy in the 1920s. Thereafter, in line 
with the Dutch polder model tradition, the organizations retained a major 
role in cycling governance by working closely with government engineers.
1.1 Dutch Cycling Clubs’ Unique Position in an International 
Context
When young bourgeois men all over the industrializing world popularized 
cycling as a recreational activity in the 1870s and 1880s, they organized 
(urban) cycling clubs. As the scholarship shows, apart from providing 
sociability, the clubs soon transformed into lobby organizations, addressing 
poor or muddy road surfaces, and created cycling paths, maps, routes, and 
road signs.3 After a few decades, however, new car organizations sidelined 
cycling clubs, culturally and politically: the cycling club founders switched 
to the new big thing, the car, and left cycling behind as outdated. The car 
replaced the bicycle as the symbol of modernity. Countries whose cycling 
clubs were split along class lines had a weaker power base to compete 
with the new and powerful car lobby.4 Scholars have shown this trend for 
German, as well as American, British, Italian, and South African clubs.5 The 
3 Frank Veraart, “Geschiedenis van de f iets in Nederland 1870-1940: Van sportmiddel naar 
massavervoermiddel” (Master Thesis, TU Eindhoven, 1995); M.F.A. Linders-Rooijendijk, “Gebaande 
wegen voor mobiliteit en vrijetijdsbesteding: I. De ANWB als vrijwillige associatie 1883-1937” 
(PhD diss., Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, 1989).
4 For a synthetic analysis of the international scholarship: Oldenziel and Hård, Consumers, 
Tinkerers, Rebels: The People Who Shaped Europe, 1.
5 Carlos Héctor Caracciolo, “Bicicleta, circulación vial y espacio público en la Italia Fascista,” 
Historia Critica 39 (2009): 20-42; Peter Cox, “‘A Denial of our Boasted Civilization’: Cyclists’ View 
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Netherlands took a different path. True, its cycling policies started with a 
cycling club (the ANWB), shaping cycling infrastructure for forty years. Like 
elsewhere, the Dutch government’s Public Works (Rijkswaterstaat, or RWS) 
only took a limited interest in roadbuilding before the 1920s.6 Unlike other 
countries, however, the Dutch organization remained a powerful advocate 
for cycling throughout the f irst half of the twentieth century, as we will see.
Following the early international trend, at f irst the many local Dutch 
cycling clubs merged into a national tourist organization ANWB in 1883. 
The name stands for General Dutch Cyclists’ Union (Algemene Nederland-
sche Wielrijders Bond). The organization’s rapidly broadening scope soon 
made this name obsolete, and it was changed to Koninklijke Nederlandse 
Toeristenbond ANWB (“Royal Dutch Tourist Union ANWB”).7 Like many 
similar clubs, its members were young bourgeois and urban cyclists keen 
to promote recreational cycling in the countryside. Initially, their interests 
also included cycle races. In 1898, the Dutch club decided to scrap racing 
and focus on all forms of tourism, by bicycle, car, boat, or on foot. In their 
recent history of the organization, historians Hans Buiter and Peter Staal 
characterize it in the years 1883 to 1900 as a “boys’ club”; 1900 to 1919 was 
when the club broadened into a tourist organization, and 1919 to 1949 was 
the period when it lobbied to shape new infrastructure (for bicycles and 
cars).8 Over these different periods the ANWB developed from a single-issue 
bicycle club before 1900 to an organization advocating multiple forms of 
tourism (walking, cycling, driving) in the 1910s and 1920s. Meanwhile, the 
ANWB built up engineering expertise and increasingly became interested 
in a (utilitarian) roads network as well. After 1920, the organization therefore 
was an all-purpose lobbying organization which tried to balance recreational 
and utilitarian mobility needs.
on Conflicts over Road Use in Britain, 1926-1935,” Transfers 2, no. 3 (2012): 4-30; Anne-Katrin 
Ebert, Radelnde Nationen: Die Geschichte des Fahrrads in Deutschland und den Niederlanden 
bis 1940 (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2010); Lorenz Finison, Boston’s Cycling Craze, 1880-1900: A 
Story of Race, Sport, and Society (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2014); Evan Friss, 
The Cycling City: Bicycles and Urban America in the 1890s (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2015); Longhurst, “The Sidepath Not Taken: Bicycles, Taxes, and the Rhetoric of the Public Good 
in the 1890s,” 557-86; Longhurst, Bike Battles; Njogu Morgan, Cycling Cities: The Johannesburg 
Experience (Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of Technology, 2019).
6 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 91.
7 They kept the name ANWB because of brand recognition. The original but short-lived name 
Het Nederlandsche Vélocipèdisten-Bond changed in 1885 to the more Dutch-sounding Algemene 
Nederlandsche Wielrijders-Bond. Linders-Rooijendijk, “Gebaande wegen I” 31, 110.
8 Hans Buiter and Peter Staal, Het avontuur van de ANWB: 135 jaar onderweg (Bussum: Uitgeverij 
THOTH, 2018), 5.
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A key question is how the ANWB conducted its political lobbying, since 
it played such a crucial governance role through its cycling advocacy. 
Like many European tourist and cycling clubs, the Dutch organization 
took up the improvement of road quality and traff ic legislation earlier 
than state engineers.9 The expertise gained in the process gave the 
organization the power to function as governance partner. The ANWB 
eventually became so important that people sometimes considered it a 
f ifteenth ministry (alongside the off icial fourteen Dutch ministries).10 
Multiple commemorative volumes ref lect the organization’s sense of 
self-importance and it has generated more studies than most other aspects 
of Dutch cycling history.11
Historians approach the ANWB from three perspectives. M.F.A. Linders-
Rooijendijk has written the organizational history of the ANWB.12 She traces 
it evolving from being dedicated exclusively to cycling in the nineteenth 
century, to a highly professionalized organization claiming to protect the 
interests of all forms of tourism.13 Ebert’s cultural-historical perspective 
highlights the values the ANWB aimed to promote through mobility and 
tourism, studying its (discursive) attempts at nation-building.14 The ANWB 
hoped to integrate the Dutch nation culturally and physically into one 
liberal-bourgeois network. In a socially divided society (the “pillars” of Prot-
estants, Catholics, and socialists), the liberal ANWB emphatically avoided 
an explicit ideological prof ile. In line with Ebert, innovation historians 
9 Emanuel, “Making a Bicycle City,” 499; Catherine Bertho-Lavenir, “How the Motor Car 
Conquered the Road,” in Cultures of Control, ed. Miriam R. Levin (Amsterdam: Harwood 
Academic Publishers, 2000), 117, 130-32. On French associations similar to the ANWB, Sébastien 
Gardon, “Gouverner la circulation urbaine: Des villes françaises face à l’automobile (années 
1910 – années 1960)” (PhD diss., Université Lumière – Lyon II, 2009). https://tel.archives-ouvertes.
fr/tel-01540257.
10 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 83, 394. Before 1940, there were less ministries, 
but when this nickname was introduced it had grown to 14.
11 Veertig jaar. A.N.W.B., Toeristenbond voor Nederland, 1883-1923, (S.l.: S.n., 1923); Een halve 
eeuw A.N.W.B. 1883-1933. Gedenkboek, uitgegeven ter gelegenheid van het 50-jarig jubileum van 
den A.N.W.B. – Toeristenbond voor Nederland, en aan dezen Bond en zijn bestuurders aangeboden 
door J. Jonker Roelants, Mr. H.A.M. Roelants en H.L. Jonker Roelants (Schiedam: Roelants, 1934); 
D. Schaap, Een eeuw wijzer 1883-1983. 100 jaar Koninklijke Nederlandse Toeristenbond ANWB (Den 
Haag: ANWB, 1983); Buiter and Staal, Het avontuur van de ANWB.
12 M.F.A. Linders-Rooijendijk, Gebaande wegen: I, and II. De ANWB van vereniging naar instituut, 
1937-1983 (Den Haag: ANWB, 1992).
13 Linders-Rooijendijk, “Gebaande wegen I,” 9.
14 Anne-Katrin Ebert, “Cycling Towards the Nation: The Use of the Bicycle in Germany and 
the Netherlands, 1880-1940,” European Review of History: Revue europeenne d’histoire 11, no. 3 
(2004): 347-64. 
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Gijs Mom, Johan Schot, and Pieter-Eloy Staal, consider its mission as a 
(paternalistic) “civilizing role”: the ANWB promoted an etiquette for new 
cyclists and drivers, to educate them as responsible road users.15 In the 
tradition of innovation studies, this third perspective considers the ANWB’s 
system-building role for the Netherlands’ (utilitarian) roads and cycling 
networks. Expanding on Linders-Rooijendijk and Ebert’s focus on tour-
ism and recreational cycling activities, these historians characterize the 
ANWB as “the main system builder … of the Dutch automobile system” and 
highlight its mediating role in creating the demand for cars by promoting 
their usefulness as transport vehicles.16 Mom et al. describe the ANWB 
leaders as intermediary actors, also for cycling, “who not only position 
themselves as representatives of what they see as ‘the user,’… but who 
negotiate the alignment between the products and their use.”17 Adri Albert 
de la Bruhèze and Ruth Oldenziel theorize this crucial position as the 
“mediation junction” in shaping innovations.18 By organizing conferences, 
publishing trade journals, and joining governmental committees, the 
tourist and lobby organization ANWB was at the heart of Dutch mobility 
governance. It had a strong hand in shaping not just policy but also educating 
(local) traff ic experts. The scholarship explains this success in terms of 
culture and politics.
Culturally, many cycling clubs in other countries framed cycling more 
exclusively than the Dutch ANWB. In other countries, their single-issue 
advocacy made it harder to claim state support for cycling as a public good. 
Cycling clubs in the United States and Canada, for example, had a limited 
upper-class membership. According to geographer Glen Norcliffe, the Montreal 
Bicycle Club (founded in 1878) created an image that always implied an 
inside and outside group.19 Similarly, Charles Pratt, patent lawyer for major 
bicycle producer Pope, who founded the Boston Cycling Club (1878) and 
the League of American Wheelmen (LAW, 1880), reserved membership for 
15 Ebert, Radelnde Nationen; Gijs Mom, Johan Schot, and Peter-Eloy Staal, “Civilizing Motorized 
Adventure: Automotive Technology, User Culture, and the Dutch Touring Club as Mediator,” in 
Manufacturing Technology, Manufacturing Consumers: The Making of Dutch Consumer Society, 
eds. Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze and Ruth Oldenziel (Amsterdam: Aksant, 2009), 139-58.
16 Mom, Schot, and Staal, “Civilizing Motorized Adventure,” 150-51.
17 Ibid., 139.
18 Ruth Oldenziel, Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze, and Onno de Wit, “Europe’s Mediation Junction: 
Technology and Consumer Society in the 20th Century,” History and Technology 21, no. 1 (2005): 
107-39; Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel, “Theorizing the Mediation Junction for Technology 
and Consumption,” 9-39.
19 Glen Norcliffe, “Associations, Modernity and the Insider-Citizens of a Victorian Highwheel 
Bicycle Club,” Journal of Historical Sociology 19, no. 2 (2006): 121-50.
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white, upper-class men.20 Historian Lorenz Finison details how clubs like 
the LAW excluded people of color.21 This is not to say that excluded groups 
did not ride bicycles. On the contrary. Non-affiliated cyclists, however, were 
not represented politically, rendering them invisible to policymakers – as 
the archives prove. In Germany, like in the Netherlands, the cycling club 
founders were British, as part of the transnational network of early European 
cycling culture.22 Ebert describes the variety of cycling clubs in Germany, 
with membership differentiated by region and class. Once working-class 
citizens could afford bicycles, they established their own club, Solidarität, 
when other social classes considered cycling vulgar.23 Oldenziel and Mikael 
Hård show that the rapid decline of cycling’s status as modern and desirable 
happened across the industrializing world.24 This had consequences for 
funding and state support.
Ebert’s comparison with Germany highlights how the ANWB developed a 
more inclusive and successful framing of (recreational) cycling as nationally 
valuable.25 Earlier, Veraart had pointed out that, partly to pre-empt rival 
organizations, the ANWB board’s strategy was to claim it represented 
all cyclists.26 In pillarized Dutch society, with Protestant, Catholic, and 
social democrat clubs, the ANWB knowingly presented itself as a broad and 
ideologically neutral organization. The reality was different: cycling became 
more affordable only gradually throughout the f irst half of the twentieth 
century – and not all cyclists were ANWB members. The political success 
of this claim, however, meant that in the Netherlands, only one cycling 
organization had a monopoly on representing cyclists until the 1970s. Ac-
cording to Ebert, the ANWB board members were typically liberal bourgeois 
men, who framed cycling as an activity for the entire country – regardless 
of class or gender. Cycling would unite the (middle-class) nation and create 
patriotic, disciplined, and healthy citizens.27 She argues that this cultural 
framing of cycling in the Netherlands was part nation-building and positively 
20 Ibid., 131-32. The many cycling clubs often catered to select groups. Friss, On Bicycles, 43.
21 Finison, Boston’s Cycling Craze.
22 Ebert, Radelnde Nationen, 150.
23 Anne-Katrin Ebert, “Cycling Towards the Nation: The Use of the Bicycle in Germany and 
the Netherlands, 1880-1940,” European Review of History: Revue europeenne d’histoire 11, no. 3 
(2004): 357-62.
24 Oldenziel and Hård, Consumers, Tinkerers, Rebels, 1, 124-59.
25 Ebert, Radelnde Nationen. For English summaries, Ebert, “Cycling towards the nation,” 
347-64, and “When Cycling Gets Political,” 115-37.
26 Plenty of local clubs emerged in cycling’s early days but none could rival the ANWB: Veraart, 
“Geschiedenis van de f iets in Nederland,” 30, 137-38.
27 Ebert, Radelnde Nationen, 363.
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affected policymaking; it created a willingness among experts to facilitate 
cycling. In elaborating Ebert’s point, sociologist Giselinde Kuipers argues the 
Netherlands had the right conditions for successful cultural embedding: a 
small, homogeneous, and highly integrated country, predominantly upper 
middle class yet with minor class differences. A national dislike for ostenta-
tion, moreover, had created a culture of “conspicuous non-consumption.”28 
The ANWB contributed to the bicycle’s representation as typically Dutch 
through its journals and other media expressions. The broad cultural framing 
of Dutch cycling mattered politically as a background condition for putting 
cycling on the political agenda as a public good. Class and regional tensions 
hindered the establishment of this status in other countries.
Politically, many international cycling clubs failed to gain long-lasting 
power and influence in decision making. When elites shifted their allegiance 
from the bicycle to the car, cycling clubs could not compete with motorist 
clubs. In the United States, the nineteenth-century bicycle craze disap-
peared rather suddenly. As soon as the bicycle spread beyond the exclusive 
circle, it no longer functioned as a status symbol and modern lifestyle. The 
car soon engaged everyone’s interest. American cycling had few power-
ful advocates and dwindled in the early 1900s.29 Similarly, British clubs’ 
strong class dimensions created power conflicts between elite drivers and 
middle- or working-class cyclists. As cycling sociologist Peter Cox shows, 
the British Cyclists’ Touring Club (CTC) was exclusively for cyclists, who 
had to f ight car drivers for road space. Having to contend with engineers’ 
single-minded privileging of cars, the CTC “was transforming from a polite, 
middle-class club to a campaigning organization.”30 Significantly, the British 
CTC strongly opposed separate cycling lanes, considering them an attack 
on the cyclists’ right to the road.31 In Italy, policymakers rarely embraced 
cycling infrastructure provision as a state task, despite lobbying by cycling 
clubs.32 This brought them into direct conflict with drivers, in contrast to 
the Dutch case, where interest groups and the government worked out a 
compromise through the traff ic separation model. In the short run, it was 
controversial. In the long run, it was effective.
In line with Buiter and Staal’s periodization, in the period after 1920, the 
tourist and lobby organization ANWB succeeded as mobility interest group 
28 Kuipers, “The Rise and Decline of National Habitus,” 24.
29 Friss, The Cycling City, 3-4, 186ff; Longhurst, Bike Battles, 83.
30 Cox, “A Denial of our Boasted Civilization,” 11.
31 Albert de la Bruhèze and Veraart, Fietsverkeer in praktijk en beleid, 133. Cox, “‘A Denial of 
our Boasted Civilization’,” 16-17.
32 Caracciolo, “Bicicleta, circulación vial y espacio público en la Italia Fascista,” 29-30.
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and government intermediary for multiple reasons. The organization built 
up an extensive body of knowledge on mobility and infrastructure issues 
in the Netherlands between 1880 and 1920. In return for this specialized 
expertise, the Dutch government granted the organization a major role in 
shaping mobility policy. The government’s inclusion of the ANWB was not ex-
ceptional for Dutch politics: its culture allowed interest groups, representing 
certain parts of society, a significant role in governance. Consensus-seeking, 
the so-called polder model, as political scientists have pointed out, was the 
nation’s key political value.
In marked contrast to other nations, moreover, the ANWB also became 
the main automobile club in the Netherlands. The US car lobby shaped the 
American highway code, while the cyclists’ League of American Wheelmen 
had no influence.33 Over time, the car boosters within the ANWB became 
more dominant, yet cycling advocacy – particularly for leisure purposes 
– remained a large and visible part of the organization. By claiming to 
represent both cyclists and drivers, the conflict between these groups 
did not play out in open power politics but in a more diffuse process of 
compromises, as I detail in Chapter 2.
Third, the young men who founded the ANWB in the 1880s became 
mature citizens, holding prominent positions in administration, law, and the 
economy.34 Like their Danish counterparts, the ANWB off icials’ elite status 
ensured a close relationship with state officials.35 Edo Bergsma, in particular, 
ANWB chairman for half a century between 1884 and 1937, formed a link 
between civil society and the government: active in many organizations 
and long-time mayor of the city Enschede (1896-1932), he strengthened 
the ANWB’s position in the policy network through his personal contacts 
and influence. Equally his successor as chairman, Henri Bloemers, held 
many public functions including mayor. He was also president of the Dutch 
Institute for Public Housing and Urban Development (NIVS) and nature 
conservation groups.36 Although the leading ANWB figures were not traff ic 
experts and had to establish their credentials in this f ield, they were well 
connected within the Dutch state at multiple levels. This interweaving of 
state and civil society was a key characteristic of Dutch cycling governance 
and facilitated access to policymaking circles. Consequently, the Dutch 
33 Longhurst, Bike Battles, 237.
34 Buiter and Staal, Het avontuur van de ANWB, 39.
35 Emanuel, “Making a Bicycle City,” 500-501.
36 P.R.A. van Iddekinge, “Bloemers, Henri Peter Johan (1880-1947),” in Biografisch Woordenboek 
van Nederland. http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/bwn1880-2000/lemmata/bwn3/bloemers 
[accessed August 18, 2017].
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cycling policy coalition’s non-governmental stakeholders stood close to 
government policymakers and engineers.
Through new research in state archives, I highlight two of the ANWB’s 
cycling governance roles: governing cycling with a coalition of non-gov-
ernmental actors and, in parallel, putting cycling on the political agenda, 
particularly after 1920. Section 1.2 shows how this coalition and aff iliated 
cycling path organizations built recreational cycling infrastructure in rural 
areas with little help from the government. As state engineers showed 
more interest in cars and roads in the 1920s, the ANWB also tried to carve 
out a role in this new governmental sphere. It became a key stakeholder 
by working closely with the government to shape cycling governance and 
defend cycling’s interests. The organization framed cycling broadly as a 
recreational but also very much utilitarian activity for everyone – a recurring 
strategy and distinction throughout the twentieth century. Although several 
historians have studied many elements of these roles, this chapter, “Citizen 
Power,” brings the activities into an integrated analytical framework, f illing 
in the blanks and drawing a more comprehensive picture of independent 
initiatives’ major role in Dutch cycling governance between 1880 and 1950.
1.2 Citizens Building Recreational Cycling Paths
Until the 1950s, non-governmental actors took responsibility for building a 
tourist cycling infrastructure in the Netherlands – the paths that led civil 
servant Jan van Dokkum to wax so lyrical about cycling infrastructure in 
1921. Governmental involvement was limited to occasional subsidies. The 
ANWB promoted domestic tourism by advocating a cycling network. As 
Ebert argues: “Bicycle path construction was neither an environmental 
nor a social project, but was brought about by the efforts of a social elite 
that used bicycle tourism to strengthen national identity and increase 
social restraint.”37 Before 1920, the Dutch state made no concerted effort 
to build cycling lanes. The only paths it built were in response to citizen 
petitioners – usually recreational cyclists demanding comfortable paths, or 
access where sand roads or the lack of roads prevented them from enjoying 
nature. Recreational cyclists also needed road signs, maps, guides, and 
designated places to stop for breaks that provided repair kits (see f igure 2). 
The ANWB initiated many of these system-building resources. By 1904, for 
instance, the tourist organization had placed 1,000 road signs throughout 
37 Ebert, “When Cycling Gets Political,” 120.
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the country.38 Through a system of local representatives, the organization 
was well aware of local conditions and worked with local elites, while also 
effectively lobbying at a national level, as section 1.3 shows.
Such private initiatives to create cycling resources were an international 
phenomenon. In Germany, cyclists f inanced most cycling infrastructures 
until at least the 1920s.39 Cycling clubs were also behind America’s Good 
Roads Movement in the 1880s. Evan Friss shows that similar to the ANWB, 
the League of American Wheelmen lobbied for establishing national road 
agencies and supported the government with expertise and funding.40 
Many local clubs also constructed cycling paths based on a user-fee mod-
el.41 According to historian James Longhurst, the Good Roads Movement 
was “urban, middle class, eff iciency minded, and nationally organized.”42 
This approach to road improvement was an indictment of the US govern-
ment’s failure to acknowledge cyclists’ demands. In the long run, however, 
American clubs failed to secure a solid policy basis for cycling within public 
institutions. The initiatives – patchwork and incidental – were vulnerable. 
Longhurst contends that “because cyclists could not successfully argue 
that the proposed side-paths were a public good that would benef it all 
society, they could not make a claim on public funding, and the f inancing 
was limited to charitable contributions and a user-fee model.”43 After 1900, 
the American framing of cycling, and subsequent policies, were limited to 
recreation.44 The Dutch government did not recognize recreational cycling 
infrastructure as a national public good either, arguing that the provinces 
were responsible (see 2.5). Before the 1950s, citizen organizations built two 
to three thousand kilometers of recreational cycling paths. These worked 
successfully until mid-century, when the provinces took over this task.
Like its international counterparts, the ANWB’s attempts to persuade 
the state to create cycling paths around 1900 initially had limited success. 
Especially where road surfaces were poor or bumpy, like the cobbled roads in 
the province Noord-Brabant, cycling tourists required paths. Occasionally the 
ANWB financed paths, but it did not have enough funds for larger networks. 
Instead, the organization lobbied local government to construct these paths, 
38 Veraart, “Geschiedenis van de f iets in Nederland,” 67.
39 Briese, Besondere Wege für Radfahrer, 2.
40 Friss, The Cycling City, 82-99.
41 Ibid., 103.
42 Longhurst, Bike Battles, 63.
43 Ibid., 55.
44 Evan Friss discusses New York’s recreational network initiated by famous planner Robert 
Moses in the 1930s. Friss, On Bicycles, 75-100.
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pointing to cycling’s increasing recreational and emerging utilitarian value. 
In the early 1900s, the bicycle’s use was growing among occupations like 
postmen and doctors.45 When welfare state policies increased leisure time, 
initially for middle-class and later for working-class citizens, many independ-
ent organizations initiated (cycling) tourism and recreation in nature.
45 In the 1890s, Dutch cities experimented with cycling telegraph messengers or postmen and 
military cyclists. Veraart, “Geschiedenis van de f iets in Nederland,” 68-69.
Figure 2 The Dutch tourist organization ANWB was an omnipresent stakeholder in tourism and 
mobility in the early phases of cycling and driving. State engineers valued working closely with this non-
governmental organization thanks to its unparalleled knowledge of local (cycling) conditions. This 1928 
map was for cycling tourists exploring the central Utrecht region of the Netherlands. On the red cycling 
paths, cyclists encountered the ANWB’s road signs. [Source: Collectie Het Utrechts Archief, cartographer 
A.W. Stork, catalogue no. 818513]
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To open up the Dutch countryside to recreational cyclists, the ANWB 
worked with local elites to create (non-governmental) cycling path organiza-
tions. Regional in scope, funded through membership fees, donations, and 
local governments subsidies, the local clubs sought to build cycling paths, 
often independently and separate from the existing roads in nature reserves. 
Most local organizations were created in the 1910s and 1920s: Het Wielerpad 
(Meppel 1906);46 Gooi en Eemland (1914); Het Drentsche Rijwielpad (1916); 
EMO (Eindhoven 1916); Twente (1917); Noord-Veluwe (1917); UMO (Utrecht 
1918); Noord-Kennemerland (1920); Walcheren (1926); West-Veluwe (1926).47 
They thrived but experienced growing diff iculties during the economically 
diff icult 1930s and were “provincialized” in the late 1940s and early 1950s.48
From a governance perspective, these were non-governmental organiza-
tions. Their leaders, however, had connections with (local) political elites, 
which helped members secure subsidies and permits for building local cycle 
paths. Historian Buiter describes how ANWB off icials worked closely with 
prominent local politicians and industrialists to form these cycling path 
organizations. A key figure in establishing such organizations was Alexander 
Emil Redelé, a former military engineer who directed the ANWB’s roads 
committee. He worked with local ANWB representatives who were familiar 
with the political and infrastructural landscape.49 For instance, Buiter 
explains that Redelé invited forty prominent local f igures to an inaugural 
meeting in Eindhoven. Local mayors and industrialists like Anton Philips, 
founder of the electronics factory, attended. Redelé also approached local 
dignitaries (schoolteachers, notaries, etc.) to join the organizations’ boards.50 
After establishing these organizations, the ANWB provided technical advice 
on construction. The cycling path organizations demonstrated an informal 
and personal network of local dignitaries, state off icials, and the ANWB, 
committed to recreational cycling.
To construct their cycling paths independently, the organizations all 
had a small board of volunteers, hired their own construction workers, 
and relied on subscription fees and subsidies. The provinces were most 
46 Ibid., 89-90.
47 The original organization was founded in 1911 in the town Barneveld.
48 The Gooi en Eemland organization was an exception: it continued and still exists formally: 
https://www.rijwielpadengooieneemland.nl/
49 A leading ANWB f igure in the UMO area advised Redelé to bring in J.C. Gerlings (ANWB 
representative in De Bilt) and baron Taets van Amerongen, who was passionate about cycling 
and had a large network in Utrecht. ANWB archive, inv. no. 1197, letter Pos (ANWB) to Redelé 
(ANWB), September 6, 1918.
50 Buiter, “Als een spin in het web,” 79.
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receptive to the clubs’ requests, while municipalities provided small sums, 
as did local Chambers of Commerce and tourist organizations. In practice, 
the ANWB advanced the money to speed up the process.51 Funding did not 
buy the government any influence on location or design: the cycling path 
organizations operated separately from the authorities and constructed 
their own network.52 At the time, such governance initiatives were not 
unique. Conservationist clubs like the Society for the Preservation of Natural 
Monuments privately purchased scenic heathlands for instance.53 The state 
and civil society shared the responsibility for these tasks.
Between 1900 and 1920, the citizens clubs focused on creating a leisure 
infrastructure. After World War I, they began to lobby public authorities. 
To convince policymakers that their cycling paths were worthy of public 
funding, organizations presented their paths as useful not just for weekend 
cycling trips in the countryside, but also for commuters, and persuaded 
local authorities to award larger subsidies. The argument that cycling paths 
served both recreational and utilitarian functions strengthened their case 
as a public good. Later in the twentieth century, cycling advocates still used 
this strategy. For instance, in 1923, the club UMO (Utrecht and surrounding 
areas, Utrecht Met Omstreken) targeted three groups: “city people,” who could 
now enjoy “the beauty and quiet of the surroundings,” “farmers” benefiting 
from “the short and good connections to the village, church, or market,” while 
the doctor, veterinarian or postman could now “easily reach their patients or 
destinations.”54 In his 1935 regional zoning design for Utrecht, well-known 
social geographer and urban planner Theodore Karel van Lohuizen stressed 
that the paths’ dual purpose enabled cyclists to enjoy nature undisturbed by 
motorized traffic, and “greatly matter for the mutual contact of the many small 
settlements, both purely practically as for the great freedom of movement they 
allow residents.”55 Van Lohuizen’s emphasis on cycling infrastructure serving 
recreational and commuter purposes was the same argument the organiza-
tions and ANWB used. As a major figure in the surveys for Amsterdam’s 1930s 
51 Ibid., 81.
52 As these paths did not follow existing roads but attractive natural areas, obtaining permis-
sion from landowners to construct paths over their ground was a time-consuming task. The 
well-connected board members made this process easier.
53 Frank Veraart, “Agriculture and Nutrition: The End of Hunger,” in Well-being, Sustainability 
and Social Development: The Netherlands 1850-2050, eds. Harry Lintsen, Frank Veraart, Jan-Pieter 
Smits and John Grin (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 265-66.
54 ANWB archive, inv. no. 1186, booklet “UMO 1 mei 1918-1 mei 1923,” 4.
55 Th. K. van Lohuizen, “Het schetsontwerp voor het streekplan ‘Utrecht-Oost’,” Tijdschrift 
voor Volkshuivesting en Stedebouw 16, no. 4 (1935): 69.
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Extension Plan and detailed traffic counts, Van Lohuizen realized how highly 
city-dwellers valued the bicycle for both work and recreation.56 While we do 
not know to what extent people used the paths, historian Buiter agrees with 
these contemporaries who saw that the widespread cycling paths provided 
new and shorter connections between towns and villages.57 The club EMO, 
active around Eindhoven, and the UMO southeast of Utrecht, worked in 
densely populated areas, where people probably used the paths not just on 
Sundays or after work. Twente cycling path organization, near the textile city 
Enschede, also had mixed-use paths, as Chapter 3 discusses.
Some organizations even considered constructing separate cycling paths 
alongside roads that the state authorities built. Given the government’s 
mandate in building roads for cars, this raised the question of who was 
responsible for the construction of the separate cycling infrastructure: citizens 
or the state? The UMO built its f irst cycling path in 1919 parallel to a national 
road going east from Utrecht.58 In the 1920s, planners started to consider this 
cycling infrastructure was the state’s responsibility. Increasingly the issue 
was the demarcation between public and private responsibility. ANWB 
official Redelé tried to convince provincial engineers to support the regional 
cycling path associations’ work. He lobbied engineer Linden van den Heuvell 
at the eastern province of Overijssel’s Public Works department for subsidies, 
arguing that farm and factory workers living far from their workplace needed 
cycling paths: a state agency like the province should provide these.59 Redelé 
convinced another province – Noord-Brabant – to change its statutes to allow 
funding for its main city Eindhoven’s cycling path organization.60 These 
initiatives f it into the ANWB’s strategy in the 1910s and 1920s of framing 
cycling broadly to involve the government in cycling governance (see 1.3). 
In the long-term, the national government adopted the ANWB tactic of not 
involving the national or local, but targeting provincial government.
The cycling path organizations made considerable headway from the 1910s 
to the 1930s. After a decade, the Gooi en Eemland club (north of Utrecht), 
founded in 1914, had 2,000 members and constructed 100 km of cycling 
paths.61 In 1928, ten years after it was founded, club UMO had the same 
56 Arnold van der Valk, Het levenswerk van Th. K. van Lohuizen 1890-1956: De eenheid van het 
stedebouwkundige werk (Delft: Delftse Universitaire Pers, 1990).
57 Buiter, “Als een spin in het web,” 81-85.
58 Ibid., 81.
59 ANWB archive, inv. no. 1219, letter Redelé (ANWB) to Linden van den Heuvell (PWS), 
December 12, 1918.
60 Buiter, “Als een spin in het web,” 81.
61 Ibid., 77.
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amount of paths around Utrecht and 3,000 members.62 By far the most 
successful was the eastern area Twente, where the textile barons dominated, 
with about 1,000 km of cycling paths constructed between 1917 and 1937.63 
From 1914 to 1940, local organizations together built 2,500 km of cycling paths 
like those in f igure 3, equivalent to what the Dutch government achieved 
in this period for cycling paths alongside roads.64
This private governance model had its limitations, however. The informal 
arrangements between the national ANWB, local government, and the 
cycling path organizations, could lead to friction at times. Some clubs, such as 
the Gooi en Eemland cycling path association, did not always get along well 
with the ANWB. Local clubs found the national organization bureaucratic 
and paternalistic in requiring detailed insight into their organization and 
f inances before considering subsidies.65 Government Public Works’ increas-
ing role in roadbuilding since the late 1920s also led to conflicts about the 
division of responsibilities – by creating paths for traff ic alongside roads, the 
cycling path organizations were potentially encroaching on Public Works 
terrain. The Gooi en Eemland club, for instance, tried to build a separate 
cycling path along a busy commuter road between Baarn and Hilversum in 
the center of the country. By the 1920s, the national government started to 
see the construction of cycling paths along major arteries as a public task 
which should not be left to non-governmental organizations.66 To present 
a united front, the organizations created an umbrella lobby in 1933, the 
Federation of Dutch Cycling Path Organizations (Federatie van Nederlandse 
Rijwielpadverenigingen, FNRV). Unlike the national tourist organization 
ANWB, the local clubs shared their expertise with each other. The federa-
tion, however, did not nurture a relationship with the government’s Public 
Works. The federation did not even invite national or provincial Public 
Works’ representatives to its annual meetings.67 It goes to show that the 
62 Ibid., 83.
63 Ibid., 85. There were also less successful organizations. If they had no subsidies, diff iculties 
obtaining permission to use land, or if path construction was expensive, the organizations led 
little more than a paper existence, as in Walcheren and Kennemerland. Walcheren did build a 
popular cycling path through the dunes.
64 Buiter and Staal, Het avontuur van de ANWB, 75.
65 ANWB archive, inv. no. 1108, letter ANWB to Gooi en Eemland, April 13, 1915, and multiple 
letters in inv. no. 1107.
66 ANWB archive, inv. no. 1111, Gooi en Eemland 1932 Annual Report, 3; also inv. no. 1117, letter 
De Bruyn (ANWB) to Gooi en Eemland, October 31, 1926, when the organization tried to extend 
a cycle lane along a national road, the ANWB advised against it since this was the government’s 
responsibility.
67 ANWB archive, inv. no. 1233, letter Louwerse (FNRV) to De Bruyn (ANWB), May 23, 1939.
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various actors involved in cycling path construction did not necessarily 
communicate with each other and that parallel governance coalitions 
existed. The national ANWB representatives’ extensive participation created 
a partial overlap. It did not unify cycling governance structures.
The economic crisis of the 1930s changed the dynamic. Social organiza-
tions found it harder to acquire local state subsidies: they could not upscale 
their activities when local communities had less funding than the national 
government. Nor was the ANWB willing to step in and fund cycle paths. 
At its general meeting in 1935, the board argued that – while supportive of 
promoting recreational cycling – it deemed f inancial support problematic 
because it feared municipalities would be unwilling to subsidize, assuming 
the ANWB would keep the cycling path organizations afloat.68 Instead, the 
board preferred a form of public-private partnership, with (local) government 
providing more generous subsidies.
The ANWB’s position forced cycling path organizations to seek closer 
collaboration with municipalities. Often in vain. Despite supporting 
letters from ANWB arguing the public would stand to benef it from 
68 “Notulen van de vergadering van het Algemeen Bestuur … op Zondag 22 december 1935,” 
De Kampioen 53, no. 6 (1936): 133.
Figure 3 This cycling path, likely constructed by UMO (Utrecht met Omstreken) cycling path organiza-
tion in the woodland near Bilthoven, just east of Utrecht, is an example of the citizens’ initiatives that 
constructed 2,500 km of cycling paths. The signpost in the centre is the iconic ANWB “mushroom.” 
[Source: Collectie Het Utrechts Archief, no. 8544]
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subsidizing privately initiated cycle paths, local authorities were reluc-
tant, fearing that without control over these private associations, granting 
public money would mean fully relegating control over the recreational 





































































































































Gooi and Eemland Cycle Path Association's Income, 1923-
1956
Membership fees Subsidies
Figure 4 Income (in guilders) was modest but stable throughout the 1920s to 1940s. Higher subsidies in 
the 1950s indicate growing governmental acknowledgement of recreational cycling infrastructure as a 





































































































































Gooi en Eemland Cycle Path Association's Expenses, 1923-
1956
Marketing, Salaries Maintenance New Construction
Figure 5 While subsidies rose, higher (labour) costs meant that the citizen organizations could not 
translate this higher income into a larger network. Source: ANWB archive, inv. nos. 1111 and 1112 (data 
for 1939, 1940, 1943 and 1950 missing).
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not carry out the work under their direct control? The idea of public 
responsibility gained more ground in the late 1930s and 1940s – and in 
the long run rendered cycling path organizations obsolete. In f igures 4 
and 5, we see the income and expenses of the Gooi en Eemland organiza-
tion from the 1920s to the 1950s. These f igures show how subsidies and 
membership fees stagnated during the economic crisis of the 1930s. All 
income went to maintenance instead of expanding the cycle network. 
After the war in the late 1940s, subsidies increased sharply, but as the 
data shows, costs also rose. By then, the citizen organizations reached 
their limits and their role in recreational cycling governance diminished. 
In other words, the cycling path organizations had their heyday between 
1920s and 1950s – as their 2,500 km of paths demonstrate. Had local 
government agreed to funding, they could have continued their work. 
Ultimately, the private regional organizations represent the path not 
chosen.
The local clubs did not disappear. Instead, the cycling path organizations 
were upscaled to a higher governance level in the provinces. Over time, 
the argument that the government, at some level, should be responsible 
for providing recreational cycling infrastructure gained traction among 
Dutch provincial and municipal policymakers – in large part because the 
nationally oriented ANWB succeeded in convincing provincial policy-
makers to cooperate with the cycling path organizations and create new 
cycling paths as a public good, serving tourism, recreation, and (rural) 
commuters. As a result, several non-governmental provincial organizations 
were subsumed later in the 1950s and 1960s into regional governmental 
recreational agencies (recreatieschappen). These built on the physical and 
personal networks created decades earlier by recognizing recreational 
cycling as a public good. The period represented the steppingstone for 
later, when provincial policymakers succeeded in ensuring that the civil 
society efforts continued.
1.3 Advocating Cycling as Part of Car-Centric Planning
In 1923, a sharp attack on the ANWB appeared in numerous newspapers. 
Signed simply “R.,” the letter’s author was Pierre van de Rivière, chairman 
of the Dutch tourist organization VVV’s branch in the rural, northernmost 
province Groningen and editor-in-chief of the Provinciale Groninger 
Courant. According to Van de Rivière, the government showed more 
interest in cars than in bicycles, possibly because the authorities “as a 
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general rule have become drivers, and no longer ride bicycles.”69 The 
ANWB had similarly turned its back on cyclists. Its support of cycling 
path construction was a ruse, “not favoring cyclists, but drivers who 
want an empty road for their high speeds.”70 New separated cycling paths 
were often narrow, forcing cyclists to ride single f ile to allow overtak-
ing, hardly conducive to the leisure rides Van de Rivière promoted as 
chairman of a tourist organization. This proved that both the ANWB 
and the government went to much greater lengths to create a pleasant 
experience for motorists than for cyclists. Van de Rivière criticized the 
hugely expensive attempt to increase drivers’ speed as politically mis-
guided. By backing this scheme, the ANWB revealed its true colors as a 
“degenerate cyclists’ union,” and so he called upon “the meek cyclist” to 
resist this mistreatment and use their majority to create a “real cyclists’ 
organization.”71 The critique shows the claim of the ANWB to represent 
(all) cyclists was contested.
In the 1920s – just as again decades later in the 1970s – the ANWB 
indignantly rejected such criticism. Still wanting to be considered a 
cycling organization, the ANWB was evidently alarmed at the potential 
reputational damage Van de Rivière’s letter could cause.72 Equally, it 
wanted to be seen as the preeminent car organization in the Netherlands. A 
1938 survey revealed that many tourists still regarded the ANWB primarily 
as a cyclists’ club. Its leadership deplored the impression, calling it “outra-
geous” that an organization with tens of thousands of driver members 
and that published a widely read car journal (Autokampioen), was still 
seen as purely for cycling.73 The ANWB was convinced it could promote 
cycling and driving equally. In the spirit of typically Dutch political 
compromise, an agreement was feasible, even if cyclists had to give up 
a little more than motorists, the organization seemed to suggest. The 
resulting principle of traff ic separation applied to major roads may have 
favored drivers (f inancially). In the long run, as I argue, it also created 
better conditions for cyclists and drivers’ co-existence to succeed than 
elsewhere. The next chapter explains how this compromise came about. 
Combining cycling and driving as a lobby organization in the 1920s and 




72 ANWB archive, inv. no. 1665.
73 “Misvattingen over het werk van den A.N.W.B.,” De Kampioen 55, no. 23 (1938): 413.
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1930s, while also trying to retain its function as a tourist organization, 
was a true balancing act.
Early on, the ANWB’s cycling advocacy defended the value of cycling 
for the whole country. Framing cycling infrastructure as a public good 
involved emphasizing the bicycle’s utilitarian potential – rather than just its 
predominantly recreational use. This distinction between recreational and 
utilitarian use is crucial to understanding every aspect of Dutch cycling. In 
practice, the distinction may not have been very sharp – after all, cycling 
infrastructure often served dual purposes. State engineers and decision-
makers, however, created separate governance structures and funding 
streams for both. And uniquely, the ANWB leadership managed to position 
the organization as the only stakeholder in both the private governance 
coalition for recreational cycling as well as the public policy coalition for 
commuter cycling infrastructure. The ANWB technocratically considered 
its own organization the only common factor in cycling policy free from 
the ephemeral state party politics, and therefore a more eff icient, reliable 
stakeholder.
The monopoly is quite remarkable. The ANWB carved out its key mediat-
ing role in Dutch mobility governance thanks to its board members’ elite 
status and its unrivalled knowledge of local road conditions. While civil 
society organizations can have a role in political decision-making, interest 
groups still need to prove themselves reliable and useful governance part-
ners. By successfully presenting itself as representing the interests of tourists 
(from pedestrians to car drivers) and an exceptional source of expertise, 
the ANWB succeeded in becoming a key presence in many government 
bodies and on relevant committees, like the Committee for Consultation 
on Roads (see 2.2). As state engineers came to regard roadbuilding (for the 
new car, and to a lesser extent the bicycle) as their task, they required new 
road engineering expertise for which they had not really been trained. The 
ANWB organized conferences, published trade journals, and disseminated 
new knowledge of roadbuilding and mobility.
Until the 1920s, the tourist organization developed more expertise in 
road engineering and (access to) user knowledge than Dutch state engi-
neers. This also allowed it to become a powerful lobby group after 1920. 
To obtain this specialist “road” knowledge, the organization appointed 
regional representatives, called consuls, who informed the central board of 
local developments and lobbied at a local level.74 Since 1898, this knowledge 
74 Linders-Rooijendijk, “Gebaande wegen I,” 138-44, 225-29; Buiter and Staal, Het avontuur van 
de ANWB, 20-22, 50. Germany did not have such a local network: Ebert, Radelnde Nationen, 166.
CITIzeN PoWer: from bourGeoIS CLubS To GoverNANCe GrouNdbreAkerS 77
came together in the Roads Committee that the organization formed with 
the rival Royal Automobile Club (KNAC).75 According to Mom and Filarski, 
Dutch Public Works historically focused on rail- and waterways instead of 
roads. The state agency found it diff icult to introduce new organizational 
forms and procedures to address the roads issue.76 The non-governmental 
ANWB stepped in as an indispensable partner for making infrastructure 
policy – a role it gladly claimed and fiercely defended.77 State engineers found 
it important to participate in its network.78 A close relationship emerged 
between the state and the non-governmental organization. In 1917, several 
national and local engineers joined the organization’s Roads Committee to 
benefit from its expertise.79 Key members of the ANWB studied engineering 
at the Military Academy in Breda, like Alexander Redelé and Hermanus 
Willem Otto de Bruyn, both former engineers in the Royal Netherlands East 
Indies Army. After World War II, the ANWB’s traff ic department employed 
University of Delft-trained civil engineers.80
The ANWB, rather than state off icials, became the go-to advisor for all 
questions relating to cycling and roadbuilding.81 This pattern also emerges 
from the ANWB archives: (state) organizations with a question or a com-
plaint about cycling contacted the ANWB because it most visibly represented 
cyclists. Whether it was for advice on the best bicycle parking system, help 
with lobbying, or paying for a local cycle path, citizens from all over the 
Netherlands turned to the ANWB.82 Most people would not know how to 
go about making a complaint or a request to the government about cycling. 
The ANWB often put petitioners in contact with the relevant authorities. 
75 Despite working with this car club, the ANWB saw it as a rival and tried to stop it becoming 
too powerful by also embracing car advocacy: Buiter and Staal, Het avontuur van de ANWB, 46.
76 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 177. On Public Works administration before the 
1920s, Eric Berkers, Technocraten en bureaucraten: Ontwikkeling van organisatie en personeel 
van de Rijkswaterstaat, 1848-1930 (Zaltbommel: Europese Bibliotheek, 2002); A. Bosch et al., Twee 
eeuwen Rijkswaterstaat: 1789-2015, 2nd revised and expanded edition (Asten: Nieuwe Uitgevers, 
2015).
77 This also happened with the French Automobile-Club du Rhône in Lyon. Gardon, “Gouverner 
la circulation urbaine: Des villes françaises face à l’automobile (années 1910 – années 1960),” 2.3.
78 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 93-94.
79 Linders-Rooijendijk, “Gebaande wegen I,” 142.
80 These included A. Boost (trained at Breda), L. Lorié, K. Tusenius, H. Puister, C. Kuysten, G. de 
Regt and J. Barkhof, see Chapter 4. The Technical University of Delft had university status since 
1905 but was not off icially named a university until 1986, operating as a Technische Hogeschool.
81 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 178; Marcus Popkema, “Tussen techniek en planning: 
de opkomst van het vak Verkeerskunde in Nederland, 1950-1975” (PhD diss., TU Eindhoven, 2014), 
74.
82 The ANWB archive has numerous requests for advice on bicycle parking systems.
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Over the course of the twentieth century, a complex governance network 
emerged around cycling, ranging from state agencies and industry to user 
groups. Yet the ANWB succeeded in acquiring a near monopoly over cycling 
governance before 1920. Its legitimacy as an expert foreshadows the user 
expertise that Dutch cycling activists would claim to possess in the 1970s.
In turn, the ANWB managed to place its members in key positions within 
new institutions and forums that channeled knowledge about traffic and road 
engineering. Through all its ventures, it had a strong impact not just on policy 
but also guiding (local) traff ic experts. From 1925, the non-governmental 
organization issued the leading roadbuilding journal Roads (Wegen) and 
organized annual roadbuilding conferences through its aff iliated organiza-
tion The Dutch Road Congress (Het Nederlandsche Wegencongres).83 A leading 
organizer and Roads editor-in-chief was engineer De Bruyn. During army 
leave, he had become involved in the ANWB, heading the Roads and Traff ic 
section. After retiring from active service in 1922, De Bruyn became a “spider 
in the web of the roadbuilding lobby.”84 He often served as the ANWB’s 
representative on governmental consultation committees (see 2.3).
To retain its power, the ANWB was forced to take up utilitarian transport 
and traff ic when these became important topics around 1920. An emerging 
car lobby made the case for urgent road improvements based on economic 
arguments.85 The ANWB initiated the f irst Dutch Road Congress in 1920 
in cooperation with the Royal Institute of Engineers (KIvI), not with the 
government Public Works Agency.86 This culminated in the 1925 “Grand 
Meeting” where some 200 stakeholders gathered to discuss road improve-
ment and funding.87 Thanks to the ANWB’s advocacy, the debate led to 
a compromise between motorists and cyclists, as we will see in the next 
chapter. The ANWB’s positioning involved a subtle shifting in political 
emphasis between the 1890s and 1920s.
Since the 1890s, the question of determining cycling’s status as a public 
good had centered on whether cycling should be considered simply a leisure 
83 Linders-Rooijendijk, “Gebaande wegen I,” 226.
84 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 178.
85 M.L. ten Horn-van Nispen, “Het Rijkswegenplan 1927. De aanpak van het verkeersvraagstuk 
in de jaren twintig,” Jaarboek voor de geschiedenis van bedrijf en techniek 9 (1992): 185. In 1915, 
Transport Minister Cornelis Lely had already proposed in vain to improve some roads: Dirk 
Ligtermoet, Beleid en planning in de wegenbouw: De relatie tussen beleidsvorming en planning 
in de geschiedenis van de aanleg en verbetering van rijkswegen Rijkswaterstaat-serie, vol. 51 (Den 
Haag: Rijkswaterstaat, 1990), 15-16.
86 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 174-80; Linders-Rooijendijk, “Gebaande wegen I,” 
226.
87 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 179-80.
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activity for the well-to-do or whether it should also be a utilitarian mobility 
for commuting and going to school. The ANWB framed cycling in both ways 
to claim its larger role in state policy: cycling was not just a luxury for the 
happy few, but useful for the entire nation – and the government should 
invest in promoting it. Back in 1895, when the province Noord-Brabant was 
considering a bicycle tax, the tourist organization wrote to the provincial 
authorities, opposing their argument that cycling was a luxury good or 
activity. The ANWB countered: “the bicycle is no longer a recreational 
activity for the well-to-do, but has surely become the man in the street’s 
and the manual laborer’s horse.”88 This claim was an exaggeration, but it 
suited the ANWB’s political strategy. The ANWB objected furthermore to 
the prohibitive provincial bicycle tax, arguing that cycling brought the rural 
population closer to urban centers. Finally, echoing modern arguments, 
the organization claimed that the bicycle was “of great importance for the 
health of persons who lead a busy but sedentary lifestyle.”89
These arguments had entered the national stage when the ANWB fought 
a proposed national bicycle tax in 1895. At the time, conservative liberal 
MP Jan Willem Hendrik Rutgers van Rozenburg (1830-1902) introduced the 
idea when parliament discussed a general tax reform.90 MPs debated which 
new consumer goods and services – for example, domestic servants, luxury 
furniture, and horses – should be included in the “personal tax” (personele 
belasting). According to Rutgers van Rozenburg, since horses were taxed 
as a luxury good, the bicycle as their successor (“the iron horse” as bicycles 
were called) should be as well.91 He claimed that “enthusiasts use at least 
90 percent of the bicycles in this country, only a few are used by a pharmacist, 
a baker, or a butcher.”92 This view was not shared by many at the time.
The Dutch did not invent bicycle taxation: across Europe, cycling was 
taxed as a luxury activity in the 1890s. By 1895, France already had a bicycle 
tax.93 Individual provinces in Belgium introduced a tax between 1893 and 
88 NA 2.04.57 (Ministry of Internal Affairs), inv. no. 2280, ANWB petition.
89 ANWB archive, inv. no. 1657, petition ANWB against bicycle tax Noord-Brabant.
90 Background political information from www.parlement.com, a site run by and based on 
research at the University of Leiden’s Centre for Parliamentary Documentation.
91 Handelingen II 1895/96, 17 (November 19, 1895), 266, where Rutgers van Rozenburg defended 
the comparison with the horse, pointing out that its utilitarian use on farms exceeded all 
utilitarian cycling’s share.
92 Handelingen II 1895/96, 16 (November 15, 1895), 248.
93 Part of France’s tax laws in 1893. The initial rate was 10 francs, reduced to 6 (1898), then 3 
(1907), raised again to 6 (1924), then 12 (1926), and 25 (1942), before it was abolished in 1958. As 
Dutch cyclists already had a metal disc as proof of payment, this idea was obviously not pioneered 
in the Netherlands (adopted in 1924).
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1895, centralizing this in 1900, but did not allocate the revenues to cycling 
paths or road improvement.94 Only around the capital Brussels was bicycle 
tax money reserved for cycling infrastructure. Similarly, some cities and 
provinces in the Netherlands considered a bicycle tax in the mid-1890s, 
but the national tax scheme prevented this.95 According to Albert de la 
Bruhèze and Oldenziel, around 1900, various countries either used the 
bicycle tax for building cycling lanes or justif ied it by promising them. 
Internationally, cycling was still considered an upper-class leisure activity 
and hence taxable as a luxury.96
Dutch national politicians contested the bicycle’s luxury status already in 
the 1895 debate. In contrast to his conservative liberal colleague Rutgers van 
Rozenburg, Finance minister Sprenger van Eyck opposed a luxury tax “since 
most bicycles are being used for people’s occupation or business.”97 Rutgers 
van Rozenburg, commenting on a draft of the bill in 1898, asserted that he 
had always meant to exempt utilitarian cycling from the tax and missed an 
“exemption for farm laborers and other workmen, for schoolchildren and for 
everybody who uses the vehicle in their livelihood; I also unfortunately miss 
the semi-exemption, at the time proposed by us, for so-called second-hand 
bicycles and bicycles for mixed use.”98 Commenting in 1924, social democratic 
MP Arie IJzerman found this a striking development: Rutgers van Rozenburg 
had argued for these exemptions even though he “could not be suspected 
of democratic leanings” and had “wholehearted contempt” for the working 
class.99 If a politician of this persuasion could regard utilitarian cycling as 
a national public good in the 1890s, there would be an even stronger reason 
for more left-leaning politicians.
In the 1920s, the ANWB would change its position. In the 1890s, it still 
objected to a bicycle tax. To do so, the organization – perhaps opportunisti-
cally – claimed cycling was as much a commuter activity as a recreational 
one. The bicycle was simultaneously a useful vehicle for workers and a 
94 Donald Weber, De blijde intrede van de automobiel in België 1895-1940 (Gent: Academia Press, 
2010), 23.
95 Cities such as Enschede (1895, 6 guilders) and Brielle (1895, 4 guilders) considered a bicycle 
tax. The province Noord-Brabant proposed a 5-guilder tax in 1896 but was asked to suspend this 
in anticipation of a national law. After lobbying, it could levy the tax, which meant a double tax 
burden for cyclists until the 1930s, (N.A. Lunsingh Tonckens, Bekostiging van wegen (Hengelo: 
H.L. Smit & Zn., 1929), 89-93.) Attempts by social democrat MP Drop to change this failed: 
Handelingen II 1929/30, 28 (December 3, 1929), 838.
96 Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel, “Who Pays, Who Benef its?,” 75-77.
97 Handelingen I 1895/96, 16 (November 15, 1895), 248.
98 Handelingen I 1897/98, 27 (July 12, 1898), 385.
99 Handelingen II 1923/24, 69 (May 13, 1924), 2007.
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recreational toy for the upper classes. In a petition, it argued that a bicycle 
tax should acknowledge the different types as well as the widely diverging 
costs of (second-hand) bicycles.100 As a young and new organization, the 
ANWB was still building up its credibility and legitimacy. Rutgers van 
Rozenburg dismissed the ANWB’s involvement by accusing its relatively 
young members of “youthful rashness” and “tilting at windmills” in their 
petition.101 The liberal MP especially resented what he considered the club’s 
disingenuous emotional appeal regarding the plight of poor farmers and 
their bicycles, questioning the frequent references to working-class cyclists 
and the “fairy tales that there are numerous workers who to ride to their 
work, buy a bicycle with 25 guilders taken out of the savings bank.”102 In 
other words, Rutgers van Rozenburg, staking his defense of a bicycle tax 
entirely on framing cycling as recreational, had to dismiss the claim that 
cycling was also, and increasingly, a utilitarian activity.
While exaggerated, there was something to the ANWB’s claim that the 
bicycle had a utilitarian use around 1900. The organization’s chairman 
Bergsma attached a list to its 1898 petition against the bicycle tax. He had 
begun his long public career as mayor of the Frisian village Het Bildt (1892-
1896) and listed all his villagers who needed a bicycle for their work. In a 
community “connected neither to the tramway nor to the railroad … a cyclist 
purely for pleasure can hardly be found.”103 Cyclists in Het Bildt included 
manufacturers, merchants, the doctor, veterinarian, teacher, reporter, sales 
representatives, blacksmiths, housepainters, carpenters, and farm workers. 
The petition argued that those residents had “not purchased their bicycle 
out of luxury.” Even if they also used their bicycle for recreation, this did not 
justify an “increase of the taxes, already oppressive” which would “weigh 
heavily” on the average cyclist.104 The argument may have been self-serving, 
but when the tax was introduced, the number of bicycles in the cheapest 
tax category (the working class) increased rapidly, showing that the bicycle 
had become affordable for many workers.
The ANWB’s 1898 petition stipulated that if the government introduced 
the tax, cyclists should be compensated with proper cycling infrastructure 
– to be paid in part from the bicycle tax revenues. The income should at least 
partly be used for “the improvement of roads or the construction of cycling 
100 Handelingen II 1895/96, 17 (November 19, 1895), 273.
101 Handelingen II 1895/96, 18 (November 20, 1895), 284.
102 Ibid.




paths.”105 This point is crucial: it is one of the f irst instances when bicycle 
taxation was linked to public cycling path construction. The argument 
would weigh heavily for justifying a new bicycle tax twenty-f ive years later. 
It demonstrates the ANWB’s willingness to compromise and its belief that 
cyclists’ interests were best served by working with the government. From 
the start, the ANWB was willing to consider a bicycle tax, if done in a fair 
and balanced way, using a progressive tax rate and/or a generous system of 
exemptions for working-class cyclists using the bicycle for work.
By the early 1920s, the ANWB came to support the bicycle tax. By then, the 
organization’s mission had fundamentally changed. It had been founded in 
the 1880s as a single-issue cycling club. By the 1920s the ANWB had evolved 
into a complex organization. It defended middle class recreational cycling 
and claimed to defend utilitarian cycling, while balancing the interests of 
cyclists against those of car drivers. As an all-purpose tourist and lobby 
organization trying to prevent rival traff ic organizations from becoming 
too powerful, the cycling club quickly converted to a car lobby group. The 
tourist organization competed with the car organization KNAC for members. 
Despite the ANWB claiming to represent all cyclists, when the number of 
cyclists grew, an ever-smaller percentage joined the ANWB.106 It nevertheless 
continued to present itself as the cyclists’ representative, avoiding specif ica-
tion of the term “cyclist” while in practice doing more for middle-class 
recreational cyclists than urban working-class cyclists, for instance. Over 
the course of the twentieth century, the ANWB was increasingly a lobby 
organization for motorists, yet continued its cycling advocacy. Reconciling 
cycling and driving, the demand for a large road network, and support for 
nature reserves was a delicate balancing act. Ultimately, various parts of this 
“heterogenous, multi-layered” organization pulled in different directions.107
ANWB chairman Bergsma, who served from 1884 to 1937, best represents 
the balancing act. A strong supporter of cycling from the start, he decades 
later considered the car as the bicycle’s natural successor. In 1936, he wrote 
that the car performed on a larger scale what the bicycle did on a local 
level – ending the countryside’s isolation and bringing more jobs and rec-
reational facilities within people’s reach. When the bicycle was introduced 
in the 1880s the ANWB promoted its usefulness and safety. In the 1930s, the 
105 Handelingen II 1897/98, 59 (June 9, 1989), 1007. The ANWB also demanded a better legal 
status for cyclists by creating uniform national traff ic rules, which did not yet exist.
106 Exact numbers are hard to give, as car drivers also became ANWB members, not least 
because of the roadside assistance service: Linders-Rooijendijk, “Gebaande wegen I,” 355.
107 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 173.
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organization did the same for the car. It argued the public had to accept the 
car as a useful transport mode of the future. At the same time, drivers had 
to learn how to drive responsibly and in a civilized manner.108 To this end, 
the ANWB published articles targeted at drivers, for example, explaining 
how overtaking cyclists at speed created a gust of wind that threatened 
their balance and safety.109
After the 1920s, alongside its continued support for cycling, the ANWB 
believed that a high level of car ownership was a sign of modernity. The 
organization considered the slightly declining number of cars on Dutch 
roads during the 1930s economic crisis “extraordinarily grave” and the 
high car tax “an attack against the car.”110 Compared to other European 
countries, the Dutch “cut a poor f igure as far as car density is concerned.”111 
According to historian Vincent van der Vinne, the f iscal pressure on drivers 
was indeed higher in the Netherlands than elsewhere in the 1930s.112 The 
Danish Bicycle Federation (Dansk Cyklist Forbund, DCF), founded in 1905, 
created a similar alliance with automobility – although the relationship 
was contested and took time to materialize.113 Contrary to the Dutch case 
in the 1920s, the DCF even proposed that “the luxury taxes on cars should 
be used for building bicycle paths.”114 Danish drivers retaliated by proposing 
a bicycle tax, which was never introduced in Denmark.
While becoming increasingly pro-car, in the 1930s, the ANWB leadership 
still argued that the Dutch government should not forget cycling infra-
structure as a matter of public good. At the ANWB’s 1939 annual meeting, 
chairman Bloemers thought it “incomprehensible” that the government 
did so little for the four million cyclists in the Netherlands and accused it 
of “seeing traff ic only from the viewpoint of fast traff ic.”115 Bloemers gave 
numerous examples of situations where engineers failed to allot enough 
space to cyclists. Often separate cycling paths were lacking or suddenly 
ended at bridges over major rivers. This was an insult to cyclists, who paid 
a bicycle tax, he argued. If anything, this tax should ensure cyclists had 
108 E. Bergsma, “Middelen om verkeersonveiligheid te bestrijden,” De Kampioen 53, no. 3 (1936): 
49-50.
109 “Wanneer een auto een f ietser inhaalt,” De Kampioen 53, no. 4 (1936): 83.
110 “Het 53ste jaarverslag (Vervolg),” De Kampioen 53, no. 16 (1936): 346.
111 [H.J. Peppink], “Er zijn 43.297.587 automobielen op de wereld,” De Kampioen 56, no. 17 (1939): 
319.
112 Vincent van der Vinne, De trage verbreiding van de auto in Nederland 1896-1939: de invloed 
van ondernemers, gebruikers en overheid (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 2007), 411.
113 Carstensen and Ebert, “Cycling Cultures in Northern Europe,” 35-36.
114 Ibid.
115 “Notulen van de jaarlijksche Algemeene Vergadering,” De Kampioen 56, no. 18 (1939): 346.
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the same status as drivers. Not only should there be a network of separated 
cycling paths alongside main roads, but he also pled for an extensive network 
of recreational cycling paths.116 How the state took up this call to facilitate 
cycling alongside driving is the topic of the next chapter.
1.4 Conclusion
Non-governmental organizations played a foundational role in Dutch cycling 
governance. The tourist and lobby organization ANWB in particular earned 
a long-term position in Dutch cycling governance, unlike clubs elsewhere. 
This chapter explored their attempts at putting cycling on the political 
agenda. This advocacy’s success was predicated on an inclusive discourse 
presenting cycling infrastructure as a public good. While cycling’s advocates 
were middle class and well-connected politically, they did anticipate and 
promote a broader working-class use of the bicycle – even if some found 
the arguments opportunistic. According to Mom, 1930s car lobbyists found 
it advantageous to spread myths about the car as a utilitarian vehicle, 
even though most drivers used cars for pleasure, adventure, and as status 
symbol.117 In a similar vein, by connecting different types of cycling to the 
pressing social issues of the day, claims for government to support cycling 
and its infrastructure became more powerful.
Depending on political circumstances, the organizations foregrounded 
either non-urban or urban cycling, recreational, or utilitarian cycling. Even in 
the f irst f ifty years of Dutch cycling (1880s-1930s), when they predominantly 
promoted recreational activities and only gradually became more afford-
able, the non-governmental organizations also presented the utilitarian 
framing of cycling as a political tactic to get funding. Cycling advocates 
within the ANWB and Parliament linked concerns over the unhealthy 
living conditions in cities with the bicycle’s potential for recreation in the 
countryside. Conversely, some also argued the bicycle could also solve the 
issue of people living in the countryside being isolated (from work, school, 
and the rest of the nation). Many of these arguments returned later in the 
twentieth century, as cycling advocates kept having to make the case for 
cycling infrastructure as a public good.
116 An additional argument for separate cycling infrastructure was the claim that accidents 
on mixed traff ic roads were 32 percent higher than on roads with separated cycling paths.
117 Gijs Mom, Atlantic Automobilism: Emergence and Persistence of the Car, 1895-1940 (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2015), 343-46.
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This chapter, “Citizen Power,” identif ies why a civil-society stakeholder 
like the ANWB managed to gain a large governance role early on. First, the 
openness of the Dutch political system to representatives of civil society 
was signif icant. The political rules of the game enabled the ANWB to 
become key to cycling’s policy coalition. The organization made full use of 
this. Its board members were at home in policymaking and administration 
circles. Second, the organization’s leadership was adroit at preventing rival 
tourist or mobility organizations from gaining prominence. The organiza-
tion built up expertise between the 1890s and 1920s that also benef ited 
state engineers, while lobbying engineers at different state levels to give 
cyclists a place alongside the future car infrastructure. When the topic 
of utilitarian infrastructure for cars and cyclists became a political issue 
in the 1920s, the ANWB protected cyclists’ interests when policymakers 
embraced the economic value of cars and trucks, leaving cyclists out of 
the equation.118 In contrast to its sister organizations in other countries, 
the leadership believed it could support both sides and continued to lobby, 
in the form of countless requests to local authorities for constructing 
and funding cycling facilities, and managed to represent cycling in the 
policymaking process.
For all its wide-ranging lobbying work, the ANWB had little to say about 
cycling in cities, even though many local cycling organizations were started 
up in cities by well-to-do urbanites as recreational clubs to help citizens 
escape and explore the countryside. To get funding or when lobbying, the 
ANWB discourse also frequently invoked workers who used their bicycle 
to commute. Its lobby focused on cycling infrastructure outside cities, 
along the busiest roads, and in nature reserves. Given the low levels of 
automobility in the Netherlands until the late 1950s – especially from an 
international perspective – there was perhaps less political pressure for 
dedicated infrastructure to separate cyclists from motorists in cities. Still, 
the disparity between cycling facilities constructed in the countryside and 
those in cities characterized the period. It would take another half century 
before the needs of the urban cyclist were addressed. The ANWB and cycling 
path organizations’ extensive network of recreational infrastructure helped 
integrate the Netherlands materially, even though it barely involved the 
government. When the state’s role in this policy domain of leisure grew, the 
private governance model clashed with a potential public role.
118 Popkema, “Tussen techniek en planning,” 50. Attempts to calculate the economic benef its 
of cycling: O.J. Boot and Jan Ploeger, De economische waarde van het fietsverkeer in het bijzonder 
met motief onderwijs: Eindrapportage (Den Haag: Adviesbureau Van Roon, 1987).

2 A Contested Compromise: National 
Government Supports Commuter 
Cycling
In 1930, the accountant Duyts had to build a cycling path in his road 
because his town authorities refused to take on this task. Citizens like 
Duyts across the country organized to construct their cycling paths because 
they could not count on the government. Yet something was changing. In 
the late 1920s, unbeknown to Duyts, engineers and interest groups at the 
highest level of Dutch policymaking were debating the principles of a new 
program for roads and cycling paths. In the summer of 1927, leading national 
Public Works engineers paid a work visit to the busy road between the 
manufacturing town Delft and the harbor city Rotterdam along the river 
Schie. Local provincial engineer Arnold Kempees gave them a walking tour 
so that they could observe with their own eyes the traff ic situation and 
road conditions. The engineers expected traff ic to increase rapidly, and 
concluded “this narrow road with busy car traff ic is especially dangerous 
for cyclists.”1 Gerrit Jan van den Broek, a leading Public Works engineers 
thought, “at least something should be done for the safety of cyclists.”2 
Engineer Ludolf Reinier Wentholt suggested constructing a cycling path 
on the other side of the Schie, but his colleague George Rooseboom shot 
down this plan: without a bridge to cross the river, cyclists would waste 
time waiting for the ferry, and prefer to cycle on the road – it would simply 
be faster, so who could blame them? The public works’ administration 
August 1926 traff ic counts had shown that at least 800 cyclists used the 
road daily. The engineers decided that the situation was urgent enough 
to justify a separate cycling path, a solution benef iting both cyclists and 
drivers.
In 1929, Public Works inspector-general and engineer Rooseboom found 
the cyclists’ requests for infrastructure “reasonable demands,” arguing 
that engineers took “insuff icient account of the interests of the cyclists … 
One should not forget that the cyclists produce a large share of the Road 
Fund.”3 This sounded promising. Why was cycling infrastructure now seen 
1 NA 2.16.59, inv. no. 43, committee meeting June 8, 1927.
2 Ibid.
3 NA 2.16.59, inv. no. 44, meeting March 7, 1929.
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as a public good, a task for state engineers? And why was the “Road Fund” 
important to Rooseboom?
Struggling to fund their recreational infrastructure, cycling organizations 
were in no position to also initiate commuter paths. The state became 
involved in the 1920s for two reasons. Some engineers and politicians – echo-
ing their international counterparts – believed that the Netherlands needed 
an ambitious highway system for cars to prepare for the modernist future. 
This early lobby for automobility is somewhat surprising: as historians have 
pointed out, the Netherlands was one of the f irst countries to undertake 
such a program in Europe, yet its car levels were the lowest. To facilitate 
such a network, the many cyclists obstructing the flow of drivers on planned 
major car routes had to be moved aside, one of the motivations in the 1927 
Delft-Rotterdam road debate. This development inadvertently coincided 
with the government’s new bicycle tax in 1924. Originally introduced to 
reduce budget def icits, the tax was earmarked for road improvement in 
1926 after lobbying efforts from car interests and national engineers. What 
arguments were employed to justify this? And what were the (long-term) 
consequences for Dutch cycling (infrastructure)?
Historians Adri Albert de la Bruhèze and Ruth Oldenziel as well as Anne-
Katrin Ebert have studied the inequalities and profound consequences of 
the bicycle tax for the future of Dutch cycling. Ebert evaluates German and 
Dutch cycling clubs’ cultural policies to explain why the Dutch ANWB was 
more successful in framing cycling as a national activity. According to Ebert 
Dutch cyclists used the bicycle tax to demand (utilitarian) cycling paths: 
“The bicycle tax put cyclists on the political map and helped to create a 
tradition of traff ic engineering devoted to cycling paths and regulation. 
This would form an important basis for the ‘survival’ of the Netherlands as 
a cycling nation in the second half of the twentieth century.”4 Compared 
to German clubs, the Dutch ANWB could make a stronger claim. In Ebert’s 
view, this explains the stronger embedding of cycling in Dutch (middle-
class) culture and politics. In contrast, Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel 
emphasize the unjust distribution of bicycle tax revenue and its highly 
contested political nature. Not only did tax revenues prioritize the few 
drivers over the much larger group of cyclists, it also benefited non-urban 
cyclists more than urban working-class cyclists. Over a ten-year period, 
the tax forced a political compromise between cyclists and car drivers, 
providing the overwhelmingly urban and taxpaying cyclists with roads that 
included cycling paths outside the city. The numerous cyclists generated 
4 Carstensen and Ebert, “Cycling Cultures in Northern Europe,” 37-38.
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a higher revenue than the small group of drivers, yet most proceeds from 
the tax went to building highways. Working-class urban cyclists did not 
use these paths and did not benefit from them, despite paying tax.5 Using 
newly sourced material, this chapter, “Contested Compromise,” adds depth, 
detail, and corrections to these claims. By studying a longer timeframe than 
Ebert, Albert de la Bruhèze, and Oldenziel, the following chapters trace the 
long-term impact of the bicycle tax.
The justif ication for taxing cyclists and drivers in relation to road and 
cycling path building was the subject of lengthy parliamentary debates. 
State engineers deliberated with social representatives about roadbuild-
ing norms. Records of these debates shed light on the behind-the-scenes 
negotiations. This rich material reveals how the political compromise for 
the bicycle tax led Dutch state engineers to regard cycling commuting 
infrastructure as a public good. As national and provincial engineers had 
almost no influence on urban infrastructure, however, these policymakers 
largely ignored urban cycling (and commuters) in the 1920s and 1930s. Only 
in the 1970s would urban cycling appear on the national agenda. I show 
that social democrat MPs ensured the debate included the value of utility 
cycling in the countryside. As Ebert did not focus on government sources, 
her claim that engineers constructed Dutch cycling paths on account of 
the bicycle tax needs further examination. Public Works archives reveal 
that cycling paths were indeed considered a political compromise for the 
controversial bicycle tax. I also show that cycling paths were already on the 
agenda (and considered justif ied) before the bicycle tax. Cycling’s legitimacy 
did not rest exclusively on the existence of a bicycle tax. I examine how the 
translation of principles into government agency road engineering norms 
had a significant long-term effect on cycling path construction. This chapter 
takes up the political debate on where cycling belonged in governance terms. 
In the spirit of compromise between interest groups, Dutch policymakers 
found a way to facilitate driving combined with cycling.
2.1 Justifying Road Funding and the Bicycle Tax
Traditionally, Dutch engineering had been focused on building water- and 
railways before it invested heavily in roadbuilding as well. In 1913, Public 
Works Minister Cornelis Lely, a famous engineer responsible for some of 
the Netherlands’ major water works, initiated the government’s plans for 
5 Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel, “Who Pays, Who Benef its?,” 73-100.
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roadbuilding. He ordered Public Works engineers to design a new (and 
expensive) national roads network: their 1915 plan projected reserving a 
10-meter-wide space for roads so that cycling paths could be included if 
necessary. A state role in cycling infrastructure was at least on the agenda. 
Financial constraints during World War I dashed any hope of realizing the 
expensive plan.6 Early on, Dutch engineers and social stakeholders envisaged 
the future motor age and the roads network required. Since most Public 
Works engineers were railway specialists, lacking knowledge of roadbuilding, 
the tourist non-governmental organization ANWB managed to play an 
outsized role in providing advice.7 Projecting a rapid increase in motorized 
traff ic, politicians and engineers claimed that the Dutch road network was 
not ready for – what they assumed would be – a car-centered future. They 
felt that the existing roads were too narrow and could not withstand heavy 
vehicle loads.8 Previously, lobbyists for better roads presented tourism 
as their main argument. After 1920, they adopted utilitarian terms like 
the economy, industry, and agriculture. Although the Netherlands was 
the premier cycling country, its leadership also embraced cars early on. 
The country built exclusive automotive highways in the 1930s – within 
Europe only Italy and Germany did this earlier, and the UK waited until 
long after World War II.9 Those boosting an automotive future realized it 
would be extremely expensive and required new f inancial instruments. 
Consequently, taxation considerations in the mid-1920s proposed earmarking 
the 1924 bicycle tax (an emergency measure to balance the budget) for road 
construction. This decision had major implications for the construction of 
suburban and rural cycling paths alongside major roads.
Funding road improvements meant answering the question: should 
cyclists be included or excluded in road taxation? To jumpstart the discussion 
on f inancing roadbuilding, stakeholders in the new car industry organized 
the Dutch Road Congress and decided in the early 1920s to draft a road tax 
bill. The driving force behind this congress, and opponent of the toll road 
model, was the ANWB. It set up a committee with representatives of its 
Roads Committee, automobile club KNAC, commercial car owners (BBN), 
6 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 100-103.
7 Ibid., 91, 100, 177; Willem van der Ham, Heersen en Beheersen: Rijkswaterstaat in de twintigste 
eeuw, PhD diss. (Zaltbommel: Europese Bibliotheek, 1999), 30-31, 47-48; Auke van der Woud, Het 
landschap, de mensen. Nederland 1850-1940 (Amsterdam: Prometheus, 2020).
8 Especially in the West of the Netherlands, where soil conditions made subsidence a major 
risk.
9 Gijs Mom, “Roads without Rails: European Highway Network-Building and the Desire for 
Long-Range Motorized Mobility,” Technology and Culture 46, no. 4 (2005): 745-772, here 747.
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government off icials from the provinces Groningen and Noord-Brabant 
(where a road tax was already in place), and state agency legal and f inancial 
experts.10 Once more, interest groups rather than the Dutch government 
initiated this discussion – although they did cooperate closely with the 
state. One issue was whether or not to include cyclists in the road taxation.
In their 1924 report, the road and car coalition stakeholders considered 
taxing cyclists, but decided against it. The main rationale behind their tax 
proposal was to pay for road maintenance, based on a vehicle’s weight and 
number of wheels. This engineering logic of load differed from taxing road 
use: traditionally the toll model had generated funds for national roads until 
1899, although tariffs varied depending on vehicle type and weight.11 If the 
main problem was that roads could not withstand the weight of heavy cars 
and trucks, it would be justif iable to tax drivers.12 Bicycles were so light that 
they caused little road damage or necessary maintenance.
Organizations did consider – but rejected – the possibility of taxing 
cyclists to fund separate cycling paths. According to the 1924 report, cy-
clists preferred separate cycling paths to improved roads. Free from heavy 
motorized traff ic, the paths would have low maintenance costs. If the state 
constructed a network of separate cycling paths, cyclists would not benefit 
from road improvements, making it unjustif iable to incorporate a bicycle 
tax in the Road Fund. A separate bicycle tax could pay for cycling paths. 
Because these paths were cheaper to construct than roads – and because 
there were many cyclists – a tax would have to be modest. However, the 
plan was unworkable because the sheer cost of the bureaucracy to raise the 
tax would undermine its actual purpose. For this practical reason, most of 
the Dutch Road Congress committee decided cyclists should not be taxed 
under the new bill.13
For opportunistic reasons, the more car-oriented stakeholders (indus-
trialists for instance) did push for cyclists paying tax: implementing road 
improvements with the modest tax revenues from the small number of 
10 The committee report: Vereeniging Het Nederlandsche Wegen-Congres, Ontwerp voor eene 
wegbelastingwet ([Den Haag]: Haagsche Drukkerij, 1924).
11 Local toll roads existed well into the twentieth century. The decentralized structure of road 
governance, allowing local government signif icant autonomy, meant national government had 
to buy out local government, a drawn-out and expensive process.
12 Wegen-Congres, Ontwerp voor eene wegbelastingwet, 17-20. The issue of funding road use 
through a pricing system returned in the 1960s and is ongoing: Maarten Smaal, Politieke strijd 
om de prijs van automobiliteit: de geschiedenis van een langlopend discours, 1895-2010 (Delft: 
Eburon, 2012), PhD diss., University of Tilburg.
13 Wegen-Congres, Ontwerp voor eene wegbelastingwet, 21.
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drivers would delay construction.14 By contrast, the millions of cyclists 
on the roads – surprisingly more than the government ever realized be-
fore starting to count them – provided a tempting source of income. The 
committee’s report included its dissenting members’ opinions. The tourist 
organization ANWB, representing cyclists, automobile club KNAC, and 
motorcycle club KNMV, claimed the proposal unjustly singled out motorized 
vehicles and that both horse-drawn vehicles and bicycles should contribute 
to road improvements.15 Committee member Andries Johannes ten Hope, 
a Rotterdam industrialist representing the transport lobby BBN, penned a 
strongly worded letter signed by eighteen factory owners.16 Alarmed by the 
committee proposal, the entrepreneurs claimed their businesses depended 
on road transport, and echoing the ANWB, KNAC, and KNMV car lobby 
comments, argued that bicycles, not cars, caused costly road improvements: 
cyclists demanded expensive, smooth road surfaces and extraordinarily 
wide roads “as a consequence of the very large number of cyclists in our 
country.”17 Cyclists should pay their fair share for road improvements.18 The 
road-width argument is problematic. Cyclists only demanded wider roads 
if car drivers wanted an unobstructed flow without reducing their speed. 
The real motivation was the remark that cyclists were an easy source of 
income: because of the vast number of cyclists, even a small levy would 
generate substantial funds.19
Most of the actors involved saw through this transparent defense of a 
bicycle tax. The committee chose not to comment on this tax. Instead, it 
objected to the BBN’s far-fetched argument for absolving truck drivers and 
motorized traff ic of all responsibility for funding new and better roads. 
According to the committee, it was undeniable that the need for better 
roads – which had suff iced until then – resulted from the increase in heavy 
motorized traff ic, especially trucks. The road tax, moreover, would help in 
constructing a long-distance network of national roads, mainly benefiting 
industrial and commercial traff ic. Taxing local cyclists or even horse-drawn 
14 Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel, “Who Pays, Who Benef its?,” 80-83.
15 Wegen-Congres, Ontwerp voor eene wegbelastingwet, 50.
16 They launched a marketing campaign with posters ‘Keep the road clear’ and dramatic images 
of chained factories and collisions between trucks and trains: S.A. Reitsma, Laat den weg vrij! 
Een ernstig woord tot het denkende deel der natie (Den Haag Moorman’s Periodieke Pers, 1933).
17 Wegen-Congres, Ontwerp voor eene wegbelastingwet, 21.
18 Ibid., 58.
19 Ibid., 21. Noord-Brabant cyclists paid 2.50 guilders tax; in the f iscal year 1921-22, this yielded 
287,000 guilders from a total tax income of 744,000, of which only 150,000 was from motorized 
vehicles.
A CoNTeSTed ComPromISe: NATIoNAL GoverNmeNT SuPPorTS CommuTer CYCLING 93
vehicles was indefensible. Business owners favoring motorized transport 
should pay for their own roads.20
The committee’s proposal neither included nor defended a bicycle tax, but 
offered many arguments in favor. Published in 1924, the report coincided with 
the introduction of the government’s bicycle tax. When the governmental 
committee, working in parallel on how to fund road improvements, received 
the report, it proposed including the 1924 bicycle tax revenues in the road 
fund.21 In other words, the car lobby’s report may not have introduced the 
bicycle tax, but it did provide arguments to transform a temporary measure 
into a permanent tax earmarked for road improvement.
In Parliament, however, the bicycle taxation led to extensive debates 
about cycling infrastructure as a public good. Initially, budget deficits rather 
than roadbuilding ambitions had motivated the government to reintroduce 
a bicycle tax in 1924. It was not Public Works but Finance Minister Hendrik 
Colijn who proposed this. A prominent member of the Protestant ARP party, 
he became Prime Minister in 1925. Invoking a f inancial crisis, Colijn argued 
that the government urgently needed new sources of revenue. Cyclists 
had great fundraising potential. Colijn stated bluntly: “If the tax levies 
a moderate amount, it cannot be deemed to weigh too heavily upon the 
owners of bicycles, whereas it will obtain a quite substantial benef it for 
the treasury.”22 He estimated one million Dutch cyclists, so a 3-guilder 
tax would bring in 3 million. To the government’s surprise, there were 
several more million cyclists, so the tax would generate at least double 
that amount: between the late 1920s and 1940, the number of cyclists rose 
from almost two to four million.23 While Colijn might have been inspired 
by the ongoing debate about road funding, he did not use any of the old 
arguments for taxing bicycles as luxury goods. Contested in the 1890s, this 
argument was even harder to make in the 1920s because bicycle ownership 
and use had spread throughout society. There was simply an urgent national 
f inancial need and here was some low hanging fruit, ripe for the picking. 
Because Colijn had the backing of a majority coalition, parliament passed 
the proposal, albeit with amendments. Cyclists now had to display a disc 
shown in f igure 6. His major concession was a clause stipulating the tax 
would expire in 1930.
20 Ibid., 65-66.
21 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 179.
22 Kamerstukken II 1923/24, 268, 3, 2. These records are digitized and accessible at https://zoek.
off icielebekendmakingen.nl/uitgebreidzoeken/historisch.
23 Albert de la Bruhèze and Veraart, Fietsverkeer in praktijk en beleid, 44-47.
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The temptation of easy revenues proved too big. Within two years, the 
tax became permanent. This time, it was specif ically allocated to road 
improvement. While the average cyclist would not have been aware of 
this – they just had to pay the fees – the fundamental debate marked a key 
development in Dutch road policy. The Ministry of Public Works proposed 
a Road Fund (Wegenfonds), into which new taxes on cars and fuel would 
flow. In addition, the bicycle tax would become an earmarked tax (bestem-
mingsbelasting) also deposited in the Road Fund. This Road Fund would be 
used for national roads, but partly distributed over provinces to reconstruct 
the provincial road network. The austerity measures of 1923 and 1924 had 
increased government revenues signif icantly and improved the country’s 
economic situation after 1925. The bicycle tax – approved by Parliament only 
as a temporary crisis measure – was no longer needed to balance the budget.
To make the bicycle tax permanent, a more fundamental Parliamentary 
debate about cyclists’ political rights and duties ensued in October 1926. 
Supporters of a bicycle tax presented traff ic separation as the ideal solu-
tion for (un)mixing drivers and cyclists. This was a Dutch engineering 
compromise for solving political conflict: without choosing sides, give each 
party something. Giving cyclists separate cycling paths was possibly the 
Figure 6 Under Dutch bicycle tax regulations (1924-1941), cyclists always had to have this disc fixed 
to their bicycle (although to prevent theft, many kept it on their person). Valid for one year (here 
1939-1940) and costing most people 3 guilders, the disc was personalized with the bike owner’s name 
and address. The country’s millions of cyclists generated large revenues that the state used to construct 
highways for cars. Working-class people exempt from the tax got a perforated disc for free. To avoid this 
stigma, some scraped together the money for a disc. [Source: Belasting & Douane Museum Rotterdam, 
no. 58776]
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only justif ication for including the bicycle tax in the Road Fund. Christian 
democrat Finance Minister De Geer pointed out that under the new law, 
cycling paths could be f inanced from the Road Fund if they served a traff ic 
function – in other words, if they “unburdened” the main roads that would 
be overcrowded if cyclists and drivers intermingled.24 This line of reasoning 
gives us insight into what type of cyclists the politicians were considering: 
those who used the roads to commute between cities and suburbs or went 
cycling for recreation on weekends.
Politicians across the spectrum were well aware that Dutch cyclists were 
too numerous for policymakers to ignore. Catholic MP – and future Royal 
Commissioner of the province Noord-Brabant – Augustinus Bernardus 
Gijsbertus Maria van Rijckevorsel thought the unique number of cyclists in 
the Netherlands required traff ic separation because “their life is constantly 
endangered … [and] depends on the competence and the sense of respon-
sibility of car drivers.” Consequently, “bicycle traff ic has to be separated 
from car traff ic; separated cycling paths have to be constructed.”25 Van 
Rijckevorsel later served on the Roads Committee, advising the Minister 
of Public Works, where he also tried to give cyclists some (protected) road 
space. Other politicians agreed that the appeal for cyclists’ safety seemed 
little more than an excuse to get them out of the way and ensure motorists an 
uninterrupted flow. Conservative liberal Walrave Boissevain, an Amsterdam 
shipping merchant, argued that “the extraordinarily large number of bicycles 
in the Netherlands has created a situation which requires special measures, 
because they hinder fast traff ic on normal roads to such an extent that fast 
traff ic and bicycle traff ic should no longer be allowed together from a safety 
viewpoint.”26 A car advocate, he nevertheless believed that the Dutch state 
should be involved with cycling governance, if only to get bikes out of the 
way. The ANWB’s cycling advocacy and the growing popularity of bicycles 
for everyday use made cyclists an inescapable political problem that could 
not be easily ignored.
To separate cyclists and drivers, a bicycle tax for building both roads and 
cycling paths seemed a good if contested compromise. According to Albert 
de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel, however, most cyclists who lived in cities and 
tended to be working class, were not part of this political compromise.27 
While urban cyclists had to pay the tax, the Road Fund was not used to 
24 Handelingen II 1926/27, 10 (October 27, 1926), 212.
25 Handelingen II 1926/27, 11 (October 28, 1926), 230.
26 Ibid., 231.
27 Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel, “Who Pays, Who Benef its?.”
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reconstruct urban infrastructure. For one, national engineers had no 
jurisdiction over this area as municipal autonomy was a key doctrine of 
Dutch administration, while tax revenues f lowed into the national and 
provincial coffers.28 In Parliament, the main advocate for working-class 
urban cyclists’ needs was social democrat Florinus Martinus Wibaut, a 
powerful Amsterdam alderman responsible for public housing construction. 
He defended workers’ rights to leisure: the average worker had very little 
free time anyway and “for a major part of the population [the bicycle] is 
the only way to get away from the oppressive environment of large cities.”29 
Rather than opposing the bicycle tax outright, Wibaut focused on how urban 
workers used the bicycle to enjoy nature. Taxing this vehicle made the bicycle 
tax the “worst and certainly most foolish tax the Netherlands has ever 
known.”30 This framing of cycling as not just utilitarian but also recreational 
had enduring appeal in social democratic circles: in the 1950s, provincial 
policymakers – members of his own social democrat party – would later 
use the argument to defend investing in recreational cycling facilities for 
the highly urbanized Zuid-Holland region.
Other social democratic opponents of the bicycle tax, however, spoke 
more about the plight of rural than urban cyclists. MPs like Arie IJzerman 
argued that rural cycling should be a crucial public good: “much more than 
in cities, the bicycle has become totally indispensable,” he said, for attending 
school, and for both children and adults’ livelihood in the countryside.31 
IJzerman’s argument represents the wide support rural cyclists could 
count on in Parliament from MPs who had a rural background. While 
there were also numerous MPs with an urban background, urban cyclists 
only became the focus of attention in the 1970s. Many MPs felt that due to 
expensive or infrequent public transit and low wages, the bicycle was the 
only means available for rural people and agricultural workers to extend 
their action radius.32 This required proper and safe cycling infrastructure. 
Instead, the proposed bicycle tax would go to a highway network considered 
economically necessary for the country. Most people could not afford a 
car, nor did they need one because the bicycle fulf illed all their mobility 
28 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 199.
29 Handelingen I 1923/24, 38 (June 19, 1924), 707; Harry Lintsen et al., Well-being, Sustainability 
and Social Development, 306-8.
30 Handelingen I 1927/28, 17 (December 29, 1927), 183.
31 Handelingen II 1923/24, 69 (May 13, 1924), 2008, an argument reiterated by Arend Braat of 
the Plattelandersbond (2010) and Hiemstra (2021).
32 The Swedish government had a very similar argument: Rautio and Östlund, “‘Starvation 
Strings’ and the Public Good,” 42-63.
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needs – a valid argument even for the ruling coalition parties. According to 
Chris van den Heuvel of the conservative Protestant party (ARP) dominant 
in rural areas, “to levy a bicycle tax in the future on our mine workers 
or farm laborers who would then pay for these modern roads on which 
they will never drive and which they will not even see from a distance” 
was unfair.33 Like the social democrats, Van den Heuvel realized that the 
proposed network of national main roads would only benefit elite business 
travelers and entrepreneurs.34
MPs from a rural or working-class background could see how important 
cycling was to people with the same roots. Social democrat Piet Hiemstra, 
a former farm laborer and dairy factory worker from the northern province 
of Friesland, spearheaded the agricultural laborers’ f ight against the bicycle 
tax throughout the 1920s. His “Hiemstra Amendment” in 1924 proposed 
to exempt laborers who paid no income tax and could provide proof from 
their local authority that they needed a bicycle for work.35 Catholic MPs 
Toon Loerakker, a laborer at a flower bulb grower in the Haarlemmermeer, 
and Cornelis Knigge, farmer and dairy farm director in the province of 
Utrecht, proposed similar amendments. They were both from rural areas 
and thought the bicycle was important there. As Loerakker testif ied, the 
provincial bicycle tax in Noord-Brabant had been a heavy burden on the 
poorest classes: “I have repeatedly witnessed how collections had to be 
organized to help people pay the tax and thereby enable them to get to 
work.”36 In 1926, social democrat Jan van den Tempel, a former house 
painter’s assistant who came from a large family and later in life obtained 
a doctorate in economics, insisted that large households with several cheap 
and rickety bicycles would be severely limited in their mobility if they had 
to pay 3 guilders for every (second-hand) bicycle they owned. Cartoonist 
Johan Braakensiek satirized this in 1924 (see f igure 7).37 Even according to 
progressive liberal Jan Berent Westerdijk, a wealthy farmer from the province 
Groningen, “living in the countryside” meant he witnessed the large cohorts 
of men and women cycling to their work on farms. In the countryside, he 
33 Handelingen II 1926/27, 9 (October 26, 1926), 180. Van den Heuvel had conflicting feelings: 
he thought Parliament was too hostile to car drivers. And the proposed Road Fund was unfair 
not just to cyclists but also car drivers in remote areas; both would pay but not benef it from the 
road construction.
34 Former railway off icial and public commentator Reitsma also objected: S.A. Reitsma, De 
rijwielbelasting als bestemmingsheffing voor het motorsnelverkeer (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1938).
35 Handelingen II 1923/24, 69 (May 13, 1924), 2020-22.
36 Ibid., 2021.
37 Handelingen II 1926/27, 11 (October 28, 1926), 231-32.
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believed, “most bicycles are used in this way.”38 In other words, knowing 
how important the bicycle was for workers, these politicians were convinced 
that cycling should be considered a crucial public good. They felt they had to 
pressure the government to take cycling seriously. In later decades, cycling 
advocates in parliament would often refer to their personal experience of 
cycling. In this mundane but important way, the everyday practice of cycling 
in the Netherlands entered the country’s national arena, influencing cycling 
advocacy and governance.
Another objection to the bicycle tax targeted the logic of the road tax 
and improvement system. The new tax on motorized vehicles was based on 
weight and tried to link a vehicle’s weight and road use in relation to road 
construction and maintenance. The heavier the vehicle, the more damage 
it inflicted and the more its owner had to pay towards maintaining the 
road. This engineering logic could not be applied to the bicycle, however, 
38 Handelingen I 1923/24, 38 (June 19, 1924), 707. Westerdijk stressed that many working women 
relied on bicycles. Exempting male heads of household or children would not help them.
Figure 7 Social democrat politicians opposed the bicycle tax because it put a disproportionate burden 
on working-class families, especially if they owned multiple bicycles. This 1924 cartoon by Johan 
Braakensiek, a well-known cartoonist for the magazine de Amsterdammer, shows a man who, 
because he cannot afford three taxes, has to transport his whole family on one bike. The caption reads: 
“The consequences of the bicycle tax” [Source: Belasting & Douanemuseum Rotterdam, no. 04922]
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because its light weight caused hardly any damage.39 At an international 
level, the roadbuilding association PIARC discussed these issues at length.40 
University of Delft-trained engineer and social democrat MP Theo van der 
Waerden argued that as far as f inancing road improvements was concerned, 
in principle “each mode of transport mainly has to pay for the construction 
and maintenance of its own lane.”41 The introduction of the car led to ideas 
about roads exclusively for its use, a revolutionary idea with serious implica-
tions for other road users. If regulations forbade cyclists to use the highway 
and they had to use their own cycling paths, it was fundamentally unjust 
to have them contribute to highway construction, so his argument went.
The compromise – that cyclists would get cycling paths in return for tax 
money – was contested. Were cycling paths needed? And should car drivers 
not pay for them? According to progressive liberal Fekko Ebels (VDB), a 
farmer from rural Groningen, only a few roads were busy enough to require 
such separated cycling paths. This would def initely not exceed the 6 to 7 
million guilders raised through the bicycle tax.42 Social democrat Van den 
Tempel went further, stating that car drivers should fund separate cycling 
paths: after all, they were responsible for endangering cyclists in the f irst 
place. He found it absurd that “cyclists have to pay for limiting the danger 
that is created by the other side.”43 Backing this argument was Steven Anna 
Reitsma, editor of a tram journal and an outspoken commentator on Dutch 
traff ic policy.44
Others did not raise principal objections. They saw opportunities. Ac-
cording to Protestant MP Hendrik Leenstra, cyclists would be well-advised 
39 Handelingen II 1926/27, 11 (October 28, 1926), 228.
40 Gijs Mom, “Building an Infrastructure for the Automobile System: PIARC and Road Safety 
(1908-1938),” in Proceedings 23th World Road Congress 17-21 September 2007 (Paris: PIARC, 2007), 
2004-30; Massimo Moraglio, “Transferring Technology, Shaping Society: Traff ic Engineering 
in PIARC Agenda, in the early 1930s,” Technikgeschichte 80, no. 1 (2013): 13-32; Ruth Oldenziel, 
“Accounting Tricks: How Pedestrians and Cyclists were Thrown under the Bus, 1910s-1940s,” 
(Unpublished paper, 2016).
41 Handelingen II 1926/27, 9 (October 26, 1926), 175.
42 Handelingen II 1926/27, 11 (October 28, 1926), 228.
43 Ibid., 232.
44 Reitsma wrote many critical pamphlets in the 1920s and 1930s: S.A. Reitsma, Open brief 
aan de leden der Tweede Kamer van de Staten-Generaal n.a.v. den Nederlandschen verkeerschaos 
(Utrecht: Drukkerij J. van Broekhoven, 1932); S.A. Reitsma, De weg naar coördinatie van het verkeer 
in Nederland (Den Haag: Moorman’s Periodieke Pers, 1933); S.A. Reitsma, Laat den weg vrij! F. 
de Vries and S.A. Reitsma, Twee lezingen over het verkeerswezen (Arnhem: G.W. van der Wiel & 
Co., 1933); Reitsma, De rijwielbelasting als bestemmingsheffing voor het motorsnelverkeer; S.A. 
Reitsma, Herwaardeering van verkeerseconomische waarden (Den Haag: Moorman’s Periodieke 
Pers, 1942).
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to support the bicycle tax since it gave them a stronger bargaining chip with 
which to demand state-sponsored cycling infrastructure. If attempts to 
abolish the bicycle tax succeeded, their negotiating position would become 
very weak, since “the cyclist does not have a right any more to ask for the 
roads to be in good condition, but they can if the bicycle tax is deposited in 
the Road Fund.”45 His reasoning implies many considered cycling paths not 
a public good to the same extent as roads for cars. The Road Fund not only 
drew money from car, fuel, and bicycle taxes, but also considerable funds 
from the general treasury: parliament considered automobility important 
enough to receive public funding, even if most Dutch citizens did not benefit 
directly. Leenstra portrayed cyclists as citizens only because they paid 
taxes – not because cycling should be considered a public good. This rather 
limited concept of citizenship was, however, a key argument: engineers, 
civil society actors, and business groups employed it often in this period.
A parliamentary majority ultimately voted in favor of this bicycle tax. 
Still, the working-class cyclists’ defense did have political consequences. In 
1924, heads of households who paid no income tax and needed the bicycle to 
commute were exempted from the tax.46 In 1934, at the deepest point of the 
Great Depression, the government created an exemption for the unemployed, 
greatly increasing the number of free bicycle tax discs distributed.47 Between 
1930 and 1931, the government handed out about 82,000 free discs. By the 
late 1930s, the number rose to more than 400,000.48 Despite the exemptions, 
most cyclists had to pay the 3-guilder tax. The millions in revenue largely 
went to roads for car drivers, who at this time formed only some 3 percent 
of road users.49
The political compromise did not end the controversy. When Germany 
occupied the Netherlands, the German authorities abolished the bicycle 
tax in 1941, sensing a populist opportunity to curry favor with workers. 
Leader of the populist Dutch national socialist NSB party, Anton Mussert, 
announced during a speech in the southern mining town of Heerlen in 
February 1941 that the NSB would strive to abolish the bicycle tax, so that 
the “fellow citizen with the dog tag” would no longer be seen in the streets.50 
45 Handelingen II 1926/27, 11 (October 28, 1926), 230.
46 Grapperhaus, Over de loden last, 25-26.
47 Ibid., 60-62. Cyclists were f ined for not displaying this small metal disc. Free tax discs had 
a hole in them, stigmatizing the cyclist as poor or unemployed.
48 “De rijwielbelasting verdwijnt,” Haagsche Courant, April 24, 1941, 1.
49 Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel, “Who Pays, Who Benef its?,” 80-81.
50 “Gemengd nieuws. N.S.B. contra rijwielbelasting,” Nieuwsblad van Friesland, February 24, 
1941, 2. Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel, “Who Pays, Who Benef its?
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The next month, in an important speech outlining his policy, Reich Com-
missioner Arthur Seyss-Inquart argued that the Dutch tax system was a 
liberal, capitalist, and socially unfair system and announced his intention 
to abolish the bicycle tax.51 Then, on 24 April 1941, the newspapers reported 
that in a few days (starting on May 1) the Germans would abolish the tax, 
as they did elsewhere in Europe, to win round the local working class.52 In 
the off icial communiqué, Seyss-Inquart justif ied the end of the bicycle tax 
by referring back to the parliamentary debates, arguing that the tax had 
not distinguished between rich and poor cyclists, nor cyclists who used the 
bicycle for work versus those who only used it for leisure, and that this would 
rectify the injustice.53 Dutch newspapers dutifully reprinted this message.54
What does this debate tell us about political views of cycling in the 
mid-1920s? Discussions about cyclists took up a substantial amount of 
politicians’ time during the Road Fund debate. The debate was inspired by 
an imagined future of high automobility and the need for road infrastructure 
investments. Cyclists entered this debate as an afterthought once they 
clearly became a valuable source of income. In addition, making way for cars 
meant separating traff ic so that drivers would have the road to themselves 
and force cyclists to one side. Unintentionally, cycling rallied defenders in 
parliament as well: many members – including but not limited to the social 
democrats – testif ied to its usefulness, in cities and the countryside, for work 
and pleasure. Car drivers were the f inancial priority. In the process, national 
politicians articulated the status of cycling infrastructure as a public good.
2.2 A Polder Model for Cycling Governance
The bicycle tax and Road Fund debate of the mid-1920s forced Public Works 
engineers responsible for the nation’s roadbuilding program to think about 
cyclists and cycling infrastructure. How did the engineers and policymakers 
in executive government departments translate these political debates 
into cycling policy? What were these engineers’ views on cycling and its 
place on the road? To what extent did they cooperate with civil society 
representatives in this process? And what engineering norms did they create 
51 “Belangrijke rede van den Rijkscommissaris,” Nieuwsblad van Friesland, March 14, 1941, 1.
52 Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel, “Who Pays, Who Benef its?,” 84.
53 Ebert, Radelnde Nationen, 408.
54 “De rijwielbelasting verdwijnt,” Haagsche Courant, April 24, 1941, 1; “De rijwielbelasting 
verdwijnt,” De Tijd, April 24, 1941, 1.
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that would be applied for decades to come, creating a network of suburban 
and rural cycling paths?
When the Dutch parliament and Ministry of Public Works took on the 
role of providing more and better roads and prioritizing cars, their decision 
did not sideline civil society actors. In 1915, Public Works Minister Lely had 
created an advisory National Roads Committee (Rijkswegencommissie) with 
his Ministry’s engineers. In 1926, parliament discussed appointing a road 
construction advisory body, also to engage with major social groups. The 
envisaged road tax and Road Fund would generate large sums of money, 
which MPs could to some extent control. If the distribution of these funds 
was left entirely to the discretion of Public Works engineers, it would be 
diff icult for Parliament to control the process. That is why Protestant MP 
Jan Krijger (CHU), a former civil servant in Public Works argued that “tax-
paying stakeholders can hardly be denied a moral right to some influence 
on the way their tax money is spent.”55 The government and conservative 
MPs opposed Lely’s proposal, arguing that an advisory council would slow 
down road improvements.56 At stake was the issue of how technocratic 
the roadbuilding development would be – that is, to what extent experts 
rather than parliament would govern the process. A parliamentary majority 
strongly favored a more indirect form of social representation, a decision-
making process that represented social rather than technical interests.
Non-governmental actors already played a very large role in mobility. 
Government agencies regularly sought advice informally from the ANWB. 
The proposal for a Road Fund formalized this consultation process between 
governmental and non-governmental actors. Catholic MP Leonardus Gerar-
dus Kortenhorst recommended H.W.O. de Bruyn, secretary of the ANWB and 
KNAC’s joint road committee, the key expert outside the official government 
bureaucracy, as valuable member of a state committee.57
As a result, a Public Works engineers advisory committee and a non-
governmental committee operated in tandem since the 1920s. Through 
regular meetings, both aimed to create a consensus-driven road policy 
amid a politically charged environment.58 Cooperation proved diff icult, 
however. The civil society committee complained about the engineers’ lack 
55 Handelingen II 1927/28, 68 (May 9, 1928) 2010.
56 Handelingen II 1926/27, 9 (October 26, 1926) 186-87.
57 Handelingen II 1927/28, 67 (May 8, 1928) 1989.
58 The engineers were on the National Roads Committee (Rijkswegencommissie, 1915-1928), 
changed to National Committee for Roads (Rijkscommissie voor de wegen, 1928-1932) in 1928. 
The civil society committee was known as National Committee for Consultation on Road 
Improvement (Rijkscommissie van overleg voor de wegenverbetering, 1928-1932).
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of cooperation.59 At the instigation of the government, the two committees 
merged into one Roads Consultation Committee (Commissie van Overleg voor 
de Wegen, hereafter COW) in 1932. Through the consultation committee, key 
members of roadbuilding lobby and interest groups discussed the principles 
of Dutch road planning with leading engineers.
Besides the ANWB, the civil society committee comprised a cross-section 
of interest groups (see table 1) but was dominated by car lobbyists. According 
to historian Hans Buiter, the committee enabled the car lobby to access 
government Public Works.60 Dutch industrialists – closely aligned with the 
car lobby for the transportation of goods – were well represented, as was the 
Dutch highway lobby (NEVAS).61 Several road user and industry associations 
tried, as Mom and Filarski explain, to present their particular interest as the 
59 The engineers committee admitted in 1928 that it had been diff icult “to stay in touch with 
those who regard themselves as representatives of road users.” NA 2.19.46, inv. no. 43, committee 
meeting April 18, 1928.
60 Hans Buiter, “‘Hoogviadukten in het polderland?’ De introductie van de autosnelweg in 
Nederland,” NEHA-jaarboek voor economische, bedrijfs- en techniekgeschiedenis 60 (1997): 303.
61 Ibid., 285-306 for more on NEVAS.
Table 1  Civil society representatives in the Roads Consultation Committee (COW), 
1920s-1930s
Person Organization Interest/Expertise
edo bergsma dutch Tourist organization (ANWb) Tourists, Cyclists, Car drivers
Hermanus de bruyn dutch road Congress (Het Nederlandsch 
Wegencongres)
roadbuilding industry
emile Schiff royal dutch Automobile Club (kNAC) Car drivers
Andries ten Hope dutch federation of Company vehicle 
owners (bbN)
Transport Sector/Industry
Cornelis Sormani dutch union of drivers and other 
Automobile Personnel (NuCA; Neder-
landsche unie van Chauffeurs en overig 
Automobielpersoneel)
Car drivers
J. van der molen dutch Highways organization (NevAS) Highway construction industry
H. molhuysen royal dutch Agriculture Committee (kNLC) Agriculture/rural
Henri bloemers dutch Institute for Public Housing and 
urban development (NIvS)
Public Housing, urban Planning
Pieter van Tienhoven dutch Society for Nature Conservation 
(Natuurmonumenten)
Nature Conservation
Piet bakker Schut The Hague urban Planning department Public Housing, urban Planning
Source: CoW archives, NA 2.16.11 and 2.16.59
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public good.62 Mayor Henri Bloemers, a biologist and future ANWB director, 
was a very active member, as was Pieter van Tienhoven, representing the 
nature conservation organization Natuurmonumenten. Urban and spatial 
planning representatives also participated, including social democrat and 
urban planner Pieter Bakker Schut from The Hague. Bakker Schut was 
part of a generation of engineers trained around 1900, with common social 
democratic sympathies, as historians Nil Disco and Harry Lintsen show. 
Influential engineers and planners at the heart of the formative period of 
Dutch road and cycling governance in the 1920s and 1930s, trained in this 
milieu.63 By giving various sectors and factions of society a seat at the table, 
Public Works ministers strengthened the corporatist and consensus-driven 
political culture which political scientists characterize as the hallmark of 
Dutch political history.64
According to ANWB director Bergsma, it was important to consider 
various interests in addressing the problem of ever busier roads. In 1928, he 
argued that “the progress in the use of motorized power is larger than was 
thought.” This did not, however, mean the bicycle, “that individual mode of 
transport that has become so truly and specifically Dutch,” was disappearing. 
On the contrary, Bergsma believed the bicycle “is used more and more. In 
short, our roads are quickly being f illed with modern means of transport.”65 
The policymaking process to address these pressing issues should not be 
left to engineers. Road users and taxpayers had to have a voice. Bergsma 
argued that “road users, who have such an interest in the construction and 
improvement of roads, bridges and other connections – and who, in addition, 
provide a tax entirely out of their own pockets – should be involved in the 
62 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 173.
63 On Bakker Schut: Yvonne van Mil, “Pieter Bakker Schut (1877-1952), manager in stedenbouw,” 
Bulletin KNOB 116, no. 4 (2017): 209-23. Influenced by the progressive liberal professor Pekelharing, 
these students formed the Sociaal-Technische Vereeniging van Democratische Ingenieurs en 
Architecten (Social-Technical Organisation of Democratic Engineers and Architects). Leading 
Dutch urban planners such as Piet Bakker Schut (later active in The Hague), Th. K. van Lohuizen 
(central to the 1930s Amsterdam Extension Plan) and Arie Keppler (social housing in Amsterdam) 
were members. Others such as Willem Albarda and Theo Van der Waerden would become MPs 
for the SDAP party, where they defended cyclists in debates around bicycle taxation: N. Disco 
and H.W. Lintsen, “De vervlechting van ingenieursberoep en industrie: 1890-1925,” Tijdschrift 
voor Sociale Geschiedenis 9 (1983): 343-69; Harry Lintsen, “De Delftse Polytechnische School als 
bakermat van het socialisme 1900-1925,” in Het tweede jaarboek voor het democratisch socialisme, 
eds. J. Bank, M. Pos, and B. Tromp (Amsterdam: Wiardi Beckman Stichting/De Arbeiderspers, 
1980), 81-109. See also Nil Disco, “Made in Delft: Professional engineering in the Netherlands 
1880-1940” (PhD diss., University of Amsterdam, 1990).
64 Kickert, The History of Governance in the Netherlands.
65 De Kampioen 45, no. 51 (December 21, 1928): 1429, quoted in NA 2.16.59, inv. no. 47
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preparation and execution of the plans of road administrators and consulted 
in ongoing matters.”66 He specif ically mentioned nature conservation and 
city planning groups, who were concerned about natural and cultural beauty 
and wanted to safeguard them during road improvements. Bergsma, like 
his successor Bloemers, saw the potentially negative effects of roadbuilding 
and cars for nature and recreation. Their leadership created a compromise 
between road space for drivers and cyclists. As Mom rightly notes, the 
ANWB’s “roots as a bicycle club with a long tradition of enjoying touring in 
nature, prevented these advisers from reducing planning issues to a mere 
problem of road adjustment.”67
An analysis of the financial basis for mobility policy shows that the bicycle 
tax unintentionally made cyclists politically visible. Examining the policy 
coalition around mobility (involving non-governmental actors) as well as 
the applicable rules of the game (balancing trade-offs), reveals that Dutch 
traditional political values of accommodation and compromise meant both 
drivers and cyclists got something from the deal – albeit clearly benefiting 
drivers more than cyclists f inancially. In the mid-to-late 1920s, a formative 
period in Dutch road policy, cycling advisors played a key part in shaping 
Dutch car and cycling infrastructure outside major cities.
2.3 Is Cycling Infrastructure a Public Good?
As a result of the parliamentary debates and the mediating role of the ANWB 
around the bicycle tax, national state involvement in cycling governance 
started in earnest after the mid-1920s – though several (lower-level) state 
engineers had been involved in cycling infrastructure before that. By around 
1915, some already believed that national roads (rijkswegen) should include 
separated cycling paths. Speaking in 1916, provincial engineer Lambertus 
Tjerk van der Wal thought national roads should be built with a separated 
cycling path on one side and a separated pedestrian path on the other side, 
both measuring 2.50 meters.68 On secondary, provincial roads (provincial 
wegen), engineers should design a 1-meter-wide cycling lane, but not neces-
sarily separated, he thought.69 Van der Wal had joined the ANWB in 1910 
66 Ibid.
67 Mom, “The Emancipation of the Urban View,” 89.
68 L.T. van der Wal, Het wegennet en de wegenverbetering in de provincie Zuid-Holland (Mid-
delharnis: Flakkeesche Boek- en Handelsdrukkerij, 1916), 17.
69 Ibid.
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and would later sit on its board (1941-1959).70 Between 1928 and 1952, he 
headed Public Works in the rapidly suburbanizing province Zuid-Holland, 
allowing him to realize his vision of separate cycling infrastructure. It was 
not unusual for a state engineer to be a member of the tourist organization 
ANWB: Dutch cycling governance typically entwined state and civil society.
Engineers were aware that suburban commuters constituted the large 
numbers of bicycle traff ic. In preparation for the road construction plan and 
to improve forecasting, the national Public Works agency organized regular 
traff ic counts when in the 1920s, the state’s sporadic traff ic counts became 
more systematic.71 Its counts in 1923, 1926, 1929, and 1932 showed that the 
busiest cycling routes were to and from the major Dutch cities.72 The busiest 
in 1923 were between The Hague, Utrecht, Haarlem, Arnhem, and their 
suburbs.73 The traff ic counts showed this suburban traff ic (voorstadsverkeer 
in Dutch engineers’ jargon) was much heavier than inter-city or through 
traff ic.74 To ensure all commuters were counted, the national 1926 count 
included the 6-8AM and 6-8PM rush hours when workers cycled to factories 
and construction sites.75 By 1932, the counts showed how at most points in 
the country, bicycle traff ic had increased compared to three years earlier. 
On some routes, cycling dropped, according to the reports because of the 
economic downturn between 1929 and 1932, reducing “the suburban traff ic 
of factory and off ice workers” near the major industrial hubs.76 Through 
their statistical data, national engineers discovered the many blue- and 
white-collar workers commuting by bicycle to cities during rush hour.
It led national engineers to start building separate cycling infrastructure 
for commuters along all the national roads they noted in their traff ic count 
datasets. Take for instance a discussion in 1924 – before the bicycle tax 
70 “Ir. L.T. van der Wal †,” De Kampioen 79, no. 10 (1964): 616.
71 In 1915, engineers considered improving the national road at Duivendrechtse Bridge in the 
industrial district near Amsterdam. To make an informed decision, they asked local Public 
Works off icials to organize a two-week traff ic count at the bridge in October 1915. The daily 
average was 1,000 cyclists and 600 pedestrians, but only 50 cars and 30 motorcycles. There were 
more horse-drawn vehicles (200). Source: NA 2.16.59 (Commissie van Overleg voor de Wegen), 
inv. no. 1, dossier 15, letter November 3, 1915.
72 Verslag betreffende de verkeerswaarnemingen in 1932. I. Rijkswegen, (’s-Gravenhage: Algemeene 
Landsdrukkerij, 1934), 10; for the map Bijlage IIIc. Gemiddeld rijwielverkeer per dag van 14 uur. 
In aantallen.
73 Verslag betref fende verkeerswaarnemingen in 1923 op de rijkswegen in Nederland, (’s-
Gravenhage: Algemeene Landsdrukkerij, 1925), 8.
74 Successive reports note that due to rising automobility, inter-city traff ic grew in importance.
75 Verslag betreffende de verkeerswaarnemingen in 1926. I. Rijkswegen, (’s-Gravenhage: Algemeene 
Landsdrukkerij, 1928), 5.
76 Verslag betreffende de verkeerswaarnemingen in 1932. I. Rijkswegen, 11.
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had been linked to roadbuilding – concerning the need for a cycling path 
alongside the national road from Amsterdam to Germany at Naarden, one 
of the f irst Dutch commuter towns. Engineer Wentholt found the option of 
an on-road and unseparated cycling lane “too dangerous for cycling traff ic, 
because regular drivers will see the path as part of the regular road surface 
and not recognize it as a cycling path.”77 His colleague Van Heijst proposed 
to skip the cycling lane altogether. The influential G.J. van den Broek, head 
of Public Works’ national roads department disagreed, however. He pointed 
out that 900 to 1,000 cyclists used this road daily, far outnumbering cars, 
and justif ied a separated cycling path.78 The committee’s engineers agreed 
that “suppressing a cycling path on this road with very busy cycling traff ic 
cannot be recommended.”79 The engineers preferred separate infrastructure 
because drivers tended to consider on-road cycling lanes part of their space.80 
The engineers’ conviction that separate cycling infrastructure would reduce 
accident rates was another reason for promoting this engineering solution. 
The ANWB cited traff ic statistics seemingly showing that cycling accidents 
were less likely on roads with separate infrastructure.81 In short, just before 
the bicycle tax took effect, the basic assumption was that on major roads, cars 
and cyclists should not mix, but have their own, clearly recognizable place.
For national engineers and policymakers, the introduction of the bicycle 
tax was a powerful additional argument for separate cycling paths. According 
to many Roads Committee (COW) members, the bicycle tax morally obliged 
policymakers to “give something back” to cyclists. In 1932, engineer Van 
der Steur stated plainly that “cyclists bring in a lot of tax and they should 
be taken care of.”82 Nature conservationist Van Tienhoven pointed out 
that cyclists brought in 7.5 million in taxes, giving them a right to decent 
77 NA 2.16.59, inv. no. 43, committee meeting July 9, 1924.
78 Verslag betreffende verkeerswaarnemingen in 1923 op de rijkswegen in Nederland, 17 + Bijlage 
IIIC.
79 NA 2.16.59, inv. no. 43, committee meeting July 9, 1924.
80 NA 2.16.59, inv. no. 43, committee meetings August 15, 1924 and February 19, 1926. Engineer 
Van Heijst said: “If a paved cycling path or road shoulder is adjacent to the road, drivers will 
soon see it as a three-lane road and drive on the cycling lane more often, which endangers 
cyclists.” Different paving was the compromise solution: less expensive than separate paths 
but more visible for drivers. A meeting on December 12, 1924 emphasized the same point for a 
bridge: cycling lane paving should be a different colour, or with a band of lightly coloured stone 
to highlight the separation. See also NA 2.16.59, inv. no. 44, committee meeting December 21, 
1928, that found this solution more practical (and cheaper) than buying land for a separated 
path.
81 “Vrijliggende rijwielpaden zijn noodzakelijk,” De Kampioen 56, no. 11 (1939): 184.
82 NA 2.16.11 (Raad van de Waterstaat en zijn Taakvoorgangers), inv. no. 371, meeting Decem-
ber 29, 1932.
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cycling facilities.83 Committee chairman and MP Van Rijckevorsel remarked: 
“given that cyclists bring in a lot of taxes it is not right that this category 
of road users is fobbed off with a partial solution.”84 According to Cornelis 
Gerrit Timo Sormani, chairman of the automobile transport workers union, 
“the cyclists are being treated in a ‘step-motherly’ fashion.”85 Even though 
separate cycling paths were more costly and complicated to administer due 
to expropriation procedures, cyclists had a basic right to them.86 Committee 
members from very diverse interest groups agreed on this point. The bicycle 
tax decision clearly changed the perceptions of cyclists’ public status and 
increased support for a state role in cycling governance.87
Most key stakeholders approved of cycling paths. A few engineers opposed 
constructing them. At one committee meeting in the mid-1930s, engineer 
Ludolf Reinier Wentholt raised a series of far-fetched counterarguments: for 
one, on the new highways, cars would go so fast that elderly cyclists from the 
countryside (bejaarde buitenlieden) would not be able to properly estimate 
the speed of the cars, which might cause accidents at intersections. Wentholt 
made it clear that people who could literally not keep up with the speed of 
progress would not receive any concessions but would be forced to stay in 
their own quiet zones.88 During another meeting, Wentholt tried to play 
down the need for cycling infrastructure, calling cycling predominantly 
a leisure activity. In the clash over resources, Wentholt framed cycling as 
recreational and motorized traff ic as utilitarian and asked: “Should utility 
not transcend tourist interests?”89 He meant that investments in roads for 
cars and trucks should get priority over cycling infrastructure, ignoring 
the utilitarian function of bicycles. This recreational framing of cycling 
was a minority position in 1936 when so many traff ic counts had shown 
the opposite. Few committee members supported his views. Many fellow 
engineers considered cycling more a public responsibility than Wentholt. 
83 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 371, meeting October 17, 1935.
84 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 372, meeting July 13, 1936.
85 Ibid.
86 NA 2.16.59, inv. no. 47, meeting December 13, 1929.
87 Proof that cycling’s status as public good depended on class connotations and tax-paying 
status, is a case in 1916 at Soest, a village in the province Utrecht. A headmaster requested more 
connections between his school and where most workers lived. Reporting to the ANWB, cycling 
path association Gooi en Eemland wrote that the alderman in Soest did not want to consider 
a cycling path. The workers’ low incomes meant “the municipality is not willing to contribute 
suff iciently in the costs considering the very small tax contribution of the inhabitants of this 
borough.” ANWB archive, inv. no. 1108, letter Gooi en Eemland to ANWB, October 14, 1916.
88 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 371, meeting October 17, 1935.
89 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 372, meeting February 11, 1936.
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Still, some within the (national) engineering community took a more 
outspoken stance in favor of the car.
These national engineers had little to say about urban cycling infra-
structure.90 After all, they had no jurisdiction over urban space, where 
traff ic separation was not the norm. And if their schemes impacted cities, 
they tended not to consult urban planners.91 On road plans and traff ic 
counts, national planners literally drew circles around cities and left the 
inside blank.92 Provincial road plans also ended at city boundaries, as 
did the cycling paths constructed on national or provincial roads. Few 
cities constructed downtown cycling paths and kept street space shared. 
Urban cyclists not only needed their own paths, but also a place to park 
their bicycles. In these instances, the ANWB acted on behalf of urban 
cyclists, complaining that not enough was done for cyclists living in the 
city: urban planners and architects failed to provide enough parking 
facilities around housing.93 Urban cyclists also experienced problems 
90 Oldenziel and Albert de la Bruhèze, “Contested Spaces,” 29-49.
91 Mom, “The Emancipation of the Urban View,” 83-85.
92 Visible on the 1923 map of cycling traff ic: Verslag betreffende verkeerswaarnemingen in 
1923 op de rijkswegen in Nederland, Bijlage IIId. http://publicaties.minienm.nl/documenten/
verslag-betreffende-de-verkeerswaarnemingen-in-1926-1932
93 “De verschoppeling der steden,” De Kampioen 61, no. 5 (1946): 3.
Figure 8 National engineers’ ideal was to separate cyclists and car drivers completely. At this provincial 
road between Soestdijk and Bilthoven, Utrecht province, the engineers achieved that (c. 1930) by 
turning the former road into a cycling path while constructing a new road to the right of the row of 
trees. [Source: Collectie Het Utrechts Archief, Photographer unknown, no. 220773]
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like long waiting times at railway crossings. They had to f ight a long bat-
tle for underpasses that would reduce these delays.94 The Netherlands’ 
relatively late automobilization probably prevented negative effects on 
everyday cycling in cities in the prewar era. Well into the second half 
of the twentieth century, national policymakers ignored urban cyclists, 
while urban policymakers and engineers reiterated the argument that 
separate cycling infrastructure was either unnecessary or impossible in 
narrow city streets.
2.4 Making Cycling Infrastructure the Default Norm
The roadbuilding and taxation discussions led to national engineers creating 
norms for national roads that included separate cycling paths as the stand-
ard. On the subject of road profiles, engineers often referred to the bicycle 
tax as the reason for cycling infrastructure, defining more generous norms 
for national roads, at least on paper, than the earlier cycling paths. In 1928, 
engineers created different standard road prof iles, with 2.50-meter-wide 
cycling paths for the busiest roads, as in f igures 8 and 9.95 Cycling paths 
were the default on national roads. Engineers could only deviate from the 
guidelines under specific conditions.96 In practice, these norms were flexible. 
It was common to have a single broader path on one side of the road for 
two-way cycling traff ic. This was the case with the cycling path along a new, 
highly visible landmark, the Afsluitdijk, a 32-kilometer causeway and major 
dam between the North Sea and the Zuiderzee, connecting the provinces 
94 Frank Veraart, Martin Emanuel, and Ruth Oldenziel, “Eindhoven: Engineering a Path for 
Bikes?,” in Cycling Cities: The European Experience. A Hundred Years of Policy and Practice, 
ed. Ruth Oldenziel, et al. (Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of Technology, 2016), 52-54; 
Henk-Jan Dekker, “Jeremiades over de Jeremiebrug: Fietsf iles bij spoorwegovergangen in Utrecht, 
1915-1940,” Oud-Utrecht 91, no. 2 (2018): 32-38.
95 NA 2.16.59, inv. no. 43, committee meeting May 9, 1928. On road prof iles for urban roads: A. 
van den Bogaard, “De geplande stad, 1914-1945,” in Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw. 
Deel 6. Stad, bouw, industriële productie, eds. J. Schot, et al. (Eindhoven: Stichting Historie der 
Techniek, 2003), 66-67.
96 NA 2.16.59, inv. no. 44, committee meeting December 21, 1928, Leidraad voor het aanleggen 
van rijwielpaden langs wegen, voorkomende op het rijkswegenplan, attachment to letter to Ministry 
of Public Works, Dec 28,1928. According to the guidelines, in built-up areas it was left to the 
engineers’ discretion; they could omit cyclists if space for cycling paths was lacking, a criterium 
open to interpretation. Outside the built-up area, cycling paths could only be omitted if (a) 
constructing separate cycling paths would leave less than 5.5 meters road space for cars; (b) if 
the road was wider than 6 meters and less than 500 tons/day total traff ic intensity; or (c) if the 
new road was a car highway.
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Noord-Holland and Friesland.97 ANWB chairman Bloemers found a single 
wide path “very pleasant for cyclists” and had the additional advantage 
of accommodating large streams of cyclists during rush hours or “special 
occasions like football matches.”98
Given the respect for decentralized autonomy in the Netherlands, provin-
cial engineers had considerable leeway and could not be legally compelled to 
comply with these national norms. In practice, national Public Works could 
influence lower government’s road and cycling policies through its control 
of funding. The provinces had few funds of their own and relied on national 
contributions from the Road Fund; the percentage they received was linked 
to compliance with off icial road profiles. With its preference for separate 
cycling paths over traff ic lanes on roads, the government adjusted the sub-
sidies so that it was f inancially more attractive for provinces to reconstruct 
roads with separate cycling paths.99 Through these “soft” norms, national 
97 NA 2.16.59, inv. no. 43, committee meeting May 20, 1927.
98 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 372, committee meeting July 13, 1936.
99 HUA 1201, inv. no. 5300, correspondence Utrecht province with Minister of Public Works, 
1929; inv. no. 5316, “Nota betreffende het normaal dwarsprof iel van de verbeterde provinciale 
Figure 9 Around 1927, the standard profile that engineers in the Utrecht area applied for a provincial 
road (rijbaan) included a 2.5-meter-wide cycling path (rijwielpad). [Source: Het Utrechts Archief 1201, 
inv. no. 5316]
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policymakers could nonetheless ensure lower government implemented 
a form of traff ic separation. By the early 1940s, some provinces had been 
much more active in cycling path construction than others.100
Because (working-class) cyclists were considered unruly, unpredictable, 
and headstrong road users, engineers linked the quality of cycling paths 
with their user: cyclists had to be “seduced” into preferring paths to the 
main road. Engineers assumed cyclists would refuse to use the paths if the 
paving was not at least the same quality as the road surface.101 Former Public 
Works engineer, Taeke Huitema, thought cyclists endangered themselves 
by mingling with other traff ic and not staying on the right. He character-
ized this behavior as “dissoluteness, a desire to annoy, thoughtlessness or 
thick-headedness, which only punitive measures can prevent.”102 However, 
even Huitema opposed obliging the use of cycling paths if they were not 
of suff icient design standards. So did car enthusiast Hendrik Jan Peppink, 
editor of ANWB journal Autokampioen, who felt “the right of the cyclist … 
is respected all too little” because “the condition and construction of so 
many cycling paths is such, that it would be a ‘moral murder’ to ‘drive’ the 
cyclists onto them.”103 Again though, “the interests of fast traff ic are also 
served through the construction of many cycling paths.”104 Using bricks for 
surfacing alongside asphalt roads was a recipe for disaster: the cycling path 
would remain unused while drivers and cyclists would have to mingle. In 
1929, Frederik Kanstein, an engineer from the city of Arnhem, wrote in the 
roadbuilding journal Wegen that cyclists were lazy by nature, “choosing the 
line of least resistance, like electricity.”105 The rise of asphalt roads equally 
required high-quality cycling paths since cyclists much preferred them to 
the bumpy road surfaces: f igure 10 provides a good example. Most cycle 
paths alongside national roads had a concrete (paved) surface, however.106 
For car advocates like Peppink, Kanstein, and Huitema, calling for cycling 
infrastructure was perhaps informed more by the needs of drivers to cruise 
wegen” (attachment to letter from provincial head engineer Mussert to Provincial Executive 
of Utrecht, November 16, 1927).
100 “Neerlands rijwielpaden en hun bewijzering,” De Kampioen 59, no. 9 (1942): 65-66.
101 For the debate on road surfaces: Gijs Mom, “Inter-Artifactual Technology Transfer: Road 
Building Technology in the Netherlands and the Competition Between Bricks, Macadam, Asphalt 
and Concrete,” History and Technology 20, no. 1 (2004): 75-96.
102 T. Huitema, “Rijwielpaden,” Wegen 5, no. 11 (1929): 270.
103 H.J. Peppink, “Aparte rijwielpaden … òf: wielrijders op den hoofdweg?,” Wegen 5, no. 9 (1929): 
220.
104 Ibid., 221.
105 F. Kanstein, “Rijwielpaden,” Wegen 5, no. 7 (1929): 161.
106 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 311.
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along without interruption than those of cyclists. Still, they went out of their 
way to call for improvements in the quality of cycling paths.
This broad support for cycling infrastructure alongside Dutch roads led to 
norms which looked impressive on paper and were applied in practice. The 
network of cycling paths was already growing before the days of the bicycle 
tax. The 1923 traff ic count report includes a map of cycling traff ic on roads 
with cycling paths.107 While certain urbanized areas (notably Rotterdam and 
the South-East) lacked cycling paths, other regions (The Hague-Amsterdam-
Utrecht) already had intensively used cycling infrastructure. By the late 
1930s, the National Roads Plan counted over 2,300 km of roads. Of these, 
almost 1,800 km had a cycling path (3,050 km, counting roads with cycling 
paths on both sides). A further 1,350 km of (secondary) provincial roads 
also had cycling paths. Engineers and policymakers considered these paths 
primarily for utilitarian purposes. A separate recreational network of cycling 
paths, not alongside roads and often in nature, was twice as long: 3,900 km by 
1942.108 This more extended recreational network had been some forty years 
107 Verslag betreffende verkeerswaarnemingen in 1923, attachment IIId.
108 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 197.
Figure 10 Traffic separation was not possible everywhere in the Dutch landscape but getting cyclists 
off the main road remained a priority. This provincial sand road between De Meern and Oudewater 
in Utrecht province was paved somewhere between 1924 and 1934. The adjacent asphalt lanes were 
intended to “seduce” cyclists into not riding in the middle of the road. [Source: Collectie Het Utrechts 
Archief, Photographer: Jochmann Disco, no. 220755]
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in the making. The utilitarian interurban and rural network materialized 
in the decade after the introduction of the Road Fund in 1927.
Judged separately, these results are impressive. However, comparing 
the investments in roadbuilding to cycling infrastructure shows a glaring 
disparity as the ANWB argued. In 1932, the government spent 18 million 
guilders on national road construction for 80,000 drivers, and reserved 
1.5 million for separate cycling paths for 2.8 million cyclists. By 1939, the 
roadbuilding budget had risen to 34 million, whereas the cycling budget had 
not kept pace at 1.4 million. This suggested that space for cars was growing at 
a much faster rate than for cyclists. Even considering the increased spending 
on the new highways, which the ANWB did not oppose in principle, the 
disparity was too great. With the exception of new car-only highways, the 
ANWB argued, every road on the 1938 National Road Plan should have 
at least one separate cycling path.109 Cyclists got paths in return for their 
investments, but also paid for the roads the car lobby demanded.
2.5 Governing Cycling Publicly or Privately?
Once the bicycle tax led to agreement on cycling paths, the question 
remained who was responsible for constructing and coordinating them. 
Citizen organizations could receive subsidies, as was the case with the 
recreational cycling clubs, or the various government levels could take on this 
task. Over centuries, the growing network of roads and waterways built and 
governed by various authorities had led to a patchwork of responsibilities. 
The national, provincial, and municipal government were responsible for 
certain roads: the national, regional, and local network.110 By the 1920s, each 
governmental layer had to provide its roads with cycling infrastructure. 
In contrast to car infrastructure, it was unclear who was responsible for 
(coordinating) the countrywide cycling network or represented cyclists in 
general. The question of who governed cycling in the Netherlands hinged on 
whether cycling was defined as a predominantly recreational or utilitarian 
activity, and would shape policy for the next hundred years.
In the 1930s, state policymakers disagreed on the national cycling govern-
ance role beyond constructing cycling paths on national roads. In 1936, COW 
consultation committee chairman Van Rijckevorsel proposed designing “a 
national cycling-connections plan, in which the matter can be viewed from 
109 “Vrijliggende rijwielpaden zijn noodzakelijk,” 184.
110 A few roads were controlled by other governmental agencies such as the water authorities.
A CoNTeSTed ComPromISe: NATIoNAL GoverNmeNT SuPPorTS CommuTer CYCLING 115
a larger perspective,” although he qualif ied this by saying “the interests of 
cyclists are more of a local nature.”111 The question created a clear analogy 
with the national government’s initiative of building a road network for 
cars. According to committee member Jenze Jan Talsma, mayor of the 
small town Renkum, cycling governance was the national government’s 
responsibility. He believed “cycling connections for through traff ic [door-
gaande rijwielverbindingen], … [was] a task for the national government.” 
Acknowledging “the felicitous local initiative that is being shown by the 
cycling path associations,” he nevertheless believed the national government 
should intervene.112 Some national policymakers agreed that the national 
government should provide cycling infrastructure.
The cycling governance issue became more urgent when the possibil-
ity arose of delegating road coordination to non-governmental actors. In 
1936, when the umbrella organization Federation of Dutch Cycling Path 
Organizations applied for an annual subsidy to support their burgeoning 
cycle path network and to cope with the rising costs and stagnating income, 
the non-governmental organization claimed to be a valuable governance 
partner by pointing to the 2,500 km of paths they had already constructed. 
Multiple arguments supported their request. Not only was it in the interest 
of recreational cyclists to have paths and access to nature areas but the 
shorter connections also served government employees like postmen, 
telegraph messengers, and police off icers who used bicycles to get around. 
Because the network had become so big, the associations were f inancially 
overstretched: “there is now a danger, that many of these cycling paths 
cannot be properly maintained anymore and will consequently have to be 
closed for cycling traff ic, while expanding this network of cycling paths will 
have to be limited to a minimum, due to the decreasing contributions from 
state institutions.”113 In need of funds, the non-governmental organizations 
argued for the public status of their cycling paths.
According to the Federation, the subsidies also created employment 
opportunities in times of economic crisis. The Federation proposed deposit-
ing a small part of the bicycle tax (e.g., 10 cents per bicycle) in a special 
fund dedicated to the construction of cycling paths under the associations’ 
control: a public-private partnership, with control over spending state funds 
delegated to private associations. The proposal sparked a debate that sheds 
light on how major policymakers viewed recreational cycling’s political 
111 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 372, meeting February 11, 1936.
112 Ibid., meeting July 13, 1936.
113 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 436, letter July 1936.
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status. A COW subcommittee consisting of state engineers Van Heyst and 
Wentholt, plus non-state representatives Bloemers (ANWB chairman), De 
Bruyn (ANWB engineer) and Van Tienhoven (conservation group), ruled 
against awarding the subsidy.114
During this debate, the policymakers minimized the national govern-
ment’s potential role in coordinating and funding (recreational) cycling 
infrastructure. They did not consider the cycling paths these private 
associations had constructed important enough: the paths served “primar-
ily a provincial interest, because the connections are inter-local and the 
associations are more or less provincially oriented.”115 A few years later, 
engineer Pieter Johannes van Voorst Vader also doubted “whether the 
national government should involve itself with the construction of these 
cycle paths” because leisure and tourism were only of “regional interest.”116 
The national responsibility for cycling, in Van Voorst Vader’s opinion, ended 
with creating cycling paths that freed main roads of cyclists. That was not 
what the average association paths did, as they were primarily for tourism. 
Some committee members disputed this restrictive stance, however. Talsma 
pointed out that cycling tourists used the road just like utilitarian cyclists if 
there were no cycling paths. Van Rijckevorsel added, “one should not look too 
much to the goal of the cycling path. It only matters whether there is a traffic 
need.”117 What precisely a “traff ic need” meant was open to interpretation. 
For some, this meant drivers’ needs, while others recognized cyclists’ needs. 
The debate gave only minimal attention to cycling, mostly on account of the 
interest in car drivers, without much representation from cities or workers.
The national policymakers on the COW committee preferred to assign 
provinces the leading role. Despite “an interest in these connections,” most 
cycle path organizations could not f inance construction because many were 
“near f inancially less well-to-do municipalities.”118 The national government 
felt it could not be responsible for these paths because cycling was a local 
mode of transport, yet local communities, while given the mandate, could not 
bear the f inancial burden. The only remaining options were the provinces. 
National policymakers decided to “involve the provinces, while the financing 
could be arranged with the help of state subsidies, the province, municipali-
ties, unemployment relief, and bodies like the ANWB and the cycling path 
114 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 436.
115 Ibid., memorandum January 21, 1938.
116 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 372, meeting October 26, 1939.
117 Ibid.
118 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 436, memorandum January 21, 1938.
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associations.”119 In short, the provinces should have administrative control. 
The money had to come from different sources, including the national 
government, as well as local bodies and non-governmental partners.
ANWB leaders Bloemers and De Bruyn lobbied through the COW 
committee for national investments as well as provincial coordination. 
The committee agreed. However, the distinction between utilitarian and 
recreational cycling complicated matters. Legislation prohibited the national 
Traff ic Fund (for all transport infrastructure investments) from subsidizing 
recreational infrastructure. The fund could only subsidize cycling paths if 
these served “to unburden the traff ic along main connections for through 
traff ic … irrespective of whether these paths are part of the roads.”120 Again, 
recreational cyclists were framed as completely different than commuting 
cyclists. According to Bloemers and De Bruyn, communities wanting to 
attract tourists by building recreational paths lacked the f inancial means 
to do so and while “we can def initely speak of a task for the Provincial 
Government here,” at the same time “the large cultural value for the entire 
population of our country of a judiciously constructed network of cycling 
paths separated from the large roads can hardly be underestimated.”121 A 
subsidy was entirely justif ied. The ANWB kept framing cycling as an activity 
for the entire nation, requiring state involvement. Funding and coordination 
demanded a national governing body: “This committee could then also 
be charged with the highly important task of coordinating the different 
provincial plans and promoting the execution of them, among others by 
encouraging the cooperation of the different relevant institutions.”122
The ANWB lobby was not entirely successful either, as Public Works 
Ministry engineers were committed to a narrower def inition of cycling as 
a (national) public good that fell to local governments. The state engineers 
were willing to consider a modest subsidy, but no more. And there was 
another dilemma: what types of cycling deserved support and which gov-
ernmental bodies should receive subsidies? Van Voorst Vader and Bloemers 
argued that more money had to go to the provinces with a strong interest in 
tourism and the most attractive nature. According to Van Voorst Vader “in 
a region with natural beauty, there will be a larger need for cycling paths 
than elsewhere.”123 Politician Van Rijckevorsel opposed this blatant neglect 
119 Ibid.




123 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 373, meeting February 15, 1940.
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of other cyclists’ needs: “one should not in the f irst place construct cycling 
paths for tourists, but take into account the opening up and establishment 
of industry in the countryside.”124 Bloemers admitted that cycling paths 
should also serve this goal, like for industrial workers around the textile 
cities Hengelo and Enschede.125 While the committee members got bogged 
down in long legal discussions, however, the outbreak of World War II 
halted the debate temporarily.126 After the war, the provinces took on the 
governance of (recreational) cycling together with individual organizations 
(see Chapter 3).
By the late 1930s, the consensus was that the national government 
would only build interurban commuter cycling paths alongside major 
roads – to create unobstructed roads for cars and compensate for cyclists’ 
tax money. Other cycling infrastructure, whether recreational or, as the 
cycling clubs argued, mixed-use, was the responsibility of a coalition 
consisting of provincial and local government and the tourist organization 
ANWB.
Determining cycling infrastructure’s status as a public good depended 
on two key factors. By invoking the scale and range of cycling, policymakers 
framed the bicycle as local (in stark contrast to the car as national). Cycling 
was lower government’s responsibility. By stressing the distinction between 
utilitarian and recreational cycling, Public Works off icials limited their 
involvement in cycling governance to providing separate infrastructure 
along major roads. Recreational cycling infrastructure was not seen as a 
national public good, but a local task, if that. In other words, the cycling 
governance debate was about the proper level as well as sector of government 
involvement.
There was no permanent solution to the responsibility issue. Key civil 
society actors like the ANWB and smaller tourist organizations continued 
to contest the national government’s limited role in cycling governance, 
particularly as they thought it contrasted sharply with the government’s far 
more generous car policies that did not make this distinction. The distinc-
tion between utilitarian and recreational cycling that divided committee 
members in the 1930s played a huge role in postwar discussions. The ques-
tions they debated – what was a cycling path? and for whom? – were not 
straightforward and had major implications.
124 Ibid.
125 Traff ic counts in the 1920s and 1930s show the Eindhoven region’s very high cycling share. 
Oldenziel et al., Cycling Cities: The European Experience, 42.
126 After 1942, the COW committee did not meet till after the war.
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2.6 Conclusion
By the mid-twentieth century, politicians and engineers across Europe and 
the United States redefined the road as an exclusive space for automobiles.127 
In the decades-long process, cyclists were disregarded and marginalized. In 
this international process, a car lobby was also active in the Netherlands, but 
not with the same negative repercussions for cycling practices as elsewhere. 
This has everything to do with the introduction of a bicycle tax linked to 
national roadbuilding that put Dutch cycling policy on a different track. As 
a result, and in line with Dutch accommodationist tradition, policymakers 
did not emphatically choose either travel mode. It became a key principle for 
Dutch traffic planners to cater for both. Many wanted to remove cyclists from 
the road to facilitate drivers – but unlike elsewhere, they built an extensive 
network of separate cycling paths, not simply accepting a “survival of the 
f ittest” system without protection for cyclists. The national and provincial 
government started (re)constructing roads for cars, simultaneously providing 
separate cycling paths. The state resisted taking on a larger role in cycling 
governance (regarding recreational cycling), but independent actors stepped 
in. The cycling infrastructure served suburban commuters. Firmly embedded 
in engineering norms, and with significant support from engineers and civil 
society representatives, this type of infrastructure continued thereafter. In 
short, the origins of the unique Dutch trajectory lie in this period.
Ebert and Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel discuss this development 
in broad brushstrokes. Ebert explains that the bicycle tax gave Dutch cy-
cling advocates a unique political weapon that cyclists in other countries 
lacked. The bicycle tax also meant that, unlike cyclists elsewhere, they 
had a legitimate claim on the Dutch government to see cycling as a public 
good. This chapter confirms Ebert’s argument using previously unexplored 
sources – parliament and committee records – to paint a richer and more 
nuanced picture of how not only the ANWB, but also engineers and politi-
cians saw cycling. The bicycle tax debates in parliament established the 
connection – and the compromise – between the tax and cycling paths, 
albeit contested. Using the advisory committee’s reports to the Dutch 
minister of public works, I show how engineers, working with civil society 
stakeholders, did indeed understand that the bicycle tax’s mandate and 
political compromise allowed cyclists some claim to public funds.
The bicycle tax did not, however, convince Dutch policymakers to 
consider cycling as a public good: motorized traff ic had a higher priority. 
127 Norton, Fighting Traffic.
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For national policymakers, cycling was only a public good when it came to 
getting (commuting) cyclists off future interurban car connections. While 
recreational cycling advocacy was strong and eventually successful, the 
bicycle tax argument did not procure state support for recreational cycle 
paths. One of Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel’s central arguments is 
that urban (working class) cyclists paid the tax but got nothing in return. 
Indeed, in engineering circles and strikingly in parliament, urban cyclists 
remained largely invisible. They could use suburban infrastructure on 
recreational trips, but cycling’s status as a public good remained limited 
to the middle classes.
Ebert summarizes the problem facing German cyclists: “Because cyclists 
paid nothing, they could not ask for anything.”128 Albert de la Bruhèze 
and Oldenziel rightly qualify her conclusion, stating: “the paths were also 
designed to discipline rather than facilitate cyclists.” In short, mobility 
policy was less benign than Ebert argues.129 It is fair to say that the bicycle 
tax, especially its third and f inal instalment, was both unjust and dispro-
portional. Yet it also set the Netherlands on a path-dependent course of 
cycle path construction, creating an institutional culture of engineering 
standards with long-lasting effects on the viability of Dutch cycling. Once 
traff ic separation became a norm, and cycling remained popular, mostly 
because of this infrastructure, it was very diff icult to stop constructing 
these commuter paths. The bicycle tax certainly prioritized drivers’ needs. 
Yet it had unintended, positive long-term consequences – a kind of path 
dependency – for cyclists. It indirectly contributed to the survival of a cycling 
culture and cycling expertise among engineers, creating favorable condi-
tions for introducing cycling infrastructure in Dutch cities after 1970 when 
cycling reemerged as part of the political agenda: by that time there were 
still large groups of cyclists who legitimated activist demands. Moreover, 
the expertise and experience of mainly provincial engineers, some national 
engineers, and the ANWB’s engineers, enabled a quicker implementation 
of pro-cycling measures than elsewhere, as we will see.
This exploration of Dutch policymakers’ role in cycling governance reveals 
a large involvement for the period 1920-1950, from MPs to engineers and 
interest groups. Because of the bicycle tax, long and heated discussions 
about cycling took place in parliament. The social democrats f iercely tried 
to defend working-class cyclists against the bicycle tax. When only very few 
people owned a car (1 percent of the population), car-minded politicians from 
128 Ebert, “When Cycling Gets Political,” 236.
129 Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel, “Who Pays, Who Benef its?,” 85.
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different parties had to reckon with cycling’s popularity as everyday mobility 
mode in the Netherlands. The bicycle tax and debate led to a compromise and 
an engineering standard of traff ic separation. National engineers preparing 
the way for automobility could not either ignore the cycling majorities 
that became visible in their agencies’ traff ic counts. Engineers, crucially 
working with civil society representatives, spent a signif icant amount of 
time and effort reconciling drivers and cyclists’ interests. A division of tasks 
emerged: The national Public Works department’s involvement in cycling 
was limited to providing separate cycling paths alongside major roads – a 
pattern still visible in later decades. Provincial Public Works departments 
provided regional roads with cycling paths, while any coordination of the 
cycling infrastructure network as a whole was informally left to the ANWB. 
The interaction between stakeholders was what we might call accommodat-
ing. The relationship between the influential tourist organization ANWB 
and engineers was close and cooperative. Urged on by politicians whose 
electorates increasingly depended on cycling, cyclists had institutional 
backing. More so than in other countries, commuter cycling infrastructure 
became a public good.

 Conclusion Part I
Cycling as a practice underwent major changes across the world between 
1880 and 1950. Starting as an upper-class leisure activity, it gradually be-
came more affordable and more popular for commuting and transport. In 
the process, the bicycle acquired increasingly working-class connotations. 
Meanwhile, the elite adopted the new symbol of modernity, the automobile, 
and shifted their lobbying efforts from better roads for cyclists, to better 
roads for cars – preferably with no space for bicycles. The declining status 
of cycling and the declining role of both government and lobby groups 
reinforced each other, making cycling an increasingly dangerous and 
unattractive practice. By the mid-twentieth century, large groups of people 
all over world were still cycling as they could not afford or lacked access 
to public transit or car ownership. The conditions for cyclists, however, 
were deteriorating. In the Netherlands this played out differently. Cycling 
put down deeper roots in governance structures and engineering norms. 
The role of the bicycle tax compromise can hardly be overestimated. 
Nor should we overlook the regional cycling path organizations working 
on recreational infrastructure. Both laid the groundwork for a material 
infrastructure supporting the practice of cycling to a greater extent than 
elsewhere.
The political compromise of the bicycle tax formed a crucial though 
contingent starting point which set the Netherlands on a track of traff ic 
separation. The late adoption of cars combined with an early and ambitious 
commitment to highway building in a high-cycling context resulted in a 
unique situation when politicians and engineers faced the dilemma of 
funding these highways. A coalition of non-governmental cycling advocates, 
politicians, and national and provincial engineers agreed upon a political 
compromise in which national policymakers exploited cycling’s popularity 
as a source of revenue to f inance a road network for future motorization. 
This system still shapes Dutch cycling today. Giving cyclists a separate path 
while prioritizing cars was a way of engineering and designing traff ic space 
with important path-dependent implications. The persistence of cycling in 
the Netherlands during the 1950s and 1960s, much more so than in other 
countries, has its roots in policies put in motion in the 1920s. In engineering 
norms and culture, engineers adopted road and cycling path norms that 
acquired their own path-dependent logic. Once traff ic separation was 
established as desirable, engineers everywhere adopted this measure, a 
process that was increasingly hard to reverse. The annual reports of all the 
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public works departments listed the construction of new stretches of cycling 
paths as a matter of course. For young engineers entering the Public Works 
departments, including cycling facilities in new or reconstructed roads 
was standard procedure. Outside the Netherlands, cycle path construction 
never became such a standard practice. In the struggle for resources and 
legitimization, cycling advocates in other countries lost out. In my view, 
because cycling paths became off icial policy and standard practice, Dutch 
Public Works continued to construct cycling infrastructure even during the 
heydays of car-centered planning post-World War II, as we will see.
Alongside this system, a second coalition of recreational cycling govern-
ance existed, as discussed in the f irst chapter. This separation of utilitarian 
and recreational cycling policy coalitions would also shape Dutch cycling 
in the long run. Cycling paths not following the road network were osten-
sibly recreational and did not involve the national government or national 
policymakers at all. From the 1910s onwards, a coalition of the ANWB, 
here in its role as a tourist organization, together with local elites, set up 
several cycling path organizations. They managed to build a network of 
several thousand kilometers of cycling paths in rural areas. The citizen 
initiative role in Dutch cycling governance was large and predated state 
involvement. As a result, these citizen groups built up expertise which gave 
them legitimacy and usefulness as governance partner. Coupled with the 
Dutch polder model, where social representatives were routinely included 
in consultation procedures, this explains why the tourist and (since 1920) 
lobby organization ANWB played such a prominent role in Dutch cycling 
governance.
The political appreciation of cycling was highly uneven. For one, the 
ANWB mostly ignored cycling within cities, so did most MPs. Moreover, 
national investments in car infrastructure far exceeded those in cycling. 
And as we have seen, not all cyclists were equal. The distinction that cycling 
advocates and politicians made from the start was between recreational and 
utilitarian infrastructure, investing in the latter while leaving the former 
to citizen organizations. This was linked to the idea that they required 
different funding streams and different governance coalitions. Throughout 
the twentieth century, these two separate streams would remain. Urban 
cycling also remained out of focus for national and provincial policymakers. 
The policies in place supported suburban commuters and recreational 
(including urban) cyclists, but fell short for utilitarian cycling within the 
city. The late adoption of the car in the Netherlands meant that cyclists in 
cities, sharing the road with cars, had some safety in numbers, as f igure 11 
illustrates. This would change in the decades to come.
CoNCLuSIoN PArT I 125
Between 1880 and 1950, Dutch cycling governance expanded from 
private recreational cycling to a public-private partnership supporting 
a wider range of cycling practices. The ANWB, working with regional 
cycling path organizations, initially dominated private initiatives. By the 
mid-1930s, cycling governance had a larger if contested place in national 
governmental policy. An informal coalition of engineers and non-prof it 
organizations governed cycling at multiple levels. Responsibility for 
utilitarian (commuter) cycling had landed with Public Works depart-
ments, whose design norms for roads now included separate cycling 
paths. Responsibility for recreational cycling on the other hand gradually 
shifted to the provinces, but still largely controlled by non-government 
organizations. As a knowledge actor and intermediary, the ANWB was 
the stakeholder keeping cycling on as many policymakers’ agendas as 
possible.
Figure 11 Cyclists dominated city streets, like here in Utrecht in 1931. A traffic policeman, standing in his 
chequered box behind the tram pole, has stopped the throng of cycling traffic from the right to allow 
another stream of cyclists to cross the road. Urban engineers did not apply traffic separation within 
cities, giving cyclists ample space to use the entire width of the road. This was necessary too, given 
the droves of cyclists during rush hours. This picture appeared in the illustrated magazine utrecht in 
Woord en beeld (Utrecht in Text and Pictures). [Source: Collection Het Utrechts Archief, no. 83925]
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Rising income levels in the 1950s and 1960s enabled more people to drive 
a car, often with disastrous consequences for cycling levels and policies. 
How did utilitarian and recreational cycling fare in the Netherlands? Did 
the governance coalitions established before the 1950s survive, or were they 
dismantled, leaving cyclists to fend for themselves, just like urban cyclists 
up to that point?
Part II
Divergence : How Dutch Cycling Policy and 
Practice Persevered, 1950s-1970s
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The scarce cycling scholarship on the postwar period tends to focus on the 
disappearance of urban cycling as a result of its increasing marginalization, 
both on the road and in policymaking. Adri Albert de la Bruhèze and Frank 
Veraart’s work is exceptional in this regard. Building on their research, 
mobility historians Gijs Mom and Ruud Filarski acknowledge the presence of 
cyclists, moped riders, and extensive cycling infrastructure in their overview 
of Dutch mobility in this period, but highlight the rise of the car and the 
extension of the road network.1 In cycling historiography, Ruth Oldenziel, 
Martin Emanuel, Veraart, and Albert de la Bruhèze frame the period 1950-1970 
in a similar way, as we see from their subsection titles “Planning a Car-friendly 
Future 1945-1970” for the city of Utrecht or “Catering to Cars in a City of 
Cyclists 1950-1970” on Enschede.2 Most cycling historiography focuses on 
how policymakers and engineers facilitated cars in the city and the negative 
impact on urban cycling practice. This general direction of the historiography 
is well documented and beyond doubt. Policymakers and engineers did 
prioritize cars. Cycling everywhere suffered as a result – an injustice that 
urban cyclists would f ight to correct after the 1970s, as discussed in Part III.
Rather than concentrating on how car-centered policies marginalized cy-
cling, Part II, entitled “Divergence,” analyzes cycling’s contested but enduring 
status in policy circles as a Dutch public good from the late 1940s to the 1960s. 
This approach does not contradict but, rather, enriches the current scholarship. 
My focus on national and regional rather than urban politics sheds a different 
light on cycling governance during these neglectful years. It helps explain 
the divergent trajectory of Dutch cycling in comparison with elsewhere. The 
following three chapters argue that while urban cyclists were still largely left 
to their own devices, older policies aimed at commuter cycling outside cities 
survived in governmental circles. In addition, new groups of cyclists became 
more central: in the 1950s, (provincial) policymakers developed an interest in 
recreational cyclists. Previously governed by independent organizations, the 
promotion of cycling tourism for public health or economic benefits triggered 
new governance initiatives. In the 1960s, the safety of children cycling to 
school gradually emerged as an additional concern. Social actors, planners, 
policymakers, and car boosters may have expressed negative judgements 
about (commuter) cycling, considering it outdated, yet a large group of Dutch 
1 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 246. Mom, “The West and the Rest,” 143-99. The 
same applies to Nil Disco, “De bewogen stad, 1945-1980,” in Techniek in Nederland in de twintigste 
eeuw. Deel 6. Stad, bouw, industriële productie, eds. Johan Schot et al. (Eindhoven: Stichting 
Historie der Techniek, 2003), 74-99.
2 Oldenziel et al., Cycling Cities: The European Experience, 32, 43.
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engineers and politicians remained committed to publicly supporting bicycle 
commuting or developed new support for cycling tourism.
The argument spans three chapters. Chapter 3 takes up the governance of 
recreational cycling where it left of in Chapter 1. It analyzes how responsibil-
ity shifted from citizen organizations to provincial policymakers. Chapter 4 
focuses on what happened to the utilitarian cycling policies described in 
Chapter 2 of Part I once the bicycle tax ended in 1941. It examines the extent 
to which older engineering norms for cycling infrastructure still applied in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, Chapter 5 shows how the new moped boosted 
cycling infrastructure in unintended ways as its undecided status as a vehicle 
(neither a bicycle nor a car) challenged policymakers. Chapters 4 and 5 
stress policymakers’ ambivalence towards utilitarian cycling in this period. 
Together, these chapters show why cycling persisted in the Netherlands as 
policy and practice, unlike in many surrounding countries. While Dutch 
politicians and engineers still considered many forms of cycling a public 
good at a time when policymakers in other parts of the world found cycling 
outdated, urban cycling became increasingly dangerous when policymakers 
started accommodating cars in cities – the topic of Part III. This chapter 
constitutes a crucial pivot linking the cycling tradition established before 
1950, to the cycling revival of the 1970s. Tracing this trajectory is essential 
for understanding each of those periods: to discover not just the long-term 
effects of policies set in motion in the 1920s, but also to fully understand 
the conditions cycling activists and policymakers faced in the 1970s.
To understand the context of the late 1940s to 1960s, we need to place 
the development of cycling in wider mobility developments. As a practice, 
cycling remained crucial to Dutch mobility in the 1950s for commuting, 
shopping, and touring. Many European cities saw their cycling levels drop 
sharply around 1950.3 In the UK, for instance, the total distance cycled per 
capita declined after 1952.4 In the Netherlands, as the Cycling Cities research 
group has shown, the bicycle’s relative decline – its share of total trips vs. 
automobility and public transit – was already visible in the 1950s.5 Even 
3 Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze and Ruth Oldenziel, Cycling Cities: The Munich Experience, 8. 
Volker Briese notes it was common to transform existing cycling lanes into car (parking) lanes 
in Germany, but that hardly ever happened in the Netherlands and Denmark: Briese, Besondere 
Wege für Radfahrer, 20.
4 Malcolm J. Wardlaw, “History, Risk, Infrastructure: Perspectives on Bicycling in the Neth-
erlands and the UK,” Journal of Transport & Health 1, no. 4 (2014): 243-250, here 245.
5 Ton Welleman, The Dutch Bicycle Master Plan: Description and Evaluation in an Historical 
context (The Hague: Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, Directorate-
General for Passenger Transport, 1999), 28-29.
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so, the bicycle’s relative share remained signif icant; the growth in total 
distances traveled confirms that cycling remained popular for the Dutch 
in the 1950s and 1960s. The high cycling levels dropped sharply in the 1960s, 
reaching rock bottom around 1970, but even at this relative low-point in 
Dutch urban cycling, the bicycle still had a major modal share of roughly 
30 percent in many cities.6 In Denmark’s capital, Copenhagen, where cycling 
levels also remained signif icant before plummeting between 1955 and 
1970, substantial numbers of commuters (20 percent) and schoolchildren 
(30 percent) continued cycling in the 1960s.7 In many cities across Europe, 
cycling’s decline was much more dramatic than in the Netherlands.
Dutch cycling policies and practices turned out to be more resilient than 
in other countries in the 1950s and 1960s, when governmental support for 
automobility made cycling increasingly hard across the Western world. 
This partly has to do with the deep roots cycling governance put down in 
the f irst half of the twentieth century, but also with new developments. 
Cycling practice remained very strong in the Netherlands, even while 
policymakers planned – and built – car infrastructures and kept investing 
in public transit.8 Rather than seeing the bicycle and car as successive 
stages, it is important to realize that new technologies often undergo 
a signif icant period of overlap with older ones. In the 1950s and 1960s, 
cycling co-existed with driving in the Netherlands. While engineers and 
planners around the world might have framed cycling as obsolete, the 
reality was different.
Indeed, as scholars like David Edgerton and Elizabeth Shove stress, 
technologies do not simply disappear overnight, but experience a gradual 
process of decline. Certain elements of the technological system remain 
in place.9 People do not discard technologies as quickly as policymaking 
elites and engineers do. Many elements of technical systems that innova-
tors, policymakers, or opinion makers consider outdated can survive long 
beyond the actual use of an artefact. Shove calls these elements “pockets 
of persistence” and argues that they can serve the revival or reintroduction 
6 Oldenziel et al., Cycling Cities: The European Experience, 13.
7 Emanuel, “Making a Bicycle City,” 507.
8 As Jan Ploeger at Eindhoven University of Technology argues in his forthcoming book on the 
bicycle-train combination, there was early opposition to car-oriented planning among Dutch 
planners, which fostered the emergence of the bicycle-train combination as an alternative.
9 David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 (London: Profile 
Books, 2006). Already questioning the easy periodization of cycling and automobility: Monika Burri, 
Das Fahrrad: Wegbereiter oder überrolltes Leitbild? Eine Fussnote zur Technikgeschichte des Automobils 
(Zürich: Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule, Institut für Geschichte, Technikgeschichte, 1998).
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of these technologies at a later date.10 Taking cycling history as an example, 
she writes: “Regimes of cycling declined across Europe during the 1960s but 
different forms of vanishing resulted in the patchy and partial endurance 
of selected elements.”11 Indeed, my argument in the following chapters is 
that the decline of cycling in the Netherlands was much less radical than 
elsewhere, and that important elements of the cycling system and network 
persisted throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Cycling engineering expertise, 
governance relations, and practices survived to such an extent that they 
partly explain why the campaign for creating cycling cities after 1970 was 
so successful. Dutch cyclists still formed a large group, engineers still had 
knowledge about cycling infrastructure, and policymakers and engineers 
still formed cycling governance coalitions.
To sum up, understanding cycling in the 1950s and 1960s is crucial to the 
overall project. This is the period when European countries wrestled with the 
car. The approaches they chose might have been only marginally different, but 
in the long run, these minor initial choices created major differences, as path 
dependency theorists also argue. Explaining the revival of urban cycling since 
the 1970s, something which interests both historians and cycling practitioners, 
too often fails to consider the circumstances when it started around 1970. 
While these do not explain everything, they are crucial to understanding 
the conditions that supported campaigns to limit the car’s place in the city 
and redistribute space for cyclists and pedestrians. Cycling activists needed 
a base to recruit members and gain legitimacy with policymakers; engineers 
tasked with building cycling infrastructure needed the expertise to do so. 
Many countries lacked this base and knowledge due to cycling’s dramatic 
decline after mid-century. We urgently need to examine why cycling persisted 
in the Netherlands after the 1950s. The Cycling Cities project is addressing 
this diversity in urban cycling. In the following chapters, I f ill a gap in the 
scholarship by taking a f irst look at other cycling policies and practices 
at a national and provincial level. Older policies lived on, now as routine 
procedures, leaving fewer traces in the public debate, but have led to material 
infrastructure. New policies regarding mopeds and recreational cycling had 
major impacts on cycling and mobility in the Netherlands. It is easy to lose sight 
of this: the automobilization in these decades is one of the most fundamental 
infrastructural transformations of the twentieth century. We need to study 
this in order to understand why Dutch cycling survived alongside the car.
10 Elizabeth Shove, “The Shadowy Side of Innovation: Unmasking and Sustainability,” Technology 
Analysis & Strategic Management 24, no. 4 (2012): 363-75.
11 Ibid., 372.
3 A Right to Recreation: Provincial 
Policymakers Design Cycling Networks
“Actually, the construction and maintenance of cycling paths is a govern-
ment task for municipalities,” a journalist wrote in 1949. “It is fortunate 
that this Twente organization, founded on January 6, 1917, has taken this 
governmental work upon itself because otherwise, the condition of many 
cycling paths in Twente would almost certainly be a lot worse than it is now.”1 
He praised the Twente cycling path organization for its valuable service to 
society – but also implicitly critiqued local government for ignoring a public 
task. Constructing 1,000 km of cycling paths in the eastern region of Twente 
had not been easy: local municipalities invested very little, and funding 
had to come from elsewhere. Both tourists and commuters were served: 
Twente had a signif icant textile industry, so to provide mobility options for 
its workers, major industrialists sponsored path construction through the 
Chamber of Commerce. The region also received small sums from the tourist 
organization (ANWB), the tourist board (VVV), the district water board, the 
farmers union, the agricultural loan bank, and dairy factories. The plethora 
of contributors reveals the broad support for cycling infrastructure in this 
prominent textile region. By the late 1940s, a growing chorus of voices called 
for local authorities to take up a larger role in cycling governance and not 
leave it all to the energy and initiative of others. Finally, the 1930 call from 
the Loosdrecht accountant with which our story started seems to resonate: 
building cycling path should be the government’s task.
Some of the earliest policymakers to realize this were in the province of 
Drenthe. Wanting to take up the construction of cycling paths as a state task, 
policymakers decided to establish a cycling path organization in 1940. At 
their founding meeting, a key member of the successful sister organization 
in neighboring Twente (in the province Overijssel), L. Vincken, advised 
Drenthe “to concentrate not only on paths with a recreational interest, but 
also on utilitarian paths [utiliteitspaden] to obtain f inancial support from 
residents.”2 Vincken’s underlying strategy was opportunistic: get funding for 
recreational cycling paths by stressing cycling paths’ economic uses. Hendrik 
1 “De Rijwielpadvereniging Twente: Haar werk en haar vele moeilijkheden,” Twentsch dagblad 
Tubantia, April 30, 1949, 2.
2 DA 0196, inv. no. 544, minutes foundation meeting Drenthe cycling path organization, 
May 7, 1940.
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Wytema, mayor of one of Drenthe’s municipalities, agreed, pointing to the 
1930s crisis funding that deployed jobless workers to construct cycling paths. 
Those plans were also for “utilitarian paths” and had a broader political 
support than the purely recreational paths, he counseled.3 In the context 
of the 1930s economic crisis, the liberal clubs found tourism was less of a 
priority. They needed other arguments to convince social democrat and 
confessional parties to invest in cycling. Vincken and Wytema perhaps 
realized that utilitarian cyclists formed a larger group supported by labor 
parties than purely recreational ones reputed to benefit the well-to-do. Their 
claims for state involvement were more likely to succeed if both groups 
would benefit from cycling paths.
What arguments did the organizations use to convince local government 
to become more active in cycling governance? And why were provincial and 
municipal politicians so eager to build cycling paths at a time when around 
the world, policy attention on cycling was reaching a low point? Framing 
cyclists as either predominantly utilitarian or recreational was a strategy 
that non-governmental organizations applied opportunistically to secure 
government subsidies. Stressing the bicycle’s utilitarian potential turned 
out to be a good strategy. And it proved to be successful.
While scholarship has paid attention to recreational cycling in its early 
bourgeois culture, it has ignored its crucial history in mid-century as missing 
link to the 1970s expansion of utilitarian cycling. Moreover, for the 1950s, the 
scant scholarship focuses on urban commuters, but not on how recreational 
cycling helped sustain and expand cycling infrastructure. This chapter, enti-
tled “A Right to Recreation: Provincial Policymakers Design Cycling Networks,” 
uses untapped archival material to reveal how provincial politicians and public 
works departments initiated new cycling policies for regional recreational 
cyclists in the 1950s and 1960s. My argument provides a counterweight to the 
dominant narrative of cycling’s decline in this period. A coalition of state and 
non-state actors believed that recreational cycling could solve concerns over 
public health and boost tourism – as two case studies illustrate – and invested 
in cycling accordingly. Policymakers in the densely populated province of 
Zuid-Holland introduced policies to improve its residents’ lives, while the poor 
agricultural province of Drenthe saw the economic potential of attracting 
middle-class cycling tourism. Interested in social uplift, social democrat 
politicians pushed to create recreational opportunities for the city’s working 
and middle classes. Only in the 1960s would the national government start 
to follow suit and support provincial initiatives.
3 Ibid.
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3.1 Pioneering Recreational Cycling Governance in the 1940s
When non-governmental cycling path organizations had sought Dutch state 
funding, they had made a case for their cycling infrastructure by underlining 
that it was a public good, serving both recreational and utilitarian purposes. 
However, their attempts to acquire national funding in the 1930s had failed. 
National policymakers argued that (recreational) cycling was a local concern, 
to be handled by local government. At the same time, as we have seen, public 
works engineers at national and provincial levels remained committed to 
building separate cycling paths alongside roads, which they considered 
utilitarian. In contrast, the cycling paths discussed in this chapter had their 
own trajectory. These did not follow the road network, but were recreational, 
meandering through the landscape. Over time, policymakers began to realize 
that this division was too simplistic: separate cycling paths that were not 
alongside main roads also served commuters and were mixed-use. In 1940, 
this problematic distinction between utilitarian and recreational cycling 
infrastructure was what had prompted Drenthe’s policymakers to establish 
a cycling path organization.
The effects of the war proved important. Around mid-century, local 
policymakers, increasingly recognizing the public service that the cycling 
path organizations provided, for example, f inanced much-needed repairs 
to the paths damaged in the war.4 State reconstruction agencies offered 
the organizations interest-free advances for the repair work. The tourist 
organization ANWB mediated between these agencies and the local cycling 
clubs in complex and time-consuming administrative procedures.5 The 
state did accept the war damage claims. It shows the government started 
to recognize the private organizations’ work as a public service. In 1950, 
for instance, Utrecht’s provincial government strongly recommended that 
municipalities raised subsidies to repair war damage to the local cycling 
path organization’s network (UMO). Municipalities had to “award and/or 
4 Two ANWB off icials, engineers Lorié and Tusenius, visited cycling path organizations 
throughout the country and together with local off icials made an inventory of the war damage: 
ANWB archive, inv. no. 1225 and for specif ic organizations ANWB Archive, inv. nos. 1113, 1115 (Gooi 
en Eemland), 1184 (Noord-Kennemerland), 1191, 1193 (UMO), 1209 (Walcheren), 1220 (Twente), 
and 1231, 1243 for an FNRV overview. The ANWB urged organizations to take advantage of the 
f inancial claims as some boards had become rather inactive over the years.
5 The ANWB was an intermediary in these contacts with the Ministry of Finance’s Reconstruc-
tion Agency (Bureau Financiering Wederopbouw Publiekrechtelijke Lichamen): ANWB archive, 
inv. no. 1191, letter UMO to Bureau, May 15, 1946 and letter ANWB to Bureau, June 15, 1946. UMO 
submitted a total of forty-four damage claims. After approval by the provincial state engineer, 
the ANWB forwarded requests to the Ministry’s policymakers.
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increase a reasonable yearly contribution” to UMO “which in effect takes 
care of the government’s tasks.”6 The ANWB and the UMO lobby succeeded 
in getting state recognition.
In the immediate postwar period, provincial authorities were increasingly 
involved in recreational cycling. Due to the Netherlands’ decentralized 
governance structure, each province had slightly different plans and fund-
ing procedures, as a 1938 ANWB report demonstrates.7 Zuid-Holland was 
working on its newly designed cycling path plan; as did other provinces 
like Drenthe, Noord-Brabant, and Limburg. Some provinces contributed 
by subsidizing a f ixed amount or percentage per kilometer of constructed 
cycling path.8 These provincial subsidies often stipulated that the cycling 
paths had to serve a public need: in Utrecht subsidies were only awarded to 
“paths which were considered of suff icient general interest.”9 The province 
Gelderland’s chief engineer emphasized that provincial subsidies were only 
meant for “bicycle tourism … because bicycle traff ic indicates an entirely 
different concept.”10 The funding streams for cycling paths alongside roads 
(seen as utilitarian) and recreational cycling paths were separate, as were 
the governance coalitions.
In 1946, the Federation of Dutch Cycling Path Organizations resubmitted 
its prewar request for national subsidies. The federation stressed the bicycle’s 
all-purpose postwar use, because due to shortages, “in the coming years, the 
bicycle will (have to) be used a lot.”11 The organizations employed their pre-
ferred strategy of stressing cycling paths’ mixed use to argue that tourism was 
not the primary goal. The paths served “numerous daily bicycle commutes 
for agricultural and factory-workers” and diverting cyclists from main roads 
was an additional reason to invest heavily in cycling infrastructure.12 The 
6 HUA 1007-3, inv. no. 30791, letter Utrecht province to municipalities, September 12, 1950.
7 Note again how hand in glove the Public Works department worked with the ANWB; the 
distinction between state and non-state actors was almost meaningless.
8 Overijssel provided 7.50 guilders per year/km of cycling paths. In Gelderland, the provincial 
executive chose paths it would f inance (25 guilders per year/km to a maximum of 180 km). Shortly 
after World War II, in a renewed attempt to boost tourism, this subsidy rose to 75 percent of 
maintenance costs, with a maximum of 75 guilders per km: Gelders Archief (hereafter: GA), 0039 
(Gedeputeerde Staten 1814-1950), inv. no. 9482, subsidies to cycling path organizations 1927-1949; 
GA 3204 (GS 1950-1979), inv. no. 7173, letter GS to provincial roads committee, November 26, 
1947.
9 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 436, memorandum ‘Nota naar aanleiding van het Adres van de Federatie 
van Nederlandsche Rijwielpadvereenigingen.’
10 GA 0039, inv. no. 9482, letter HID Kempees to cycling path organization Oostelijk Gelderland 
(BROG), February 11, 1932.
11 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 436.
12 Ibid. Letter May 14, 1946.
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ANWB agreed this was in the public interest: “a network of well-constructed 
utilitarian and recreational cycling paths would fulf il … a pressing need.”13 
The Minister of Public Works’ national advisors also deemed “a cycling path 
network covering the entire Netherlands of such great importance for the 
Dutch people … there is every reason to systematically design such a plan.”14 
The Ministry, however, decided that coordination and construction fell to 
new provincial bodies rather than the national government.
In the 1940s, policymakers systematized the planning of land use, includ-
ing recreation, under a new agency coordinating the efforts.15 During the 
war, the German occupiers of the Netherlands introduced a national spatial 
planning agency (Rijksdienst voor het Nationale Plan) in 1941.16 Each province 
had its own planning agency (Provinciale Planologische Dienst), also oversee-
ing recreation. After the war, the government established the new Ministry 
of Social Work in 1952, becoming the Ministry of Culture, Recreation, and 
Social Work in 1965 that would subsidize recreational cycling infrastructure 
(see 5.3).17 The provinces’ recreational cycling path design reflected growing 
government intervention in leisure and recreation policy, as well as designs 
for spatial planning and nature preservation. Since the 1940s, this process 
tended to sideline non-governmental actors, diminishing the role for private 
initiative. At the same time, it also marked cycling governance’s increasing 
professionalization. The policy’s main implementors were the provinces 
and municipalities working together regionally.
In the late 1940s and 1950s, some local policymakers created organizations 
to design regional (recreational) cycling networks.18 Others transformed 
existing private organizations into state agencies, taking over their privately 
built networks. Many municipalities, especially in the touristic Veluwe region, 
took up this initiative energetically in the late 1940s, seeing opportunities for 
developing tourism. For example, the founder of Zuid-Veluwerand, the cycling 
path organization around the nation’s key nature reserve area in 1949, was the 
mayor of the town Barneveld. He invited local mayors, tourist organizations 
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. Concept advice 1946.
15 Faludi and Van der Valk, Rule and Order, 64, 74, 97; Mom, “The West and the Rest”; Van der 
Cammen and De Klerk, Ruimtelijke ordening, 152-65; Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 
255-56.
16 Its f irst director was Frits Bakker Schut, son of prominent social democratic The Hague city 
planner Piet Bakker Schut.
17 Ido de Haan, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Maarten van Bottenburg, In het hart van de 
verzorgingsstaat: Het ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk en zijn opvolgers (CRM, WVC, VWS), 
1952-2002 (Zutphen: Walburg Pers, 2002).
18 E.g. the organization Zuid-Veluwerand (founded in 1949, ANWB archive, inv. no. 1199).
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(VVV), along with the province’s chief engineer J.G. Kruimel and ANWB 
engineer C.A. Kuysten to take part.19 Kruimel clarif ied provincial subsidy 
opportunities, while Kuysten explained the wider construction context and 
procedures elsewhere. The governance network consisted exclusively of 
regional policymakers (mayors), provincial policymakers (engineers), and 
the (national) non-governmental tourist organizations VVV and ANWB, 
functioning as advisors. The national government barely played a role.20
3.2 Pioneering Provincial Cycling Governance in Drenthe and 
Zuid-Holland
Stimulating cycling in Drenthe was a means to an end. Compared to densely 
urbanized Zuid-Holland, which supported cycling for public health reasons 
for its urban working classes, Drenthe was a sparsely populated, poor, and 
rural province. Drenthe actively promoted cycling (tourism) as a way to 
boost its economy. Before World War II, Drenthe had an active private cycling 
path organization and, uniquely, early state involvement with cycling. The 
local bourgeoisie in Drenthe created a non-governmental organization in 
1916. By 1937, it had constructed 100 km of paths. At that point and in the 
midst of the economic crisis, provincial policymakers took an interest in 
cycling path construction, even though the Drenthe branch of the Dutch 
Municipalities Association’s (Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeentes) applica-
tion to the national government for more cycling paths had been recently 
rejected. A key f igure behind the promotion of cycling paths was the Royal 
Commissioner for Drenthe, the conservative liberal baron Reint Hendrik de 
Vos van Steenwijk. A doctor of law, he belonged to a prominent family and 
was a long-time member of the Upper House of Parliament. His goal was to 
improve the economic situation of the relatively poor province of Drenthe. 
To this end, he wanted to attract industry and tourism, partly by improving 
19 ANWB archive, inv. no. 1199, “Kort verslag van het verhandelde in de vergadering van 
10 Februari 1949.”
20 Other examples of new public cycling path organizations, or private organizations taken over 
by the state, include Noord-Veluwe (ANWB archive, inv. no. 1226) and VRIGA in the Achterhoek 
region (both in Gelderland province) as well as organizations in Noord-Brabant province: Brabant 
Centrum, De Kempen, Markiezaat Bergen op Zoom, and later the Baronie van Breda. See also 
“Heden en toekomst van de rijwielpaden,” De Kampioen 53, no. 16 (1936): 266-67; “Rijwielpaden 
in de Geldersche Achterhoek,” De Kampioen 62, no. 11 (1947): 329; C.A. Kuysten, “Rijwielpaden 
in Zuid-Holland,” De Kampioen 62, no. 9 (1947): 274-75; “Rijwielpadennet in het centrum van 
Noord-Brabant,” De Kampioen 67, no. 12 (1952): 348-49; “Fietsen op de paden van de Zuid-Veluwe,” 
De Kampioen 75, no. 6 (1960): 176-77.
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Drenthe’s infrastructure. He took the initiative for the Development Agency 
for Drenthe (Centrale Vereeniging voor den Opbouw van Drenthe).21 Cycling 
path construction was one public works administration project that f itted in 
with these goals and would also address the massive youth unemployment 
in Drenthe during the 1930s economic crisis.22 He appointed some mayors 
and the Development Agency’s director Jaap Cramer to form a committee 
for this purpose. Cramer was a social democrat who would succeed De 
Vos van Steenwijk in 1951 as Royal Commissioner for Drenthe. While of 
different political aff iliations, both were elite f igures with good connections, 
in a position to realize their vision for Drenthe. Authorities in Drenthe 
pioneered the funding and building of the regional cycling path network in 
the late 1930s as a public works project to combat unemployment and create 
prosperity through a program of infrastructure construction.23
Drenthe also pioneered cycling governance. It was unclear which agency 
should be responsible for cycling paths. While the discussions in the late 
1930s had shown the state’s reluctance to do anything more than construct 
commuter cycling paths alongside roads, Drenthe decided to take the lead. 
The inspector for youth unemployment argued that Drenthe’s municipalities 
were too poor to contribute: municipal plans would only cover parts of the 
province. A provincial initiative would be a faster and more streamlined 
process. The inspector also advised to start quickly on a pilot, not to wait 
until the completion of a comprehensive plan. Building one path immedi-
ately would “rouse interest from other parts of the province.”24 Head of the 
Development Agency Cramer sought funding higher up, asking the ANWB, 
and signif icantly not the national government, to “function as a funnel for 
national subsidy.”25 Cramer obviously hoped that the ANWB’s good contacts 
with national government would guarantee funding, but he was mistaken. 
ANWB engineer De Bruyn, a member of the national Roads Consultation 
Committee (see Chapter 2) responded that neither the state nor the ANWB 
was likely to provide the funding.26 Still, the very well-connected De Vos 
21 DA 0196, inv. no. 544, letter Royal Commissioner Drenthe to nominated members subcom-
mittee cycling paths, February 19, 1937.
22 On using unemployed people in public works: Van der Woud, Het landschap, de mensen. 
Nederland 1850-1940.
23 W.J. Simons, Daar fietst men toch zo heerlijk heen: vijftig jaar Provinciale Drentse Rijwielpad-
vereeniging/Stichting Het Drentse Fietspad (Assen: Stichting Het Drentse Fietspad, 1990).
24 DA 0196, inv. no. 544, meeting sub-committee on the construction of cycling paths by young 
unemployed people, March 11, 1937.
25 DA 0196, inv. no. 544, letter Cramer to ANWB (De Bruyn), February 5, 1940.
26 Ibid., letter De Bruyn to Cramer, March 7, 1940.
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van Steenwijk and Cramer knew the rules of the political game – what 
arguments to employ and which people to approach to achieve their goals.
Provincial cycling coordination required a new agency and external 
expertise. When Drenthe formed its Provincial Cycling Path Organization, 
its founding meeting in 1940 was an interesting event from a governance per-
spective: it demonstrates how knowledge traveled between provinces, without 
the national government’s involvement. Vincken attended the meeting to 
suggest key strategies and best practices from Overijssel and as representative 
of the National Federation of Cycling Path Organizations. The Twente region 
of Overijssel received annual subsidies from the province on two conditions: 
that a path’s quality was approved by a provincial inspector and that it was 
of “provincial interest.” The province apparently considered this to be the 
case for 300 km of the Twente organization’s  900 km network. In addition, 
Twente received 1,000 guilders as an annual subsidy from the local Chamber 
of Commerce “because factory workers benefit from the paths,” proving that 
many paths were indeed used for both recreation and commuting.27 A broad 
range of actors subsidized the organization’s activity. Vincken’s presence and 
central role in the founding of Drenthe’s cycling path organization demonstrate 
how the provincial and regional cycling path organizations networked and 
shared expertise and best practices at a sub-national level.
Dutch provincial authorities also shared knowledge on governing 
(recreational) cycling. The Cycling Path Organization Drenthe worked 
with the province’s Public Works chief-engineer, Willem Izak Cornelis van 
Veelen. He quizzed colleagues in other provinces on how they went about 
gaining support for rural cycling path improvement and construction, in 
other words those paths not alongside roads.28 Was there a private cycling 
path organization or a “semi-off icial” one consisting of municipalities, or 
was the province directly involved? And which organizational form did 
other provincial engineers prefer? Van Veelen enquired whether the other 
provinces already had a rural (landelijk) cycling path plan. If so, how was 
it structured. He also wanted to f ind out the various provincial conditions 
for cycling path subsidies. Van Veelen needed the information as input for 
Drenthe’s policy to support the Provincial Cycling Path Organization, and 
so he urged his colleagues to reply swiftly. Within a few months, all the 
provinces had provided detailed responses about their plans, allowing Van 
Veelen to draw up a memorandum summarizing provincial cycling policy 
27 DA 0196, inv. no. 544, foundation meeting May 7, 1940.
28 DA 0924, inv. no. 167, letter Public Works department Drenthe to public works in other 
provinces, May 16, 1951.
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in 1951.29 The provinces were aware that private organizations existed and 
were now seeking cooperation, having sparingly subsidized them for decades.
With the input from other provinces, the Provincial Cycling Path 
Organization Drenthe formulated its tourism-oriented “Central Cycling 
Path Plan” in 1952 – updated and expanded in 1959. A key f igure (“the great 
promotor and animator” as one newspaper called him) behind the plan 
was Gerard Adriaan Maarten van den Muyzenberg, an off icial in Drenthe’s 
Public Works department.30 As the organization’s secretary and treasurer 
from 1950 until 1974, he and his colleagues designed a 400 km cycling path 
network, dependent on national subsidies. Drenthe would have needed 
f ifty years to implement the plan without such a subsidy. In its address to 
the national government, Drenthe Public Works administration framed 
a provincial cycling path network as a necessary condition for economic 
growth. According to the engineers, Drenthe had huge tourism potential 
and “the cycling path network contributes substantially in boosting a 
healthy provincial economic structure. A completed cycling path plan 
constitutes the “framework” that has to be furnished with holiday centers, 
catering companies, and amusement facilities.”31 In other words, recrea-
tional cycling paths were necessary to lift Drenthe from its economically 
disadvantaged position. Cycling tourism was the key to that end (see 
f igure 12).
The province framed the cycling paths in a broader light, however. Chair-
man of the Provincial Cycling Path Organization Drenthe’s board, Jan 
Antonie Reinders Bosma (the former mayor of Winterswijk in the province 
of Gelderland) refused to distinguish recreational and utilitarian cycling 
paths: the organization dealt with cycling paths “in general.”32 Cycling 
paths relieved traff ic on the major roads – a remarkable argument given 
Drenthe’s low car ownership in the 1950s.33 Cycling paths would improve 
the connection between industrial and commuter areas as well as end the 
29 DA 0924, inv. no. 167, “Nota betreffende het beheer, de subsidiëring, de plannen en de wijze 
van aanleg van landelijke rijwielpaden in de verschillende provincies van ons land,” 6-7.
30 “G.A.M. v. d. Muyzenberg promotor Drents f ietspad vertrekt op 13 december,” Nieuwsblad 
van het Noorden, November 30, 1974, 15.
31 DA 0923, inv. no. 6258, letter Public Works Drenthe to Ministers OKW/EZ/SZ, December 4, 
1959.
32 DA 0196, inv. no. 544, foundation meeting Drenthe cycling path organization, May 7, 1940.
33 Wolf, “Following America? Dutch geographical car diffusion, 1900 to 1980” (PhD diss., 
Eindhoven University of Technology, 2010), 75.
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isolation of certain rural areas.34 These appeals were probably strategic, 
aimed at acquiring more funding.
The strategy targeting economic growth and utility succeeded because 
many government bodies funded Drenthe’s cycling path plan. In 1955, the 
Drenthe provincial legislature approved a 500,000-guilder subsidy.35 The 
local communities contributed 7.5 percent, the province added 20 percent. 
The remaining 72.5 percent was state funding, with the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs picking up 42.5 percent, and the Ministry of Social Affairs 30 percent. 
34 DA 0923, inv. no. 6258, letter Public Works Drenthe to Ministers, December 4, 1959.
35 “f 500.000 gevoteerd voor rijwielpadennet,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, July 12, 1955, 3.
Figure 12 Policymakers in Drenthe felt their province could attract tourists and improve the economy 
through a network of appealing cycling infrastructure. Here tourists enjoy riding on a cycling 
path constructed near Ruinen, 1965, part of the provincial recreational cycling path plan. [Source: 
National Archives, Fotocollectie Nederlandse Heidemaatschappij, Photographer unknown/Heidemij., 
no. 161-1396]
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By the 1960s, the new Ministry for Culture, Recreation and Social Work 
did subsidize recreational cycling. The Ministry of Public Works was not 
even considered for funding as it did not regard recreational cycling its 
responsibility. The contribution from Economic Affairs was unusual, but 
Drenthe’s official designation as economic development area made it eligible 
for funding.36
The right people in the right place made all the difference. Drenthe’s Jaap 
Cramer lobbied national policymakers, and what is more, he was great at 
playing the publicity game. When the cycling path plan’s implementation 
stalled, Cramer’s stunt was to organize a visit from the royal family, resulting in 
a widely disseminated picture of Queen Juliana cycling on the paths. He then 
used the queen’s interest in the plan to put pressure on the government: there 
were regular meetings between the Royal Commissioners and the Queen, which 
helped Cramer keep up the momentum for funding the plans (see figure 13).37 
Van den Muyzenberg’s longtime position in provincial Public Works made him 
another key spider in the web. Individuals mattered in Zuid-Holland as well.
In the 1950s, Zuid-Holland was one of the f irst Dutch provinces to devise 
a provincial “Cycling Path Plan.” Revisions and updates over the following 
decades allow us to track the plan’s changing notions of what cycling meant to 
provincial policymakers. Zuid-Holland forms a different case than Drenthe. 
The motivation behind the plan was a social democratic conviction that 
provincial authorities should provide healthy recreational facilities for urban 
working people. In densely populated Zuid-Holland, with large cities like 
Rotterdam and The Hague, this was a particular concern in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s.38 The province commissioned a short film in 1954 to introduce the 
new recreational area Brielse Maas, east of Rotterdam, explicitly targeting 
city-dwellers. Called Free Outdoors (Vrij Buiten), the drama illustrates the 
ideology behind the plan.39 A stressed city bank employee seeks in vain 
a little peace and quiet on a busy beach. Finally, he f inds tranquility and 
relaxation by taking a cycling trip on paths through Zuid-Holland’s nature, 
far from any noisy cars or traffic. The film represented a new insight in policy 
circles. According to provincial engineer Fekkes in 1956, “in a wide circle, the 
realization is growing that on a larger scale than hitherto, provisions have to 
be made” for cyclists and mopeds, particularly “by creating possibilities for 
36 Simons, Daar fietst men toch zo heerlijk heen, 60.
37 Piter Bergstra and Martin de Bruin, “Een goede CdK opent Haagse deuren,” Nieuwsblad van 
Friesland, August 27, 1994, 23.
38 Harm Kaal, “Ruimtelijke ordening,” in Behoedzaam bestuur. Twee eeuwen provincie Zuid-
Holland, eds. Roel Pots and Nico Randeraad (Leiden: Primavera Pers, 2014), 156-57.
39 The f ilm is on archief.zuid-holland.nl under “Vrij Buiten.”
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recreational cyclists to travel by good and attractive cycling routes.”40 Fekkes 
explained that such paths would follow Zuid-Holland’s many waterways or 
connect villages to public pools or beaches.
The Zuid-Holland cycling path policy only f inanced paths that were not 
parallel to the road network. Separate cycling paths alongside major roads 
did not qualify. Policymakers considered these an integral part of the road – 
already funded and governed by national and provincial government public 
works departments. Politicians and engineers tended to see these paths that 
lined the country’s main arteries as serving a predominantly commuter 
function. This clashed with the plan’s goal – to provide a quiet, relaxing 
ride in the countryside. Under the plan, paths had their own trajectories, 
sometimes former rail- or tramway lines.41 Engineers had to meet high design 
standards for paths: 3 meters wide and asphalted.42 While the substantial 
paths along roads served utilitarian cyclists, provisions for recreational traf-
f ic fell short. As this traff ic needed paths with a separate trajectory, Fekkes 
40 J.C. Fekkes, “Provinciaal Rijwielpadenplan voor Zuid-Holland,” Wegen 30, no. 1 (1956): 1-2.
41 Examples from the 1950s include the tramway in the Hoeksche Waard between Rotterdam-
Zuid and Oude Maas (NA 3.02.27, inv. no. 1559); between Goedereede and Melissant (NA 3.02.27, 
inv. no. 1339); and in the 1970s, the former tramways between Wassenaar and Leiden and in 
Naaldwijk (NA 3.02.27, inv. no. 2918 and 2923).
42 “Nieuwe rijwielpaden in Zuid-Holland,” Trouw, August 13, 1959.
Figure 13 Keen cyclist Queen Juliana of the Netherlands visited Drenthe on many occasions. In 1975, 
during the tenth Four Day Cycling event (Rijwielvierdaagse), she cycled over one of the province’s many 
recreational cycling paths. [Source: Rob Mieremet, Nationaal Archief / Anefo, no. 928-0377]
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set “great store by opening up the province through the construction of a 
touristic cycling path network.”43 For provincial policymakers, recreational 
cycling was an important public good.
This commitment to providing recreational opportunities had a social 
democratic pedigree. In Zuid-Holland, Provincial Executive (Gedeputeerde 
Staten) politicians rather than provincial public works administration (PWS) 
engineers initiated the provincial cycling plan. Provincial politician Stien 
de Ruyter-de Zeeuw was the major initiator of this policy in the 1950s and 
1960s.44 With a background in radical socialist movements, in 1946 she 
represented the social democratic SDAP party (later the labor party PvdA).45 
When she left the Provincial Executive in 1970, she was praised for her role 
in creating cycling paths and recreational facilities.46 As a workers’ advocate, 
she believed in the right to “possibilities for recreation and nature” close to 
the city for “people without a car.”47
A later successor, fellow social democrat Joop Borgman, took up 
the torch. He was Provincial States member from 1962 and Provincial 
Executive member from 1974 until 1987, the period when the provincial 
recreational plan was reanimated and substantially revised. His interest 
in (recreational) cycling is also evident from his post-retirement role as 
director of the National Cycling Platform (Landelijk Fietsplatform), an 
independent coordinating agency for recreational cycling, from 1991 
until his death in 1999.48 In an interview with newspaper Trouw in 1978, 
Borgman strongly supported creating and promoting a recreational 
cycling network. He also emphasized how much road traff ic safety had 
improved in the past two decades thanks to widespread cycling path 
construction alongside most secondary and tertiary roads.49 This ref lects 
policymakers’ growing focus on utilitarian cycling in the 1970s. In short, 
since the postwar decades, cycling in Zuid-Holland had strong supporters 
within the Provincial Executive. Implementation of the recreational 
43 Fekkes, “Provinciaal Rijwielpadenplan voor Zuid-Holland” (1956), 1-2.
44 Dick Linders, “Mr. Chr. A. De Ruyter-De Zeeuw, Rotterdam 22 Aug 1907 – IJlst 5-12-1995, 
Onafhankelijk, sociaal-democraat,” Rotterdams Jaarboekje Series 10, no. 4 (1996), 146-53; Kaal, 
“Ruimtelijke ordening,” 167.
45 The SDAP merged with two other parties to form the PvdA in 1946, the major social demo-
cratic party in Dutch politics.
46 Linders, “Mr. Chr. A. De Ruyter-De Zeeuw,” 152.
47 Ibid., 152.
48 For Borgman, see https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09llp0nlz5/j_joop_borgman, biography 
consulted September 7, 2018.
49 Haro Hielkema, “Zuid-Hollandse f ietsers krijgen meer de ruimte: Gedeputeerde Borgman 
kan nog wel paar miljoen gebruiken,” Trouw, November 10, 1978, 6.
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plan may have been slow – requiring a constant battle for resources 
and engineers’ attention – but this long-term political commitment 
by Zuid-Holland social democrats to recreational cycling was a crucial 
success factor.
Digging Up Data
Politicians in zuid-Holland struggled to get provincial engineers to implement 
cycling plans. To make a proper cycling policy, a first step was an inventory of 
existing cycling paths in the province. No such overview existed. The lack of a 
coordinating agency for cycling meant that zuid-Holland’s engineers had the 
painstaking and time-consuming task of compiling this information, as shown in 
figure 14. There were paths alongside roads, governed either by national or pro-
vincial government (in green). Then there were separate paths in the provincial 
cycling path plan (black), or built by other organizations (blue). All these authori-
ties had constructed paths, but many from the late 1950s only existed on paper 
(the paths in red). That is why this map has so many different colours. 
A similar request by the Provincial executive in the province Gelderland was 
also time-consuming for Public Works. It asked for the extent of existing cycling 
paths and the cost of further construction.
Figure 14 Map of cycling paths in Zuid-Holland province, c. 1959. [Source: NA 3.02.27, inv. no. 1559]
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In february 1949, politicians reminded engineers that they had still not 
provided this information requested in April 1948. The Gelderland engineer 
eventually responded, telling them in no uncertain terms how expensive cycling 
path construction would be, requiring “very extensive preparation,” and it could 
only be “implemented very gradually.” Politicians were irritated by this negative 
response: cycling paths alongside roads were needed urgently: a temporary and 
cheaper construction was one option. 
In the 1960s, implementation of the zuid-Holland plan was slow. engineers 
blamed this on lack of technical personnel and frankly admitted that roads were 
their priority. but finding out how provincial engineers spent their budgets 
remained an issue well into the 1970s. Politician Joop borgman complained that 
the plan’s progress reports gave no insight into what percentage of the budget 
for improving road surfaces went to cycling paths or to roads. This information 
was only obtained after multiple strongly worded letters and meetings with 
engineers. A true political decision about the distribution of funding was only 
possible once politicians knew how much money was actually being spent on 
improving conditions for drivers and cyclists. Civil servants’ longevity in office 
fostered consistent policymaking and enabled long-term personal relationships 
between stakeholders, but could also lead to inertia and delay.
Sources: NA 3.02.27, inv. no. 1559, letters PWS to Gedeputeerde Staten decem-
ber 14, 1959 and January 7, 1963; GA 0039, inv. no. 9488, letters GS Gelderland to 
HId PWS, April 22, 1948, february 22, 1949, April 21, 1949, July 1, 1949; NA 3.02.46, 
inv. no. 2676.
Friction arose between politicians and provincial Public Works engineers: 
politicians’ frequent calls to action suggest engineers were slow to imple-
ment the plan (see box). Initial objectives had to be scaled back multiple 
times. The f irst proposals in the mid-1950s were for 400 km of cycling paths. 
For budgetary reasons, provincial engineers proposed reducing the plan 
to 215 km.50 The f ive-year plan for realization adopted in 1959 counted 
110 km, a target not even reached by 1965.51 In 1958, provincial engineers 
acknowledged “the demand of your board to accomplish more in realizing 
the provincial cycling path plan than has happened in previous years.”52 
The Provincial Public Works’ chief-engineer admitted he believed that roads 
50 NA 3.02.27, inv. no. 1559, letter PWS to Provincial Executive, March 26, 1959.
51 Ibid., January 7, 1963.
52 NA 3.02.27, inv. no. 1559, PWS memorandum February 6, 1958 “Overzicht van de stand van 
zaken met betrekking tot de voorbereiding en de aanleg van het provinciale rijwielpadenplan.”
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had priority over cycling paths. For the delay, he also blamed the lengthy 
and costly process of land expropriation.53 This was less of a problem for 
paths alongside roads because they were included in road budgets and 
expropriation procedures; but because recreational cycling paths had their 
own trajectory, they required legally and f inancially complex procedures. 
The process was not just an excuse by the engineers, as Joop Borgman later 
claimed. If landowners refused to part with their land, there was little the 
authorities could do.54 Despite fluctuating investments, the network grew 
steadily over the 1960s and 1970s (see f igure 15).
By the 1970s, Zuid Holland’s expanded version – like other provincial 
plans – included utilitarian as well as recreational cycling, demonstrat-
ing a changed perception of cycling over the decades. According to the 
provincial public works engineers in 1975, “the bicycle’s transport function” 
(vervoersfunctie) was valued more.55 This new awareness was partly due 
to mobility statistics research, such as a 1974 Dutch Statistics Agency 
report which Zuid-Holland engineers cited. This showed that 29 percent 
of commuters still cycled.56 More important was the 1970s shifting politi-
cal climate: cycling activism and growing concern over automobility’s 
negative effects had changed policymakers’ views on cycling, as Part III 
will demonstrate. Policymakers realized that the bicycle was not just 
for recreation, and once again recognized its actual and future role in 
transport. They designed the new cycling path plan with an additional 
125 km of cycling paths also f it for utilitarian purposes. Likewise, the 
northern province Friesland introduced a recreational cycling path plan 
in 1962, updated in 1978 to include “cycling paths for daily use.”57 The 
policymakers considered their ambitious plan a product of the previous 
recreational plan.58 The institutional “cost” of introducing it was low, 
because public works could just copy the initial plan’s procedures used 
in the 1950s and 1960s.59 The only major difference was launching a much 
53 Ibid.
54 Hielkema, “Zuid-Hollandse f ietsers krijgen meer de ruimte.”
55 J.P. Bakker and R. v.d. Hout, “Herziening provinciaal f ietspadenplan Zuid-Holland,” Ver-
keerskunde 26, no. 7 (1975): 356.
56 Ibid., 359.
57 “Onzeker of provincie aanleg paden met geld kan steunen,” Leeuwarder Courant, November 6, 
1978.
58 “Eerstkomende 15 jaar: bijna 250 f ietspaden erbij in Friesland,” Leeuwarder Courant, 
December 1, 1979, 13.
59 Since funding was never suff icient to implement the envisioned provincial plans entirely, 
policymakers created guidelines for determining the priority of potential new paths. They also 
used this strategy when they saw the need for utilitarian cycling paths since the 1970s.
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more extensive participation design procedure. In a sign of the times, 
municipalities, recreational organizations, but also members of the public 
could comment on and revise the proposed plans.
Seeing cycling as a means to improve public health and wellbeing, 
provincial off icials created a cycling path network and recreational areas 
for their (urban) residents. The energetic efforts of several provincial social 
democrat politicians who put pressure on Provincial Public Works engineers 
to take cycling more seriously, resulted in a progressive cycling policy for 
Zuid-Holland compared to many other provinces in the 1950s and 1960s.
3.3 1960s National Subsidies for Recreational Cycling
A national role in recreational cycling, brief ly discussed in the 1930s, 
became only a reality in the 1960s. The Ministry of Culture and Recreation 
began subsidizing recreational facilities, including cycling paths.60 In the 
1970s, the Public Works ministry also subsidized (urban) utilitarian cycling 
infrastructure, as Chapter 7 explores. The national recreational subsidies 
were earlier, ref lecting that the infrastructure for recreational cyclists 
received more political support in the 1950s and 1960s than for commut-
ers, who were not entirely neglected. The national recreational subsidy 



































Zuid-Holland Province Recreational Cycle Path Network, 
1962-1975 
Money spent in millions of guilders Cumulative length cycling paths in km
Figure 15 Funding for the Zuid-Holland cycling path plan fluctuated but supported a gradual increase 
of the network over the 1960s and 1970s. Source: J.P. Bakker and R. v.d. Hout, “Herziening provinciaal 
fietspadenplan Zuid-Holland,” verkeerskunde 26, no. 7 (1975), 356.
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entailed a 75 percent state contribution for cycling paths separate from the 
road network, leading through national parks, forests, and other attractive 
recreation areas. Appendix 1 lists the projects funded in the 1960s, earlier 
than the construction of (activist inspired) urban cycling infrastructure. 
The 1960s paths were mainly in provinces attempting to attract tourists 
and recreational cyclists. Provinces differed signif icantly in their proactive 
efforts to acquire subsidies. A 1976 consultancy report on recreational 
cycling and the associated policy processes noted these considerably dif-
ferent policies from province to province: “there is not one government in 
particular directing the policy process concerning recreational cycling.”61 
Policy coordination at a national level remained minimal.
The fact that (recreational) cycling was not declining as fast as some 
believed, spurred the national government to adopt a more proactive role. 
A 1961 Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work committee meeting 
on outdoor recreation posed the question whether it still made sense to 
“invest large subsidy amounts in cycling paths in view of the advancing 
motorization.”62 R. van de Waal, head of the National Planning Service’s 
recreational branch (Rijksdienst voor het Nationale Plan) considered 
this type of thinking simplistic and warned against “the great danger of 
“catchphrases” [kreten] in determining policies.” He referred to one popular 
catchphrase: “every young person rides a moped nowadays; the regular 
bicycle [trapfiets] is disappearing.” However, “results of objective research 
often show a much more nuanced picture.”63 He cited 1956 research showing 
that during weekends, a third of the population left cities for recreation, 
often by bicycle. Even if this share dropped to 10 percent, he argued, that 
would still be 150,000 cyclists leaving cities at weekends. These absolute 
numbers justif ied investing in cycling infrastructure. According to another 
committee member, policy could be inspirational: “The presence of cycling 
paths – and familiarity with them – can stimulate cycling.”64 Van de Waal 
pointed to recreational cycling’s rising popularity in the United States as 
further proof that bicycles would no doubt never disappear altogether.
Cycling path construction up to this point had been mainly rural. The 
construction of urban cycling facilities really took off in the 1970s. As an 
intermediate step, policymakers increasingly focused on paths connecting 
61 NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, letter consultancy agency C. Kappelhoff to A.A.H.C. van Onzenoort 
(Ministry of Culture and Recreation, Outdoor Recreation branch), December 20, 1976, attachment 
to letter, 54.
62 NA 2.27.5111, inv. no. 60, 28th meeting INCOR-committee, July 5, 1961.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
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the city to the countryside. In their rich vocabulary for cycling facilities, 
Dutch engineers coined the term “break-out path” (uitvalspad).65 They 
were referring to paths that provided a safe, separate way to leave the city 
for short recreational rides or connect to nearby recreational facilities. 
Recreation off icials increasingly saw the lack of such paths as problematic; 
city-dwellers who did not own a car were locked within the city’s confines. 
According to W.G. van der Kloet, an engineer with the State Forestry Agency 
(Staatsbosbeheer) “especially during the weekend, traff ic from residential 
areas to destinations in the vicinity can be very substantial, especially 
around cities. These paths fulf il an important role, especially if they can 
be extended to connect with the separate cycling paths being constructed 
– albeit not enough – in towns.”66 Such paths would not be cheap but served 
commuters as well as tourists, making the expense more justif iable.
Initially, the coalitions focused on recreational cycling and only involved 
utilitarian cycling in the late 1960s, as we will see. One typical example is 
the province of Limburg, where a cycling path committee (for recreational 
paths) created during World War II achieved very little.67 Even a new pro-
vincial committee to help establish a Provincial Cycling Path Fund for local 
communities in 1956 was discontinued twelve years later.68 This ended in 
1968: according to the authorities, the municipalities did not use the fund 
suff iciently. A new funding opportunity for recreational and utilitarian 
cycling replaced it. Zuid-Holland province shows a similar pattern. Private 
organizations and provincial agencies framed cycling predominantly as 
a recreational activity until the late 1960s, when the focus on utilitarian 
cycling returned. Triggered by recreational plans and the people behind 
them, the attention to utilitarian cycling broadened cycling path plans 
and subsidies.69
65 NA 2.27.5111 (Ministry CRM, INCORET = Interdepartementale Coördinatiecommissie 
Openluchtrecreatie en Toerisme), inv. no. 60, ‘Nota Rijwielpaden’ by Ministry of Agriculture 
(Cultuurtechnische Dienst), attachment to letter to Ministry CRM/INCORET, August 16, 1963.
66 NA 2.27.5111 (Ministry CRM, INCORET = Interdepartementale Coördinatiecommissie 
Openluchtrecreatie en Toerisme), inv. no. 60, Memorandum INCOR-315, attachment to Ministry 
of Agriculture letter to Ministry OKW/INCOR, June 12, 1962.
67 Frank Veraart and Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze, “Fietsen in de Nederlandse bergen. Achter-
blijvend f ietsgebruik in het zuiden van Limburg in historisch perspectief,” in Studies over de 
sociaal-economische geschiedenis van Limburg/Jaarboek van het Sociaal Historisch Centrum voor 
Limburg, eds. Ad Knotter and Willibrord Rutten (Maastricht: Sociaal Historisch Centrum voor 
Limburg, 2001), 142.
68 Ibid., 145-48.
69 When the Brabant organization De Kempen was founded in 1976, its aim was “mainly 
recreational paths, while now functional paths (those with a traff ic function) are considered 
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3.4 Conclusion
In the 1950s, Dutch government policymakers framed recreational cycling 
as a public good by linking it with multiple policy goals. The province of 
Drenthe pioneered this strategy. Its leading politicians looking to combat 
unemployment and economic crisis as well as attract tourism and industry, 
saw cycling infrastructure as part of a package of measures. In Zuid-Holland, 
social democrat politicians held ideas – long-standing and widespread in and 
beyond the Netherlands – about cities’ unhealthy impact on their residents. 
Ideas about green lungs and garden cities circulated transnationally. In 
the Interbellum, Dutch social democrat urban planners and public hous-
ing experts had emphasized the need for recreation – a notion provincial 
policymakers in both highly urbanized and tourist regions revisited in the 
1950s. This time their motivation for building recreational infrastructure was 
economic: provinces with considerable nature reserves such as Gelderland or 
Drenthe were convinced a cycling path network would attract tourists – the 
kind of national tourism the ANWB promoted in its journal De Kampioen. 
Building on private organizations’ earlier work and benef iting from the 
recreational cycling culture established before 1950, provincial policymakers 
in turn expanded cycling infrastructure.
Policy beliefs about recreational cycling developed at a time when regional 
planning ideas were equally strong. The result was a layered structure 
of national, provincial/regional, and local plans for land use, roads, and 
recreation. That these beliefs about cycling and governance coincided, helps 
explain why so many regional policymakers supported and initiated regional 
cycling plans. During the 1940s and 1950s, the national government was 
noticeable by its absence from this story, while provincial authorities took 
the initiative. Despite the lack of national coordination, regional authorities 
regularly shared best practices. Only in the 1960s did the national state start 
subsidizing recreational infrastructure on a larger scale.
Unlike in earlier decades, local politicians were the driving force. The 
ANWB’s tourism and recreation lobbies played a background role by con-
necting people and institutions with relevant knowledge. However, the main 
initiative came from the ruling elites. Many mayors were personally involved 
in the organizations, as were leading provincial politicians and off icials – a 
by far the most important.” Archive Eindhoven Regionaal Historisch Centrum, 10091 (Interge-
meentelijke organisatie voor rijwielpaden in de Kempen, Valkenswaard), inv. no. 2, “Verslag 
bespreking studiecommissie heroriëntering taakstelling van de rijwielpaden-organisatie 
10-09-1976.”
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marked difference from the urban cycling activism that would emerge in 
the 1970s. The large and well-connected group of Dutch politicians who 
took an interest in recreational cycling also improved the connections for 
rural commuter cyclists. Mostly appointed and not elected, their longevity 
in off ice and continuing support for the policy were crucial. A stable corps 
of civil servants with whom cycling advocates could forge relationships was 
significant for urban cycling activism in the 1970s and beyond. Building these 
cycling infrastructure networks took decades, as competition for funding 
was a recurring theme. Engineering departments had many tasks and did not 
always prioritize implementing recreational plans. The piecemeal approach 
nevertheless produced signif icant results over time. The key players who 
made a real difference at the right time were social democrat politicians 
Stien de Ruyter-de Zeeuw and Joop Borgman in Zuid-Holland, and chief 
engineer Gerard van den Muyzenberg in Drenthe. Similarly, in a province 
not discussed here, Gelderland, Public Works chief engineer J.G. Kruimel 
was also the local representative (consul) for the ANWB. Like De Ruyter-de 
Zeeuw and Van den Muyzenberg, he had to struggle with a Public Works 
department that often objected to constructing cycling infrastructure and 
only reluctantly executed provincial policy.70 He stimulated subsidizing 
cycling path organizations throughout his career, so it is not just Gelderland’s 
natural areas but also his support that explains why so many organizations 
were formed here.71
By the late 1960s, policymakers not only expanded recreational but also 
utilitarian cycling. The next section discusses this development, but the 
link with recreational cycling policies is important. After 1970, provincial 
policymakers and engineers remained the key intermediaries between 
national and local government – for negotiating subsidies, subsidizing 
cycling, and coordinating (the interconnectedness of) local cycling networks. 
Designing regional cycling path networks was an invaluable stepping-stone 
for the future.
70 GA 0039, inv. no. 9488, letter PWS Gelderland to GS, March 28, 1949 and letter GS Gelderland 
to HID PWS, April 21, 1949.
71 “Fietsen op de paden van de Zuid-Veluwe,” 176.

4 Popular or Outdated? National 
Policymakers’ Ambivalence about 
Bicycles
In 1950, the Netherlands’ major roadbuilding trade journal Wegen (“Roads”) 
celebrated its twenty-f ifth anniversary. For this occasion, the special May 
issue featured a specif ic theme. A few years after World War II, in a context 
of reconstruction, readers might expect a vista on the future of highway 
building, perhaps inspired by American highway engineering ideas circulat-
ing through Europe at this time. Instead, the special issue was dedicated 
entirely to cycling paths “since bicycle traff ic and the cycling path question 
are at the center of attention at the moment.”1 What does this theme choice 
tell us about cycling’s status in the Netherlands around 1950? Was it the last 
stand for cycling before automobility took it over entirely? Or was it rather 
an indication of cycling’s continuing presence in practice and governance?
Postwar reconstruction was still in full swing in 1950. Building up industry 
and roads for trucks and cars was a priority. With the country’s low levels 
of automobility, for many Dutch people, cycling was still the best mobility 
option. Yet the justif ication for the bicycle tax to fund cycling infrastructure 
outside cities had gone: abolished by the occupying German government 
in 1941 and not reinstated after the war. And with it, the discourse of giving 
cyclists something in return for their tax money disappeared. Did this 
also entail a return to the pre-1920s situation in which the state did not 
consider cycling infrastructure a public good? Or did leading engineers 
and politicians’ 1950s and 1960s technocratic approach still have a place 
for cycling? The Wegen special issue suggests that engineers continued to 
take cycling seriously. But to what extent could cycling persist alongside 
advancing automobility in the Netherlands?
In Chapter 2, “Contested Compromise,” I argued that cycling’s political 
status had become more f irmly embedded in the Netherlands than else-
where. This suggests that the generated political support and engineering 
norms were strong enough to have a lasting impact. This chapter investigates 
that hypothesis. Did the cycling policies created in the 1920s and 1930s 
set in motion a path-dependent process where older engineering norms 
still applied, even as ideas about cycling were about to change? Based on 
1 Wegen 24, no. 5 (1950): 136.
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engineering committees’ archives and literature produced outside com-
mercial and academic publishing, this chapter explores the lingering role 
of policies initiated in an earlier period, to explain how cycling survived 
as part of standard engineering practices.
“Popular or Outdated? National Policymakers’ Ambivalence about Bicy-
cles” argues that while national engineers and the ANWB gave lip service 
to urban cycling as a transport mode, they increasingly left cycling policy 
to provincial and local policymakers. At the same time, the 1920s and 1930s 
engineering norms and practices for traff ic separation remained relevant 
nationally. Older policies continued to guide new cycling infrastructure 
outside the city. And in designing new car infrastructures, national engi-
neers investigated ways to safely combine rising levels of car ownership 
with (commuter) cycling. Additionally, for the f irst time, specif ic groups 
of cyclists started to catch the government’s eye: recreational cyclists and 
schoolchildren, for instance. In other words, cyclists’ status as citizens with 
equal rights to drivers came under pressure but did not crack with the rise 
of car mobility. In some ways, that status was even reinforced in unintended 
and unexpected ways, as we will see.
4.1 Dutch Cycling’s Staying Power from an International 
Perspective
Although beyond the scope of this study, the lack of mobility alternatives, 
as Adri Albert de la Bruhèze and Frank Veraart already pointed out, partly 
explains cycling’s persistent popularity in the Netherlands. In particular 
the (late) adoption of the car in the 1960s meant cycling remained popular 
– although the moped and bus had become rivals in the 1950s.2 By 1960, 
Dutch car ownership levels were significantly lower than in other European 
countries: 45 cars per 1,000 inhabitants, only half the number in similarly 
small countries like Belgium (82), and Switzerland (89). Meanwhile, the 
number in France and the UK was over 100, and in the United States almost 
350.3 This huge gap closed by 1970, when Dutch car ownership reached 
2 Patrick Bek book with working title “Governing Workers’ Mobility: Job Accessibility and the 
Politics of Movement in Twentieth-Century Netherlands” (PhD diss., TU Eindhoven, forthcoming); 
Albert de la Bruhèze and Veraart, Fietsverkeer in praktijk en beleid.
3 Importantly, even in countries with high car numbers, it was not self-evident that people 
would own a car around 1960; many people did not, as Simon Gunn points out for the UK in his 
article, “People and the Car: The Expansion of Automobility in Urban Britain, c. 1955-70,” Social 
History 38, no. 2 (2013): 220-37.
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similar levels to Belgium and Switzerland (200), although still less than 
France and West Germany, and especially the United States.4 The end of 
Dutch wage control policy in 1963 suddenly increased purchasing power, 
resulting in a rapid uptake of car ownership. Mom highlights other factors 
to explain the different development of car culture and ownership in the 
Netherlands, like the absence of an “aristocracy” of car owners convincing 
the bourgeoisie to take up the car, so important in other countries. In addi-
tion, the country lacked a car industry.5 Instead, the democratic, favorable 
bicycle culture – increasingly linked to the train system that the Dutch 
tourist organization ANWB cultivated, meant cycling was stigmatized far 
less than elsewhere and remained a crucial transport mode.6
Similarly, the role of public transit and urban development in Dutch 
mobility patterns is beyond the scope of this study.7 It is, however, important 
to note that public transit outside the large Dutch cities did not compete 
significantly with cycling. This is partly why cycling remained so popular in 
medium-sized cities. Dutch railways ran an inter-city network, linking major 
cities rather than constructing spiderwebs of lines around cities connecting 
suburbs and small towns, which was the case in Belgium.8 The 1960s new 
urbanization policy in the Netherlands strengthened public transit’s role and 
was called “bundled deconcentration,” a term introduced in the 1966 Second 
Memorandum on Spatial Planning. Planners did not want to spread the 
population equally over the country because it would stretch public facilities 
and increase travel distances. Yet concentration was equally undesirable 
as most people preferred a house with a garden and in a more spacious 
environment. In typical Dutch planning fashion, bundled deconcentration 
became the adopted compromise. Planners designated so-called growth 
centers near existing cities. Public transit played a major role in connecting 
these new towns to large cities. Inspired by an envisioned population of 20 
million, space – always at a premium in the Netherlands – had to be used 
eff iciently. Planners saw public transit along with the bicycle and moped 
as preferable to cars. However, power struggles between spatial planners 
4 Filarski in cooperation with Mom, Shaping Transport Policy, 177. Numbers based on Hanna 
Wolf, “Following America? Dutch Geographical Car Diffusion, 1900 to 1980.”
5 Mom, Atlantic Automobilism, 67-69.
6 Jan Ploeger shows Dutch Railways (NS) focused on cycling early on as a way to get to and 
from stations, and facilitated this, strengthening the bicycle-train combination as alternative to 
commuting by car: Jan Ploeger, “The Influence of the Netherlands Railways on Spatial Planning 
(1960-1990). How the Bicyclist was Discovered as a Feeder,” Working paper, 2021.
7 Patrick Bek, “Governing Workers’ Mobility,” book manuscript, 2021.
8 De Block, Kool, and Meulder, “Paradise Regained?”
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and traff ic engineers limited the implementation of this vision, as Mom 
notes. While these new growth cores did get good public transit facilities, 
automobility levels also soared.9 Advocates of driving, cycling, and public 
transit kept each other in check, avoiding hard choices for any one mode. As 
a result, Dutch planners and engineers ended up trying to do a little bit of 
everything – a system which provided opportunities for cycling advocates 
to carve out their own space.
The popularity of cycling gave rise to much f iercer competition for space 
in historic Dutch cities when automobility grew in urban centers around the 
1960s. Parked and moving cars increasingly obstructed cyclists – yet drivers 
and some policymakers blamed cyclists for slowing down motorized traff ic. 
The authors of Cycling Cities show that urban policymakers and traff ic 
engineers struggled with drivers and cyclists competing for space.10 Urban 
authorities were so preoccupied with the traff ic problems cars presented, 
that they lost sight of cyclists’ plight in the 1960s: cycle lanes were rarely 
part of street redesigns in historic city centers.11 By contrast, planners did 
include cycling lanes in new residential areas on the outskirts of towns.12 
Dutch planners pioneered the idea of the Woonerf in the 1960s – a traff ic-
calming residential area where walking, playing, and cycling were the norm 
and cars only could move around as guests.13 Outside these new residential 
areas, traff ic separation rather than traff ic calming remained the Dutch 
engineering norm.14 Traff ic engineers were rarely willing to sacrif ice space 
for cycling lanes in city centers due to car drivers’ ever growing demands 
9 Faludi and Van der Valk, Rule and Order, 131; Jan Straub, “Binnenstadsbeleid en verkeers- en 
vervoersproblematiek. Een onderzoek naar het beleid ten aanzien van de verkeers-, vervoers- en 
parkeerproblemen in binnensteden in Nederland in de periode 1960-1990” (PhD diss., University 
of Amsterdam, 1991), 32-33; Mom, “The West and the Rest”; Marco Bontje, “A ‘Planner’s Paradise’ 
Lost? Past, Present and Future of Dutch National Urbanization Policy,” European Urban and 
Regional Studies 10, no. 2 (2003): 135-51.
10 Ruth Oldenziel and Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze, “Amsterdam: World Bicycle Capital, By 
Chance,” in Cycling Cities: The European Experience, eds. Ruth Oldenziel, Martin Emanuel, Adri 
A. Albert de la Bruhèze and Frank Veraart (Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of Technology 
and Rachel Carson Center for Environment and Society, 2016), 21.
11 Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze, “Enschede: An Experiment in Cycling,” in Cycling Cities: 
The European Experience, ed. Ruth Oldenziel, et al. (Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of 
Technology and Rachel Carson Center for Environment and Society, 2016), 44.
12 Hans Buiter, “Utrecht: Bicycles Rule – Again,” in Cycling Cities: The European Experience, ed. 
Ruth Oldenziel, et al. (Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of Technology and Rachel Carson 
Center for Environment and Society, 2016), 33; Berkers, “Fietsgebruik en -beleid in Maastricht 
en Parkstad in historisch perspectief.”
13 Van der Cammen and De Klerk, Ruimtelijke ordening, 204-6.
14 Veraart, Emanuel, and Oldenziel, “Eindhoven: Engineering a Path for Bikes?,” 56-57.
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for space. At the same time, many cities invited foreign engineers to design 
large-scale traff ic plans for cars, like the German planner Feuchtinger in 
Utrecht (1958), Friedrich Lehner in The Hague (1964), or American engineer 
David Jokinen in Amsterdam (1967), invited by the car lobby Stichting Weg 
(“Roads Foundation”).15 Local politicians ultimately rejected these plans, 
not least because of citizen protests and concerns over the destruction of 
historic neighborhoods. Had these plans been implemented, the long-term 
development of Dutch urban mobility would have looked very different. And 
because most Dutch (like Danish) cities did not invest in subway construc-
tion, cycling had less competition from public transit.16 The conservation 
of historic city centers and a fear of cars’ destructive effects on American 
cities already played a role in this reluctance.17 In other places, redesign-
ing the city for cars was more successful. For the industrial Dutch city of 
Eindhoven, German engineer Schaechterle drew up a new traff ic plan 
in 1961, which the city did implement. The number of cyclists surprised 
the German planner: creating a car-friendly city meant f inding ways to 
separate traffic in an urban environment.18 Involving some separated bicycle 
infrastructure, the main goal was nevertheless to speed up car traff ic by 
getting cyclists out of the way.19 And in the 1950s and 1960s, the similarly 
industrial port city of Rotterdam – as Eric Berkers, Frank Schipper, Patrick 
Bek and Ruth Oldenziel note – a “modernist urban planning lab … was not 
kind to cyclists.”20 Plans for the city center that was destroyed in World 
War II were American in inspiration, making room for cars while leaving 
little pockets of space for pedestrians. Yet even here, critical voices were 
lamenting the marginalization of cyclists already in the 1950s and 1960s.21
In many countries and cities, the people who continued to ride their 
bikes in the 1950s and 1960s were no longer visible to policymakers and 
engineers. But cyclists were still there, in the streets and on the roads, as 
Albert de la Bruhèze, Veraart, and later co-authors in Cycling Cities have 
uncovered through painstaking archival work. From a technological point 
15 On Jokinen: Oldenziel and Albert de la Bruhèze, “Amsterdam: World Bicycle Capital, By 
Chance,” 21-22. On Feuchtinger: Buiter, “Utrecht: Bicycles Rule – Again,” 32-35; Tim Verlaan, 
“De toekomst van de Nederlandse binnenstad 1960-1978” (PhD diss., University of Amsterdam, 
2016), 60.
16 Carstensen and Ebert, “Cycling Cultures in Northern Europe,” 45.
17 The demolition for a subway system in Amsterdam sparked major protests in the late 1960s.
18 Albert de la Bruhèze and Veraart, Fietsverkeer in praktijk en beleid, 81-83.
19 Veraart, Emanuel, and Oldenziel, “Eindhoven: Engineering a Path for Bikes?” 56-57.
20 Berkers et al., Cycling Cities: The Rotterdam Experience, 7.
21 Ibid., 30-34.
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of view, this is not so surprising: technologies remain in use long after 
engineers and policymakers have lost interest in them. Moreover, the car 
boosters who campaigned for motorizing the masses faced a barrier: there 
were also urban social democrats promoting public transit for working-
class commuters. Engineers’ predominant focus on driving as the path 
towards the future, however, meant that cycling’s public status declined 
precipitously. As Oldenziel argues, by excluding them in traff ic counts or 
otherwise erasing them from off icial documents, cyclists became invisible 
to policymakers in many parts of Europe.22 German traff ic planner Feucht-
inger, who also designed a controversial urban renewal plan for Utrecht 
in the 1950s at the invitation of local authorities, is a striking example. A 
1956 traff ic count in Germany’s Saarland region showed two-wheelers 
had a 16 percent share of road traff ic, but nevertheless Feuchtinger argued 
that cycling levels were so low that they could be omitted in future traff ic 
counts without this “signif icantly altering the general traff ic picture.”23 It 
was a modernist planning argument he would use again for his Utrecht 
circulation plan This deliberate decision to render cyclists invisible had 
major negative repercussions for cycling planning.24 As geographer and 
management expert Bent Flyvbjerg summarizes: “Power is more concerned 
with def ining a specif ic reality than with understanding what reality is.”25 
It was only in the 1970s and 1980s that traff ic counts would include cyclists 
and pedestrians again in response to activists call to arms – and in that 
way their (for planners surprisingly large) share of trips became visible 
once more.26 According to Frédéric Héran, a whole generation of French 
engineers and planners were not interested in cycling and consequently 
their technical knowhow – and users’ tacit knowledge – were lost.27 Maxime 
22 Oldenziel, “Accounting Tricks.”
23 Fläschner, “Stahlroß auf dem Aussterbe-Etat,” 13-14. Buiter, “Utrecht: Bicycles Rule – Again.” 
For a present-day perspective on counting and calculating procedures: Jens Stissing Jensen, 
Matthew Cashmore, and Morten Elle, “Reinventing the Bicycle: How Calculative Practices Shape 
Urban Environmental Governance,” Environmental Politics 26, no. 3 (2017): 459-79.
24 Similarly, British planners did not include cyclists in future mobility plans, despite still 
signif icant numbers in the 1950s: Rorie Parsons and Geoff Vigar, “‘Resistance was Futile!’ Cycling’s 
Discourse of Resistance to UK Automobile Modernism 1950-1970,” Planning Perspectives 33, no. 2 
(2018): 167-68.
25 Bent Flyvbjerg, Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), 36.
26 Barbara Schmucki, Der Traum vom Verkehrsfluss. Städtische Verkehrsplanung seit 1945 im 
deutsch-deutschen Vergleich, Deutsches Museum: Beiträge zur Historischen Verkehrsforschung, 
vol. 4 (Frankfurt: Campus, 2001), 169-72, 93-96.
27 Frédéric Héran, Le retour de la bicyclette: Une histoire des déplacements urbains en Europe, 
de 1871 à 2050 (Paris: La Découverte, 2014), 153.
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Huré shows how the concerted efforts of non-governmental actors were 
often required to put cycling back on the political agenda – a struggle 
that is ongoing.28
In the 1950s, the future projections became a self-fulf illing prophecy. 
Because urban traff ic planners believed cycling was on the way out, cycling 
infrastructure was not worth public funding – even in cycling-friendly 
cities like Copenhagen. Engineers constructed no new cycle lanes in the 
city, considering this, like in the Netherlands, an ineff icient use of space.29 
Martin Emanuel notes: “National and local policy makers’ focus on the car 
and on public transport had drawn attention away from bicycle traff ic. 
In the 1960s, hardly anyone mentioned the bicycle.”30 Nevertheless, many 
Copenhagen and Dutch residents kept cycling in the 1950s and 1960s.
Where cycling culture was not as robust as in the Netherlands or Denmark, 
the practice of cycling – discouraged more actively by policymakers – disap-
peared much faster.31 Planners envisioned and eventually built ring roads, 
parking garages, and other facilities for cars, but very little provision for 
cyclists.32 Barbara Schmucki concludes that while Germany focused more 
on cycling paths right after World War II, the predominant idea – reinforced 
by the importance of American influences – in the 1950s and 1960s was that 
the car should be able to reach every (inner-city) destination with as little 
interruption as possible.33 To the extent that urban policymakers invested 
in alternatives to the car, they focused on buses, subways, and light railways 
28 Maxime Huré, “Les réseaux transnationaux du vélo. Gouverner les politiques du vélo en 
ville. De l’utopie associative à la gestion par des grandes f irmes urbaines” (PhD diss., Université 
Lyon 2 Lumière, 2013).
29 Martin Emanuel, “Copenhagen: Branding the Cycling City,” in Cycling Cities: The European 
Experience. A Hundred Years of Policy and Practice, ed. Ruth Oldenziel, et al. (Eindhoven: Founda-
tion for the History of Technology, 2016), 81-82.
30 Emanuel, “Making a Bicycle City,” 509.
31 On the declining numbers of walkers and cyclists, see Colin Pooley and Jean Turnbull, “Modal 
Choice and Modal Change: The Journey to Work in Britain Since 1890,” Journal of Transport 
Geography 8, no. 1 (2000): 11-24; Colin Pooley, Jean Turnbull, and Mags Adams. A Mobile Century? 
Changes in Everyday Mobility in Britain in the Twentieth Century (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).
32 Frank Veraart, Stijn Knuts, and Pascal Delheye, “Antwerp: Cycling Claims a Comeback,” in 
Cycling Cities: The European Experience, eds. Ruth Oldenziel, Martin Emanuel, Adri A. Albert de 
la Bruhèze and Frank Veraart, (Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of Technology, 2016), 93; 
Martin Emanuel, Frank Veraart, and Peter Cox, “Manchester: Cycling at a Standstill,” in Cycling 
Cities: The European Experience, 105; Emanuel, “Malmö: A Center of Cycling Innovation,” in Cycling 
Cities: The European Experience. A Hundred Years of Policy and Practice, ed. Ruth Oldenziel, et 
al. (Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of Technology, 2016), 141-42.
33 Schmucki, Der Traum vom Verkehrsfluss, 98-99, 118-53; Albert de la Bruhèze and Oldenziel, 
Cycling Cities: The Munich Experience, 26.
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rather than cycling.34 According to Huré, many French planners saw a mix 
of “automobility and underground public transit” as the future; planners in 
the Dutch port Rotterdam had similar ideas.35 In the 1960s, urban planners 
in capitals like Stockholm and Amsterdam were also experimenting with 
strictly separating pedestrians and cyclists from car traff ic in their new 
suburbs.36 Such safe areas for cyclists and pedestrians were built outside 
these suburbs, giving them the character of an island reservation. The car 
ultimately became popular everywhere. Dutch traff ic discourse in the 
1960s focused on cars too. What needs to be explained is why these high 
car levels became more compatible with cycling in some countries than 
others. Policymakers in the Netherlands never lost sight of cycling in the 
1950s and 1960s, even though public debate and engineering discourse 
seemed single-mindedly focused on driving: cyclists remained more visible 
than elsewhere.37 What forms of cycling survived in the Netherlands? And 
which policies supported this?
4.2 Ambiguities and Continuities
In the postwar period, Dutch policymakers’ attitude towards commuter 
cycling became more ambivalent. State engineers in the 1920s and 1930s had 
been positive about utilitarian cycling’s status as a public good worthy of 
(some) funding and policies, despite an active car lobby. Criticism of cycling 
did not intensify in the 1950s and 1960s, but cyclists were increasingly ignored 
by certain policymakers, preoccupied as they were with the problems of the 
car’s massive space demands – whether moving or parked – particularly in 
historic cities not built for cars. Nevertheless, some engineers and urban 
34 Adri A. Albert de la Bruhèze and Martin Emanuel, “Hannover: Sidelining the Bicyclist,” 
in Cycling Cities: The European Experience. A Hundred Years of Policy and Practice, ed. Ruth 
Oldenziel, et al. (Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of Technology, 2016), 118; Emanuel, 
“Copenhagen: Branding the Cycling City,” 82.
35 Maxime Huré, “Lyon: The Bicycle Goes Corporate,” in Cycling Cities: The European Experience, 
ed. Ruth Oldenziel, et al. (Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of Technology, 2016), 177; 
Berkers et al., Cycling Cities: The Rotterdam Experience.
36 Martin Emanuel, “Stockholm: Where Public Transit Eclipses Cycling,” in Cycling Cities: 
The European Experience. A Hundred Years of Policy and Practice, ed. Ruth Oldenziel, et al. 
(Eindhoven: Foundation for the History of Technology, 2016), 153. This idea was also considered 
and partially implemented in the Bijlmer area of Amsterdam and the new Dutch town Lelystad: 
Petra Brouwer, Van stad naar stedelijkheid: Planning en planconceptie van Lelystad en Almere 
1959-1974 (Rotterdam: NAi Uitgevers, 1997), 35, 56.
37 Buiter, “Utrecht: Bicycles Rule – Again,” 33.
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planners even recognized cycling was a potential solution for the excessive 
demands that cars made on urban space. In the interwar period, engineers 
had translated cycling’s status as a middle-class public good into engineering 
norms that remained in place throughout the 1950s and 1960s, regardless of 
changing ideas about cycling’s place. And cycling’s public support continued 
to be strong – reversing these norms was never a serious consideration. The 
ambivalence about cycling had no major negative repercussions in policy 
terms.
We should note that although the evidence of the support for cycling 
cited in this section comes from the 1950s that continued in the 1960s, the 
public utterances supporting cycling were rare. Some engineers criticized 
this, attributing the worsening quality of cycling infrastructure to neglectful 
engineers, who increasingly swapped the bicycle for the car themselves, 
one colleague observed.38 Efforts and investments in cycling reached a low 
point in the early 1960s. Instead of bicycles, the popular moped along with 
fear and/or excitement over the future growth of car ownership dominated 
the public and engineering debates. Behind the scenes, however, some 
construction of utilitarian and recreational cycling infrastructure continued. 
Efforts varied from place to place: cycling conditions deteriorated for some 
cyclists and improved for others. Overall, as with cycling levels, cycling 
policy attention in the Netherlands dropped in this period but still remained 
higher than elsewhere.
The continuity of engineering norms mattered. As we have seen, having 
decided in the late 1930s that cycling should primarily be governed locally, 
Dutch state engineers increasingly turned their attention to highway plan-
ning at the expense of cycling, even as a relatively bicycle-friendly country, 
it was also at the vanguard of highway planning internationally. Engineers 
and civil society representatives on the Roads Consultation Committee 
(COW) had often discussed cycling in the 1920s and 1930s (see 2.3), but during 
the postwar decades of reconstruction and economic growth, narrowed 
its focus to determining ideal routes for (new) highways connecting cities, 
while continuing to implement separate cycle paths along them. Local 
mobility patterns, where cycling, walking, and public transit outnumbered 
driving, had been assigned to local government, so state engineers no longer 
discussed them.
In the 1950s, local policymakers working on cycling did confront state 
engineers with the increasing conflicts between highway car traff ic and 
local non-motorized traff ic. Working in The Hague, the nation’s seat of 
38 H.B. Bakker, “Opnieuw over rijwielpaden,” Wegen 38, no. 3 (1964): 70-76.
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government, COW officials visited cities or towns impacted by these national 
new highway plans. As the national COW members discovered, local of-
f icials regularly insisted on cycling infrastructure. For instance in Laren, 
one of Amsterdam’s f irst commuter satellite towns, a planned road would 
cut straight through its center. Discussing the plan with state engineers 
in 1961, the municipality demanded the national government built “small 
tunnels” for pedestrians and cyclists.39 Laren was home to many wealthy 
Amsterdam elites, which perhaps explains why such a small place felt it 
could demand this special infrastructure. Other local authorities specifically 
requested “bicycle tunnels” to address the danger of crossing the new roads. 
The traff ic futures imagined in national traff ic planners’ minds collided 
with the everyday reality of mobility in local communities. In the 1960s, 
several municipalities demanded cycling facilities (often tunnels under 
newly planned highways) for tourists and school children, in particular. In 
1967, Abcoude, a village near Amsterdam and rapidly becoming a commuter 
area, requested “a cycling tunnel (for school children),” and in 1970, the 
mayor of Schaijk, a rural village in the province Noord-Brabant, wanted a 
bicycle tunnel “for the school-going children of Schaijk and the recreational 
cyclists.”40 Local policymakers made sure national engineers were aware 
of cyclists’ existence and concerns.
State engineers may have refused a major role in cycling governance, but 
not necessarily because they thought cycling was outdated. Their neglect 
probably has more to do with their belief in decentralized governance than 
any overly negative opinions of cycling. Evidence suggests they started to 
value urban cycling as a transport mode. While f irmly convinced of the 
(economic) importance of facilitating the car, its disproportional demands 
on urban space concerned city planners. Tim Verlaan contends that Dutch 
urban planners recognized these problems earlier than their counterparts 
in other European cities.41 Berkers, Schipper, Bek, and Oldenziel make a 
similar claim even for the car-centered city of Rotterdam: local authorities 
and planners sought to avoid American models and pushed for public transit. 
Rotterdam Public Works engineer Theun Brouwer wrote critical pieces 
about car dominance and its negative effects on cycling in the early 1960s,42 
39 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 374. meeting January 26, 1961.
40 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 375, meetings March 1, 1967 (Abcoude) and May 14, 1970 (Schaijk).
41 Tim Verlaan, “Mobilization of the Masses: Dutch Planners, Local Politics, and the Threat of 
the Motor Age 1960-1980,” Journal of Urban History 47, no. 1 (2021): 136-56. Ambivalence about 
the car also prevailed in Britain: Simon Gunn, “The Buchanan Report, Environment and the 
Problem of Traff ic in 1960s Britain,” Twentieth Century British History 22, no. 4 (2011): 521-42.
42 Berkers et al., Cycling Cities: The Rotterdam Experience, 30-33.
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showing how American traff ic engineering ideas circulating widely in 
Europe were appropriated locally in different ways.43
The pushback against American traff ic engineering and planning came 
early. The Netherlands’ cycling tradition and late automobility led some 
engineers in the 1950s already to point to the space-eff iciency of cycling 
versus the car in urban contexts. The nation’s leading Public Works (Rijk-
swaterstaat) engineer Marius Cosquino de Bussy defended the advantages 
of cycling for Dutch mobility at the 1956 Dutch Road Congress on city center 
traff ic. Trained at Delft Polytechnical University, he became a Public Works 
engineer in 1929. As a highway planner, he nevertheless also participated 
in a 1954 committee to research pedestrians’ interests.44 He also claimed to 
have a “predilection for cycling [voorliefde voor het rijwielverkeer].”45
During a working visit, a delegation of French engineers had witnessed 
rush hour traff ic at a major junction in The Hague, where a traff ic police 
off icer regulated traff ic. As De Bussy reported, the visitors observed how 
each time the off icer signaled for traff ic to move, eight cyclists could cross 
for every car. De Bussy deduced from the statistics that each car had on 
average two occupants. As “disorderly” as the cycling traff ic looked, “one 
should not forget that it moves around a large amount of people in our old 
and narrow cities.”46 Possibly the biggest headache for urban car traff ic in 
historic cities – parking space – was also much less of an issue with bicycles. 
Figure 16 shows how many cyclists could move through a city at rush hour: 
it was much more eff icient than if all those people were to drive a car. At 
least some arguments for taking cycling seriously as a public good circulated 
in the 1950s and 1960s.
For some prominent road engineers, urban cycling was even in theory part 
of the solution rather than the problem. De Bussy claimed road construction 
outside cities had to be increased, but at the same time wanted to protect 
(urban) cycling wherever possible.47 In a 1956 newspaper article, De Bussy 
admitted cycling was “fast and eff icient despite the oftentimes chaotic sight 
43 Carla Assmann, “The Emergence of the Car-Oriented City: Entanglements and Transfer 
Agents in West-Berlin, East-Berlin and Lyon, 1945-75,” The Journal of Transport History 41, no. 3 
(2020): 328-352, here 331.
44 “Belangen voetganger in het verkeer,” Arnhemsche Courant, 08-01-1954; “Rapport over het 
probleem van voetgangers in het verkeer: Wettelijke bescherming gevraagd van oversteekp-
laatsen,” Het Vaderland, September 15, 1954.
45 “Verkort Verslag van de Congresdag op 14 december 1956 te Utrecht: Maatregelen ter bevorder-
ing van de Vlotheid van het verkeer en van de parkeer-mogelijkheden in de binnenstad,” Wegen 
31, no. 7 (1957): 195-96.
46 Ibid.
47 “Nieuwe wegen zullen moeten worden aangelegd,” Het Parool, February 28, 1956.
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it presents.”48 Traff ic counts showed that cyclists still dominated city traff ic 
so “considerable investments in bicycle traffic” were needed “to avoid making 
cycling too unattractive in cities.”49 It was paramount that “urban planners” 
would “promote cycling as much as possible, or at least prevent that it is 
squeezed out by other traffic.”50 Two years earlier, De Bussy had made a study 
trip to the United States with Rotterdam’s chief of police K.J. Müller and 
ANWB’s head of traff ic C.A. Kuysten.51 De Bussy’s later defense of cycling 
proves he did not f ind the American paradigm an attractive blueprint.52 
However, this fear applied primarily to cities. Increasing roadbuilding on 
48 “In Nederland komt een miljoen auto’s,” Nieuwsblad van het Zuiden, February 28, 1956. The 
author thanks Eric Berkers for this information.
49 M. Le Cosquino de Bussy, “Verkeer – heden en toekomst,” De Kampioen Special issue ‘75 jaar 
ANWB’ (July 1, 1958): 38.
50 Ibid.
51 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 334. On adopting US highway plans: Bruce E. Seely, 
Donald E. Klingner, and Gary Klein, “‘Push’ and ‘Pull’ Factors in Technology Transfer: Moving 
American-Style Highway Engineering to Europe, 1945-1965,” Comparative Technology Transfer 
& Society 2, no. 3 (2004): 229-46.
52 Dutch off icials visited US (suburban) shopping centers. They also traveled to Sweden, 
where the more controlled, state-led planning made a better impression: Janine Gosseye, “The 
Figure 16 In the 1950s, commuter cyclists still dominated urban traffic like near Utrecht’s Central 
Station during rush hour. The image illustrates what engineers also observed: cycling traffic required 
much less space than car traffic and might therefore be worth safeguarding. [Source: Collectie Het 
Utrechts Archief, Photographer L.H. Hofland, cat. nr. 43231]
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the outskirts was not a (spatial) problem, but an economic necessity in De 
Bussy’s view – although new roads had to have cycle paths which were “an 
important improvement requiring little costs.”53 De Bussy was not alone in 
this view. In 1953, engineer Willem Valderpoort published a critical book 
The Selfish Car, arguing that the car benefited only a select group while its 
negative aspects affected everyone.54
Dutch urban planners were also concerned about the rising automobility 
in cities.55 At the Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work, engineer 
R. van der Waal cited research in 1961 showing that recreational cycling 
was still very popular.56 In sharp contrast to the f irst half of the 1900s, 
national policymakers started to take an interest in urban cycling as a public 
good and potential solution to the automobility issues as well. That these 
engineers often rode a bicycle may have reinforced their support for measures 
that enabled cycling alongside car roads. Public Works highest off icial, 
director-general August Maris, was not the only off icial to commute by 
bicycle.57 This new belief had little immediate effect: national policymakers 
had hardly any influence on urban mobility governance. Struggling with 
automobility in their cities, urban policymakers ultimately also did little 
to limit its place in the 1950s and 1960s. Consequently, the urban landscape 
and space distribution changed dramatically.
The logic of traff ic separation had not been applied exclusively to cyclists. 
Developed in the 1910s, it was the outcome of engineers’ general distinction 
between fast and slow traff ic. Instead of roads and cycling paths, engineers 
considered – and in some cases built – parallel service roads for all forms of 
slow traff ic: agricultural or any remaining horse-drawn vehicles, mopeds, 
and cyclists. Speaking in 1958 at a conference on future traff ic development, 
province of Gelderland engineer W. Mols argued that “in certain cases it can 
be better to open the road only to motorized vehicles and let slow traff ic 
use a parallel road which also replaces the uni- or bidirectional cycling 
paths.” Wider than a typical cycling path, this would also “largely solve the 
Janus-Faced Shopping Center: The Low Countries in Search of a Fitting Shopping Paradigm,” 
Journal of Urban History 44, no. 5 (2018): 862-86.
53 “Wij spraken met Ir. M. le Cosquino de Bussy, Hoofdingenieur-directeur Rijkswaterstaat,” 
Het Vaderland, 28-02-1958, 3. NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 373, COW meeting January 14, 1954.
54 W. Valderpoort, De zelfzuchtige personenauto: Beschouwingen over een onderdeel van het 
verkeersvraagstuk, met een bijzondere toepassing op de stedebouw (Amsterdam: Van Saane, 1953).
55 Verlaan, “Mobilization of the Masses,” 142; Disco, “De bewogen stad, 1945-1980.”
56 NA 2.27.5111, inv. no. 60, 28th meeting INCOR-committee, July 5, 1961.
57 “Generaal van een roemrijk leger, in een land vol vredestrofeeën: Ir. A.G. Maris ten afscheid,” 
Algemeen Handelsblad, October 19, 1961, 4.
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problem of fast mopeds on narrow cycling paths.”58 Provincial engineers 
like Mols continued to believe in providing cyclists with their own space, 
even though they no longer contributed to road improvement through the 
bicycle tax. According to province of Noord-Holland engineer C. Krijn in 1950, 
the abolition of the bicycle tax “was by no means a reason not to continue 
the construction of cycling paths.”59 Like De Bussy, these engineers saw 
the interests of “slow” traff ic as important enough to justify investment.
Many authorities built cycling infrastructure. With no coordinating 
agency collecting data, however, a comprehensive picture of cycling path 
construction is lacking. Still, the evidence shows that national and provincial 
Public Works departments kept working towards providing all major roads 
with separate cycling paths. In 1954, national engineer De Bussy argued 
that this was a cost-effective way and “important improvement” to the 
road network.60 Annual roadworks reports featured many cycling paths. 
One traff ic journal provided an overview of construction works on major 
roads in 1956. It mentioned the (re)construction of cycling paths on no 
fewer than thirty-four national or provincial roads.61 For other years, the 
pattern is similar. Although the lack of distinction between separate cycling 
paths and on-road cycling lanes complicates comparing the statistics, the 
Roads Atlas that main Public Works statistician Van Gils compiled shows 
a clear increase in the 1950s. The 1949 and 1960 Atlases show how in the 
intermediate period, national Public Works engineers had provided over 
400 km of national roads with cycling paths.62 In contrast to other countries, 
where cycling infrastructure stagnated or existing paths became space for 
cars, Dutch engineers continued to gradually extend the network.
There were signif icant regional differences. State engineers only 
administered part of the Dutch road network: provinces played a large 
and independent role. Decentralized road governance meant that each 
58 Het Nederlandse Wegennet in verband met de toekomstige verkeersbehoeften. Prae-adviezen 
te behandelen op de Congresdag 1958, Utrecht, 19 december 1958, 36-37.
59 C. Krijn, “Rijwielpaden langs Provinciale Wegen,” Wegen 24, no. 5 (1950): 147.
60 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 373, meeting January 14, 1954.
61 “De Rijkswegen in 1956,” Berichten en beschouwingen van de verkeersafdeling van de ANWB 
8, no. 1 (1957): 9-20. Even the postwar reconstruction years saw 100 km of cycling paths added 
alongside national roads: Kamerstukken II 1950/51, 1900 IX B, 9, December 7, 1950, 48.
62 Not including parallel roads, but counting separate cycling paths and on-road cycling lanes, 
1,815 km of nationally administered roads had cycling infrastructure in 1949. By 1961 this was 
2,231 km. Source: Rijkswaterstaat: Centrale Dienst voor de Wegen en de Bruggen: Bureau voor 
de Wegen- en Verkeersstatistiek, Atlas van de Rijkswegen 1949 (’s-Gravenhage: Rijkswaterstaat, 
1950), 4; Rijkswaterstaat Directie Algemene Dienst, Atlas Rijkswegen 1960 (’s-Gravenhage: 
Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1962), Table 4.
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province could decide whether, where, how, and when to reconstruct 
roads and provide cycling infrastructure. Unsurprisingly, a 1942 ANWB 
overview had uncovered the large differences between provinces in types 
of cycling infrastructure. As no government agency had such an overview, 
the ANWB took on the task of data collection throughout the twentieth 
century.
Table 2  Partial overview of the status of cycling infrastructure on the main 
provincial roads in the Netherlands, 1942







drenthe None/mixed Traffic –
Source: “Neerlands rijwielpaden en hun bewijzering,” De Kampioen 59, no. 9 (1942): 65
This partial overview, omitting a few provinces, made clear that engineers 
chose different solutions. Separate cycling lanes, the ANWB’s choice, were 
more expensive than cycling lanes on the road. Overijssel had more cycling 
lanes than other provinces. Some had hardly started to construct any cycling 
infrastructure at all.63 In 1954, a Friesland newspaper journalist praised 
the province’s initiative with recreational cycling paths but criticized the 
inadequate efforts to create safe cycling routes alongside major roads. There 
were barely any “normal ‘utility cycling paths’” (gebruiksfietspaden) along 
these roads.64 Friesland’s provincial policymakers only started constructing 
63 “Neerlands rijwielpaden en hun bewijzering,” 65-66.
64 “Waar blijft het geld voor onze ‘gewone’ f ietspaden?,” Leeuwarder Courant, June 26 1954. The 
response to “who had caused this,” was: “Clearly it’s the national public works administration 
[Rijkswaterstaat].” The reporters emphatically blamed national public works as Friesland’s 
provincial branch in Leeuwarden was aware of the problems but received no funding to remedy 
the situation. “Time and again the item for our cycling paths is dropped from the budget. No 
money! We’ll see again next year.” Other departments received what they requested, but Friesland 
was too far from the centre of power: “Like so many other things, the Frisian cycling paths are 
located too far from The Hague.” There was some justif ication for this critique as funds were 
distributed nationally over the provinces. However, the provinces then chose how to spend 
their allocated roads budget.
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these in the 1960s. Others had already been doing this in the 1930s.65 One 
consequence of the decentralized Dutch system was that each province 
operated at its own pace.
Many different stakeholders were responsible for their share of cycling 
governance. National and provincial engineers provided “their” roads 
with separate cycle paths in response to the ANWB lobby. Regional 
networks of provincial and local policymakers too boosted recreational 
cycling (see Chapter 3). Just after the war, cycling received a lot of policy 
attention because the war had damaged recreational cycling paths, the 
popularity of the moped was putting pressure on cycling infrastructures, 
and the ANWB continued its advocacy. It is hardly surprising that the 
Wegen special issue was dedicated to cycling paths. The f ive articles 
on this theme clearly illustrate the Dutch governance network around 
cycling at the time. National engineer H.B. Bakker authored an article 
on cycling paths alongside national roads; provincial engineer Krijn of 
Noord-Holland wrote about cycling paths alongside provincial roads; legal 
expert and urban planner B. Mees from Rotterdam (critically) described 
urban cycling, which he found chaotic; ANWB traff ic engineer Kuysten 
discussed rural cycling paths, and another ANWB off icial, August Boost, 
contributed on cycling tourism.66 The f irst four topics were considered 
serving utilitarian functions, governed by different authorities. The 
recreational cycling infrastructure required a separate and equally 
complicated coalition. Given the patchwork of governance for cycling, 
it is hard to overstate the ANWB’s role in creating a more or less uniform 
outcome over time.
Despite the lack of top-down coordination, the initiatives described 
formed an impressive total. By the mid-1940s, the provinces had constructed 
some 1,350 km of cycling paths alongside roads.67 By 1965, an ANWB report 
found this had increased to 1,750 km, despite the missing justif ication of the 
bicycle tax after World War II. The rate of cycling path construction slowed 
down, but did not stop altogether.68 By 1983, almost all major provincial roads 
65 “De opbouw van een goed wegennet, in het bijzonder in Friesland,” Wegen 36, no. 6 (1962): 
126-33.
66 H.B. Bakker, “Rijwielpaden langs Rijkswegen,” Wegen 24, no. 5 (1950): 137-44; Krijn, “Rijwiel-
paden langs Provinciale Wegen,” 145-48; B. Mees, “Het rijwielverkeer in de grote stad,” Wegen 24, 
no. 5 (1950): 149-54; C.A. Kuysten, “Rijwielpaden ten Plattelande,” Wegen 24, no. 5 (1950): 154-57; 
A.G.M. Boost, “Rijwielverkeer en toerisme,” Wegen 24, no. 5 (1950): 158-59.
67 “Neerlands rijwielpaden en hun bewijzering,” 65.
68 Koninklijke Nederlandse Toeristenbond ANWB, Fietspaden en -oversteekplaatsen ([The 
Hague]: 1966), 10.
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and a substantial share of the secondary roads would have cycling paths 
(see table 3).69 Providing major roads with separate cycling paths became 
part and parcel of Dutch roadbuilding norms and practices outside cities. 
In short, cycling path construction was clearly an incremental process, and 
sustained over time, would become a comprehensive network of suburban 
and rural infrastructure.
Table 3  Extent of cycling infrastructure on the largest provincial (secondary) 
roads and the network (tertiary roads) in 1983, calculated by the 
Organization of Provinces (IPO)
Province Percentage of Secondary Roads 
with Cycling Infrastructure
Percentage of Tertiary Roads 
with Cycling Infrastructure
In 1983 Planned by 
1986-87
In 1983 Planned by 
1986-87
friesland 98 98 54 67
Groningen 86 88 46 50 
drenthe 91 92 62 75 
overijssel 92 92 48 52 
Gelderland – 90 – 58
Noord-Holland 68 68 53 53 
zuid-Holland 92 93 33 34 
utrecht 100 100 70 70 
Noord-brabant 88 98 64 77 
zeeland 94 95 42 49 
Limburg 98 100 25 38 
Source: HuA 1205, inv. no. 5065, letter IPo Traffic Committee to minister of Public Works, may 16, 1983
4.3 ANWB Expands its Role as an Expert Organization
The tourist organization ANWB, so important in promoting the practice 
and political acknowledgement of cycling in the interwar period, expanded 
its role as a crucial mobility actor. Historians Buiter and Staal characterize 
the ANWB from 1919 to 1949 as a lobby organization in shaping the new 
infrastructure – a role the organization continued in the 1950s and 1960s. It 
also increased its role in disseminating knowledge.70 As state involvement in 
69 Source: HUA 1205, inv. no. 5065, letter IPO Traff ic Committee to Minister of Public Works, 
May 16, 1983.
70 Buiter and Staal, Het avontuur van de ANWB, 5.
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mobility and tourism grew, the ANWB placed its governance expertise more 
central by employing its own civil engineers. The expansion entailed not 
only creating educational platforms, but also producing and disseminating 
knowledge through brochures and traff ic courses. It is hard to determine 
what the state of affairs on cycling in international engineering research 
was around the 1950s and 1960s, but the ANWB’s extensive expertise on 
this topic seems to have developed with relatively little international input. 
This stands in sharp contrast to its road engineering expertise.71
The organization’s leaders believed the ANWB was possibly the most 
important actor in Dutch mobility governance in terms of its engineering 
expertise but also its representation of the user perspective – especially in 
the absence of strong national governmental coordination. The growth of 
car ownership created many conflicts between pedestrians, cyclists, and 
car drivers. In a decentralized administrative system, where provincial and 
local engineers had considerable autonomy, the uniformity of road design 
and other car or cycling facilities was by no means guaranteed. ANWB 
off icials found the lack of standardization dangerous: road users were 
confused by the diverse local conditions, thus increasing the likelihood 
of accidents. With its good contacts at all government levels and bird’s eye 
perspective of mobility, the ANWB believed it should be pro-actively involved 
in formulating road engineering standards. Between 1946 and 1977, engineer 
and member Kuysten headed the ANWB’s Roads Section. In an interview 
in 1977 to mark his retirement, he reflected that “coordination among the 
more than a thousand road authorities in the design of roads and junctions 
was an important task, which the ANWB took upon itself without being 
asked.”72 He presented the ANWB as non-political and neutral technical 
expert, independent from the policy reversals as a result of governments 
changing their political color. In a classic trope of technocratic thinking, 
the ANWB considered itself a more eff icient organization than the state.
According to the ANWB, there was an informal division of labor between 
various mobility actors. The ANWB had to take the lead in the knowledge 
role. In 1956, Traff ic Department director August Boost asserted that the 
ANWB subscribed to the three Es: Engineering, Enforcement, and Educa-
tion. The education (of traff ic users) “has by gentlemen’s agreement for the 
71 The World Road Congresses of the engineering association PIARC discussed cycling oc-
casionally in the Interbellum, but rarely if ever after World War II. See https://www.piarc.org/
en/activities/World-Road-Congresses-World-Road-Association/Congress-Proceedings
72 “De verkeerskundige moet eenvoudig durven zijn! Gesprek met ir. C.A. Kuysten bij zijn 
afscheid als Directeur Verkeer en Recreatie van de ANWB,” Verkeerskunde 28, no. 11 (1977): 506.
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most part been awarded to the Traff ic Safety Association” (Veilig Verkeer 
Nederland), another non-governmental organization.73 Enforcement was 
the government’s task, but Engineering was the ANWB Traff ic Depart-
ment’s specialty. This was more than an informal collaboration: the ANWB 
performed “the function of a consultancy bureau off icially – i.e. at the 
request of municipal and provincial authorities.”74 The ANWB enjoyed 
many personal links with the state. Engineer Frederik Hendrik van der 
Linde van Sprankhuizen worked for the provincial public works and plan-
ning departments, while chairing the ANWB between 1962 and 1980.75 
The ANWB’s executive board, as Linders-Rooijendijk shows, were often 
prominent f igures, including mayors, lawyers, and a few (state-employed) 
engineers. The relationship between the ANWB and the state might not 
have been formalized, but it was very close.
Indeed, authorities recognized and sought out the ANWB’s expertise. 
When a municipality consulted the Association of Dutch Municipalities 
(VNG) about a dangerous crossing, it recommended the village turn to 
the ANWB instead.76 It is telling that the Association did not refer them to 
provincial or national Public Works engineers: the ANWB was more visible 
and easier to contact even though government engineers developed cycling 
engineering expertise over time. Local authorities considered the ANWB a 
prominent expert and source of free advice in traff ic engineering.77 Mom 
and Filarski show that in the 1950s the number of occasions on which the 
ANWB provided engineering advice to municipalities rose from 100 to 
more than 250 annually, before it declined in the 1960s.78 National Public 
Works not only accepted, but actively supported this ANWB role. Historian 
Marcus Popkema discovered that after 1950, the ANWB received a secret 
government subsidy from Public Works to publish a traff ic engineering 
journal for experts. The reason for this secrecy lies in the administrative 
tradition of decentralized autonomy, where lower authorities considered 
advice and guidance from national Public Works an encroachment on their 
autonomy. That is why the Public Works administration, to promote its vision 
73 HUA 1007-3, inv. no. 23060, opening speech Boost (ANWB) at ‘Eerste Politie-Verkeersleergang’ 
May 9, 1956. Boost succeeded H. de Bruyn, also a central f igure in Dutch road and traff ic planning. 
Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 335.
74 HUA 1007-3, inv. no. 23060, opening speech Boost, May 9, 1956. Linders-Rooijendijk, Gebaande 
wegen II, 576.
75 Ibid., 1032.
76 NA 2.19.185 (Archive VNG), inv. no. 2628, letter VNG to municipality Asten, June 16, 1951.
77 Popkema, “Tussen techniek en planning,” 74.
78 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie.
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of preferred mobility solutions, chose to work with the seemingly neutral 
social actor ANWB.79 The cooperation between the two organizations 
conf irms the close entwinement between state and non-state actors in 
Dutch mobility governance. Furthermore, it demonstrates that engineers 
and ANWB off icials had very similar core ideas. Had this not been the case, 
Public Works would not have subsidized the ANWB.
The ANWB used various means to create this monopoly on mobility 
knowledge. Since the 1920s, the ANWB had published Wegen, organized road 
conferences, and launched a traff ic engineering journal.80 In the 1950s, in 
collaboration with academics from Delft technical college, it set up traff ic 
courses. As there was no off icial degree course for traff ic engineering in 
the Netherlands, many Dutch off icials responsible for traff ic in their region 
received their training through the ANWB courses. Civil servants and 
engineers responsible for traff ic at the local level often had no specif ic 
background in traff ic engineering and received further training. Through 
these courses, local traff ic engineers could acquaint themselves with the 
new traff ic expertise. In a time before the establishment of traff ic engineer-
ing degrees at universities or independent research institutes, the ANWB 
fulf illed a key role.
The ANWB expanded its educational role for government engineers. To 
help local traff ic engineers design safe and uniform traff ic environments, 
the ANWB wrote manuals. These included sections devoted to cycling paths, 
pedestrian crossings, intersection design, and so on. The instructions were 
detailed, technical, and presented objectively to help local off icials design a 
better traffic system. Leading ANWB official Boost described how these had 
“the intention as well as the effect, fortunately, of achieving standardization 
of traff ic facilities.”81 A memorandum on the proper construction of cycling 
paths and pedestrian crossings underwent many revisions in the 1960s.82 
In line with cycling policies up to that point, it concentrated on road design 
in rural areas rather than the city. Dominant in these brochures and other 
79 Popkema, “Tussen techniek en planning,” 78.
80 Ibid., 75-82. Wegen featured traff ic planning in the Interbellum but geared towards road-
building when increasing specialization led to new traff ic engineering journals: Berichten 
en Beschouwingen van de Verkeersafdeling van de ANWB (Reports and Ref lections from the 
ANWB’s Traff ic Department, 1950-1958), Tijdschrift voor Verkeerstechniek (Traff ic Engineering 
Journal, 1958-1959), Verkeerstechniek (Traff ic Engineering, 1960-1974) and Verkeerskunde (Traff ic 
Studies, 1975-now). The ANWB also published Traffic Law from 1953, which still exists, and 
Recreatievoorzieningen (Recreational Facilities).
81 HUA 1007-3, inv. no. 23060, opening speech Boost, May 9, 1956.
82 ANWB, Fietspaden en -oversteekplaatsen.
PoPuLAr or ouTdATed? NATIoNAL PoLICYmAkerS’ AmbIvALeNCe AbouT bICYCLeS 175
knowledge distribution channels, was the belief that traff ic f low was the 
gold standard – a dominant international view increasingly under pressure 
as traff ic volume grew and demanded solutions. A 1961 brochure on urban 
traff ic stressed that cities had to reserve space for the growing car traff ic 
(and parking) because “the (car) traff ic function of the street is primary.”83 
The brochure did include The Hague’s traff ic count, demonstrating that 
cyclists and mopeds outnumbered cars three to one. Consequently, the 
ANWB proposed alternative main routes for commuter cycling traff ic: 
complete with smooth asphalt and optimized waiting times at traff ic lights, 
these should entice cyclists to avoid major car routes.84 In effect, the ANWB 
proposed a more space-eff icient way to separate traff ic that prioritized cars. 
As in the 1920s, the car-serving logic is apparent, despite not ignoring cyclists.
As the ANWB’s expert role grew stronger and stronger from the late 
1940s onwards, how did its stance on cycling and consequently its cycling 
advocacy develop over the same period? When World War II disrupted 
travel patterns in the Netherlands, the ANWB had turned its attention 
more towards cycling than before. At the time, the organization admitted 
it “was, at least in appearances, primarily oriented toward car tourism,” 
but this made less sense “now that more than ever the entire Netherlands 
is cycling.”85 In line with its self-imposed task of educating road users, the 
organization immediately published an article explaining to all former 
drivers-turned-cyclists how to behave responsibly and orderly in traff ic.86 
The ANWB’s liberal stance was characteristic – it claimed users were free 
to choose their preferred transport mode. The ANWB and government 
should then facilitate that choice. They did not acknowledge that these 
policies nudged users into certain behavioral patterns.
In the late 1940s, the ANWB had been particularly active in forging new 
connections in cycling governance between engineering departments, local 
politicians, and private cycling path organizations. As Chapter 3 showed, local 
policymakers were keen to boost cycling. The lack of clear cycling governance 
hindered progress. If a cycling path functioned primarily within a local area, 
the municipal policymakers were in principle interested in f inancing it. 
The trouble started when a path crossed different state level boundaries. It 
required the ANWB’s constant networking to solve the resulting deadlock. 
83 Koninklijke Nederlandsche Toeristenbond ANWB, Verkeersstructuurplan en dwarsprofielen 
van stadsstraten, Verkeersmemorandum, vol. 16 ([The Hague], 1961), 22, 24, 30.
84 Ibid., 21-22.
85 “De A.N.W.B. werkt door!” De Kampioen 57, no. 12 (1940): 177.
86 “De correcte f ietser,” De Kampioen 57, no. 12 (1940): 179-80.
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A 1948 ANWB article encapsulated this: “The statement ‘a path is a path and 
all that matters is that it is a good path’ might be true for users, but it is not 
true for managing authorities. They self-evidently only spend their limited 
means to the extent they benefit from a path.”87 Getting spatial planners and 
engineers within the state to work together, or different levels of government, 
even neighboring municipalities, often required ANWB officials to intervene. 
That they were highly active in this role in the late 1940s shows how much 
stock they still put in recreational cycling as a public good.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the ANWB remained f irmly in favor of 
separate cycling paths alongside suburban and rural national roads. Traff ic 
safety research indicated that this signif icantly reduced accidents.88 Over 
the 1960s, the ANWB frequently revised its manual on designing paths, 
with many diagrams and photographs indicating ideal junction layout. The 
ANWB recommended the cycling path was built a few meters away from 
the parallel road, so that drivers turning right would have more time to slow 
down and check their mirrors for cyclists.89 Similarly, the ANWB proposed 
short cycling paths around city bus stops, so that busses would not have 
to cross cycling traff ic when pulling in to stop. These kinds of innovations 
the ANWB pioneered show its commitment to f inding space for different 
road users. Facilitating motorized traff ic was a priority, but also protecting 
cyclists. Rather than banning cyclists completely, ANWB engineers sought 
effective compromise solutions.
The ANWB did not approve of separate cycling paths in city centers, 
however. The main radial routes leading to and from the city should have 
separate paths, but near the many downtown junctions, it was better “to 
include bicycle traff ic in the traff ic f low so that it can get into the lane in 
front of traff ic near junctions [voorsorteren].”90 Separate cycling paths were 
recommended for the more spacious new neighborhoods on the outskirts 
of cities. The ANWB gave precise design norms: a 1-meter strip separating 
the path from the road (clearance to prevent accidents from parked cars 
opening doors); if there was a cycling path on only one side of the road, it 
should be 2.85 meters wide: 1 meter for mopeds, two 0.80-meter lanes for 
bicycles, and 0.25 meters of additional space because cyclists automatically 
keep a certain distance from the curb, so this space is effectively lost.91 The 
87 “Heden en toekomst van de rijwielpaden,” De Kampioen 63, no. 10 (1948): 267.
88 ANWB, Fietspaden en -oversteekplaatsen, 6-8.
89 Ibid., 31-53.
90 ANWB, Verkeersstructuurplan en dwarsprofielen van stadsstraten, 48.
91 Ibid., 48-50.
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organization’s research into cyclists’ behavior, experiences, and needs is 
further proof they were still taken seriously as road users (see f igure 17). It 
also showed its investment in increasing its expertise about cycling.
The ANWB continued its cycling advocacy and lobbying at a local level, 
where its networks provided extensive knowledge of local road (safety) 
conditions. Its new traff ic journal in 1950 offers numerous examples. The 
ANWB had asked Public Works to construct a “bicycle groove” (rijwielgoot) 
in the bridge over the river Oude Maas, a major connection on the busy 
commuter cycling route between Dordrecht and Zwijndrecht. This bridge had 
steps, and a groove on the side would make it easier for cyclists to transport 
their bicycle over the bridge. Another example is the cycling path along 
the national road Haagsche Schouw-Wassenaar. It had a sharp bend which 
cyclists sometimes missed at night due to bright car headlights. The ANWB 
asked Public Works to paint white lines on the road to enhance visibility. 
A f inal example comes from the southern province of Limburg, where a 
Figure 17 The Dutch ANWB increasingly promoted driving over the 1950s and 1960s, and sought 
to maintain cycling, believing it could simultaneously facilitate both. This junction near De Meern, 
Utrecht in 1975, developed by ANWB experts in the 1950s, has been widely applied since then to prevent 
collisions between cars turning and cyclists crossing. The ANWB circulated its design ideas among 
engineers through its trade journals, engineering courses, and good contacts with authorities. [Source: 
Collectie Het Utrechts Archief, Photograph Provincie Utrecht 847432]
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cycling path route went around a gas station. There was a telephone pole 
just behind the station, and the ANWB knew that “on multiple occasions, 
cyclists have crashed into this pole.” At the ANWB’s request, the pole was 
moved further away from the cycling path.92 These examples demonstrate 
the ANWB’s detailed knowledge of local infrastructure and cycling practices. 
Most state-employed traff ic engineers certainly did not have access to this 
type of information; without the ANWB’s role as mediator between user and 
government, it would have been much harder to resolve problems like these.
The ANWB’s cycling expertise was clearly large. What about acting on be-
half of cyclists and managing the conflicting interests of drivers and cyclists, 
or traff ic and nature? The ANWB continued to be a large and multifaceted 
organization. Some defended cyclists (and pedestrians) against car traff ic. 
Leading ANWB off icial and vice-director of Traff ic and Recreation C.A. 
Kuysten had mixed views. In a 1964 interview, he commented that utilitarian 
cycling was becoming obsolete. Commuting distances were now too long, and 
in the future, people would mainly use the bicycle to go to train and metro 
stations. In the same interview, Kuysten chastised municipal authorities for 
neglecting cyclists, for example by not building cycling routes to industrial 
zones, so workers could not go there by bike.93 In his 1977 retirement interview, 
he also called the average Dutch driver “aggressive and immature,” attributing 
this partly to the fact that most people had not grown up with the car (hinting 
at late automobilization in the Netherlands) and regarded driving too much 
as a race. After retirement, Kuysten became chairman of the Pedestrian 
Protection Association (Vereniging Bescherming Voetgangers). A central 
ANWB figure like Kuysten held views that did not boil down to exclusive 
support for one transport mode, but typically avoided hard choices.94
Other ANWB off icials believed cycling was outdated. According to J. 
Koolhaas Revers, a veteran car journalist and editor of the ANWB journal 
Bromfietskampioen (“Moped Champion”), the bicycle was about to be 
superseded by the moped and the car: “our old faithful pedal bicycle,” he 
argued, was fast becoming a “tiny national minority.” The last bicycle might 
even end up as a curiosity in Amsterdam’s Rijksmuseum. When he wrote 
this in 1951, however, cycling was not declining at all.95 But the succession of 
transport modes was a survival of the f ittest: the moped was a “conqueror, 
92 Berichten en beschouwingen van de verkeersafdeling van de ANWB 1, no. 3 (1950), 9, 13.
93 “Steden laten de f ietsers versukkelen,” Trouw, February 28, 1964, 11.
94 “De verkeerskundige moet eenvoudig durven zijn!” 507.
95 J. Koolhaas Revers, “Bromf iets de ‘Veroveraar’: Een beschouwing over het ontstaan van 
een nieuwe phase in ons gemotoriseerde verkeer,” Bromfietskampioen 1, no. 1 (1951): 6. The term 
pedal/push bike (trapfiets) distinguished it from the motorized bicycle (bromfiets).
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who imposes his will, against which there is nothing to be done.”96 For the 
more car-minded wing of the ANWB that Revers represented, technology’s 
progress was unstoppable. It was best to facilitate it – though not without 
a certain nostalgia for the loss of the old. Others remained invested in 
safeguarding Dutch natural and cultural heritage; they saw the encroach-
ment of cars and mopeds on natural areas as a regrettable development. 
Allied to conservationist and heritage protection movements as part of its 
promotion of national tourism, the ANWB had some qualms about allowing 
cars into historic Dutch inner cities.97 Within and beyond ANWB circles, 
not everyone believed cycling would disappear. A 1955 ANWB survey among 
12,000 bicycle dealers in the Netherlands showed only 22 percent thought 
the moped would eclipse the bicycle. Other dealers were certain the bicycle 
would remain the most popular two-wheeled vehicle.98
In a sign of the times, the various wings of the ANWB increasingly clashed 
in the 1960s. While one ANWB branch praised nature and national parks, 
others encouraged people to enjoy these parks by car and offered cheap 
deals. Klaas Kroon, a graduate of Wageningen Agricultural University, 
who became head of the ANWB’s new department of Environment and 
Landscape in 1966 “to promote the interests of nature within the ANWB,” 
had no easy task. He had to negotiate constantly with the ANWB’s traff ic 
department, where his “nagging about trees” was not appreciated.99 This 
internal tension became manifest for example in the late 1960s, when a 
new road was proposed through the dunes between the west coast seaside 
resorts Scheveningen and Zandvoort. Boost, representing the ANWB’s 
roads and traff ic interests, supported this road, claiming it was necessary 
for the future development of traff ic. However, ANWB director Blankert 
and chairman Van der Linde van Sprankhuizen opposed the road because 
it would damage nature and make the dunes less attractive for recreation.100 
This tension between utility and aesthetics also played out in discussions 
about American parkways, or the environmental embedding of the Autobahn 
and autostrada in Germany and Italy.101 More so than in those countries, 
96 Ibid.
97 Buiter and Staal, Het avontuur van de ANWB, 132.
98 “Bromfiets zal rijwiel niet overvleugelen,” Bromfietskampioen 5, no. 4 (1955): 285.
99 Hugo Arlman and Rudie van Meurs, “‘De adem van de ANWB stinkt eeuwig naar benzine.’ De 
macht van het vijftiende ministerie [the ANWB’s breath stinks for ever of petrol],” Vrij Nederland 
(Bijvoegsel) 17 (1980), 28.
100 Linders-Rooijendijk, Gebaande wegen II, 853-55.
101 On Germany’s relationship between roads and driving vs nature: Thomas Zeller, Driving 
Germany: The Landscape of the German Autobahn, 1930-1970, Studies in German history (New 
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however, the central discussion in the Netherlands was twofold: not just 
how to embed a road in nature, but whether a road was necessary at all 
when that nature could also be enjoyed by bicycle, a vehicle still widely 
owned and used by the Dutch, in contrast to Germany and certainly the 
United States, even in the 1960s. And now, the onetime lobby organization 
for cycling tourism in the Netherlands was increasingly considered an 
organization whose “car face … wins out too much.”102 This was why around 
1970, new activist groups would emerge around cycling: the ANWB was no 
longer considered a cycling advocate.
4.4 Conclusion
In the two decades when cycling lost much of its public status in many 
countries, the Dutch did not abandon their bikes. This chapter focused on 
the continuities and influence of policies initiated in the prewar period. 
It showed that engineers and policymakers at various levels still believed 
in the importance of cycling. Engineers continued to extend the network 
of separate cycling paths alongside major suburban and rural roads. This 
was neither controversial nor subject to debate. In the major engineering 
journals and archives consulted here we do not f ind any serious implica-
tions or discussions about ending this policy. It had become unremarkable 
and normal engineering practice, just as cycling remained an everyday 
practice.
Within a few decades, traff ic separation became so deeply rooted in 
engineering practices that it developed path dependent characteristics. 
Traff ic separation still did not take place inside cities. Alongside the major 
rural and suburban roads, it became ever more prevalent. The growing – and 
controversial – popularity of the moped contributed to this, as I will discuss 
in the next chapter. The Dutch had already started building cycling paths 
alongside roads when car ownership levels were so low that there was little 
need for it.
As a result of path dependent processes, in the suburbs and countryside 
there far was more continuity between the prewar and postwar situa-
tion: the suburban system of traff ic separation Dutch policymakers had 
York: Berghahn Books, 2007); Christof Mauch and Thomas Zeller, eds., The World beyond the 
Windshield: Roads and Landscapes in the United States and Europe (Athens, OH: Ohio University 
Press; Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2008).
102 Arlman and Meurs, “De adem van de ANWB,” 22.
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adopted as a political compromise in the 1920s was still producing cycling 
paths in the 1950s and 1960s when new roads were built or existing roads 
reconstructed. The central idea of path dependency theories is that (in 
this case) mobility and planning policies tend to produce mobility pat-
terns and physical infrastructure such as cycle paths, which are so deeply 
embedded that changing them is both diff icult and expensive.103 Initial 
choices, however contingent and small, can have long-lasting and crucial 
consequences. The contingent decision to levy a bicycle tax in the 1920s 
put Dutch mobility policy on a unique path. The commitment to traff ic 
separation led to a material infrastructure of suburban commuter cycle paths 
which supported cycling as a practice, even as car levels started to rise on 
roads. For one thing, the material costs of going back to mixed traff ic were 
high, requiring the demolition of cycle paths or their transformation into 
car lanes. Institutionally, engineers would have to change road norms and 
roadbuilding practices at high costs. And most importantly, drivers who used 
roads “free” of cyclists would not accept them returning to main roads. This 
is a positive feedback process which drives path dependent processes. Once 
traff ic separation was f irmly embedded, and as long as cycling levels were 
high, it was prohibitively diff icult to change this pattern.104 The continuity 
in rural and suburban cycle path construction is easy to overlook, since it 
had become standard practice for engineers in this period, leaving fewer 
traces in the historical records than changes in policy direction. These tacit 
patterns of behavior, deeply rooted in certain institutions, are important in 
explaining the long-term success of cycling in the Netherlands.
At the same time, it was not inevitable or predetermined that Dutch 
cycling would remain a public concern throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
That this happened also has to do with cycling’s cultural and political 
status, afforded a strong position in the Dutch system. Dutch policy also 
accommodated the interests of various social groups and a large interest 
group like cyclists had a certain power. Moreover, with the powerful ANWB 
lobby on their side, groups’ appeals to policymakers who also cycled for 
recreation, or even for their commute, meant cycling had public support.
If national policymakers discussed cycling less than in previous decades, 
this lack of attention is not necessarily indicative of hostility towards 
103 Hommels, Unbuilding Cities: Obduracy in Urban Sociotechnical Change; Hommels, “Studying 
Obduracy in the City,” 323-51.
104 Martin Emanuel, in an article on Copenhagen’s cycling culture, aptly pointed to the “obduracy 
of infrastructure and its capacity to preserve habits and cultures of the past.” Emanuel, “Making 
a Bicycle City,” 497, and his “Moments of Unsustainability,” 101-21. See: Hommels, Unbuilding 
Cities: Obduracy in Urban Sociotechnical Change, and “Studying Obduracy in the City,” 323-51.
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cycling. Rather, it shows the ambivalence towards cycling in a period of 
automobilization. It is also the ref lection of deeply rooted Dutch ideas 
about decentralization and the local management of local affairs. As with 
cycling culture, the ANWB fulf illed an active role in promoting car culture. 
At the same time, the organization dedicated a signif icant amount of time 
and money explaining to policymakers how they could enable safe cycling 
alongside rising car numbers. In the process, the ANWB came up with many 
innovative cycling design solutions and greatly enlarged the knowledge of 
cyclists’ behavior and needs.
Cycling as a public good became more ambiguous as the motorization of 
commuting increasingly seemed unstoppable. Cyclists refused to give up 
their bicycles however, and developments in the 1950s and 1960s reinforced 
cycling’s political position, as well as its place on the road. The popularity 
of mopeds ended up strengthening the commuter cycle paths alongside 
major roads.
5 An Accident of History: How Mopeds 
Boosted Dutch Cycling Infrastructure
On holiday weekends in the 1950s, there was an impressive spectacle on 
Dutch roads and cycling paths leading to recreational areas. A journalist 
described how “one long procession of cyclists” used the cycling paths next 
to roads. But among these cyclists something new was visible: “The mopeds 
have not had it easy … they certainly did not move forward much faster 
than the cyclists.” These mopeds, in the early 1950s basically bicycles with a 
small engine, were not popular with the cyclists forced to share their cycling 
path. Witnessing this, the journalist noted that “cyclists stubbornly kept 
their ranks closed whenever they heard one of those mopeds coming.” An 
understandable reaction, he noted: “It is almost impossible to get out of the 
way each time, cycle behind one another, for vehicles that are so much faster 
than those for which cycling paths are intended after all.”1 What were these 
mopeds doing on the cycling paths and why were they not using the road?
In 1960, Dutch policymakers were preoccupied with the space demands 
of the fast-growing automobility park. Yet the true growth spurt of car 
ownership in the Netherlands only came in the 1960s, later than elsewhere. 
For much of the 1950s and 1960s, Dutch working- and middle-class people 
used bicycles and the new moped much more than the car. Many cyclists who 
eventually (also) became drivers, made this move through an intermediate 
vehicle: the moped. Research in France, Germany, and Sweden has shown 
how mopeds were popular across Europe with working-class commuters 
(1950s) and young people (1960s). This was also the case in the Netherlands. 
European traffic conventions meant that mopeds were classif ied as a type of 
bicycle everywhere. As far as we know, only in the Netherlands did this have 
a strong impact on cycling, however. The comparatively high levels of cycling 
combined with an extensive network of suburban and rural cycle lanes, 
both separate and alongside roads, led to busy and overcrowded cycling 
paths. Based on (provincial) engineers’ archives, parliamentary records, 
and moped journal articles, I show the intense political and engineering 
debate about moped’s rightful place on the road. It discusses the ambivalent 
status of the moped as neither a bicycle nor a car, and the consequences of 
the decision to consign mopeds to cycling paths. Why were moped riders 
forced onto the same narrow cycling paths? How did national and provincial 
1 “Tienduizenden trokken naar bos en water,” Utrechtsch Nieuwsblad, May 26, 1953, 2.
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engineers and policymakers make and defend this decision? And why did 
it also, paradoxically, benefit cyclists?
“An Accident of History: How Mopeds Boosted Dutch Cycling” argues 
that the Dutch decision regarding where mopeds could ride added an 
unintended impetus to the construction of cycling paths. This process hap-
pened in a car-oriented context. By prioritizing the status of car drivers, 
moped riders were forced onto cycling paths. This decision overburdened 
the already congested paths at a time when roads were not yet heavily 
used. It also convinced engineers that cycling path construction should 
remain a priority. This argument is new in the international scholarship, 
which discusses the moped as a technical artefact or looks at its user 
groups. An underexamined topic is how road engineers reacted to the 
moped. This merits attention as part of cycling policy, not only for its 
impact on cycling path construction. It also provides a unique perspective 
of ongoing debates about cycling’s utilitarian or recreational value as a 
public good.
5.1 Mopeds Widen Citizens’ Action Radius
International experiments with motorized bicycles were common in the 
1930s. They generally failed for technological reasons: light bicycle frames 
could not sustain the weight and power generated by auxiliary engines.2 
After World War II, European f irms started producing bicycles with more 
reliable auxiliary engines. As cars were still too expensive for many people, 
the moped was an alternative with a greater level of comfort and action 
radius than the bicycle.
Mopeds became highly popular in a very short time span around the 
1950s and 1960s in several countries, including the Netherlands, before 
ownership stagnated. After the moped’s introduction in 1947, purchases 
rocketed to two million by 1969. Experts predicted this: in 1956, the Dutch 
Traff ic Institute (NVI) estimated that by 1960 there would be one million 
mopeds in the Netherlands, a total that had already been reached by 
1949.3 Combined moped ownership exceeded car ownership signif icantly, 
2 Héran, Le retour de la bicyclette, 57-58. In France a 1925 decree stated that bicycles with an 
auxiliary engine (bicyclettes à moteur auxiliaire, BMA) should (1) not weigh more than 30 kg; (2) 
not go faster than 30 km/h; (3) and be propelled by pedals. But no registration or driver’s license 
was needed, nor was there a maximum cylinder capacity or minimum age.
3 “Miljoen bromfietsen in 1960?” Algemeen Handelsblad, March 27, 1956, 7; “Bromfiets: op 
naar het miljoen…!,” Trouw, February 25, 1959.
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causing Jan Meijer, journalist with the social democratic newspaper Het 
Vrije Volk to characterize the moped in 1950 as the “car-of-the-little-man” 
(auto-van-de-kleine-man).4 When Dutch wages rose rapidly in the second 
half of the 1960s, cars came within reach of the working-class men who 
had represented most moped use in the 1950s.5 As table 4 shows, Dutch 
moped ownership was among the highest in Europe in the 1950s. Although 
numbers dropped after 1970, mopeds remained part of everyday Dutch 
mobility. A 2013 report by the Dutch Statistics Agency shows that 58 of 
every 1,000 Dutch residents still had a moped, the highest number in 
Europe.6
The moped became part of a Dutch mobility system alongside continuing 
bicycle and increasing car use. Cycling did not disappear: Dutch people 
still owned millions of bicycles, outnumbering the (growing) moped and 
car park in the 1950s and 1960s.7 Not everyone who owned a bicycle used 
it, however: traff ic counts on provincial roads that actually distinguish 
bicycles and mopeds (many do not) verify the moped’s popularity.8 Even in 
urban traff ic it was popular, as numbers in Rotterdam’s city center show. 
At the height of the moped’s popularity in 1968, moped riders outnumbered 
cyclists by between 40 to 60 percent crossing the Nieuwe Maas river on 
their daily commute in Rotterdam.9 Traff ic counts in Gelderland province 
in 1973 showed almost 4,000 mopeds compared to 4,750 cyclists.10 Given 
the larger distances mopeds could travel, they probably showed up more 
often in traff ic counts than cyclists. These numbers mean that mopeds 
were not as popular as the bicycle, but they did form a very large minority. 
Photographs from this period confirm that the moped’s share in traff ic was 
signif icant. Policymakers and experts were aware of this and felt compelled 
to take action.
4 [Jan Meijer], “Spreeuwenpraat,” Het Vrije Volk, July 31, 1950.
5 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 268.
6 Doreen Ewalds, Ger Moritz, and Michel Sijstermans, Bromfietsen in Nederland (Den Haag/
Heerlen: Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, 2013), 7.
7 ANWB archive, inv. no. 1241, FNRV meeting May 9, 1956.
8 HUA 1210, inv. no. 1408 and 1409: data is available for 1955, 1960 then annually in the 1960s. 
It shows the moped goes from a minority share to almost equal use in 1960, and majority use in 
1968. Traff ic counts on Zuid-Holland’s provincial tracks in 1969 show a similar 50:50 division: 
NA 3.02.27, inv. no. 1560, letter Provincial Public Works and Planological Off ice to Provincial 
Executive, Oct 28, 1969.
9 The author is grateful to Eric Berkers for sharing this data.




Table 4  Moped ownership in Europe in 1958
Country Number of mopeds Population Mopeds per 
1000 people
france 2,600,000 44,243,000 59
Netherlands 503,421 10,759,000 47
West Germany 1,130,000 53,518,000 21
Italy 752,000 48,634,000 15
belgium 135,169 8,869,000 15
Switzerland 59,201 4,981,000 12
united kingdom 227,712 50,947,000 4
Source: Article in ANWb journal Wegen (roads): “Het probleem van de rijwielen met hulpmotor,” 
Wegen 32, no. 8 (1961): 191
The lack of (comparative) research on mopeds has led historians to claim 
they were only popular in certain countries. According to Frank Steinbeck, 
the use of mopeds or light motorcycles was an important intermediate step 
to full motorization in Germany.11 Frédéric Héran argues that France is the 
only country “to have known a considerable amount of moped trips” in the 
immediate postwar years.12 Blomkvist and Emanuel have recently shown 
the moped’s high use levels in Sweden.13 The moped fulf illed a similar role 
in the Netherlands. It seems mopeds have played a major but underexplored 
role in many European countries.
The Dutch moped was primarily a working-class commuter vehicle in the 
1950s before young people adopted it in the 1960s. Mom and Filarski show 
that about 65 percent of riders used the moped to go to school or work.14 
In the 1950s, mainly adult men rode a moped, before they switched, in the 
1960s, to the car. Then the young generation took over. The percentage of 
young moped-owners rose rapidly as the moped became part of a burgeoning 
youth culture.15 The moped’s expansion between 1960 and 1970 came almost 
11 Frank Steinbeck, “Rückenwind für motorisierte Fahrräder,” Kultur & Technik, no. 2 (2013): 
34-39, here 34 and his Das Motorrad: ein deutscher Sonderweg in die automobile Gesellschaft 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2012), 132-70 and 239-55.
12 Héran, Le retour de la bicyclette, 60.
13 Pär Blomkvist and Martin Emanuel, “Regulating Innovation: Utility vs. Leisure in Swedish 
Moped History, 1952-1961,” Technology and Culture 61, no. 3 (2020): 815-842.
14 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 270.
15 On the moped’s role in Dutch youth culture: ibid., 250. For a more international perspective: 
Becky E. Conekin, “Fashioning Mod Twiggy and the Moped in ‘Swinging’ London,” History and 
Technology 28, no. 2 (2012): 209-15.
AN ACCIdeNT of HISTorY: HoW moPedS booSTed duTCH CYCLING INfrASTruC Ture 187
exclusively from sixteen- to twenty-one-year-olds, and to a lesser extent 
from twenty-one- to twenty-four-year-olds.16 Popular moped types like the 
Austrian and German Puch, Kreidler, and Zündapp were part of rival youth 
cultures.17 In the Netherlands, sales reached nearly a million for the French 
Solex moped, which was slower and initially (marketed as) the workman’s 
moped before becoming more popular with women.18 The “modest and 
functional” Berini was associated with white collar workers. More “sturdy” 
mopeds like Union or Magneet carried connotations of blue-collar workers.19 
Mopeds’ dominant user groups changed over time, but still constituted a 
sizeable chunk of the Dutch population.
16 Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Verkeersveiligheid SWOV, Snorfiets, veilig of niet? Te 
verwachten consequenties van de eventuele invoering van de snorfiets voor de verkeersveiligheid 
(Voorburg: SWOV, 1976), 14. Between 1960 and 1970, ownership in the 25-49 age group dropped 
from roughly 750,000 to 600,000, while in the 16-21 age group it went from almost zero to 700,000, 
and in the 21-24 bracket doubled from just below 100,000 to 200,000.
17 Wim de Jong and Bas van Kleef, De Puch-story en andere brommerverhalen (Bussum: Uitgeverij 
Thoth, 1994).
18 Ibid., 29.
19 Ibid., 40, 122. The Berini, despite its Italian-sounding name, was a Dutch product: Servaas 
van der Horst, Berini: Geschiedenis van een Hollandse brommer (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Thoth, 
1991).
Figure 18 In the 1960s, the moped, initially a working man’s vehicle, became more popular with young 
people and women. As we see at Utrecht’s Janskerkhof square, bicycles were still around. [Source: 
Collectie Het Utrechts Archief, Photo Gemeentearchief Utrecht, no. 810884]
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In the 1960s, more women adopted the moped and the gender distribution of 
moped users also changed completely: initially there was a strong gender gap 
as most moped users were men. This gap closed in the 1960s: the male/female 
ratio changed from 6:1 in 1963 to 2.5:1 in 1968, and 2:1 in 1970 (see figure 18). And 
while in 1970 there were still two men riding mopeds for every woman rider, 
the ratio of new moped users had become 1:1, meaning that just as many men 
as women now bought mopeds.20 According to industry organization RAI, 
in 1968, about 30 percent of moped riders were women. Their numbers more 
than doubled from 250,000 to 570,000 between 1964 and 1968.21 The ANWB 
promoted the sale of mopeds to women right from the very first edition of its 
moped journal in 1951, in a special column “How women ride mopeds” (Hoe 
de vrouw bromt). Summing up, large numbers of the Dutch (working-class) 
population adopted the moped in the 1950s and 1960s. This was no surprise to 
traffic experts after the moped’s quick uptake in the late 1940s. However, they 
had to decide how to classify the moped and consequently its place on the road.
5.2 Sharing the Cycling Path
How did cyclists and moped riders experience sharing cycling paths in the 
1950s and 1960s? Letters to newspapers and governance actors provide some 
insight. I focus on three related issues: the difference in speed, congestion, 
and whether these paths were considered social spaces.
First, the issue of speed differences was – and remains to this day – a major 
bone of contention between cyclists and moped riders. While the average 
cyclist travels at 15-20 km/h, mopeds were allowed 40 km/h. And many went 
faster: moped builders as well as bicycle repairers and mechanics tinkered 
with mopeds within the legal maximum 50cc cylinder capacity. Tuned-up 
mopeds could reach speeds of 60 km, while still legally obligated to use 
cycling paths.22 However, when the government announced a lower speed 
limit, in anticipation, many producers limited the maximum speed of their 
mopeds to 40 km.23 This did not stop moped users from tinkering and tuning 
up their engines.24 This became a key argument by cyclists against framing 
the moped as a type of bicycle and in favor of its removal from cycling paths.
20 SWOV, De bromfietser en de verkeersveiligheid: Een beschrijving van de groep bromfietsbezitters 
en van de onveiligheid van bromfietsers (Voorburg: SWOV, 1973), 11.
21 GAA 1302 (RAI Archive), inv. no. 401, “Historische ontwikkeling,” 16.
22 De Jong and Van Kleef, De Puch-story, 16.
23 Ibid., 25.
24 Ibid., 96-101.
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National legislators discussed lowering the moped speed limit further. In 
the moped subcommittee of the national advisory committee for Road Traf-
f ic Safety, the ANWB advised an informal 20 km/h speed limit. The ANWB 
framed this as a “decency norm” ( fatsoensnorm) that would not become 
law – moped riders could go faster on a cycling path when it was quiet, 
but had to slow down during rush hours.25 This f itted in with the ANWB’s 
self-image as traff ic educator to the public, but also its liberal ideology of 
individual freedom: the state should not restrict or regulate motorized 
traff ic more than necessary for safety reasons.26 Committee members C. 
Krijn, chief engineer and director of Public Works in Noord-Holland, and 
Albert van Walraven, director of Public Works in Amsterdam, supported 
the ANWB’s idea.27 However, the committee decided to stick to the 40 km/h 
speed limit at all times and re-evaluate at a later point. The only change 
came in the late 1950s, when Minister of Public Works Jacob Algera agreed 
to lower the speed limit within built-up areas to 30 km/h.28 The various 
committees discussed safety measures for mopeds at length, ranging from 
speed limits to mandatory number plates, and from mandatory helmets to 
riding tests for all moped users.29 For the short term, the committees only 
succeeded in introducing the 40 km/h speed limit.30
The second bone of contention was the width. Given the problem of 
speed, the narrow, separated cycling paths could get very busy, leading to 
irritation between cyclists and moped riders. I started this chapter with 
a 1953 reporter observing that mopeds got stuck in busy cycling traff ic, 
especially on public holidays. The only advantage of this bicycle and moped 
congestion was that the slow speeds reduced the likelihood of accidents. 
After another busy holiday weekend in 1955, the same newspaper noted that 
25 “Tussentijdse balans,” Bromfietskampioen 2, no. 1 (1952): 8; J.W.A. [Ankersmit], “Divergerende 
lijnen,” Bromfietskampioen 6, no. 8 (1956): 524.
26 Mom, Schot, and Staal, “Civilizing Motorized Adventure,” 139-58.
27 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 1363, meeting Subcommittee Mopeds, December 27, 1955.
28 NA 2.16.11, inv. no. 1363, meeting Committee for the Safety of Road Traff ic, March 19, 1956, 
when 10 of the 17 members supported the idea. The Minister did not think the lower speed limit 
necessary initially (letter minister Algera to Committee, March 20, 1957) but changed his mind 
a year later (letter minister Algera to Committee, June 6, 1958). He cited the new speed limit 
for motorcycles in built-up areas (to 50 km/h), making it hard to distinguish motorcycles from 
mopeds.
29 Accident numbers with mopeds were high. In the 1960s, every year c. 20 percent of all traff ic 
deaths were moped riders (SWOV, De bromfietser en de verkeersveiligheid, 42.). Number plates 
for mopeds were introduced in 2005, though an insurance plate was mandatory since 1966.
30 Third-party insurance became mandatory in 1965, helmets only in 1975, which promptly 
led to a slower type of moped (snorfiets), limited to 25 km/h and a helmet was not compulsory.
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special moped tracks were urgently needed, indicating that both groups 
were sizeable enough to deserve their own lane.31
In many letters to the editor, cyclists and moped riders expressed both 
anger and resignation or presented potential solutions. One “passionate 
cyclist” found the shared tracks a “misery” but also noted with resignation 
that mopeds would not disappear and that “car drivers might drive them 
off the road in a less sportsmanlike fashion.”32 His proposal, given that the 
shared paths were now a fact of life, was that mopeds should switch off 
their engines when overtaking. Other readers rejected this idea and “floated 
their own trial balloons.”33 Moped riders acknowledged that their presence 
on cycling paths could be a nuisance. One moped rider, claiming he drove 
35 km/h on average, said: “Concerning the use of the cycling track, I am aware 
of being a danger to myself and others.”34 Another moped rider wrote to the 
ANWB that as an experienced motorcyclist, it was not dangerous for him to 
use the road on his moped. Restricting mopeds by consigning them to the 
cycling track hindered progress and was dangerous as well: moped riders 
“stuffed away on the cycling track between honorable fathers and mothers 
with kids in the front and backseats, it is going to be a mess ( janboel), I 
am telling you.”35 Many users, both cyclists and moped riders, were more 
inclined to frame the moped as a light motorcycle than as a type of bicycle.
The third issue concerned the social practice of cycling abreast, allowing 
cyclists to converse with each other. This practice became controversial 
as it obstructed mopeds who were overtaking cyclists. In contrast to car 
drivers, who have little or no opportunity to interact, enclosed as they 
are in their cars, cyclists can and do ride abreast because it is possible to 
communicate while cycling. Mobility scholars have analyzed this sociability 
as an advantage for slow modes like cycling and walking.36 Riding home 
from work (or school), cyclists could chat with others by riding next to 
them. With the congestion caused by consigning moped riders to already 
jam-packed cycling paths, engineers became concerned about eff iciency. 
Some tried to apply the car logic to cycling paths and argued for prohibiting 
riding abreast.
31 “Compacte massa auto’s en f ietsers,” Utrechtsch Nieuwsblad, May 31, 1955, 2.
32 Th.C.M.L., “Bromfietsenwel,” Utrechtsch Nieuwsblad, June 6, 1953, 3.
33 “Lezers-tribune: Ook bromfietser moet aan z’n trek komen,” Utrechtsch Nieuwsblad, June 10, 
1953, 4.
34 D.H.G., “ANWB Hoe zit dat?,” Bromfietskampioen 1, no. 4 (1951): 71.
35 “ANWB Hoe zit dat?,” Bromfietskampioen 1, no. 7 (1951): 123.
36 Marco te Brömmelstroet et al., “Travelling together alone and alone together: mobility and 
potential exposure to diversity,” Applied Mobilities 2, no. 1 (2017): 1-15.
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To allow for uninterrupted speed, moped riders wanted cyclists to ride 
in single f ile. George Oversteegen, a well-known local bookseller and 
anarchist, wrote to an Utrecht newspaper, suggesting a ban on cycling 
abreast. Oversteegen characterized himself as both a cyclist and a moped 
rider but noted there was little civility on cycling paths. Cyclists did not 
give way to overtaking mopeds, while moped riders act “as if the cycling 
track belongs to them alone.” This lack of civility was an issue: “Everyone 
will admit that even the widest cycling tracks are still too narrow for the 
continually increasing number of cyclists and moped riders.”37 If wider 
cycling paths were not available, cyclists should ride behind each other and 
a maximum speed for moped riders introduced. As the newspaper editor 
replied, cycling abreast was more sociable (gezellig) and would not disap-
pear. In a letter to the Moped Champion journal, a moped rider complained 
that cyclists refused to acknowledge times had changed: they no longer 
had a “monopoly” on the cycling path and should stop seeing mopeds as 
“pariahs.” Cyclists stubbornly kept cycling two abreast, talking and having 
fun without making way for overtaking moped riders. The moped rider 
wanted a traff ic rule which prohibited cycling abreast, believing it would 
eliminate 80 percent of cycle path accidents.38 The assumption behind his 
plea seems to be the same as many car lobbyists: like the road, the cycling 
path primarily had to provide “f low,” in other words the fastest way from 
A to B. Socializing and using the cycling track as a space not primarily 
dedicated to speed did not match this vision. However, such a ban was 
never seriously considered. Cyclists and moped riders had to negotiate 
their narrow strip of road space every day.
Cyclists viewed the issue differently. The large numbers of cyclists had 
to share their already limited space with faster vehicles emitting noise and 
exhaust fumes. Critical commentators noted how this decision privileged a 
still small minority of car drivers. A letter published in Bromfietskampioen 
asked: “How would you like it if the 200,000 moped riders – possibly half 
a million in two years – would decide where cars had to drive?”39 Another 
letter from a cyclist and moped rider argued that it was drivers who caused 
accidents, and their responsibility to drive more carefully rather than remove 
all other road users from the car lanes. “If we continue to let drivers have their 
37 George Oversteegen, “Fietspaden zijn veel te smal,” Utrechtsch Nieuwsblad, May 16, 1956, 7.
38 G. Pouderoyen, “Van de lezer voor de lezers: De bromfietser heeft ’t gedaan,” Bromfietskam-
pioen 5, no. 9 (1955): 661. This strongly worded letter went too far for the ANWB, who pointed 
out that cyclists’ annoyance at the new presence on cycling tracks was understandable and that 
statistics showed that mopeds riders were often to blame for accidents.
39 “ANWB Hoe zit dat?” Bromfietskampioen 1, no. 11 (1951): 195.
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way, little will remain of the public character of the roads.”40 In response, 
the ANWB argued that its genuine and primary concern was traff ic safety. 
For some, however, the ANWB had shown its true colors by promoting the 
moped as a faster type of bicycle. In a 1975 letter to the new activist group 
Cyclists’ Union, a former ANWB member wrote that “slow traff ic” was a 
seemingly neutral technical term which “had clearly been thought up from 
behind a car window.” Drivers and their interest groups thought: “everything 
that is slower than us, all that inconvenient stuff [lastige spul] that we have 
to overtake all the time, it’s all the same, it has to leave our fast lane, we’ll 
throw it out altogether.”41 Increasingly, cycling advocates criticized the 
compromises as prioritizing drivers and not giving cyclists enough space. In 
the 1970s this would lead to widespread activism, as Chapter 6 will discuss.
5.3 Framing Mopeds and Cycling Paths
The moped’s arrival presented a challenge to the national politicians and 
engineers who had agreed to the cycling path compromise. That system 
was based on two transport modes: the car and the bicycle, both competing 
for space. As Chapter 2 showed, for various reasons utilitarian commuter 
cycling infrastructure came to be considered a public good and national and 
provincial government had to provide cycling paths. When a sizeable share 
of these commuters started to travel by moped in the 1950s, they needed a 
place in the dual system. Adding a third lane on or next to roads for mopeds 
was an option engineers never really considered. Sometimes suggested, this 
solution was immediately rejected as too expensive and space consuming. 
The alternative was to consign mopeds to the road or the cycling path. In 
other words, this required answering the question: was the moped more 
car-like or bicycle-like? The early moped looked like a bicycle with a small 
engine mounted on it and was an ambivalent vehicle. Everyone writing 
about the moped in the 1950s noted the ambiguity. It led to intractable and 
still ongoing debates about its exact status.
International governance played a role in framing the moped. Organized 
by the United Nations, the 1949 Geneva Convention on Road Traff ic decided 
mopeds should be classif ied as bicycles. The Netherlands had signed this 
convention that stipulated: “Cycles f itted with an auxiliary combustion 
40 “ANWB Hoe zit dat?” Bromfietskampioen 1, no. 12 (1951): 224.
41 IISG ARCH01969 (Cyclists’ Union Archive), inv. no. 1, letter H.D. Coster to Werkgroep 2000, 
May 31, 1975.
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engine having a maximum cylinder capacity of 50 cm3 (3.05 cu. in.) shall not 
be considered as motor vehicles, provided that they retain all the normal 
characteristics of cycles with respect to their structure.”42 This formulation 
was ambivalent (not specifying “normal characteristics”) but mopeds with an 
engine were added as category to the 1953 Dutch Road Traff ic Regulations.43 
Problems arose because this formulation was based on cylinder capacity 
rather than speed: soon technological improvements (and tinkering at home) 
would enable mopeds to achieve much higher speeds than policymakers 
anticipated in 1949. A new version of the convention in 1968 stated that 
vehicles only counted as mopeds if they had a 50 km/h speed limit.44 This 
was, of course, still much faster than cyclists went.
In Dutch governance, the leading stakeholders at Public Works and 
the non-governmental organization ANWB collaborated to give mopeds 
a place in the Dutch roads system. In 1953, the Minister of Public Works 
consigned the moped to the cycling path.45 The ANWB got involved in 
the policymaking process as representative of moped riders. This was not 
self-evident. Smaller lobby groups for car drivers (KNAC) and motor cyclists 
(KNMV) could also claim to be representing moped riders. Car journalist and 
editor of ANWB journal Moped Champion, Koolhaas Revers, asserted in his 
f irst editorial that new moped riders would “instinctively seek the support 
of the largest traff ic federation in the Netherlands.”46 Koolhaas Revers was 
walking a tightrope.47 While he stressed the moped’s resemblance to the 
(old-fashioned) bicycle by evoking moped riders’ earlier cycling experience, 
he also emphasized the moped’s modernity. He asserted that the ANWB 
42 United Nations, “Convention on Road Traff ic,” (Geneva United Nations, 1949), 35. The full text 
is at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1952/03/19520326%2003-36%20PM/Ch_XI_B_1_2_3.
pdf accessed June 19, 2019.
43 Staatsblad van het Koningrijk der Nederlanden, 1953, no. 301-399; January 1, 1953, no. 337, 
599-618, accessed through Delpher on December 24, 2018, https://resolver.kb.nl/resolve?urn=
KBDC001:003028005:00001
44 United Nations, “Convention on Road Traff ic,” (Vienna: United Nations, 1968), 3. https://
treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1977/05/19770524%2000-13%20AM/Ch_XI_B_19.pdf, accessed 
19-06-2019. The 1968 text left it to the discretion of member states to classify mopeds as bicycles 
or motorcycles.
45 Sweden made a similar decision in 1955. Blomkvist and Emanuel, “Regulating a Freedom 
Machine.”
46 J. Koolhaas Revers, “Bromfietsers van Nederland, de A.N.W.B. heet u welkom,” Bromfiet-
skampioen 1, no. 1 (1951): 3.
47 Koolhaas Revers was editor of multiple car journals, including the ANWB’s Autokampioen 
since 1937. His true love was the motorcycle and in the moped’s success, he saw an indirect victory 
for the motorcycle over the car as mass transport mode: Vic Sniekers, “Bekende auto-journalist 
J. Koolhaas Revers (75 jaar): Heimwee naar motorf iets,” De Tijd, 19 February, 1966, 7.
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“adjusts immediately to present-day circumstances” and framed the moped 
as a modern transport mode.48 Whatever its motivations, the ANWB was 
a very powerful actor and had the government’s ear. Unsurprisingly, the 
national government agreed with the ANWB.
Public Works Minister Spitzen explained his position in a 1949 report to 
Parliament. According to Spitzen it was too dangerous for relatively slow 
mopeds to share the road with cars. It would be safer to treat them as bicy-
cles.49 He acknowledged that there were “certain objections in admitting large 
numbers of these ambiguous [tweeslachtige] vehicles on the cycling tracks 
which are often already overcrowded.”50 The ANWB and state engineers 
were in favor of mopeds riding on cycling paths and not using main roads.51 
Defending this decision, the ANWB argued that the difference in speed 
between cars and mopeds was higher than between bicycles and mopeds. 
Therefore, the safest, although less than ideal solution was to refer mopeds 
to cycling paths. Given the policymakers’ commitment to provide car drivers 
on main roads with a “f low” uninterrupted by cyclists, this might have 
been an unspoken reason for the decision. Although “aware this is not the 
most pleasant solution,” the ANWB upheld its seemingly neutral, technical 
alternative: “the mentality of the really fast traff ic is simply less receptive 
to the presence of road users, who are hard to see and slower in speed.”52 
Engineers and the ANWB mostly used the safety argument. The more implicit 
argument that drivers did not want to share the road with mopeds, having 
managed to clear the roads of cyclists, certainly influenced the decision.
Car interest often trumped the bicycle’s in (utilitarian) traff ic debates. 
While there was broad consensus on framing the moped as a type of bicycle 
when it came to traff ic roads (to justify relegation to the cycling path), the 
issue was more complicated regarding recreational infrastructure. The 
ANWB’s ambivalent position manifests itself here once more. The organiza-
tion wanted to guarantee an obstacle-free road for drivers, but also reserve 
certain nature areas for non-motorized vehicles only. The f irst aim required 
framing mopeds as bicycles, the second framing mopeds as motorized 
vehicles. To resolve this dilemma, the ANWB exploited the ambivalence 
of the moped as a technology: either highlighting the moped’s bike-like 
48 Koolhaas Revers, “Bromfietsers van Nederland,” 3.
49 Spitzen assumed mopeds could not go faster than 20-25 km/h: Kamerstukken II 1948/49, 
1000 IX B, 9, 20.
50 Kamerstukken II 1949/50, 1400 IX B, 11, 20.
51 Koolhaas Revers, “Bromfiets de ‘Veroveraar,’” 6.
52 ANWB archive, inv. no. 1241, Memorandum ‘De Bromf iets’, attachment to letter ANWB 
(Boost) to FNRV, October 30, 1951.
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qualities when trying to convince policymakers to remove it from the road; or 
emphasizing the moped’s motorcycle-like character when discussing its place 
on (recreational) separate cycling paths. These tracks in the countryside 
were not connected to the road network or beside unpaved roads. The 
earlier discussed cycling path organizations were often responsible for their 
construction. For strategic reasons, they framed the paths as mixed-use: 
serving both tourists and local commuters. For the ANWB, some of these 
paths were exclusive recreational routes that should ban fast and noisy 
mopeds because they would spoil cyclists’ experience of nature. In this case 
they brought to the fore the motor-like characteristics of the moped which 
they minimalized in the discourse on utilitarian mobility.
Politicians also often invoked the distinction between recreational and 
utilitarian (or “traff ic”) cycling. In 1949, liberal MP Roelof Zegering Had-
ders pleaded against allowing mopeds on rural cycling paths (landelijke 
rijwielpaden).53 He distinguished “cycling tracks, constructed to improve 
traff ic safety” and “cycling tracks which have been constructed for quiet 
enjoyment of the most scenic spots of our country.”54 In line with the ANWB’s 
stance, he agreed with the minister’s plan for mopeds on traffic cycling paths, 
but objected to the presence of mopeds on recreational routes. In response, 
the Public Works Ministry legally distinguished traff ic and recreational 
paths.55 The Ministry basically framed separated cycling paths alongside 
roads as utilitarian, while cycling paths with an independent trajectory 
(not following the road network) were recreational. It forced moped riders 
to use the utilitarian paths and to switch off their auxiliary engine when 
using designated recreational paths.56 Two different signs were created for 
these cycling paths. This f inal stipulation implied that the moped was after 
all considered more like a motorized vehicle than a bicycle – it was too fast 
and noisy and had to become more “bike-like” by turning off the engine.
Provincial policymakers, now often responsible for classifying cycling 
paths as either one or the other, were in a quandary: in 1962, politicians on 
53 Handelingen II 1949/50, 34 (December 13, 1949), 970. See parliament records online: https://
zoek.off icielebekendmakingen.nl/uitgebreidzoeken/historisch.
54 Handelingen II 1950/51, 34 (December 19, 1950), 956.
55 Recreational tracks had a different sign: not the round blue one for cycling paths alongside 
roads to prohibit cycling on the road, but a rectangular black sign, which meant that all non-
cyclists were off icially not allowed on the path. This was to protect the (basic) paving from 
damage by horses, cattle, or motorized vehicles.
56 Handelingen II 1950/51, 35 (December 20, 1950), 965. These early mopeds still had functional 
pedals and could be used without the engine. Later mopeds, while keeping the pedals, could 
not be used as bicycles and were effectively banned from these paths.
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Friesland’s Provincial Board represented various standpoints in a typical 
fashion. One member squarely opposed allowing mopeds on cycling paths as 
“the mopeds of today are basically motorcycles” and even on wider cycling 
paths “it just does not work.” Another politician pointed out that cycling 
paths were also used “for commuter traff ic; by men who go to work in 
neighboring places by moped.” The compromise, a third member suggested, 
was an arrangement distinguishing “touristic cycling paths from cycling 
paths for commercial traff ic [economisch verkeer].”57 Policymakers regarded 
cycling and moped riding from very different perspectives. Some had more 
of an eye for tourism, others were more concerned with everyday mobility. 
Coupled with the various moped appraisals, debates continued long after 
the formal solutions in 1953.
In practice, mopeds and rural cycling paths were used both for commuting 
as well as recreation. Cycling track organizations often argued that their 
rural tracks served local needs as the shortest distance between villages. 
The ANWB agreed: if the Minister’s plan to prohibit moped riders from 
using these paths became law, many moped riders would face unnecessary 
detours. The existence of unpaved sand roads meant that all cyclists and 
57 “Harlinger haven was nog niet ‘haalbaar’daarom uitdieping van grote kanelen. Fietspaden: 
gemeenten voeren plan uit en GS coördineren,” Leeuwarder Courant, July 4, 1962, 7.
Figure 19 This rectangular sign, unlike the round sign, denotes a cycling path banning mopeds because 
their noise and exhaust fumes were not compatible with the recreational function of these paths. The 
sign reads “Cycling path” above “so no mopeds [brommers].” The verb “brommen” for riding a moped 
originally means humming or droning, a reference to the moped’s sound. [Source: Donald Trung Quoc 
Don (Chữ Hán: 徵國單) – Wikimedia Commons]
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moped riders preferred riding on cycling tracks that had some rudimentary 
kind of paving.58 Nor was it only tourists who used the tracks. So did “farmers 
going to the market … postmen, district nurses, the minister and the priest, 
as well as countless workers.”59 In its letter, the ANWB claimed that only 
800 of the 5,000 km of rural cycling track (plattelandsrijwielpad) were “of 
purely touristic interest … The remainder, including the whole of Twente 
and the Achterhoek, as well as Drenthe and Noord Brabant, is primarily 
used by the regions’ residents.”60 Elsewhere, it called the independent 
paths in Twente that farmers used “working tracks” (werkpaden).61 The 
provincial government of Noord-Holland agreed with the ANWB, noting 
that cycling tracks unconnected to roads were all used for commuting as 
well as recreation.62 The decision to keep the non-mandatory cycling paths 
free of moped users was a problem for the rural residents who commuted 
via these paths.63
Moped riders were not amused. They complained about no longer being 
allowed to use the cycling paths that cycling path organization UMO 
constructed southeast of Utrecht. These paths were often the shortest 
connections available but could now only be used by bicycles. In the 
early 1950s, many moped riders applied for an exemption to this rule. One 
resident of the village Amerongen bought a moped in 1953 and wanted a 
permit for his 10 km commute to Veenendaal.64 A local journalist argued 
that he missed all the local scoops because every time he encountered a 
UMO path, he had to dismount and walk alongside his moped.65 Another 
moped user wrote to the UMO club that the cycling path alongside the 
route to his work as a mill-hand was next to an unpaved road: if he was 
not allowed to use this cycling path, he had to take a 10 km detour.66 
The Utrecht cycling path organization routinely refused these requests 
because it did not have the legal authority (as a private organization) to 
58 “Nieuwe verkeerswet sluit duizenden kilometers rijwielpad voor bromfietsen,” Berichten 
en beschouwingen van de verkeersafdeling van de ANWB 1, no. 5 (1950): 1-2.
59 Ibid.
60 HUA 1201, inv. no. 25539, letter ANWB to Ministry of Public Works, November 2, 1950. As 
proof, the ANWB showed that the Twente Chamber of Commerce gave the local cycling path 
organization a yearly 1,000-guilder subsidy.
61 “A.N.W.B. Hoe zit dat?,” Bromfietskampioen 1, no. 1 (1951): 14.
62 HUA 1201, inv. no. 25539, letter Provincial Government Noord-Holland to Ministry of Public 
Works, June 27, 1951.
63 “Open deze paden voor ons!,” Bromfietskampioen 2, no. 5 (1952): 170-72.
64 GAZ 8020, inv. no. 52, letter L. Blankestijn to UMO, June 20, 1953.
65 GAZ 8020, inv. no. 52, letter C.B. Dekker to UMO, undated.
66 GAZ 8020, inv. no. 52, letter E.J. Reemst to UMO, June 5, 1959.
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allow these exemptions; only the Provincial Executive did.67 As a result, 
some moped riders decided to use the paths anyway and risk a f ine since 
police controls were not very strict. The moped riders’ disobedience and 
the authorities’ failure to enforce the rules then led to conf licts with 
regular cyclists: one long-time UMO member cancelled his membership 
because he was often almost pushed off the rather narrow paths by mopeds 
overtaking. He suggested either making the paths twice as wide, or actually 
enforcing the moped ban.68 However, the UMO did not have the money 
to do the former, and the police did not have the capacity for the latter. In 
short, the popularity of mopeds in a system based on the well-functioning 
binary system of traff ic separation presented unsurmountable problems 
in practice.
5.4 How Mopeds Boosted Cycling Path Construction
While the outcome of the moped debate was in many respects a decision 
that prioritized drivers over commuter cyclists, it did have a positive, 
albeit unintended, impact on cycling path construction in the long run. 
After national legislators classif ied the moped as a bicycle, it was up to 
the engineers governing roads and cycling infrastructure to deal with the 
consequences. Many were convinced that the network of separate cycling 
paths was not adequately constructed to deal with this influx of moped 
riders. Aware of large numbers of suburban cycling commuters, and the 
fact that moped riders were faster and would constantly overtake cyclists, 
engineers felt that wider cycling paths were necessary.
Politicians, responding to their working-class constituency, also urged 
Public Works engineers to continue investing in cycling-and-moped paths. 
For instance, social democrat MP Siep Posthumus (PvdA) argued that the 
moped issue required a “radical solution,” like “the construction or improve-
ment of cycling tracks or secondary roads in good condition, which are 
suitable to both the slower moped riders and ordinary cyclists.”69 Like 
other stakeholders, Posthumus noted the “tensions” and “problems of a 
psychological character” cyclists experienced as they had to share paths 
with mopeds. It was to relieve this tension that engineers should “rapidly 
widen existing cycling tracks and construct new ones with a greater width 
67 GAZ 8020, inv. no. 52, letter UMO to H.J. Olie, August 13, 1960.
68 GAZ 8020, inv. no. 52, letter M. Zieleman to UMO, March 3, 1956.
69 Handelingen II 1951/52, 21 (November 27, 1951), 634.
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than has been the case up to this point.”70 In 1962, Christian democrat Cor 
van der Peijl repeated Posthumus’s call for continued construction of cycling 
infrastructure: he advocated the “permanent” interpretation of mopeds as 
“slow traff ic” and demanded more and wider cycling paths.71 Communist 
MP Jan Haken echoed claims for separate moped-only paths, but like other 
proponents did not believe this was a feasible option.72 Politicians were aware 
of the commuter needs of moped riders and pressured state engineers to 
take steps to address it. At the highest political level, calls for more cycling 
infrastructure could be heard throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
Engineers in provincial Public Works departments agreed cycling paths 
needed widening, even if they disagreed on cycling’s status and future. At a 
1956 meeting of the private cycling path organization platform, the Federa-
tion of Dutch Cycling Path Organizations, two engineers, C. de Groot from 
provincial Public Works in Utrecht and S.J. Faber from Gelderland, differed 
on cycling’s future. According to De Groot, the moped was “the transport 
mode of the future” and cycling would only be an urban activity.73 The 
suburban and interurban cycling paths in this scenario would not be used 
by cyclists but only by mopeds, not requiring modif ications. Conversely, 
Faber did not believe the moped’s rise was directly correlated with a decline 
in cycling: overall mobility levels were increasing: “one should not state 
that the normal bicycle is about to disappear. It is not like that: traff ic has 
become more intensive.”74 Both agreed, however, that engineers should 
construct more and wider cycling paths.
These provincial engineers formulated new design norms for cycling 
infrastructure. Faber explained in 1956 that the province of Gelderland 
had “decided to extensively construct cycling tracks along the roads in the 
Provincial Roads Plan. Those tracks will be 2.40 m wide on each side of the 
road. So, in the long run, all the roads in Gelderland’s Provincial Roads Plan 
will have two cycling tracks, dedicated to traff ic on two wheels.”75 In 1959, 
engineers in the province Drenthe also adjusted their design standards for 
cycling paths. Calling this “the logical consequence” of the “stormy develop-
ment” of moped use, cycling paths “that had been initially designed with 
70 Handelingen II 1953/54, 42 (December 22, 1953), 3629.
71 Handelingen II 1961/62, 40 (January 17, 1962), 3425.
72 Handelingen II 1951/52, 21 (November 27, 1951), 637. Van der Peijl also called for these special 
moped paths in 1968: Handelingen II 1968/69, 2 (September 18, 1968), 24.
73 ANWB archive, inv. no. 1241, FNRV meeting May 9, 1956.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid. A 1957 report shows that cycling paths in Gelderland were often constructed 2.40 m 
wide: “De Rijkswegen in 1956,” 17.
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a hardening width of 1.50 meters, will now be given a width of 2 meters.”76 
Public Works engineer Hendrik Baltus Bakker in the province Zuid-Holland 
described road reconstruction: “Taking into account the possibility that 
cycling paths will become more important due to the motorized bicycle, their 
width has been designed spaciously … at 2.30 meters.”77 For its recreational 
cycling paths which the province had controversially opened up to mopeds 
in certain cases, its engineers even decided the cycling paths should be 3 
meters because of this.78 Gelderland widened some of the Zuid-Veluwe 
organization’s major paths around 1960 because of moped traff ic.79 The 
lack of national guidance is clear from the varying norms that provinces 
adopted. Engineers and politicians widely agreed, however, that the rise of 
the moped necessitated investments in cycling infrastructure.
The ANWB attempted to achieve some unity in these norms. As discussed 
in Chapter 3, by publishing guidelines, the ANWB provided additional 
training in traff ic engineering for local engineers.80 The booklet on cycling 
paths said that cyclists needed at least 0.75-0.80 meters in width and mopeds 
1 meter. To allow cyclists to overtake, paths should be 1.50 meters wide; for 
a moped to overtake a cyclist, 2 meters was advisable. Ideally, the ANWB 
advised 2.50 meters as a minimum so that two cyclists could ride abreast 
and a moped could still overtake them.81 The ANWB and cyclists valued this 
social aspect of being able to ride side-by-side (see section 5.2). Besides the 
brochures, the ANWB also used its traff ic engineering courses to promote 
the idea of wider cycling paths. In 1954, provincial engineer D. Mathlener’s 
lecture stated that 2.50 meters was a minimum width for unidirectional 
cycling paths, and those with intensive moped traff ic should even be 3 
76 DA (Drents Archief) 0923, inv. no. 6258, letter Public Works Drenthe to Ministers of Education, 
Arts and Sciences, Economic Affairs and Social Affairs, December 4, 1959.
77 H.B. Bakker, “Over het saneren in het algemeen en over het saneren van een oud Rijkswegvak 
in het bijzonder,” Wegen 25, no. 1 (1951): 4.
78 “Nieuwe rijwielpaden in Zuid-Holland,” 2.
79 “Fietsen op de paden van de Zuid-Veluwe,” 176.
80 ANWB archive, inv. no. 1241, letter Boost (ANWB) to FNRV, May 7, 1956 with attached 
Memorandum no. 4 Rijwielpaden langs verkeerswegen (“Cycling tracks alongside traff ic roads”), 
published in 1956. It was reissued in updated form in 1966 and 1970 as Fietspaden en -oversteek-
plaatsen (“Cycling tracks and crossings”).
81 The ANWB even argued that the cycling track surface had to be smoother because of mopeds’ 
higher speed (and different road-holding): “Vlakke rijwielpaden,” Berichten en beschouwingen 
van de verkeersafdeling van de ANWB 5, no. 2 (1954): 6. An engineer involved in Zuid-Holland’s 
cycling track plan made the same point in 1964: tile tracks were too lightly constructed for 
mopeds, and basic asphalt paving had to be provided: J.C. Fekkes, “Provinciaal rijwielpadenplan 
voor Zuid-Holland,” Tijdschrift voor Verkeerstechniek 15, no. 8 (1964): 362.
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meters wide.82 The ANWB’s many means of knowledge dissemination and 
prestige as a knowledge actor likely helped convince engineers to adopt 
these new norms.
The construction of suburban cycling paths did indeed continue in the 
1950s and 1960s, partly because of the developments sketched in this chapter. 
The ANWB traff ic engineering journal’s 1956 overview of all construction 
work showed that cycling paths had been (re)constructed on thirty-four 
national or provincial roads in that year.83 One specif ic example: In Zeeland 
in the far south-west of the Netherlands, “a separate cycling path has been 
constructed between the built-up areas of Oostburg and Aardenburg … 
The path is 2.40 meters wide and in total 7.1 km long.”84 In general, where 
this article mentions width, cycling paths are 2.50 or 3 meters, signif icantly 
wider than before. For other years, this overview of road works shows the 
same pattern (see f igure 20).
In conclusion, in its motivation as well as its unintentional outcome, this 
compromise is reminiscent of the 1920s bicycle tax. In both cases, a major 
decision concerning a vehicle’s place on the road disadvantaged cyclists. In 
both cases, politicians and engineers realized this and decided that cyclists 
had a right to compensation. There are also differences: the position of 
cyclists was weaker in the 1950s than it had been three decades earlier: in 
the 1920s, cycling was on an upward trajectory and had broad support as 
vehicle of the masses. In the 1950s, although internationally more so than 
in the Netherlands, an increasingly large group of experts doubted the 
future of cycling as a transport mode. Ultimately, though, the long-term 
development of cycling in the Netherlands benefited in unintended ways 
from these key compromises. This is another manifestation of the Dutch 
“poldermodel” whereby compromise and the (somewhat) equal distribution 
of benefits and burdens are key beliefs. As Public Works Minister Spitzen 
noted in 1949: the moped “is dangerous on the highway and less dangerous, 
but not entirely undangerous, on the cycling path,” while people “are anxious 
about the arrival of this minor noisemaker on the quiet heath lands and 
forests.” He said: “We hope to be able to f ind a solution which reconciles 
all these interests, that are not all in line.”85 That cyclists had to give up a 
little more than drivers went unmentioned, however.
82 “De bromfiets: het snelverkeer van het rijwielpad: Nationale Verkeerstechnische Leergang 
1954,” Bromfietskampioen 4, no. 3 (1954): 142.
83 “De Rijkswegen in 1956,” 9-20.
84 Ibid., 12.
85 Handelingen II 1949/50, 35 (December 14, 1949), 1002.
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Figure 20 Provincial engineers constructed cycling paths in part to accommodate moped riders. They 
believed widening and expanding the cycle path network was crucial given the considerable cohort of 
Dutch commuter cyclists. This path was built between 1955 and 1960 near Rhenen, Utrecht province, 
at a time when only a few countries were still constructing (utilitarian) cycling infrastructure [Source: 
Photographer Provincie Utrecht, Collectie Het Utrechts Archief, no. 837959]
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5.5 Conclusion
The moped’s role has been unjustly neglected in the (cycling) historiography, 
considering its major role in Dutch mobility as an intermediate step between 
cycling and driving. In that role, it impacted both the Dutch cycling system 
of separation – and helped keep cycling high on the political agenda – as 
well as the comparatively late adoption of the car. Many working-class 
commuters and young adults took up the moped enthusiastically between 
the late 1940s and late 1960s. This posed a challenge to the engineers and the 
ANWB’s traff ic-separation paradigm. The framing of the moped was crucial 
to the solutions: both its status as an intermediate vehicle between bicycles 
and cars, but also its status as either a utilitarian or recreational vehicle. 
These motorized bicycles were neither bicycles nor cars, not fast enough to 
use the road, but too fast to use the cycling path. The chosen option meant 
that cyclists had to make way for those who had left the bicycle behind 
and adopted the moped. Leading state and ANWB engineers justif ied their 
decision by arguing that car drivers and moped riders sharing roads posed 
a greater danger than moped riders and cyclists sharing cycling paths. Over 
time, however, this became less and less true, for engineering improvements 
enabled mopeds to go ever faster while still legally classifying as a moped. 
Cyclists were the ones who had to adapt to this new mode, and engineers 
chose to ensure car users an unobstructed drive.
A key finding of this chapter is that the decision to consign moped riders to 
the cycling path had unintended, positive consequences for cyclists because 
it positively reinforced the status of cycling paths as a public good. It was not 
uncommon for roadbuilders outside the Netherlands to pave over existing 
cycling paths and make them part of car infrastructure. They did this inspired 
by a vision of the future, assuming that everybody would be able to afford and 
own a car. In this visualization of future mobility, there was no place for cyclists 
and consequently no reason to build new cycling lanes or even maintain 
existing facilities. Cycling levels in the Netherlands were higher than elsewhere, 
and cycling was much more embedded both in Dutch culture and in mobility 
institutions at a national, provincial, and local level. Without speculating 
about the development of Dutch cycling without mopeds, it is fair to say that 
thanks to the moped’s popularity, engineers regarded constructing cycling 
infrastructure as more justified. It also reinforced the existing separation that 
engineers saw between utilitarian and recreational cycling, by formalizing 
the distinction in traffic legislation. As a result, the category of recreational 
cycling became quite distinct in governance, with separate funding streams 
and governance coalitions, as the next chapter will demonstrate.
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Path dependency shaped the moped story in several ways. Without the 
prior commitment to traff ic separation (of drivers and cyclists) on major 
roads there would not have been so many cycle paths. Without these, the 
question of the moped’s place on the road would not have escalated to the 
same extent as there was only one option: the road. The decision to assign 
mopeds to cycle tracks was shaped by the particular path Dutch politicians 
and engineers had chosen in the 1920s. Additionally, the decision reinforced 
engineers’ commitment to their chosen path. Given the popularity of cycling, 
it is not very likely they could go back from a system of traff ic separation to 
mixed traff ic, but the developments around Western Europe at this time do 
suggest cycling was in peril. Engineers’ reinforced vigor to construct more 
and wider cycle paths meant the traff ic separation system remained strong 
throughout the car-centered 1960s. This chapter has not studied moped 
drivers’ experience of the cycle paths. While speculative, it is therefore 
possible that moped riders were also ‘path dependent’ in the sense that 
separate paths gave them safer and more comfortable options than moped 
riders who had to share the roads with cars. While not at its 1960s levels 
anymore, the continuing popularity of mopeds in the Netherlands, as with 
bicycles, might have something to do with its place in cycle lanes.
From a governance standpoint, the Dutch history of mopeds illustrates 
how not just multiple stakeholders, but also multiple levels of government 
shaped everyday mobility. From the international UN Convention on Road 
Traffic to the national adoption of legislation, then provincial and municipal 
implementation, each level played a role in shaping the Dutch system of 
cycling and moped riding. In the Netherlands, politicians, influential non-
governmental actors like the ANWB, and engineers called for widening 
existing cycling tracks and accelerating the pace of constructing new ones. 
Those same actors saw the few suggestions of dedicated moped tracks as 
unviable and settled upon a sort of combined moped-and-cycling path. 
Such paths were wider, smoother, and more extensive than the cycling 
infrastructure for cyclists alone. This does not detract from the fact that 
cyclists now had to share their separated cycling infrastructure with faster, 
noisier, and smellier vehicles, making cycling less pleasant. For those who 
could share the cycling path – or had no other mobility options – the many 
moped users made it possible to ride alongside major roads in the Nether-
lands, without having to mix with the 1960s fast-rising tide of car traff ic.
 Conclusion Part II
Motorization everywhere meant that cycling’s share of everyday trips 
declined precipitously in the 1950s and 1960s. This decline occurred in the 
Netherlands as well, but to a much lesser extent. A sizeable cycling culture 
remained, and by the late 1960s, far from having virtually disappeared, 
cycling was still a part of Dutch everyday life – whether for commuting, 
getting around town, or recreation. Multiple factors explain this. Many com-
muting distances remained cyclable, sometimes in combination with public 
transit. Cycling was also more compatible with driving in the Netherlands: 
partly because traff ic separation enabled safe cycling outside cities, partly 
because late automobilization made cycling a necessary and still viable 
urban mode, although increasingly beleaguered. Finally, the cultural framing 
of cycling developed before 1950 showed its staying power, so that cycling 
did not develop the same stigma as elsewhere. Politically, engineers across 
the world increasingly ignored cycling while they were grappling with or 
actively promoting automobilization.
Cycling infrastructure’s status as a public good remained strong or even 
increased in the period which has been described as one of overall decline. 
To whatever extent cycling did decline, we can conclude it was partial and 
uneven. The cycling experience varied significantly among different cyclists. 
For some, it was very eventful – particularly urban cyclists. Others saw the 
safety and comfort of their cycling routes improve. Tourists had ever more 
options. My assessment is more positive than earlier cycling histories of the 
Netherlands because they focused on urban cyclists, the group who suffered 
the worst consequences of automobilization. My analysis of provincial and 
regional policymakers and the coalitions they formed with the ANWB to 
facilitate suburban commuter as well as recreational cycling shows that 
pro-cycling policies initiated in the 1950s were still being implemented in 
the 1960s. Traff ic policy thus had a positive effect on cycling’s development 
in the Netherlands at this time.
In short, in discussing cycling as a public good in the 1950s and 1960s, we 
have to distinguish the focus on utilitarian cycling from the focus on recrea-
tional cycling. The moped and recreational cases in previous chapters show 
that politicians and ANWB officials applied this discourse opportunistically: 
sometimes it was more expedient to stress commuter cyclists’ needs, while 
at other times the tourism potential was the key to funding. Politicians and 
engineers did this consistently, resulting in diverse, yet overlapping govern-
ance and material networks. In practice, this distinction did not hold up.
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Utilitarian cycling’s status in this period is ambiguous because it was 
rediscovered in the late 1960s. Provincial policymakers began to realize 
how many people still used the bicycle for commuting. We have seen how 
policymakers in the 1950s still valued cycling as an eff icient (urban) mode 
of transport, perhaps allaying some policymakers’ qualms when thinking 
about automobility’s explosive growth. At most we can say that for a period of 
f ive to ten years from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, utilitarian cycling was 
rarely discussed. Even at this low point in cycling’s public status, however, 
the construction of separate cycling paths alongside roads never stopped. 
This was a legacy of an older conception of cyclists as (tax-paying) citizens 
deserving cycling paths, enshrined in traff ic engineering norms and rein-
forced by the need to construct more and wider cycling paths for mopeds.
In the same decade, recreational cycling became more important as a 
public good. The large and successful private governance coalition around 
recreational cycling was incorporated in provincial and regional government. 
This was not so much because these policymakers saw cycling as inherently 
good. They viewed it as a means to an end, such as public health or the 
economic benefits of tourism. New regional state bodies for recreational 
cycling proliferated, as did cycling path plans and subsidies. Ultimately this 
also had a bearing on utilitarian cycling, as the revived focus on this type 
of cycling around 1970 did not require new administrative procedures or 
institutions but could build on the provincial off icials’ existing expertise.
Cycling policies in the 1950s and 1960s were governed by various national, 
provincial, and local coalitions in which the ANWB often participated. 
However, cycling policy was not centrally coordinated but decentralized. 
It is revealing that, when politicians asked engineers in the province Zuid-
Holland to provide a comprehensive overview of cycling paths in the late 
1950s, no one could. It illustrates how much effort it took for politicians 
to convince engineers to implement their cycling vision. The national 
government’s role was limited to that of enabler. It funded provincial and 
municipal traffic and recreation departments. As the moped debate showed, 
for example, it also formulated laws. The government emphatically shied 
away from coordinating cycling policies or infrastructure networks, 
however. That task was left to the provinces, and other regional forms 
of cooperation between municipalities. It is no accident that the overall 
cycling infrastructure data used here mostly comes from ANWB sources: 
this non-governmental organization had representatives in the various 
government bodies, was in a better position to compile statistics than any 
state agency, and functioned as a de facto policy coordinator between the 
different layers of government.
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There was also a vertical separation between the agencies involved in road 
construction and in recreation. The agencies all saw cycling in a different 
light. Public Works off icials were responsible for traff ic and tried to give 
cyclists a place, while also protecting the flow of car traff ic. Spatial planners 
and civil servants, responsible for recreation, failed to contact each other 
on a regular basis – hindering knowledge sharing and coordination. At the 
same time, it is also a sign of how widely cycling planning was spread within 
Dutch bureaucracy. Officials at different levels of government and in various 
branches or sectors were all making cycling policies. This dispersed and 
decentralized rather than concentrated approach grew organically over time.
Most importantly, the role of local citizen initiatives, so crucial before, 
was assimilated by the provinces. Now the formal control in building rural 
cycling infrastructure was entirely in the hands of provincial actors. Some 
of the citizen organizations continued privately, but f inancial limitations 
gradually lessened their inf luence.1 The national organization ANWB, 
however, successfully kept – and even expanded – its control of engineering 
knowledge and education.
To sum up, in the 1950s and 1960s, Dutch cycling governance became 
more embedded within various government circles. Recreational cycling 
was policymakers’ most visible concern. Policies aimed at utilitarian cycling 
were still implemented behind the scenes. Both in policy and in practice, 
various types of cycling persevered throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
1 Around the 1940s, there was more focus on the meso level of government in Dutch politics: 
Toonen, “Dutch Provinces and the Struggle for the Meso,” 123. The provinces were deemed key 
actors for the major domains of land use, spatial planning, and infrastructure.

Part III
Dutch Model : How Urban Cycling Became a 
National Political Demand after 1970
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Until the 1970s, Dutch urban cyclists found their own way through cities, 
with little protection from other road users and even less policy focus, as 
f igure 21 illustrates. For urban policymakers, the priority was dealing with 
the car’s place in dense historic cities. As one traff ic planner admitted 
to a journalist in 1964, while he “knew everything about cars” in his city, 
“maybe we have forgotten about cyclists a little due to all the worries about 
the car.”1 Like elsewhere in Europe, car ownership in the Netherlands grew 
in the 1960s. Welcoming (suburban) car drivers into historic city centers 
made life hard for downtown cyclists. National and provincial authorities 
might have addressed the needs of (utilitarian) suburban, small-town, and 
recreational cyclists in earlier decades, but ignored urban cyclists. By the 
1970s, urban cyclists decided they would no longer accept their status as 
second-rate citizens. Across the Western world, social movements emerged, 
protesting the car’s negative impact on their cities. Other countries’ at-
tempts to transform the city had less long-time success than their Dutch 
1 “Steden laten de f ietsers versukkelen,” 11.
Figure 21 This junction in Utrecht, 1968 illustrates cyclists’ increasingly daunting battle in urban traffic. 
According to urban engineers, cycling infrastructure was impossible in city streets. In practice, road 
experts were not willing to limit the space for vehicles when faced with fast rising car levels. As a result, 
cyclists and drivers had to negotiate their place on the road every day and cycling was not for the 
faint-hearted. The situation led to growing protests from cyclists no longer willing to face these street 
battles. [Source: Collection Het Utrechts Archief, no. 810895]
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counterparts, who managed to form a coalition with urban policymakers 
and engineers that has made Dutch cities safer for cycling over the past f ifty 
years. This may be a familiar argument. Surprisingly, we know relatively little 
about these Dutch activists’ strategies, the role of national and provincial 
policymakers, and how they worked together to put cycling higher on the 
agenda. While the activist decade has been described as radically different 
from the previous period, we have no assessment of the policy continuities 
and discontinuities. This section aims to address these omissions.
According to political scientists, in countries with more consensual and 
corporatist traditions, social movements are more likely to gain access to 
policymaking circles.2 In these countries, policymakers tend to acknowledge 
that certain interest groups represent significant portions of society and form 
valuable intermediaries for consensus-driven policymaking. In the context 
of cycling activism, Emanuel, Balkmar, and Kriesi have made this claim for 
Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland respectively, though US historians like 
Furness, Friss, and Longhurst have shown how much more antagonistic 
this situation was in America.3 With a consensual political tradition like 
in Denmark and Switzerland, Dutch cycling action groups could operate 
in a similar way. Indeed, cycling activists had reached policymakers’ ears, 
but we know surprisingly little about their cycling advocacy and f ight for a 
redistribution of space. Albert de la Bruhèze, Veraart, and Oldenziel found 
examples in major Dutch cities. But a comprehensive analysis of Dutch 
cycling activism’s roots, social background, and action strategies is lacking. 
How did activists establish a working relationship with state off icials? And 
what was the activists’ input in policymaking? In Chapter 6, I explore these 
questions.
Dutch cities provided little dedicated cycling infrastructure before the 
1970s. Over the last f ifty years, they have now undergone a major transforma-
tion in catching up with the countryside. This required not just citizen 
activism but also a concerted effort by urban policymakers. Research by 
Albert de la Bruhèze, Veraart, Oldenziel, and Emanuel demonstrates how 
2 Andeweg and Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands; Van den Berg, “Dynamics in 
the Dutch Policy Advisory System,” 63-84; Kickert, The History of Governance in the Netherlands; 
Van Veen, “From Neo-Corporatism to Regulatory Governance,” 85-102.
3 Dag Balkmar, “Cycling Politics: Imagining Sustainable Cycling Futures in Sweden,” Applied 
Mobilities 5, no. 3 (2020): 324-40; Emanuel, “Making a Bicycle City,” 493-517; Hanspeter Kriesi, 
“Federalism and Pillarization: The Netherlands and Switzerland Compared,” Acta Politica XXXI, 
no. 4 (1996): 539-56; Pete Mijnssen-Hemmi and Florian Boller, 30 Jahre Veloförderung in der Stadt 
Zürich, 1975 bis 2005 (Zürich: Tiefbauamt der Stadt Zürich, Verkehrsplanung, 2006); Friss, On 
Bicycles; Furness, One Less Car; Longhurst, Bike Battles.
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urban politicians and officials, pressured by activists, started to take cycling 
more seriously in the 1970s and beyond. These cities operated in a larger 
regional, provincial, and national context, on which they partly depended for 
funding. In addition, higher government levels formulated the policy goals 
that cities had to take into consideration – a dimension largely ignored in 
the history of cycling. Scholars and historians of policymaking have shown 
that this multi-level structure is complicated. We do not know how this 
dynamic impacted urban efforts to redesign the city. My aim in Chapter 7 
is to see what role, if any, provincial and national government played in 
cycling governance. The time frame is the 1970s and 1980s, a period when 
stakeholders sought a governance arrangement that worked for the new 
policy goal of protecting and promoting urban cycling. These chapters paint 
a fuller picture of the multi-stakeholder coalition that shaped cycling policy 
in the Netherlands than earlier studies.
Curtailing the place of the car in the city and returning some of this 
space to cyclists and pedestrians has been a long and arduous process. 
It was by no means f inished in the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, national 
cycling policy received new impetus with the implementation of the national 
policy document Bicycle Master Plan (Masterplan Fiets). My f inal chapter 
shows how this (internationally) relatively well-known policy document 
was an outcome of two decades of debates.4 The overarching theme is the 
government’s attempt to decentralize cycling governance.
To understand the mobility context of the 1970s and beyond, we have 
to take a closer look at mobility developments in the Netherlands. The 
Dutch population’s overall mobility rose sharply in the 1960s in line with 
households’ increased purchasing power. It is well known that car sales more 
than doubled within just a decade (182,000 in 1963 to 430,000 by 1973). Over 
this same period, bicycle sales also soared, from 555,000 to 1,068,000 – and 
outnumbered cars in absolute terms.5 Social trends, like growing aware-
ness of environmental problems (reinforced by the Oil Crisis and Car-Free 
Sundays) but also the potential health benefits of cycling, increased cycling’s 
4 An English summary of its results and historical context was one of the earliest publications 
on Dutch cycling in English: Public Works and Water Management: Directorate-General for 
Passenger Transport Ministry of Transport, The Dutch Bicycle Master Plan: Description and 
Evaluation in an Historical Context (The Hague: Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management: Directorate-General for Passenger Transport, 1999).
5 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Statistisch zakboek 1974 (’s-Gravenhage: Trio, 1974), 
181; Henk Maurits, “Energiecrisis leidt tot recordverkoop van f ietsen,” De Tijd, January 3, 1974; 
“Gouden tijden voor rijwielindustrie,” NRC Handelsblad November 8, 1973; “Fietsenmaker H. 
Kind Jr.: ‘Ze zeggen weer u tegen me’,” Het Vrije Volk, November 8, 1973.
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popularity and status across the world and in the Netherlands.6 Having 
lagged behind in car ownership in comparison to other European countries, 
in the late 1960s the Netherlands also became a car-oriented country – yet 
with an atypical number of cyclists.
The rising critique of automobility coupled with roadbuilding around 1970 
led to a cycling revival – or to put it more accurately, stopped the declining 
trend. Public transit also flourished. Between 1960 and 1990, Dutch Railways 
(NS) added 110 stations to its network, leading to a total of 389 by 1990. New 
suburbs or satellite towns were connected to this railway network.7 Since 
the 1980s, the expansion led to a sharp increase in train use, although overall 
kilometers traveled by car also rose in an ever more mobile society.8 In this 
revival, the bicycle – privately owned or more recently the Dutch Railways’ 
shared bicycle system – has played an important part as before-and-after 
transport in people’s daily public transit commute.9 Moreover, there was no 
competition from subway systems. Like in Denmark, few Dutch cities operate 
subways (only Rotterdam since 1968 and Amsterdam since 1977) or streetcars, 
making the bicycle a necessary alternative.10 Urban planning policy, for instance 
in the 1976 Urbanization Memorandum (Verstedelijkingsnota), did stipulate 
that new neighborhoods must be within 4 km distance of train stations to curb 
automobility growth.11 At the same time, the 1960s spatial planning policy to 
concentrate population growth in new satellite towns only partially succeeded.12 
Government policy could not entirely prevent urban sprawl and automobility.
In the late 1960s, coupled with rising car levels was “an unprecedented 
highway building fever.”13 National and provincial governments constructed 
hundreds of kilometers of highways, including many expensive tunnels and 
crossovers.14 According to Mom and Filarski, municipalities also extended 
6 The health benef its of cycling were explained in a Dutch bicycle (industry) lobby brochure: 
Stichting: f iets!, Fit door fietsen: hoe fiets je voor je gezondheid?: wat zegt de dokter?: conditietraining, 
trimmen, trainingsschema’s, Fietsotheek, vol. 8 (Amsterdam: Stichting: f iets!, 1974).
7 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 366-67.
8 Ibid., 379-81.
9 Jan Ploeger and Ruth Oldenziel, “The Sociotechnical Roots of Smart Mobility: Bike Sharing 
since 1965,” Journal of Transport History 41, no. 2 (2020): 148-53.
10 Carstensen and Ebert, “Cycling Cultures in Northern Europe,” 45.
11 Van der Cammen and De Klerk, Ruimtelijke ordening, 278. Jan Ploeger’s forthcoming book 
will shed more light on this development.
12 Bontje, “A ‘Planner’s Paradise’ Lost? Past, Present and Future of Dutch National Urbanization 
Policy,” 145.
13 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 316.
14 Gijs Mom, “The West and the Rest,” 172; Hans Buiter and Kees Volkers, Oudenrijn: geschiedenis 
van een verkeersknooppunt (Utrecht: Matrijs, 1996).
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and densif ied road networks. By the early 1970s, the Netherlands had “a 
road network with a density almost unique in Europe.”15 The radical shift 
in a context where cycling and moped riding were still popular modes 
of transport created a dramatic conflict. It partly explains why citizen 
resistance against automobility was so intense, widespread, and sustained 
in the 1970s.
The government’s facilitation and rise of automobility had many negative 
effects. The increase in traff ic deaths was perhaps the most dramatic. 
Pedestrians, cyclists, and playing children had ever less space. The lack of 
restrictions on (urban) automobility coupled with little government effort 
to protect urban cyclists from the resulting dangers, led to ever-increasing 
traff ic deaths. At cycling’s lowest point in the late 1960s, hundreds of cyclists 
and children were killed every year. As f igures 22 and 23 show, the already 
high levels of road fatalities in the 1950s rose even further in the 1960s. 
Measures taken since then to improve traff ic safety have been effective, 
although the number of cyclist deaths has not decreased further over the 
past twenty years.
Dutch cities had always been cycling cities but despite, not because of 
state policies. Together with the powerful tourist organization ANWB, 
policymakers had promoted and facilitated recreational and suburban 
commuter cycling in the Netherlands throughout the twentieth century. 
Urban cyclists had been relatively ignored until the 1970s. The rising anger 
over traff ic safety, coupled with growing concerns over environmental 
degradation and the car’s space demands in such a densely built nation 
triggered a wave of broad-based activism. This acted as a catalyst for growing 
concerns about precisely these issues among certain policymakers and 
engineers. The social pressure led to a wide coalition of actors aiming to 
curtail the car’s place in the city and redistribute urban space. In the 1970s, 
wide social unrest, a peak of activism, and a receptive government all aligned 
to create a strong pro-cycling coalition and a shift in cycling policy.
15 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 316-17.
























































































































































Child Traffic Fatalities in the Netherlands, 1950–2018
Age 0-4 Age 5-9 Age 10-14
Figure 22 This graph shows how hundreds of children died in traffic every year after mid-century. Many 
of these cases concerned drivers hitting playing children, leading to widely shared anger and activism 
in the 1970s. Data from Dutch Road Safety Institute SWOV (Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Ver-
keersveiligheid). See: https://www.swov.nl/feitenencijfers/verkeersveiligheidscijfers-verkeersongevallen 
and https://theseus.swov.nl/single/?appid=5dbac35a-5fbd-401f-b711-682176941688&sheet=jvpBF&opt




















































































































































Cyclist Road Fatalities in the Netherlands, 1950–2018
Figure 23 Increasing automobility in the 1960s coupled with insufficient measures to protect cyclists, 
led to dramatic accident rates peaking around 1970. Separate cycling infrastructure existed alongside 
major roads, but very little within cities, making urban cycling ever more dangerous. Data from SWOV 
and CBS.
6 Citizen Expertise: Urban Activism 
Shapes Local Cycling Policy in the 
1970s
“When it comes to cycling, there is only one expert: the cyclists themselves. 
The cyclist knows best which situations are dangerous, which short cuts 
are needed, which barriers should be removed … Where the government 
is doomed to fail given its technocratic approach, the Cyclists’ Union can 
be strong.”1 With this resounding statement, the Dutch Cyclists’ Union 
(Fietsersbond) claimed that successful cycling governance was impossible 
without the input of everyday cyclists. Rather than making policy “from 
behind the car window” as cycling activists often suspected, urban engineers 
should work with cycling groups representing everyday cyclists. With their 
detailed knowledge of urban roads and the dangers of everyday mobility, 
they had the expertise engineers lacked. To curtail the car’s place in the 
city, f ight the record high numbers of traff ic casualties, and make cycling a 
safer and more attractive option in Dutch cities, engineers and activists had 
to work together. The new organization of young activists also questioned 
the traditional, mediating, and monopolistic role of the ANWB in cycling 
governance. It was part of a larger critique.
By 1975, the technocratic policymaking of the 1950s and 1960s had come 
under f ire. A rising chorus of activists took aim at both the undemocratic 
way engineers and policymakers operated, and the negative effects of their 
decisions: pollution and rising road accidents, for example. Citizens took 
to the streets to protest and demand change. Urban policymakers’ lack 
of interest in cycling meant that urban engineers were unaware of the 
problems that cyclists faced daily in cities where engineers gave cars free 
rein. Instead, they argued, these cyclists were the true experts when it 
came to turning back the clock to when bicycles ruled the streets. A new 
generation of young, educated, and left-wing activists put cycling back on 
the agenda and demanded that urban cyclists, neglected up to that point, 
would f inally be taken seriously.
In the early 1970s, an international wave of environmental activism was 
sweeping over the world. Central to this activism was a fear that society 
1 IISG, Archive Cyclists’ Union (ARCH01969), inv. no. 1, Christiaan la Poutré, “Inventarisatie 
knelpunten,” 2. Underlined in original.
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was losing (democratic) control over large technical systems. Many opposed 
what they considered technocracy gone awry, critiquing the waste of natural 
resources. The Oil Crisis only reinforced this conviction. The activist world 
was heterogeneous. In the area of innovation and governance, for instance, 
it split over the question of how ordinary people could develop counter-
expertise and participate in government. Some activist groups opposed 
building their own knowledge base and preferred extra-parliamentary 
activism with an eye to long-term mentality changes. Other groups wanted 
to achieve results pragmatically in the shorter term.2 These themes also 
permeate the Dutch environmental movement and cycling activism. 
Due to high cycling levels and rapid motorization, cycling activism in the 
Netherlands was a large subset of environmental activism, more so than 
in other countries. As such, it played an important role in putting urban 
cycling on the political agenda. This role has been acknowledged but not 
yet comprehensively researched.
In Cycling Cities, the authors present social movements’ achievement in 
putting cycling higher on the political agenda as a key reason for successful 
Dutch urban cycling since the 1970s.3 They show how in various cities, 
activists were the ones who pushed policymakers into action and turned 
thinking about public space, cars, and bicycles on its head. Due to its ap-
proach – “biographies” of urban cycling in various cities – the studies do 
not analyze the entire Dutch Cyclists’ Union. In this chapter, I offer a more 
comprehensive analysis of the precursors and origins, social background, 
goals, and action strategies of cycling activism in the Netherlands. In ad-
dition, this and the following chapters will delve into the new governance 
arrangements for (urban) cycling of the 1970s and beyond. Through (local) 
policy coalitions, politicians, planners, engineers, and activists redistributed 
urban space somewhat towards cyclists and pedestrians. In this process, 
cycling activists played an important role.
My analysis builds on the environmental activism scholarship, which 
observes a split between activists’ more oppositional and cooperative stances 
vis-à-vis the state. A key argument in this chapter is that from the start, 
besides engaging in large street demonstrations and other public protests, 
2 Jacqueline Cramer, De groene golf: geschiedenis en toekomst van de Nederlandse milieubeweg-
ing (Utrecht: Van Arkel, 1989), 9-13; Andrew Jamison et al., The Making of the New Environmental 
Consciousness: A Comparative Study of the Environmental Movements in Sweden, Denmark, and 
the Netherlands (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990).
3 Ruth Oldenziel et al., eds., Cycling Cities: The European Experience (Eindhoven: Foundation 
for the History of Technology and Rachel Carson Center for Environment and Society, 2016), 
11-12.
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cycling activists also pragmatically sought cooperation with state off icials. 
The main Dutch cycling activist organization (Cyclists’ Union) cooperated 
with local policymakers to make cities safer for cycling by applying bottom-
up user knowledge, for instance about bottlenecks and blackspots. These 
activists were knowledgeable, media savvy, and capable of establishing a 
f ine-meshed network of local chapters.4 They engaged with a progressive 
government that came into power during the period and a bureaucracy 
willing to experiment in order to make cities more livable. In his study on 
the role of French NGOs in cycling governance since the 1970s, political 
scientist Maxime Huré shows how (transnational) networks of interest 
groups and market parties sought public-private partnerships to stimulate 
cycling at the local level in France.5 As I show, activism in the Netherlands 
was bottom-up and broadly supported. In France, the entrepreneurial rather 
than non-governmental actors like (advertising) companies and a smaller 
cadre of lobbyists played a role. Dutch activists had different concerns and 
tactics, aiming to improve the situation (by redistributing space or traff ic 
calming) for an existing group of cyclists. In France, activism sought to 
increase the very low cycling levels. Different cycling levels led to different 
types of cycling activism.
International political science scholarship on activism indicates why 
this type of cycling activism was more likely to work in the Netherlands 
and similar small democracies like Denmark. It argues that the Dutch 
political situation is more favorable to social movement participation than 
surrounding countries for several reasons.6 The Netherlands has a low 
electoral threshold, allowing new parties to gain political influence quickly 
and forcing established parties to adopt a social movement platform in 
order to win votes or preempt the foundation of rival parties.7 This po-
litical system was beneficial to cycling activism. A second factor is Dutch 
professional bureaucracy: civil servants do not change signif icantly after 
each election. It guarantees a measure of stability and enables activists 
to build long-term relationships with off icials or participate in the civil 
4 Young engineering and architecture students from the major Dutch technical universities 
or architecture academies in Delft, Eindhoven, Enschede, and Rotterdam were an important 
part of this movement.
5 Maxime Huré, “Les réseaux transnationaux du vélo.”
6 J.W. Duyvendak and R. Koopmans, “Protest in een pacif icatiedemocratie. Nieuwe sociale 
bewegingen en het Nederlandse politieke systeem,” in Tussen verbeelding en macht: 25 jaar nieuwe 
sociale bewegingen in Nederland, ed. J.W. Duyvendak, et al. (Amsterdam: SUA, 1992), 39-57.
7 James C. Kennedy, Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw: Nederland in de jaren zestig (Amsterdam: 
Boom, 1995).
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service. Lastly, the informal political culture in the Netherlands embodies 
facilitation, assimilation, and cooperation. There is little tendency towards 
repression, confrontation, or polarization. In countries like the US, France, 
and Germany, by contrast, the absence of this consensus-driven political 
culture makes it much harder for social movements to succeed.8 All these 
factors have largely to do with access to politics. While this access proved 
comparatively easy to achieve, the implementation of actual pro-cycling or 
car-limiting policies was a slower process which often frustrated activists.
In so-called corporatist democracies, policymakers acknowledge certain 
groups as representatives of social interests or groups (corpora). The preferred 
mode of interaction between the state and society is through the mediation 
of these groups to reach a consensus. Such consensus democracies differ 
from majoritarian democracies where minority interests are given less 
consideration.9 Such a consensual tradition can benef it cycling activists 
who argue that the state has prioritized cars too much at the expense of 
cyclists and pedestrians. In countries where the balancing of interests is 
valued and cyclists form sizeable and well represented groups, the conditions 
of success seem better. This was the case for Dutch activism and seems 
to apply to Danish or Swiss cycling activism as well.10 From a governance 
perspective, in other words, it is probably no accident that cycling action 
groups were most successful in the Netherlands, Denmark, and Switzerland. 
The political culture of consensus building in these countries seems to 
accommodate citizen participation more easily and has produced some of 
the most cycling-friendly cities in the world.
Corporatist democracies like the Netherlands and Denmark also differ 
from other countries such as Sweden, in that they still had signif icant 
cycling levels when activism emerged.11 This shaped activism, increased 
the grounds for recruiting both active volunteers and passive supporters, 
and gave them access to user knowledge as well as a basis of legitimacy. In 
many other countries, pro-cycling policies were much more politicized. In 
8 Duyvendak and Koopmans, “Protest in een pacif icatiedemocratie.”
9 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-
Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Rudy B. Andeweg, “Consociational 
Democracy,” Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000): 509-36.
10 Emanuel, “Copenhagen: Branding the Cycling City,” 89-99; Emanuel, “Making a Bicycle 
City,” 493-517; Mijnssen-Hemmi and Boller, 30 Jahre Veloförderung in der Stadt Zürich, 1975 bis 
2005.
11 Balkmar, “Cycling Politics: Imagining Sustainable Cycling Futures in Sweden,” 324-40. Dag 
Balkmar and Jane Summerton, “Contested Mobilities: Politics, Strategies and Visions in Swedish 
Bicycle Activism,” Applied Mobilities 2, no. 2 (2017): 151-65.
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the Netherlands, a consensus emerged that cycling is a public good: hence 
the notion that it is the government’s responsibility to provide a safe traff ic 
environment with fast, direct, and comfortable cycling routes, as well as 
parking facilities. This happened in a context where space remained a scarce 
commodity: conflicts over distribution of public space are common in the 
Netherlands like elsewhere. Still, cycling is not framed as a fringe leftist 
project. And therein lies the remarkable difference between the Netherlands 
and other, primarily Anglo-Saxon countries.
To sum up, this chapter aims to ref ine and corroborate the Cycling Cities 
claim about the importance of social movements. It also offers the political 
history scholarship a particularly compelling “poldermodel” case study as 
explanation. It underlines the uniqueness of Dutch cycling activism in an 
international context. I do so by using the as yet unstudied Cyclists’ Union 
archives to examine how this key activist organization was structured, how 
it functioned, and its types of activism, to analyze its cycling governance 
role in the 1970s and 1980s.
6.1 Early Cycling Activism: Goals and Methods, 1965-1975
Widespread activism marks the period from 1965 to 1975, ranging from 
countercultural initiatives to environmental protests and peace dem-
onstrations. This included various groups protesting the car’s dominant 
place in society and advocating more space for cycling. It led in 1975 to 
various groups coming together to establish a new action group for cycling: 
the Cyclists’ Union (Fietsersbond). The organization was a federation of 
local cycling groups, uniting existing traff ic, cycling, and environmental 
protest organizations. It employed a discourse that argued urban cycling 
was a neglected public good, and experimented with different action 
repertoires. Much of this had been pioneered by earlier groups who 
helped found the Cyclists’ Union. To better understand its history and 
later success requires f irst taking a deeper look into the origins of these 
groups. They include countercultural movements like Provo and Gnome 
(Kabouter), unorganized (parent) protests around children’s safety, Stop 
the Child Murder (Stop de Kindermoord), and alternative planning group 
the Dooievaar. Each contributed in its own distinctive way to subsequent 
protest movements: Provo’s discourse returned in Stop the Child Murder. 
This movement’s lobbying of national policymakers was eff icacious 
because well-organized local activists and traff ic safety protesters suc-
ceeded in politically conveying the idea that millions of Dutch citizens 
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supported the movement. And once those groups had put the issue f irmly 
on the agenda, the young Dooievaar architects contributed by developing 
an innovative form of participative policymaking – or what we today 
would call co-design. Many Cyclists’ Union chapters then were able to 
use this widely published user-based design process to develop a robust 
cycling path plan. Armed with such a plan, the Cyclists’ Union activists 
lobbied local – and often progressive – authorities. Despite not always 
producing results as quickly as the activists wanted, it did set in motion 
a process of urban transformation that has played out over the last f ifty 
years.
The early countercultural movements already supported cycling 
in their trenchant critique of car culture.12 The Provo (1965-1967) and 
Kabouter movements (1969-1974) criticized capitalism and the materialist 
consumer culture it had created. The car served as a powerful symbol of 
all they opposed and car culture had to be provoked. The city had become 
a place of (large-scale) consumerism rather than a living environment. 
The car, with its large demands on space and polluting exhaust fumes, 
irritated these urban activists. Unlike later activists, their anarchist 
actions were typically provocative and playful. Their early interventions 
contributed to a mentality change rather than actual transformations 
of urban space.
Provo activists were among the f irst to draw attention to traff ic safety 
problems in the Netherlands.13 Their White Bicycle Plan critiqued the car’s 
polluting and space-consuming role in the city.14 This was a happening 
(rather than a plan) that entailed Provo activists painting a number of 
bicycles white and leaving them throughout Amsterdam free to use. A 
photograph of John Lennon and Yoko Ono with a white bicycle became 
iconic. Besides politicizing the bicycle, this also marked the invention of the 
12 On Provo and other action groups of the mid-1960s: Roel van Duyn, Provo. De geschiedenis 
van de provotarische beweging 1965-1967 (Amsterdam: Meulenhoff, 1985); Virginie Mamadouh, 
De stad in eigen hand: provo’s, kabouters en krakers als stedelijke sociale beweging (Amsterdam: 
Sua, 1992); Kennedy, Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw; Niek Pas, Provo! Mediafenomeen 1965-1967 
(Amsterdam: Wereldbibliotheek, 2015); Marko Otten, Provo: de ludieke opstand tegen bom en 
regentendom (Doetinchem: Het Boekenschap, 2017). On the Kabouter movement, see Coen 
Tasman, Louter Kabouter: Kroniek van een beweging (Amsterdam: Babylon-De Geus, 1996).
13 Bicycle historian Zack Furness traces Provo’s inspiration to French Situationist thinking of 
the 1950s. Zack Furness, “Biketivism and Technology: Historical Reflections and Appropriations,” 
Social Epistemology 19, no. 4 (2005): 401-17, here 402.
14 Van Duyn, Provo, 75-76; Mamadouh, De stad in eigen hand, 67-68, 73; Furness, One Less 
Car, 55-58; Fred Feddes and Marjolein De Lange, Fietsstad Amsterdam: Hoe Amsterdam de 
fietshoofdstad van de wereld werd (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bas Lubberhuizen, 2019), 58-62.
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shared bicycle.15 Another Provo member, Thom Jaspers – described in the 
press as the “safe traff ic magician” (veiligverkeermagiër) – organized traff ic 
safety events in 1965. He was one of the f irst people to publicly draw atten-
tion to worsening safety conditions. Shortly before, Jaspers had witnessed 
a fatal accident, motivating him to denounce traff ic as “a pagan god” to 
which “we Dutch people sacrif ice seven people every day.”16 Jaspers staged 
a happening at an art gallery in Schiedam near Rotterdam; it involved his 
Japanese friend and (performance) artist Yoshio Nakajima pouring water 
and red paint over himself while standing on a wrecked car, to symbolize 
the blood and tears of traff ic victims. Jaspers and others then demolished 
the car with metal poles.17 For the artists, the traff ic-themed performance 
was an isolated incident, yet their framing inspired Luud Schimmelpennink’s 
focus on mobility and foreshadowed the traff ic safety group Stop the Child 
Murder’s stark language of death. The art performance was rooted in social 
upheaval in the street. Street accidents skyrocketed in the early 1970s. Anger 
over traff ic accidents reached a critical mass, prompting a broad-based 
action group.
After the demise of Provo, in 1969 to 1970 a similar movement crystallized: 
the Kabouter (Gnome) movement – a name indicating small people f ighting 
giant technocratic forces. Far-reaching in its ambition to transform society, 
the movement’s vision of traff ic revolved around (free) public transit. With 
multiple activities in 1970, its most active year, it also supported cycling, like 
its cycling club (Kabouterfietsclub) promoting the cargo bike as alternative 
to the car.18 In early 1970, the Kabouters also organized multiple protest 
rides with regular and cargo bikes.19 Their key complaint, beyond the 
excessive use of space, was air pollution; at one demonstration, Kabouters 
pretended to faint and need oxygen because of car exhaust fumes.20 The Car 
15 Ploeger and Oldenziel, “The Sociotechnical Roots of Smart Mobility: Bike Sharing since 
1965,” 134-59.
16 Joop Daalmeijer, “We moeten bewuster leven ook met het verkeer,” Het Nieuwe Stadsblad, 
May 19, 1965. Jaspers placed a piece of cardboard that he was carrying around under the victim’s 
head. This bloodied cardboard he then wanted to exhibit as a “national monument for traff ic 
victims”.
17 “Auto kapot rameien voor ‘veilig verkeer’,” Rotterdamsch Parool/De Schiedammer, May 22, 
1965; “Happening voor veilig verkeer Schiedam,” Het Vrije Volk, May 22, 1965; “Hysterische 
‘kunstrakkers’ slopen Nieuwlandse galerie,” Het Nieuwe Stadsblad, May 25,1965. Jaspers’ interest 
in traff ic safety was short-lived; he later moved to Groningen to join the squatters and peace 
movements.
18 Tasman, Louter Kabouter, 61, 154-58; Mamadouh, De stad in eigen hand, 105.
19 Tasman, Louter Kabouter, 155.
20 “Zieke kabouter weggebracht: In drie steden acties,” De Volkskrant, April 13, 1970, 3.
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Elimination Service (Auto-Eliminatiedienst) organized protests against the 
car’s dominant place in the city in 1970. With sit-ins, they blockaded traffic in 
busy Amsterdam streets like Leidsestraat, where exhaust fumes and parked 
cars were a major headache. Despite confrontations with angry drivers and 
police arrests, the protesters ultimately convinced the city to experiment 
with closing this shopping street to car traff ic.21 By 1970, the action groups 
had already managed to extract some concessions from urban government.
In the long run, the countercultural movements’ primary contribution 
to cycling activism was a reframing of urban streets as public places rather 
than monofunctional car spaces. Across Europe, such movements aimed 
to make the bicycle what historian Zack Furness calls “a technological 
embodiment of environmentalism.”22 As elsewhere, the works of urban 
theorist and activist Jane Jacobs (Death and Life of Great American Cities, 
1961), economist Ernst Schumacher (Small is Beautiful, 1973), and social 
critic Ivan Illich (Energy and Equity, 1974) inspired these activists.23 The 
car symbolized everything that was wrong with capitalism; the logical 
alternative, the bicycle, its opposite of a different economic and ecological 
system. Protests like the Gnome movement’s in Amsterdam introduced 
the idea of making certain streets car-free and giving cycling and public 
transit a larger role in urban mobility. Their successor groups incorporated 
these key values: self-governance, livability, the small (neighborhood) scale, 
walking and cycling, opposition to bureaucracy, unrestricted economic 
growth, and the redevelopment of inner cities to accommodate big businesses 
and cars.24 In short, these urban social movements reframed the bicycle 
as a green symbol. They promoted cycling as an antidote to many of the 
problems plaguing the city.
These groups’ relationship with the government was more confrontational 
than the ANWB had ever been. It was also more contentious than later action 
groups. Even so, some relationships existed. Policymakers in many left-
leaning cities shared the activists’ concerns, if not their style and discourse.25 
While cycling activists since the mid-1970s had found it beneficial to work 
with the government, such dialogue was highly controversial within the 
21 Tasman, Louter Kabouter, 157-58.
22 Furness, One Less Car, 59.
23 Ibid., 66. A translation from a section of Energy and Equity appeared in a 1977 edition of 
the Cyclists’ Union journal: Ivan Illich, “Gradaties in het voortbewegen op eigen kracht,” De 
Vogelvrije Fietser 2, no. 6 (1977): 18-19.
24 Geert Mak, “Anatomie van een romantische stadsrebellie,” NRC Handelsblad, October 3, 
1992.
25 Kennedy, Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw, 121.
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Provo and Kabouter movements, which had been based on oppositional 
and anarchistic traditions. Most preferred provocative, extra-parliamentary 
activism. Nevertheless, the Kabouter movement scored successes in Dutch 
cities, winning four seats in Amsterdam’s 1970 municipal elections. In the 
city council, Kabouter Roel van Duyn, a former history and political science 
student, submitted numerous policy proposals. Sociology student Henk 
Bakker, a key member of the group The Obstinate Amsterdammer (De 
Lastige Amsterdammer) proposed making the entire city center car-free. 
He became disillusioned with the Kabouters’ playfulness and accused them 
of lacking “ready knowledge” and being unwilling to acquire expertise.26 In 
turn, activists accused The Obstinate Amsterdammer of being “alternative 
technocrats,” pointing to a split over the extent of government involvement.27 
The city council refused to discuss many of the Kabouters’ unorthodox policy 
ideas.28 Still, they became part of the municipal council and interacted with 
establishment politicians on a regular basis. If radical groups could work 
with urban government to this extent, more pragmatic groups had good 
prospects of establishing a working relationship with local engineers and 
policymakers.
The anger over the negative effects of automobilization was not limited to 
Amsterdam or specific action groups. Children everywhere in the Netherlands 
tended to cycle rather than walk to school, riding on or crossing highly danger-
ous roads. By the late 1960s, these roads had the same high car levels as other 
Western countries. Where separate cycling paths were lacking, or crossings 
were unprotected, this meant danger for cycling children. Their parents in 
cities, towns, and villages all over the country shared a widely expressed anger 
over worsening traff ic safety and took to the streets to protest the lack of 
cycling infrastructure and safe conditions. The dangerous journeys to school 
sometimes led parents to protest by keeping children at home. In 1963, after 
a twelve-year-old boy died, hit by a driver at a dangerous major crossroads 
near the harbor city Rotterdam, parents refused to let their children go to 
26 Lisette Lewin, “Lastige Amsterdammer Henk Bakker: ‘Alles is te regelen als eerst die auto maar 
weg is’,” Algemeen Handelsblad, March 18, 1970. While broadly accurate, there were exceptions. 
Notably, the Rotterdam Kabouter Pax Kroon wrote a serious report on alternative transport in 
Rotterdam in 1970. Berkers et al., Cycling Cities: The Rotterdam Experience, 41. “Rotterdam moet 
kiezen: auto of mens,” NRC Handelsblad, October 31, 1970, 20.
27 Jitske Bosma et al., “… de beste aktiegroep ter wereld …”: 40 dorpsverhalen uit de Nieuwmarkt 
(Amsterdam: Stichting Uitgeverij De Oude Stadt, 1984), 59. While the squatter movement was 
more confrontational in later years, it nevertheless maintained regular contact with city off icials. 
Herman De Liagre Böhl, Amsterdam op de helling: De strijd om stadsvernieuwing (Amsterdam: 
Boom, 2010).
28 Tasman, Louter Kabouter, 313-14.
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school.29 In 1968, parents in Holten also refused to allow their children to 
attend school after a sixteen-year-old girl died on a dangerous road. Until 
cycling paths came along, people demanded a lower speed limit and a ban 
on overtaking.30 A group of 100 six-year old school children protested in 
Amsterdam in 1970 against cars parked on the pavement.31 In the same year, 
400 children in Hilversum blocked the ring road, demanding a cycling path 
to their school, while in the village of Stompwijk, parents threatened to block 
roads with tractors if their children did not get a safe cycling path to schools 
in suburban Zoetermeer.32 In 1972, parents in border town Doetinchem kept 
their children at home when the subsidized school bus was abolished. The 
parents considered the local roads too dangerous to allow children under ten 
to cycle.33 In 1974, parents in a Noord-Holland village kept their children at 
home in protest against the dangerous school route; after an accident, two 
children had ended up in hospital with serious injuries.34 In 1975, concerned 
parents wrote to Utrecht’s city government about the children’s school route 
along the busy Amsterdamsestraatweg.35 In 1976, seventy schoolchildren 
spontaneously blocked a dangerous provincial road in Friesland the day 
after a child was killed in a traff ic accident.36 The construction of separate 
cycling paths was still not complete in provinces like Friesland or Drenthe, 
leading to dangerous situations for schoolchildren.37 These protests took 
place across the country: anger over the car spilled over into the streets.
29 “Gevaarlijk punt in Bergschenhoek eist wéér mensenleven,” Het Vrije Volk, July 9, 1963, 1.
30 “Kinderen blijven thuis: Telegram aan minister, motie aan de raad,” Tubantia, February 22, 
1968, 5. The dangers of cycling in the 1960s are well illustrated by the fact that this road was part 
of the international route to Germany until a highway was constructed south of Holten from 
1971 onward. “Rijk legt weg aan naast E 8 bij Holten,” Volkskrant, February 22, 1968, 11.
31 “‘Weg met auto’s’: 100 kleuters demonstreren,” De Telegraaf, April 21, 1970.
32 “Amsterdams Dagboek: Notities,” Het Parool, September 7, 1970, 2.
33 “Ouders houden hun kinderen van school uit protest,” Tubantia, September 27, 1972, 7. The 
conflict dragged on for ages; the municipality considered cycling safe enough, the parents did 
not, since their children had to cross two busy streets which were not adequately protected: 
“Bus-stop, school-stop,” Algemeen Dagblad, November 1, 1972, 14.
34 “De Noord heeft schoon genoeg van de onveilige weg naar school,” Het Parool, April 23, 1974, 9.
35 HUA 1338 (Gemeentebestuur van Utrecht, 1970-1989), inv. no. 12559, letter E. Graafstal-Paasche 
(parents’ committee) to mayor and aldermen Utrecht, December 15, 1975. This busy shopping 
street had a lot of bus and truck traff ic which had to stop or park at the side of the road, crossing 
the cyclists’ path.
36 “Politie steekt stokje voor blokkade Marnezijl door schooljeugd,” Leeuwarder Courant, 
September 3, 1976, 15.
37 Gert van Engelen, “‘Je ziet hier geen dikke schoolkinderen’,” De Vogelvrije Fietser 6, no. 1 
(1980): 16-17 and 37; Gert van Engelen, “‘Actie is hier een vies woord’,” De Vogelvrije Fietser 8, no. 6 
(1983): 10.
CITIzeN exPerTISe: urbAN AC TIvISm SHAPeS LoCAL CYCLING PoLICY IN THe 1970S 227
This local activism revolved around the claim that safe cycling for chil-
dren was a public good which the local and national government failed to 
provide. The gradual and implicit reframing of the street as an exclusive 
space for cars had to be undone.38 As one schoolteacher in Noord-Holland 
province commented: “every child has the right to protection, and so do 
little f ive-year-olds who ride their little bicycle to school every day on the 
busy Middenweg where there are no cycling paths.”39 The lack of cycling 
infrastructure everywhere had endangered cyclists since the introduction 
of the car. The fast rise in car ownership combined with the critical mass of 
cyclists made this danger even more acute: as commuters switched to driv-
ing, those who had to keep on cycling objected to the worsening conditions. 
It was the state’s duty to protect its cycling citizens against this danger.
The step from citizen protests to reconstructing the streets required a 
commitment from both activists and government off icials, the protesters 
38 Norton, “Street Rivals: Jaywalking and the Invention of the Motor Age Street,” 331-59; Norton, 
Fighting Traffic; Peter Norton, “Four Paradigms: Traff ic Safety in the Twentieth-Century United 
States,” Technology and Culture 56, no. 2 (2015): 319-34.
39 “De Noord heeft schoon genoeg van de onveilige weg naar school,” 9.
Figure 24 Primary school children cycled to their local town hall to protest cycling conditions in the 
Haarlemmermeer region in 1978, carrying a slogan “We’d better go by boat, because cycling you end 
up in a moat” (“We kunnen beter met de boot want fietsend kom je in de sloot”). Narrow country roads 
like these along waterways became increasingly dangerous when cars dominated traffic. [Source: 
Nationaal Archief, Bert Verhoeff/Anefo, no. 929-7231]
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believed. In 1978, for example, a group of primary school children held a 
cycling demonstration in Haarlemmermeer to protest drivers’ behavior and 
demand more cycling paths on the narrow country roads (see f igure 24). The 
chief motivation was to ensure (rural) children could cycle safely to high 
schools in towns. The group cycled to the town hall in Hoofddorp to hand 
over a petition and a bicycle they had dredged from a canal, symbolizing the 
apparently regular occurrence of school children being forced off the road 
into the water by passing cars.40 The pressure from citizens led to the promise 
of a municipal cycling path plan, but funds were lacking to actually build it. 
The activists knew how the underlying link between finance and governance 
worked. As a letter from Nieuw-Vennep’s community council (Dorpsraad) 
to parliament shows: “for the funding of this plan, the municipality is of 
course almost entirely dependent on higher authorities.”41 The activists 
also knew that their province Noord-Holland received 2.5 million guilders 
in cycling subsidies in 1979 and would receive 4 million in 1980 and 1981, to 
be distributed among the municipalities. The pittance that would remain 
for the Haarlemmermeer area made “realization of these plans a hope-
less matter,” they wrote.42 So the activists wrote to parliament requesting 
extra funds. Multi-level government relations complicated citizens’ simple 
demands. Local residents sometimes understood, but were frustrated by the 
bureaucratic complexities standing in the way of quick solutions.
Both the Provo rhetoric and the broad social unrest over unsafe school 
routes led to a high level of organization. Stop the Child Murder (Stop de 
Kindermoord), officially established on March 22, 1973, had been active a year 
earlier. In 1972, L. Rutgers-Naaijkens, a mother from Eindhoven campaigning 
for safe school routes, together with other concerned parents, approached 
Vic Langenhoff, a journalist for De Tijd, who covered environmental issues 
and traffic safety.43 Personal experience motivated Langenhoff: his youngest 
daughter, six years old, had been killed in an accident in 1971; not much later, 
another of his children and her ten-year-old friends were hit by a car, this 
time “only” resulting in concussion.44 Langenhoff’s article received many 
40 “Fietsdemonstratie naar Hoofddorp,” Trouw, May 16, 1978, 12; “Fietsers willen paden,” De 
Telegraaf, May 18, 1978, 7.
41 NA 2.02.28 (Archief Tweede Kamer), inv. no. 6270, letter Dorpsraad Nieuw-Vennep to Vaste 
Kamercommissie voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, February 5, 1979.
42 Ibid.
43 NA 2.19.198 (Archief Stop de Kindermoord), inv. no. 33; Huib Goudriaan, “Een kind blijft 
ook in het verkeer een kind,” Trouw, October 21, 1972, 21.
44 Vic Langenhoff, “Pressiegroep Stop de kindermoord” De Tijd, September 20, 1972, 9; Joop 
van Schie, “Stop kindermoord op de wegen,” De Volkskrant, October 11, 1972, 11.
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reactions: parents were now so afraid when their children came home 
late from school, that he compared it to a “war psychosis.”45 Mothers were 
particularly active in this protest group.
The group’s strong language was deliberate: they spoke consistently of child 
murder.46 It was not implying that car drivers killed children intentionally. 
Rather, it believed the government was not doing enough to address the high 
annual fatalities. In this sense, traffic casualties were “premeditated” (met 
voorbedachte rade).47 The government, in its apparent acceptance of this sacri-
fice, was guilty of murder. Founding mother Rutgers-Naaijkens told Langenhoff 
in 1972 that for children, the Netherlands was one of the least safe countries 
in Europe: “In 1970, 8,614 children up to fifteen years old were injured, 3,772 
of them pedestrians, 2,709 cyclists. Society accepts this as a kind of natural 
disaster – what is worse: we don’t put up with natural disasters but come up 
with a Delta plan [the nation’s mega-project against flooding] for them.”48 
Rutgers-Naaijkens addressed this apathic government response locally by 
organizing teams of parents to safeguard crossings. She also tried to lobby local 
government – not always easy because they did not take her seriously: if she 
requested official data, local officials “wanted to subject her to a kind of exam 
to test her knowledge of traffic issues,” Rutgers-Naaijkens told Langenhoff.49 
Activists accepted this challenge and became experts in their own right.
Representing the broad critique against technocratic governance, Stop 
the Child Murder distanced itself from the well-embedded Traff ic Safety 
interest group (Veilig Verkeer Nederland, VVN), similar to how the Cyclists’ 
Union would later square up against the well-established tourist organization 
ANWB. Like the ANWB, the highly institutionalized VVN collaborated closely 
with – and was even accused of being “coopted by” – the government. With 
an annual government subsidy of 4 million guilders, it could employ a staff of 
eighty-five.50 Stop de Kindermoord accused the safety group of only treating 
the symptoms, not the root cause: the car had been given so much space. 
Consequently, the number and speed of cars were in direct contact with 
45 Van Schie, “Stop kindermoord op de wegen.”
46 German citizens also wrote about the car in terms of violence and death: Jens Ivo Engels, 
Naturpolitik in der Bundesrepublik: Ideenwelt und politische Verhaltensstile in Naturschutz und 
Umweltbewegung, 1950-1980 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), 385-86.
47 Ibid.
48 Vic Langenhoff, “Waarom laten wij kinderen bij honderden van de weg rijden?,” De Tijd, 
September 20, 1972, 9. The Delta Plan refers to the large engineering works constructed in the 
aftermath of the devastating 1953 f loods.
49 Ibid.
50 Henk Bakker and William Rothuizen, “‘Elke dode die er niet valt is er voor ons één’,” Haagse 
Post 59, no. 51 (1972): 6.
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cyclists and pedestrians.51 The group blamed the VVN for failing to address the 
danger drivers posed to children and instead focusing on introducing periodic 
vehicle inspections or seat belts. Stop the Child Murder labelled VVN “hostile 
to children.”52 Its activists believed the system needed to change radically.
The Stop the Child Murder organization played a crucial role in lobbying 
for traff ic calming and cycling infrastructure as the key means to improve 
traff ic safety for children. They expanded on the concept of traff ic-calming 
measures for residential areas that had been emerging in urban planning 
circles, the Woonerf, pioneered around 1960 by urban planner Niek de Boer 
in the town of Emmen. Cyclists and pedestrians needed completely car-free 
routes when leaving their neighborhood to go to school. In 1974, when the 
village of Nuland in Noord-Brabant planned a road construction without 
cycling paths, Stop protested that this was an “almost undreamed-of” plan 
when so many stakeholders were insisting on separate cycling paths. The re-
construction’s primary goal should be “the protection of the non-motorized, 
especially children; which of course can only be done by guaranteeing 
car-free cycling routes.”53 In October 1972, Stop the Child Murder wrote 
to Parliament’s Permanent Committee for Public Works, setting out its 
three-phase demands: f irst, immediate police protection at intersections for 
school children and free school buses for children who had no safe walking 
or cycling route to school; second, more separate cycling and pedestrian 
facilities, traff ic lights, and speed bumps at every intersection, plus a ban 
on mopeds faster than 25 km/h on cycling paths; third, each municipality 
should complete a network of pedestrian and cycling facilities, connected to 
those in nearby communities. The group also demanded that the government 
f inanced these from the highways budget.54 At a national level, Stop the 
Child Murder lobbied for coordination between various ministries to achieve 
a more eff icient and uniform cycling policy.55 This petition, as discussed 
in the next chapter, failed. By the late 1970s, the parent group collaborated 
with the newly established Cyclists’ Union (1975) and the older Pedestrian 
51 NA 2.19.198 (Archief Stop de Kindermoord), inv. no. 232, document Vic Langenhoff, “Stuk 
nr 1 voor rubriek lezers in VARA-gids dd 27 jan.”; inv. no. 236, document “‘Stop de Kindermoord’ 
mars naar Den Haag.”
52 NA 2.19.198, inv. no. 233, letter SdK to Council of Ministers, May 14, 1973. See also Paul 
Kouwenberg, “Veilig Verkeer Nederland houdt niet van kinderen,” De Volkskrant, May 12, 1973, 
27.
53 NA 2.19.198, inv. no. 233, letter SdK to city council Nuland, February 18, 1974.
54 NA 2.19.198, inv. no. 233, letter SdK to Permanent Committee for Public Works, October 11, 
1972.
55 NA 2.19.198, inv. no. 233, letter SdK to Minister of Public Works, January 13, 1974; letter SdK 
to Minister of Public Housing, January 13, 1974
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Association (1953) to promote lowering the maximum speed in built-up 
areas from 50 km/h to 25 or 30 km/h. Somewhat to their pleasant surprise, 
in 1983 the ministry of Public Works introduced legislation to that effect.56
Because of the widely shared perception that traff ic had become unac-
ceptably dangerous by the early 1970s, Stop found easy access to policymak-
ers. Here social anger aligned with activist work and government concern. 
Former chair Maartje van Putten, at the time a young Amsterdam mother 
and a founder of the organization, recalled that on their multiple visits to 
Parliament, the protesters were received by MPs (see f igure 25).57 On another 
occasion, the group organized a bicycle tour to Prime Minister Joop den 
Uyl’s home, presenting to him and his wife – they had seven children – a 
brochure protesting the dangers for children playing outside. Stop the Child 
Murder believed in and was adroit in generating media attention for its 
public actions.
56 Interview Steven Schepel, November 13, 2019. The cooperation operated under the heading 
“Comité 50 is teveel” (Committee 50 is too much): “Voetganger in actie,” Algemeen Dagblad, 
November 3, 1979; Han Van den Berg, “50 is teveel, vindt comité,” Het Vrije Volk, August 29, 1979.
57 NTR/NPO Radio 1, De Spaak, podcast audio, Stop de Kindermoord, August 1, 2019. https://
www.nporadio1.nl/podcasts/de-spaak [accessed September 2, 2019]; Interview Maartje van 
Putten with author, June 6, 2020; “Kind moet veilig kunnen leven,” Het Parool, January 20, 1973.
Figure 25 The dangerous situation for children playing in the street or cycling to school was a powerful 
motivation for civic activism. Protest group Stop the Child Murder delivers a painting to Public Works 
minister Tjerk Westerterp on February 6, 1974, illustrating that politicians were receptive to their 
demands. [Source: Nationaal Archief, Bert Verhoeff/Anefo, no. 926-9884]
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At the same time, the group recommended to other activists in its Manual 
for Participation and Action (1975) that they establish close contacts with local 
policymakers. With “strong, well-formulated arguments” one could influence 
politics, and “diverse contacts” with politicians could give early access to 
policy proposals.58 It believed personal relationships with politicians were 
beneficial and effective. Like young architects’ Dooievaar’s citizens guide 
(1974), Stop the Child Murder explained in this manual what happened when 
an action group addressed specif ic institutions – warning, for instance, 
that a letter to the mayor and aldermen would probably never reach the 
council members’ desks.59 While protesting on the street and building public 
support for traff ic safety, the groups also explored how to influence local 
politics early on – and were surprised how seriously policymakers took them. 
Some demands were quickly adopted. As Chapter 7 shows, in response to 
protests, several MPs championed the traff ic safety issue in the 1970s. The 
pressure that citizens and politicians put on engineers was considerable and 
successful. Because so many people, including children, rode a bicycle in the 
Netherlands, traff ic safety was a particularly pressing political problem.60 
By the mid-1970s, politicians and civil servants were receptive to their 
requests after a decade of Provo and Stop the Child Murder-led activism.
Another crucial but insuff iciently recognized influence on the Cyclists’ 
Union is the Dooievaar group. Concerned about established urban planning 
practices, four young architecture students, Hans van Beek, Leo Hamer, Jan 
Ledderhof, and Arij van der Stelt, founded Dooievaar in the city of The Hague 
in 1972.61 The group’s name was a play on words: contracting the Dutch words 
for “dead” and “stork” – the white stork is the symbol of The Hague.62 The 
58 Stop de Kindermoord, Handleiding voor Inspraak en Aktie (Amsterdam: Pressiegroep Stop 
de Kindermoord, 1975), 19.
59 Ibid., 21-22.
60 In contrast, protests against the car in UK cities like Birmingham targeted air pollution 
caused by congestion rather than safety. Indeed, a serious issue, but as the negative effects were 
less immediately visible and pressing, it was a less potent reason for activism. According to Simon 
Gunn, citizen activism against the car mattered, but equally factors like economic recession and 
rising oil prices led to a revaluation of the car’s place in British cities: Simon Gunn, “Ring Road: 
Birmingham and the Collapse of the Motor City Ideal in 1970s Britain,” The Historical Journal 61, 
no. 1 (2018): 227-48; Norton, “Street Rivals”; Norton, Fighting Traffic; Norton, “Four Paradigms.”
61 Around this time, young architecture students around the world began promoting a new 
mode of urban planning, inf luenced by Jane Jacobs and Jan Gehl among others. For instance 
in Munich: Karl Klühspies, München nicht wie geplant: Stadtpolitik, Bürgerwille und die Macht 
der Medien (München: Münchner Forum, 2015).
62 On a symbolic march, the group carried a stuffed stork as if they were about to bury it 
(Interview Hans van Beek and Leo Hamer, The Hague, February 5, 2019). On the cycling history 
of The Hague, see Berkers, Botma, and Oldenziel, Cycling Cities: The Hague Experience.
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students liaised with Eisse Kalk, an advocate for democratization in politics 
from the action group Werkgroep 2000, who had studied social geography 
and political science.63 A group of like-minded thinkers from progressive 
Christian circles founded this group in 1965 in order to increase citizen 
participation in (local) politics.
The emphasis on grass-roots politics fits in a larger international context of 
technocracy critique and participatory democracy, as we see with the Students 
for a Democratic Society in the US and the wider ’68 movement worldwide. 
Werkgroep 2000 and Dooievaar, echoing this critique of technocratic rule, 
believed that behind-the-scenes expertise and the executive’s discretionary 
power made it impossible for legislators to exercise true democratic control. 
To counter this tendency, Kalk asserted in 1971, “action groups have taken 
over parliament’s monitoring task.”64 Local off icials prepared plans in a 
non-transparent way, only allowing participation once most decisions were 
done and dusted – only details could be tweaked.65 In 1973, the municipality 
of Rijnmond paid Kalk’s organization to supervise citizen participation in 
devising its regional plan (streekplan). Earlier, Werkgroep 2000 had worked 
in Helmond. Kalk appreciated these local policymakers’ efforts to involve 
citizens but disagreed about the procedure – citizens should not just be able 
to comment on already developed plans, but should be included earlier on 
in the process for an open discussion about a plan’s underlying assumptions 
and objectives. These implicit aspects, often couched in technical terms, 
hid fundamental views about society, planning, and mobility, he believed. 
In short, Kalk wanted to politicize local politics, ensure the trade-offs and 
priorities were visible for everyone, and utilize citizens’ knowledge about 
their everyday living environment in plans to improve that environment.66
Dooievaar applied these grass-root political ideas to design and planning. 
As staunch defenders of citizen participation, Dooievaar demanded an 
end to what they considered “authoritarian plan making” in The Hague.67 
According to the four students, architects and planners should be more 
63 The 4 students thesis project – the social responsibility of architects and planners – was 
inspired by Kalk.
64 H. Smits, “‘Inspraak’: nog minder dan meedenken,” NRC Handelsblad, June 12, 1971, 7. See 
also E. Kalk, “Verkeerd verkeer en ruimtelijke wanorde,” in Milieu-aktie in Nederland, eds. E. 
Tellegen and J. Willems (Amsterdam: De Trommel/Vereniging Milieudefensie, 1978).
65 “Burger wordt dupe van groeibeleid,” Trouw, November 27, 1972, T12; N.H.J. de Bruijn, “Wie 
mee wil praten moet het nu vertellen,” NRC Handelsblad, February 5, 1973, 8.
66 Paul Kouwenberg, “Inspraak-begeleider Eisse Kalk: Democratie verbeteren kost tijd,” 
Volkskrant, March 8, 1975, 19.
67 Werkgroep Dooievaar, “Weg f iets? Nee f ietswegen!,” Tijdschrift voor Verkeerstechniek 24, 
no. 11 (1973): 552-53.
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politically and socially engaged, instead of blindly executing the planning 
and mobility vision of a small group of policymakers. The engineering ethos 
should be “a process of planning preparation with as much user/resident 
influence as possible.”68 Current Dutch transport planning was, in short, 
“one-sidedly technical.”69 Citizens had to be involved.
Echoing the critique of American urban planner Jane Jacobs, the activists 
claimed that car-centered planning made cities unlivable and cycling an unat-
tractive option and feared that The Hague would become an American-style 
car city.70 City officials devised policies without consulting citizens, resulting 
in car-dominant planning at the expense of space for walking, cycling, and 
parks, and presented such options as only technical and politically neutral. 
They were not. Dooievaar criticized The Hague’s city planners for presenting 
improved cycling routes as technically impossible and obscuring the fact that 
the car was an ideological choice.71 Everywhere one looked in the city, cars had 
priority and the shortest route. Cyclists had to cope with many detours, barriers, 
and long waiting times, not to mention the danger of cycling in a car city.72
Dooievaar urged the city government to ensure citizen participation earlier 
on in the decision-making process. Because many citizens were cyclists, whose 
voices went unheard, the activists expected this process would generate a more 
cycling-friendly city, and by example encourage local Cyclists’ Union activists. 
Dooievaar activists generated attention for the cyclists’ ideals, and having 
established a public platform, set about devising alternative traffic plans.
As a f irst step they grabbed the attention of the politicians and the 
media. In June 1973, 1,500 protesters attended a Dooievaar demonstration.73 
The attendees included MP and former Minister of Public Works Willem 
Drees Jr., as well as The Hague city councilor Nuy and many council mem-
bers.74 Excellent contacts with journalists helped the activists to publicize 
68 GADH, Archive Dooievaar (0772-01), inv. no. 3, letter E. Kalk to F.J. Smits, July 20, 1972. Kalk (of 
Werkgroep 2000) explained to Smits, director of the Rotterdam Architecture School, why the students’ 
unorthodox project was relevant for the profession. Kalk and Werkgroep 2000 were increasingly 
involved in local policymaking experiments and formed an early partnership with Dooievaar.
69 Werkgroep 2000 in association with Werkgroep Dooievaar, “Fietser… kop op!,” Katernen 
2000 1974, no. 9-10 (1974): 1-29, here 6.
70 Interview Author with Hans van Beek and Leo Hamer, February 5, 2019; Furness, One Less 
Car, 53. Jacobs preferred the term vitality. See H. Kaal, “A Conceptual History of Livability: Dutch 
Scientists, Politicians, Policy Makers and Citizens and the Quest for a Livable City,” City 15, no. 5 
(2011): 532-47, here 537.
71 Werkgroep 2000 in association with Werkgroep Dooievaar, “Weg f iets? Nee f ietswegen!”
72 “Dooievaar wil Hagenaar weer laten f ietsen,” De Volkskrant, February 24, 1973, 39.
73 “Protest tegen slechte klimaat voor f ietsers,” NRC Handelsblad, June 12, 1973, 10.
74 Ibid.
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their ideas.75 The group’s exhibits and events informed the general public 
about the harmful effects of government plans. They worked together 
with a progressive group of Leiden University environmental biologists to 
(successfully) block the road construction between Leiden and The Hague. 
Here they practiced their democratization ideal by informing contracted 
road workers that some of their own homes would be demolished for the 
building project.76 Dooievaar knew how to build public support for its ideas.
Once the Dooievaar activists had built support for their goals and 
established contact with the city government, they preferred pragmatic 
and expertise-based methods. A shining example is how they designed 
a cycling plan for The Hague. In 1972, the students had criticized the city 
planners’ “Exploratory Memorandum for Slow Traff ic” for containing too 
few robust measures for cyclists, and being narrowly inspired by traff ic 
safety concerns that “in fact emphasize cycling’s subordinated position.”77 
Even if they made cycling safer – something they seriously questioned – the 
proposed measures would also make it less attractive, despite the fact that 
promoting cycling was in the best interest of cities’ living environment.78 
When The Hague authorities deemed a cycling route network technically 
impossible, the activists said the assessment was inaccurate; all that was 
required was to upend their car-centric priorities.79 Ambitious cycling 
plans could be drawn up and implemented if policymakers chose to do so.
To prove an alternative was feasible, the activists devised a step-by-step plan, 
published in the form of a manual (see figure 26).80 This plan demonstrated 
how to draw up an ideal cycling route network with the input of ordinary 
cyclists. In 1974, Dooievaar applied this to The Hague, before publishing the 
75 GADH Archive Dooievaar (0772-01), inv. no. 4 contains many articles on Dooievaar by 
journalist Jek Kleijn. Similarly, journalist Lisette Lewin gave the Amsterdam action group 
De Lastige Amsterdammer multiple long interviews in Algemeen Handelsblad and later NRC 
Handelsblad: Lewin, “Lastige Amsterdammer Henk Bakker,”; Lisette Lewin, “Fielt,” NRC Han-
delsblad, November 11, 1972; Lisette Lewin, “Henk Bakker: metro is Lammers’ struikelblok,” 
NRC Handelsblad, November 20, 1972; Lisette Lewin, “Amsterdammer is weer lastig: metro geen 
comfort,” NRC Handelsblad, January 26, 1973.
76 Ibid. On the Leiden protest: H. Udo de Haes and W. ter Keurs, “De Leidse Baan,” in Milieu-aktie 
in Nederland, eds. E. Tellegen and J. Willems (Amsterdam: De Trommel/Vereniging Milieudefensie, 
1978).
77 GADH Archive Dooievaar (0772-01), inv. no. 5, ‘Samenvatting studie 1970-1972’, 20.
78 GADH Archive Dooievaar (0772-01), inv. no. 5, letter Dooievaar to The Hague city council, 
November 1, 1972.
79 GADH Archive Dooievaar (0772-01), inv. no. 5, attachment to letter Dooievaar to The Hague 
city council, November 1, 1972.
80 In 1975, Stop de Kindermoord also published a brochure with tips and best practices for 
activists: Stop de Kindermoord, Handleiding voor Inspraak en Aktie.
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guide in Werkgroep 2000’s magazine Katernen 2000.81 They recommended that 
activists first indicate on the map the main work, recreation, and living areas, 
and secondly determine which main cycling routes were required between 
these functions. The third step was to map those main routes onto actual 
streets, creating a network on paper. Next, an article in the local newspapers 
would elicit feedback from cyclists. In The Hague, their tactic was very success-
ful: the activists’ plan garnered many responses from “ordinary [doodgewone] 
cyclists who turn out to be knowledgeable about this because they cycle 
themselves.”82 With this user input, the fifth step was to create a f inal plan, 
81 Werkgroep 2000 in association with Werkgroep Dooievaar, “Fietser… kop op!” A digitized 
version can be accessed at https://f ietsstadamsterdam.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/1974FI1.




date%20desc [accessed September 4, 2019]
82 “Het probleem van de f iets: het opbergen,” De Tijd, February 24, 1973.
Figure 26 Making alternative plans, based on input and expertise from everyday cyclists, was an 
important action strategy for activist group Dooievaar and the Cyclists’ Union. Dooievaar founding 
members (left to right): young architects and urban planners Leo Hamer, Hans van Beek, Ary van 
der Stelt and Johan Ledderhof, working on a cycling path plan for the city of The Hague [Source: 
Photographer: Stokvis, Gemeentearchief Den Haag, no. 1.53120]
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including technical drawings of the ideal cycling path. This report then served 
to enter into dialogue with local policymakers. Dooievaar included a detailed 
breakdown of city bureaucracy and politics’ inner workings. Activists were 
often young, not well-connected, and inexperienced in politics.
Though the young architects were not experienced politically, they soon 
caught up. In contrast with the experienced and well-connected f igures 
in the ANWB or the cycling path organizations, who knew how to make a 
case for state funding, the Dooievaar activists had to learn this “game” from 
scratch. Inviting local policymakers for an “informal conversation” was 
encouraged, although Dooievaar also warned activists should not be naive 
in dealing with politicians, who knew how to apply “delaying tactics.”83 This 
gave other activists valuable pointers on how to engage the local citizenry 
and politicians in a conversation about better cycling facilities. The f inal 
result – cooperation between educated traff ic planners like the Dooievaar 
activists and cyclists – had to be a cycling route plan based on the knowledge 
of both users and experts.84 City off icials transformed Dooievaar’s plan 
into technical drawings that a council committee reviewed positively.85 If 
the plan was not implemented immediately, Dooievaar accused the city of 
delaying tactics.86 Nevertheless, in 1975 the council selected two city-center 
streets for experiments with traff ic calming and cycling lanes, showing 
Dooievaar’s good relations with the city.87 Its ideas were taken seriously, 
for instance after the council’s majority supported Dooievaar’s alternative 
plans for a new tramline bridge. One dissenting councilor nevertheless 
praised the activists for producing “playful insights” as alternatives.88 In 
short, enough overlap existed between Dooievaar’s goals and ideas and a 
section of urban politicians for them to remain in conversation.
The level of activists’ collaboration with authorities – seen as selling out 
by the cause – continues to be an issue in the historiography. In their book 
on Amsterdam’s cycling history, Feddes and De Lange recently characterized 
Dooievaar’s activism as “depoliticization,” an expertise-based approach 
suggesting concrete improvements but eschewing open confrontation or 
83 Werkgroep 2000 in association with Werkgroep Dooievaar, “Fietser… kop op!” 27.
84 The emphasis was on cycling paths. As architects, The Hague’s activists were also very 
interested in cycling parking, both at home and at public venues (Interview Hans van Beek and 
Leo Hamer, The Hague, February 5, 2019); “Het probleem van de f iets: het opbergen,” 3.
85 GADH Archive Dooievaar (0772-01), inv. no. 10, letter Dooievaar to The Hague city council, 
November 23, 1975.
86 “Groene Eland en Dooievaar vormen reddend tandem,” De Posthoorn, January 10, 1974.
87 “Den Haag neemt proef met f ietsroute,” Trouw, June 17, 1975, 6.
88 “Dooievaar krijgt steun voor alternatief: PvdA vraagt raad uitstel ‘Koekamp’,” Trouw, April 17, 
1975, 6.
238 CYCLING PATHWAYS
a fundamental system critique.89 The discussion above suggests this is not 
quite correct. The emphasis on democratization and increased participation 
in planning procedures confronted an older way of doing politics. What is 
more, Dooievaar’s bone of contention was the depoliticization of local plan-
ning documents, where planners followed “facts” without considering their 
desirability or other potential policy goals. Dooievaar believed in a co-design 
process for city planning aimed at consensus through deliberation, with the 
city’s entire population explicitly discussing policy goals and trade-offs. Its 
tactic formed an influential blueprint for Cyclists’ Union activism.
6.2 User Expertise and Cycling Infrastructure: Cyclists’ Union 
Activism, 1975-1985
The activism of the early 1970s culminated in 1975 in the foundation of the 
Cyclists’ Union amid a politically favorable context. A number of smaller 
political parties had already tried to put democratization and the environ-
ment on the agenda in the late 1960s and early 1970s: the Pacif icist Socialist 
Party (PSP, 1957-1991), Democrats 66 (1966-), and Radical Political Party 
(PPR, 1968-1991).90 These young political parties also influenced the ideas 
of the best-established and largest social democrat party, the Labor Party 
(PvdA). From 1973 to 1977, the Den Uyl government was the most progressive 
coalition government to date. Its central promise was a fairer “distribution 
of income, knowledge and power.”91 Faced with the typical coalition politics 
of the Netherlands, and the worsening economic situation following the 
1973 Oil Crisis, this government could not implement its program remotely 
to the extent it had envisioned.92 Nevertheless, this was a ruling coalition 
receptive to the ideas of cycling activists. Promoting cycling f itted the Den 
Uyl promise to give more space to neglected and underserved groups like 
cyclists.
These cyclists were represented by one action group when, after a decade of 
grassroots politics, activists took the initiative to create the national cycling 
platform, the Cyclists’ Union (Fietsersbond) in 1975. Importantly, its original 
89 Feddes and De Lange, Fietsstad Amsterdam, 73.
90 The PSP and PPR merged with the Dutch Communist Party and Christian left EVP party 
into Groenlinks.
91 Remieg Aerts, Herman de Liagre Böhl, Piet de Rooy and Henk te Velde, Land van kleine 
gebaren: Een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland 1780-1990 (Nijmegen/Amsterdam: Uitgeverij 
SUN, 1999), 310.
92 Ibid., 309-12.
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name was intentionally oppositional. Initially founded as ENWB (Eerste Enige 
Echte Nederlandse Wielrijders Bond, “First Only Real Dutch Cyclists’ Union”), 
the activists deliberately adopted this acronym for its similarity with the 
existing tourist organization ANWB. The name not only pointed the finger at 
rival ANWB for neglecting its original role as cycling club, it was also designed 
to goad the ANWB into taking legal action, creating media exposure, and 
“because possible legal difficulties with the ANWB would enable the ENWB 
to clarify what it was all about.”93 In 1979, the name became ENFB in response 
to pressure from the ANWB before eventually settling on Fietsersbond, or 
Cyclists’ Union, the name I will use throughout. The 1970s Dutch cycling 
activism came from a new generation and a new cycling organization.94
Table 5  The initiators of the Cyclists’ Union [Fietsersbond]
Name Founding Year 
(approx.)
Scope Main action goal
Werkgroep 2000 1965 National democratization
vereniging milieudefensie 1971 National environment
Nivon 1960 National environment
Strohalm 1970 National environment
Stop de kindermoord 1973 National Traffic safety
rover 1971 National Public transport
Amsterdam Autovrij 1974 Local Traffic/urban planning
verkeerd verkeer Amsterdam 1973 Local Traffic/urban planning
verkeerd verkeer utrecht unknown Local Traffic/urban planning
dooievaar 1972 Local Traffic/urban planning
Werkgroep fiets den Haag 1974 Local Cycling
Werkgroep fiets Hilversum unknown Local Cycling
Werkgroep fiets Amersfoort unknown Local Cycling
Werkgroep fiets Leiden 1973 Local Cycling
Werkgroep fiets kampen unknown Local Cycling
eNWb utrecht unknown Local Cycling
eNWb Helmond unknown Local Cycling
fietsgroep rotterdam unknown Local Cycling
Source: IISG, Archive Cyclists’ union (ArCH01969), inv. no. 1. The founding date denotes the earliest 
year when there is evidence of activity
93 IISG, Archive Cyclists’ Union (ARCH01969), inv. no. 1, meeting minutes May 13, 1975, 3.
94 In Denmark, in contrast, the longstanding preeminent cycling organization DCF (Dansk 
Cyklist Forbund) reinvented itself internally: a new generation of (also) young board members 
were inf luential in shaping Danish cycling policy. See Emanuel, “Making a Bicycle City,” 512. 
This change took place in the mid-1970s. Denmark’s cycling activism took off in the second half 
of the 1970s, later than in the Netherlands.
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Many, predominantly local and some national action groups formed the 
Cyclists’ Union, as table 5 shows. Coordinated by urban planning student 
Jan Wittenberg and Werkgroep 2000, the platform aimed to increase citizen 
participation in policymaking. At the founding on October 18, 1975, in RASA, 
a music venue in Utrecht, former Public Works Minister Willem Drees Jr. (of 
the social democrat DS’70 party) stressed the importance of selective car 
use. Other speakers included Leiden biologist-activist Helias Udo de Haes, 
The Obstinate Amsterdammer (De Lastige Amsterdammer) activist Marten 
Bierman, and others from environmental and traffic protest movements. The 
program included cycling working groups sharing local activism experiences 
and ended with a cycling demonstration through Utrecht.95
The Cyclists’ Union members were young (in their twenties or thirties), urban, 
university-educated, and left-leaning politically. Despite the dominance of 
women in the foundational Stop the Child Murder, a 1978 membership survey 
showed 72 percent were men, and 70 percent were aged between sixteen and 
thirty.96 These members’ backgrounds confirm what political scientist Hanspeter 
Kriesi concluded about 1980s New Social Movements: their support was broad, 
but the active core was more radical and progressive middle class.97 Support 
for action groups like the Cyclists’ Union ENFB and Stop de Kindermoord was 
broad-based, while their active core members were young, educated, male and 
left-wing, even mockingly describing themselves as “a rather elitist club.”98
Sympathy for their action goals and support for traff ic safety and cycling 
was much more widespread. Especially outside the major cities, local Cyclists’ 
Union chapters were often staffed by a small volunteer group of older, 
less clearly left-wing men. To illustrate, f ifty-f ive-year-old businessman 
F.H. Markerink volunteered in 1975 to establish a Cyclists’ Union branch 
around Enschede. His only daughter had been killed in a car accident and, 
although he did not want the Cyclists’ Union to become “too political,” he 
also believed the traff ic safety group VVN’s lobby was too cautious and 
weak.99 Similarly, the driving f igure behind the Helmond branch of the 
95 Patricia Penrhyn Lowe, “Weg f iets? … Fietsweg. Oprichting van de Eerste, Enige, Echte 
Nederlandse Wielrijders Bond,” Jonas: tijdschrift voor sociale en kulturele bewustwording 6, no. 5 
(1975): 10-11.
96 Ien Deltrap, “Waar blijven de dames?,” De Vogelvrije Fietser 4, no. 2 (1979): 4.
97 Hanspeter Kriesi, “New Social Movements and the New Class in the Netherlands,” American 
Journal of Sociology 94, no. 5 (1989): 1078-1116, here 1102.
98 Dirk Dragtstra and Paulien Osse, “Het ENWB-bestuur doet een boekje open: ‘De f iets hoort 
juist in de stad!’,” De Vogelvrije Fietser 1, no. 5 (1976): 18.
99 NA 2.19.198 (Archief Stop de Kindermoord), inv. no. 241, letter F.H. Markerink to ENWB, 
October 8, 1975.
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Cyclists’ Union was sixty-two-year-old retired bus driver Janus Meulendijks, 
and a key f igure in Ermelo was f ifty-nine-year-old Hessel van Hoorn, a 
former PR employee at Shell.100 Cycling had its most prominent advocates 
among smaller left-wing political parties, but the more tacit support of a 
much broader political spectrum. These men, with time on their hands and 
active in local politics, defended the many ordinary cyclists’ interests as 
a non-partisan issue. As a result, the Cyclists’ Union could credibly claim 
to represent a large group of people. The Cyclists’ Union could justify that 
claim, thanks to its diverse groups, establishing numerous local branches, 
and a decade of cycling-related activism.
The new group had support, also organizationally, from other action 
groups. Organized environmental activism in the Netherlands predated the 
Cyclists’ Union foundation by a few years, for instance in the Environmental 
Defense Foundation (Vereniging Milieudefensie, 1971) and Nature and Envi-
ronment Foundation (Stichting Natuur en Milieu, 1972).101 Two members of 
the Environmental Defense Foundation, Jos van Gerven and Peter Kramer, 
joined the Cyclists’ Union finance committee, and Kramer even coordinated 
that side of the organization.102 Paul Tilanus and Maartje van Putten of Stop 
the Child Murder regularly attended Cyclists’ Union general meetings.103 
Van Putten was also on an advisory committee along with members from 
environmental action group Straw (Strohalm, Bert Kerkhof) and anti-car 
activists from Amsterdam Car-Free (Amsterdam Autovrij, Ello Paul).104 
These contacts were valuable but could also be problematic. In 1976, active 
member Dick Arendshorst left the Cyclists’ Union, unhappy with the direc-
tion Stop the Child Murder, Amsterdam Car-Free, and the Utrecht branch 
were pushing the organization. He implied that this wing was too principled 
and unwilling to compromise. According to Arendshorst, the Cyclists’ Union 
should be an organization where all or most cyclists could feel at home.105
Echoing Stop the Child Murder’s belief that the road was a public good 
and the government was liable, The Cyclists’ Union alleged the Dutch 
100 Dick Arendshorst, “Janus Meulendijks regelt het wel met de hoge heren,” De Vogelvrije Fietser 
1, no. 2 (1976): 8-9; Gert van Engelen, “Beschaafd, constructief en tóch lastig,” De Vogelvrije Fietser 
10, no. 2 (1984/85): 10-11. Both Meulendijks and Van Hoorn were well-known in local politics.
101 Cramer, De groene golf; Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie.
102 IISG, Archive Cyclists’ Union (ARCH01969), inv. no. 1, “Werkgroepen van de ENWB.”
103 IISG, Archive Cyclists’ Union, inv. no. 1, “Presentielijst ledenraad ENWB, 13 december, 
Utrecht, 1975”; ‘Presentielijst ledenraad E.N.W.B. dd. 1 mei 1976’.
104 IISG, Archive Cyclists’ Union, inv. no. 1, “Werkgroepen van de ENWB.”
105 IISG, Archive Cyclists’ Union, inv. no. 1, letter Dick Arendshorst to Jan Wittenberg, April 28, 
1976.
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government was negligent in protecting “weaker” road users against the 
hostile environment of car-centered cities. In 1978, the Cyclists’ Union 
def ined its role as “the catalyst for people who think traff ic and the living 
environment should be more geared to the weakest groups in society.”106 
Its members stood up for what they called the “traff ic paupers” [vervo-
ersarmen], stating “it is no accident that the weakest in society are also 
“captive cyclists” [gedwongen fietsers] and also the weakest in traff ic.”107 
School children, housewives, those who could not afford a car, or did not 
drive for other reasons, fell into the category of having to use a bicycle and 
needing protection. This was in line with Den Uyl’s motto of distributing 
social costs and benef its more equally. Some Dutch politicians agreed 
with this analysis. Labor socialist (PvdA) MP Jaap van der Doef saw that 
the same “immobility” and “modern pauperization” caused by a society 
that provided one-sided access for car drivers, excluded all social groups 
who could not (afford to) drive.108 The Dutch urban traff ic environment 
failed to protect this group.
Like Dooievaar and other activists, the Cyclists’ Union used protest to 
get its message across. In the early 1970s, activists in the US, the UK, and 
France also organized bicycle rides in protest against the car.109 In the 
build-up to the Cyclists’ Union’s off icial founding in 1975, Dutch cities held 
a series of mass demonstrations. Under the heading “Amsterdam Autovrij” 
(Amsterdam Car-Free), three protest rides in 1974 and more in the following 
years drew increasingly large crowds.110 Famously, in June 1977, during 
“Wereldf ietsdag” (World Bicycle Day), protesters in Amsterdam lay on the 
ground at Museumplein, portraying traff ic victims. Over time, this type of 
activism diminished but did not disappear entirely. In 1982, the Cyclists’ 
Union Amsterdam branch protested the proposed closure of a cycling 
path on a bridge. Since then, the public protest culture around the bicycle 
has declined in the Netherlands, in sharp contrast with countries like the 
US, where the protest movement Critical Mass emerged in 1992, using the 
same tactics.111
Once these protests convinced policymakers that the problem needed 
action, the dialogue between activists and government could begin. Next on 
106 IISG, Archive Cyclists’ Union, inv. no. 1, “Notitie de E.N.W.B. en de bierkaai,” April 5, 1978.
107 Ibid.
108 Smaal, Politieke strijd om de prijs van automobiliteit: de geschiedenis van een langlopend 
discours, 1895-2010, 245.
109 Furness, One Less Car, 60-63.
110 Feddes and De Lange, Fietsstad Amsterdam, 78-80.
111 On Critical Mass: Furness, One Less Car, 78-107.
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its agenda, the Cyclists’ Union sought to address the engineers’ knowledge 
gap regarding cycling because it found that data on cyclists and their travel 
behavior or preferences was much scarcer than the corresponding data about 
drivers. If they existed at all, government cycling reports gave no insight into 
(subjective) dimensions like safety, comfort, and route choice. Engineer Van 
Gurp, director of the National Traff ic Academy in Tilburg, drew attention 
to this gap at a 1977 congress on cycling and moped facilities. He noted the 
interest in cycling from the increasing stream of cycling memoranda (local) 
authorities were publishing, but also the lack of specific information. “A good 
picture of the most important cycling flows [ fietsstromen] and bottlenecks 
is usually missing.”112 In addition, “there is insuff icient understanding of 
the traff ic safety problems which cyclists experience and undergo.”113 This 
was precisely the knowledge gap the Cyclists’ Union had set out to address 
since its foundation two years earlier.
Adopting a philosophy reminiscent of Dooievaar’s, the Cyclists’ Union 
believed that the true cycling experts were the actual cyclists. By riding in 
the (urban) streets every day, cyclists developed qualitative, experiential 
knowledge about the entire cycling experience, ranging from the (subjective) 
safety of the route, to the quality of the road surface, to parking facilities 
at public buildings. A true pro-cycling policy should be based on this type 
of knowledge, not on quantitative traff ic counts and traff ic-flow studies. 
By virtue of its membership base of ordinary cyclists, the organization 
believed it could provide local policymakers with this type of knowledge and 
secure cycling’s rightful place in the governance network. In a guideline on 
bottlenecks, discussed later, the Cyclists’ Union emphasized the danger of 
a quantitative approach. It was impossible to state “objectively” how much 
motorized traff ic was acceptable on a road that cyclists also used. The dan-
gerous apparent objectivity that numbers provided could easily misconstrue 
everyday cyclists’ lived experience, the Cyclists’ Union warned: “Numbers 
cannot lie, but liars can play with numbers! Do not let yourself be tempted 
into a quantitative approach in your confrontation with the government. It 
is of much greater importance to make clear that when it comes to cycling, 
there is only one expert: the cyclists themselves.”114 Rather, as quoted at the 
start of this chapter, “the cyclist knows best which situations are dangerous, 
112 P.B. van Gurp, “De (brom)f ietser: zijn plaats in de plannen en planvorming,” in Congres 
fiets- en bromfietsvoorzieningen Tilburg 1977 (Den Haag: ANWB, 1978), 18.
113 Ibid.
114 IISG, Archive Cyclists’ Union, inv. no. 1, Christiaan la Poutré, “Inventarisatie knelpunten,” 
2. Emphasis in original.
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which short cuts are needed, which barriers should be removed … Where the 
government is doomed to fail given its technocratic approach, the Cyclists’ 
Union can be strong.”115 The Cyclists’ Union preferred participation and 
bottom-up user expertise to technocratic top-down planning.
The Cyclists’ Union was convinced that making cycling policy without 
talking to cyclists was doomed to fail. This was also why some Cyclists’ Union 
branches queried local councilors about their preferred mode of transport. 
It was highly problematic if urban policymakers did not ride a bike because 
“only actual cyclists know the problems of cycling through the city.”116 Apart 
from street demonstrations, the Cyclists’ Union also strongly believed in 
developing counter-expertise as a tool to deal with off icial planners and 
engineers.117 Armed with their own research and data, these activists were 
convinced it would be much harder for a reasonable government to reject 
them. At the time, the development of counter-expertise was a popular 
strategy among Dutch environmental action groups, believing their ability 
would help raise environmental awareness among citizens and create a 
stronger negotiating position with the state.118 While some action groups 
deplored and refused to do this, in the 1980s, environmental action groups 
increasingly cooperated with governmental stakeholders, for instance by 
“developing alternative scenarios for environmental policy.”119
Lay experts developing legitimacy as a governance partner by gaining 
credibility is, internationally speaking, not unique to the Dutch case.120 On 
the transnational circulation of French cycling activism, French political 
scientist Maxime Huré discusses action groups’ self-legitimization. He 
concludes that the role of user associations in local French politics was 
important, particularly in providing cycling expertise which municipal 
policymakers lacked.121 Huré focusses on how expertise from countries 
115 Ibid.
116 Archief Eemland, Archive ENWB Amersfoort (0242), inv. no. 3, letter Cyclists’ Union to 
Mayor and Alderman, January 18, 1976.
117 A journalist at the Cyclists’ Union 1977 annual meeting noted that a cabaret item was a 
welcome interruption to a program f illed with “the thieves’ slang [boeventaaltje] of off icials 
and planners” making him “dizzy with all the policy switches, extensive literature reviews, 
coordination, and stimulation.” J.W.E. Metselaar, “De vuist van de gemangelde f ietsers,” NRC 
Handelsblad, December 3, 1977, 5.
118 Cramer, De groene golf, 54.
119 Ibid., 99.
120 Steven Epstein, “The Construction of Lay Expertise: The Construction of Lay Expertise: AIDS 
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and Human Values 20, no. 4 (1995): 408-37, here 417-19.
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with high cycling levels like the Netherlands was adopted in local circum-
stances in Belgium or France.122 What distinguishes expertise as a form 
of action in the Dutch context, is its genuinely user-generated nature. 
Dutch organizations operated in a context where many citizens still used, 
or had to use, the bicycle. Consequently, the type of knowledge these 
organizations created was not so much technical, about how to construct 
cycling infrastructure, or how to manage cycling governance. As I have 
shown, Dutch policymakers had access to this type of knowledge: the 
construction of cycling infrastructure had continued without interruption 
from the 1920s, albeit with ebbs and f lows. The Cyclists’ Union switched 
its attention to user-based knowledge: about the routes everyday cyclists 
took, the obstacles they faced on their journey, and which bottlenecks were 
a priority. In other words, the fact that so many people in the Netherlands 
still cycled also meant that these cyclists possessed a large and untapped 
pool of experiential knowledge.
The expert role the Cyclists’ Union took up was inspired by the Dooievaar’s 
pioneering work on designing cycling path plans. A few months before the 
founding of the Cyclists’ Union, the advocates of participative processes, 
Eisse Kalk and the Dooievaar group, asserted that local cyclists should 
come together to design the main cycling routes through their cities.123 
Indeed in the second half of the 1970s, the Cyclists’ Union branches worked 
with many Dutch cities on a “bottleneck memorandum” (knelpuntennota), 
mapping in detail the greatest problems for urban cyclists. One example 
is the city of Amersfoort, near Utrecht. This branch of the Cyclists’ Union 
reported on its experience with the bottleneck memorandum in De Ketting 
(The Chain), an internal Cyclists’ Union publication for sharing news on 
local activism.124 The newly founded Amersfoort group announced its 
presence with a critique of the city’s traff ic policy in 1975, but because “it 
was not very elaborate, we never heard anything.”125 Council members 
demanded a cycling policy document from the city government. However, 
the Amersfoort branch objected to this “seen and written from behind a car 
window” memorandum.126 In other words, the cyclist’s perspective of traff ic 
problems was nowhere to be seen. To compile a better counterproposal, 
the activists handed out 3,000 questionnaires to cyclists in Amersfoort. 
122 Ibid., 131-68, esp. 58-59.
123 Elly van der Ster, “Hoe sterk is de eenzame f ietser,” De Volkskrant, March 29, 1975, 35.





The questionnaire was also printed in the free local paper and distributed 
at high schools.127 This resulted in 300 responses.
Cyclists were asked to describe points where they felt unsafe, where 
road surfacing was poor, where waiting times at junctions and traff ic lights 
were long, and similar daily annoyances, dangers, and risks. The group 
also managed to convince the city council to postpone debating its off icial 
memorandum to allow the activists time to f inish their input in the f inal 
policymaking phase. Applying the detailed survey input, the activists 
indicated on city maps which streets were unsafe and which crossings 
had to be redesigned to suit cyclists. They also devised an ideal cycling 
path network throughout the city. Their report in The Chain detailed how 
to compile, duplicate, and distribute the memoranda, including the costs.128 
The Amersfoort branch stressed two points: good contact with (some) council 
members was indispensable. Otherwise, the group would not have known 
what went on behind the scenes and could not have delayed decision-making 
to include their input. Secondly, earlier attempts at a general policy critique 
had failed. The more robust counterproposals had more effect. The detailed 
reports made it easier for policymakers to do something for cyclists, but it 
also put them on the spot. Point-blank refusing these concrete suggestions 
was harder than rejecting vague calls for system changes. Nevertheless, 
activists found the implementation of measures painfully slow, and so it 
was in this Amersfoort case.129 The f irst steps to address bottlenecks were 
easy, but seeing concrete results in the street took more time and effort.
The bottleneck memorandum became a popular and innovative tool 
for addressing everyday cyclists’ issues.130 When the Cyclists’ Union 
branches met in May 1976, many were in the process of compiling a 
memorandum: Amsterdam, Arnhem, Amersfoort, Delft, Enschede, 
Haarlem, ’s-Hertogenbosch, The Hague, Maastricht, Rotterdam, and 
Utrecht.131 Within two years, the method had become quite popular 
127 IISG, Archive Cyclists’ Union, inv. no. 1, Christiaan la Poutré, ‘Inventarisatie knelpunten’, 
5.
128 “Afdeling Amersfoort: ‘Bericht over het ontstaan van een f ietsrapport’.”
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De Vogelvrije Fietser 3, no. 4 (1978): 9.
130 Matthew Bruno, Henk-Jan Dekker, Letícia Lindenberg Lemos, “Mobility protests in the 
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and Societal Transitions (forthcoming).
131 IISG, Archive Cyclists’ Union, inv. no. 1, “Verslag ledenraad dd. 1 mei 1976 E.N.W.B. te Utrecht.” 
The Hague’s plan was based on 175 cyclists’ experiences (GADH, Archive Dooievaar (0772-01), 
inv. no. 10). The Amsterdam branch compiled a memorandum in 1977, opposing the city’s Traff ic 
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within the organization.132 Guidelines issued at the time ref lected on 
branches’ experiences and the aim of this action. The text included 
many proposals for cycling paths or facilities, but “lacked the data to 
elaborate these proposals, or provide evidence [hard maken].”133 Guidelines 
instructed the local Cyclists’ Union branch to list all local dangerous 
situations, barriers, and missing links “in order to indicate where and how 
the government has to provide facilities for cyclists.”134 The tactic worked 
in some municipalities: in the mid-1970s, the Helmond branch noted that 
its bottleneck survey was sent directly to the municipality “which usually 
acts.” It recommended this “simple but effective method” for Cyclists’ 
Union branches “which have good contact with the municipality.”135 
Elsewhere it produced less concrete results, leading a minority of activists 
to call for more street action, while others dismissed this as “sixties 
romanticism.”136 In the long run, the Cyclists’ Union consolidated and 
professionalized its expertise-based approach.
We can see this task that the Cyclists’ Union undertook voluntarily as 
a form of government outsourcing. In the Dutch political system, where 
consultation was a common feature, the action group took advantage of the 
opportunity to launch into local politics. By developing user expertise that 
the government did not have, the group tried to justify its role in cycling 
governance. In certain ways, this parallels the way the tourist organization 
ANWB leveraged its engineering expertise in the early twentieth century to 
gain a role. In the Dutch polder model, these groups succeeded in positioning 
themselves not just as the representatives of cyclists, but also as expert 
groups.
The Cyclists’ Union always felt that its key role in cycling governance was 
providing (local) authorities with the knowledge they needed to improve 
cycling policy. Evidence for this is the Cyclists’ Union’s request for national 
subsidies in 1979. Such an attempt, although unsuccessful, indicated the 
Cyclists’ Union argued that not only was this unrealistic, but also unnecessary, since many 
bottlenecks for cyclists could be solved with simple and cheap means. They also argued that 
cycling should be safe everywhere and not depend on the existence of separated cycling paths. 
The entire city’s infrastructure had to be rethought from the cyclists’ perspective, not the car’s; 
see Feddes and De Lange, Fietsstad Amsterdam, 91-94.
132 Paulien Osse, “De lange mars door de instituties,” De Vogelvrije Fietser 3, no. 5 (1978): 8-9.
133 IISG, Archive Cyclists’ Union, inv. no. 1, Christiaan la Poutré, ‘Inventarisatie knelpunten,’ 1.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid., 6.
136 Paulien Osse, “‘Beroepskrachten vind ik een gevaarlijk element’,” De Vogelvrije Fietser 6, 
no. 1 (1980): 4-5; Theo de Jong, “Knelpunten-nota’s grootste knelpunt,” De Vogelvrije Fietser 3, 
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Cyclists’ Union’s more conciliatory stance towards government and is not 
unique: most action groups were – and are – subsidized in the Netherlands.137 
For example, the young activist organization considered its six (part-time) 
staff in the national off ice inadequate for the job at hand: “the ENFB is not 
suff iciently able to fulf il a part of its aspirational goals.”138 The activities 
it listed included “systematically processing relevant literature,” “learning 
about activities and research of many organizations and institutions in the 
transport f ield,” “establishing our own research, encouraging research in 
other organizations, attracting interns, and formulating study assignments.”139 
The organization believed it needed to develop this expertise “for a mature 
functioning of our organization and for our role in the overall decision-
making.”140 Remarkably, given its initial opposition to an expert role, the 
Cyclists’ Union implied that this power – the ability to play a role in the Dutch 
decision-making process – depended on the knowledge activists could bring to 
the table. It believed the more playful happenings of the early 1970s, inspired 
by the anarchist Provos and the like, were no longer needed or effective. By 
shifting towards more expertise-based activism, producing reports, and 
discussing them with governmental actors behind closed doors, the Cyclists’ 
Union became more embedded in policy circles and soon started to resemble 
the ANWB. How then did these two organizations differ in the 1970s?
The Cyclists’ Union’s commitment to bottom-up democratic policymaking 
for cycling contrasted starkly with the ANWB’s technocratic approach. 
Moreover, the public increasingly considered the ANWB a car lobby group. 
In response, the organization claimed it merely defended everyone’s mobility 
interests, while leaving the choice of mobility mode to the individual. If 
most Dutch people chose the car, the ANWB would lobby for better roads 
and anti-congestion measures. This stance obscured how groups like the 
ANWB actively promoted automobility. Its focus on individual mobility 
also meant it left public transit to the state and to labor parties, while the 
organization conducted its lobbying activities behind the scenes. It led to 
critique in the 1970s that the organization was too car-minded and ignored 
137 R. Koopmans and J.W. Duyvendak, “Sociale bewegingen en het primaat van de politiek,” 
in Tussen verbeelding en macht: 25 jaar nieuwe sociale bewegingen in Nederland (Amsterdam: 
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ed. J.W. Duyvendak, et al. (Amsterdam: Sua, 1992), 65.
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cyclists’ interests. Letters to newspapers frequently complained that the 
ANWB failed to live up to its name.141 A long critical article in opinion 
magazine Vrij Nederland aptly summarized public sentiment.142 Journalists 
Hugo Arlman and Rudie van Meurs interviewed ANWB director Ijntema 
and press off icer Kroon in 1980, who expressed a non-interventionist small-
government ideology: if people wanted to drive, the ANWB would support 
that, even harmonize it with other interests.143 This harmonization was an 
illusion, since the organization was rife with internal contradictions. Trying 
to give drivers, cyclists, and pedestrians their due, both in utilitarian and 
recreational mobility, while also protecting the Dutch natural and cultural 
landscape, was a tall order. The Cyclists’ Union criticized the ANWB because 
its advocacy work for cycling was inspired by the goal to separate traff ic 
and make driving faster.144
The well-established tourist and traff ic organization ANWB might have 
agreed with those statements on paper, but the Cyclists’ Union leveled 
implicit critique at its rival’s more technocratic approach. As far as the 
Cyclists’ Union was concerned, the aim to improve the situation for cyclists 
should be achieved “not by preaching from above or providing even better 
experts.”145 Road users’ complaints should reach local policymakers as 
directly as possible. The Cyclists’ Union saw its role as helping organize those 
groups and making their voices heard to put cycling on the local political 
agenda. The Cyclists’ Union also criticized the ANWB by stating that a 
policy truly favoring cyclists should include restrictions on automobility. 
Many political parties were “willing to do something for the bicycle, without 
simultaneously curbing car traff ic.”146 In other words: “the double moral 
standard of choosing the bicycle and the car has to be broken.”147
In time, relations between the two organizations improved. Cyclists’ 
Union member Jos Vernooy claimed that by 1980, the ANWB had started 
paying more attention to cycling.148 ANWB chairman Frederik Hendrik van 
141 D. de Vries, “Over f ietsen gesproken,” De Kampioen 94, no. 12 (1979): 1158. Technically, the 
ANWB called itself the Royal Dutch Tourist Organization ANWB; the letters ANWB no longer 
stood for anything but were retained for the sake of recognizability.
142 In the same year, newspaper Het Parool published a similarly critical piece: Bommels, 
“ANWB, kampioen op snelwegen en zijpaden,” 25-26.
143 Arlman and Meurs, “’De adem van de ANWB’,” 4.
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der Linde van Sprankhuizen was willing to admit publicly that the “ENFB 
youngsters” had had “a useful effect” on the ANWB.149 The urban-based 
Cyclists’ Union was also widening its scope to include recreational cyclists 
– the ANWB’s traditional domain for activism. It embraced the idea that 
broadening its membership beyond the protesters would generate influ-
ence and visibility. After all, recreational cycling remained popular in the 
Netherlands.150 This also brought the organization in closer contact with the 
ANWB. The rapprochement resulted, for example, in their collaboration in 
the 1990s on mapping recreational cycling routes and designing road signage.
The ANWB also experienced internal tensions in trying to reconcile 
nature conservation with promoting driving. These were exposed in a late 
1960s proposal for a road through the scenic dunes between the coastal towns 
of Scheveningen and Zandvoort. Representing the ANWB roads and traff ic 
interest, August Boost claimed future traff ic demanded its construction. 
The organization’s director Anton Blankert and chairman Van der Linde van 
Sprankhuizen, however, opposed the road because it would damage nature 
and make the dunes less attractive for (cycling) recreation.151 Similarly, the 
ANWB supported protests against a highway between Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam right through the Green Heart area near Amelisweerd.152 It was 
never constructed.153 This critical stance did not represent opportunistic 
environmental activism. Nature conservation had been a core element 
of the tourist organization ANWB for decades. Within the organization, 
nature conservation interests continued to compete with the road lobby 
for dominance. The ANWB always sought to somehow reconcile its identity 
as traff ic organization with that as recreation organization.154 Promoting 
motorized mobility never had free rein within the ANWB, even though it 
dominated at times. Elsewhere, this tension between utility and aesthetics 
also played out in discussions about American parkways or how the Ger-
man Autobahn and Italian autostrade should be embedded in the national 
149 Ibid.
150 IISG, Archive Cyclists’ Union, inv. no. 22, Kruipolie 3 (1984): 15-17.
151 Linders-Rooijendijk, Gebaande wegen II, 853-55.
152 Amelisweerd is a forest near Utrecht that engineers planned to demolish to make way for a 
highway. Fierce protests ensued – environmental activists occupied the forest and managed to 
delay and eventually prevent any trees being cut down. See Odette van de Riet and Bert Toussaint, 
“Learning from a Contested Project in the Netherlands: The Clash over the Amelisweerd Forest, 
1957-1982,” Transfers 4, no. 1 (2014): 63-82. The Green Heart is a large agricultural area in the 
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landscape.155 The main discussion in the Netherlands did not center on 
how to embed a road into nature. The question was whether a road was 
necessary at all, especially if that nature could also be enjoyed by bicycle – a 
vehicle that the Dutch still widely owned and used, unlike in Germany and 
certainly the US, even in the 1960s.
In the critical weekly Vrij Nederland, many (anonymous) critical voices 
accused the ANWB of being a conservative, elitist, and power-hungry 
organization. Stop the Child Murder founder Langenhoff caustically char-
acterized the ANWB’s remaining involvement with the bicycle: “While 
children in their neighborhood and on the way to school were run over 
and killed, the ANWB still did something for the bicycle: they opened a 
touristic cycling path here and there in remote pine forests with the corny 
display of a Royal Commissioner on a bicycle like a circus bear. Meanwhile, 
it neglected the jungle of commuter traff ic in cities and villages.”156 In its 
defense, the ANWB stated it supported cycling in the background, not seen 
by the public. While the ANWB had once sent hundreds of letters each 
year to many different authorities in its defense of cycling, that stream had 
slowed down to a trickle by the 1970s.157
The ANWB had historically served – and continued to do so – as an expert 
organization for traff ic policy. Through a series of local government surveys, 
the ANWB attempted to gain an overview of current policymaking, critique 
it, and enable more coordinated traff ic policy. Tellingly, in the same year the 
Cyclists’ Union was established, it f irst surveyed the country’s local cycling 
policies.158 The exceedingly high response rate (81 percent) demonstrates that, 
despite the critique, municipalities still considered the ANWB a relevant 
player in the mobility governance network. Each municipality was asked 
about its cycling infrastructure type (separate or mixed), crossings designs, 
parking possibilities, a cycling path plan, and an overarching vision for 
cycling network. Larger cities often reported on a cycling plan incorporated 
in their Traff ic Circulation Plan (VCP), smaller ones did not.159 The ANWB 
155 Zeller and Mauch: Driving Germany; Mauch and Zeller, The World beyond the Windshield.
156 Arlman and Meurs, “’De adem van de ANWB’,” 20.
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en bromfietsers,” Verkeerskunde 26, no. 6 (1975): 286-95.
159 Arnhem planned a 275 km cycling path network as part of its VCP. See “Arnhems plan voor 
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urged the smaller communities to create a plan for identifying missing 
links in the cycling network and creating a coordinated cycling policy.160 
The ANWB also published papers from a 1977 congress discussing the 
governance process around demonstration cycling routes in The Hague and 
Tilburg and learning best practices.161 A wide array of local engineers and 
planners attended this congress.162 Traff ic Engineering (Verkeerskunde), 
the main Dutch traff ic engineering journal run by the ANWB, regularly 
featured articles on cycling. The rising appreciation of cycling, boosted by 
the Cyclists’ Union, pressured the ANWB to revisit its cycling roots.
By the late 1980s, as cities focused on plans to boost cycling levels, the 
ANWB agreed that the “city centers are choked by car traff ic and would 
absolutely benef it from more bicycle traff ic.”163 The ANWB remained 
committed to a national network of separated cycling paths, a policy 
it had proposed half a century earlier. It believed in traff ic separation 
models: Dutch cyclists should have access to a nation-wide network of 
cycling paths separated from roads as much as possible. Otherwise, it 
recommended on-road paths, including on quiet streets.164 The ANWB 
claimed to follow the wishes of its members, most of whom were car 
drivers, reinforcing the ANWB’s public image as a car organization.165 
Nationally, its behind-the-scenes activities did not make for a promising 
candidate to build better cycling cities. Absent locally, it concentrated 
on promoting uniform and national engineering norms and rules. And 
while the organization did sustain a system of local consuls catering to 
suburban and rural cycling, it had less footing in urban areas where the 
Cyclists’ Union was strong. Re-appropriating urban space for cyclists in 
a bottom-up process of activism and user expertise was not the ANWB’s 
modus operandi.
160 “Voorzieningen voor f ietsers en bromfietsers,” 295.
161 These demonstration projects were “reviewed’ in detail, including extensive photographs, 
in Verkeerskunde. The ANWB did more to spread knowledge about these important experiments 
than the (national) government, which largely funded the projects. See F. Stoovelaar and W. van 
Tilburg, “De f ietsroute Den Haag (1) – verkeerstechnische aspecten,” Verkeerskunde 30, no. 11 
(1979): 544-48; F. Stoovelaar and W. van Tilburg, “De f ietsroute Den Haag (2) – verkeerstechnische 
aspecten,” Verkeerskunde 30, no. 12 (1979): 597-601; W. van Tilburg and F. Stoovelaar, “De f ietsroute 
Tilburg: verkeerstechnische aspecten,” Verkeerskunde 28, no. 4 (1977): 163-69.
162 Koninklijke Nederlandsche Toeristenbond ANWB, Congres fiets- en bromfietsvoorzieningen 
Tilburg 1977 (Den Haag: Koninklijke Nederlandsche Toeristenbond ANWB, 1978).
163 Niek Schenk, “De f iets als redding,” Algemeen Dagblad, April 15, 1989.
164 “Fietser in de berm van het verkeersbeleid. Fietsen is een volwassen verkeersvorm,” De 
Kampioen 89, no. 4 (1974): 246-48, here 248.
165 Bommels, “ANWB, kampioen op snelwegen en zijpaden,” 26.
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The local and urban approach made the Cyclists’ Union successful. Though 
its core of activists was relatively small, they acted as intermediaries between 
cyclists and the (local and often urban) authorities – a role the ANWB no 
longer fulf illed. Their quick and successful integration in governmental 
circles resembled the relationship between the early ANWB and government. 
After a decade of activism, the Cyclists’ Union cycling governance became 
more participatory and collaborative. Now, cyclists could convey their 
concerns and complaints to local policymakers.
The Cyclists’ Union’s role as a non-state actor in the governance network 
around cycling was both old and new. Compared to the ANWB, the Cyclists’ 
Union gave ordinary and urban cyclists a clear voice, despite a similar 
expertise-centered approach to the political process. Historian Popkema 
has aptly said of the ANWB that it functioned as a “free consultancy 
agency” for state agencies rather than an antagonistic action group.166 
Since the 1980s, the Cyclists’ Union has functioned in a very similar way. 
There are also marked differences. While the ANWB in the f irst half of 
the twentieth century and the Cyclists’ Union since the 1970s mediated 
between users and the government, the Union did so based on direct input 
from cyclists through surveys and local meetings. Much more so than 
the well-staffed and nationally funded ANWB, the Cyclists’ Union, as a 
federation of local branches, remained an action group with a strong local 
basis, but was less effective nationally as lobby organization compared 
to the ANWB.
6.3 Working with the Government: Activists and Cycling 
Governance
In the late 1970s, local Cyclists’ Union activists sought contact with policy-
makers in many cities and towns. This often led to a working relationship, 
but certainly not everywhere. How do we explain how the Union developed 
such good contacts with local policymakers in many cities and towns in 
such an extraordinarily short period, considering it had started out as 
oppositional organization?
Both the circumstances of the time and the wider Dutch political culture 
made this possible – and both need a more in-depth discussion. First, the 
Dutch political circumstances of the 1970s were favorable for cycling activism. 
It gathered momentum under the national government coalition of Labor 
166 Popkema, “Tussen techniek en planning,” 79.
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leader Den Uyl. The electoral shift to the left helped translate many of the 
activists’ demands nationally and offered ample opportunities locally. The 
political opportunity structure was much better than ever before or would 
be in the later 1980s.167 Government stakeholders and activists considered 
a cooperative rather than an antagonistic strategy was more beneficial to 
both parties. Still, the Dutch political tradition was very favorable to action 
groups from the start. According to political scientists Koopmans and 
Duyvendak, in the Netherlands, “almost independently of political color, 
movement organizations are often and strongly professionalized due to the 
relatively strongly developed subsidy and consultation culture.”168 Both the 
larger political culture as well as the specif ic circumstances of the 1970s 
gave cycling activists a chance to succeed.
Early on, Dutch (urban) policymakers wanted to cooperate with activists 
for various reasons: these groups’ expertise, and the way they communicated 
citizens’ demands and preferences, were valuable input to policymakers. Ac-
tion groups could credibly claim to represent a large share of Dutch society; 
consequently, policymakers felt unable to ignore many of their demands. 
Urban planners also faced the impact of the car on public space and urban 
livability. Cities like Delft and Groningen were already experimenting with 
ways to curb this effect. Those planners, in other words, did not need much 
convincing by cycling activists.
Local governments found cooperation with action groups useful because 
city off icials were not trained in dealing with urban mobility conflicts 
facing cyclists and pedestrians. City engineers and traff ic experts claimed 
to be open to activists’ suggestions if they were helpful – that is to say, 
solid and specif ic enough. They were interested in citizen input. Accord-
ing to G.H.A. Hoogenboom, an engineer at Amsterdam’s Traff ic Off ice 
(Verkeersbureau), in 1968 many citizens wrote to suggest improving traff ic 
conditions, sometimes even submitting comprehensive plans for the entire 
city.169 Because reviewing and replying to them was time-consuming, he 
preferred to “receive suggestions with regard to concrete facts, concrete 
situations in the city, where something is wrong from the standpoint of 
traff ic engineering.”170 Again in 1972, the Amsterdam traff ic engineer called 
167 Hanspeter Kriesi, “The Political Opportunity Structure of the Dutch Peace Movement,” 
West European Politics 12, no. 3 (1989): 295-312, here 298.
168 Koopmans and Duyvendak, “Sociale bewegingen en het primaat van de politiek,” 30.
169 Hoogenboom went on to become a high off icial in the Ministry of Public Works, bringing 
his experience as a city planner into national engineering circles.
170 “Directeur Amsterdams verkeerbureau: Geen doorbraken in binnenstad,” Algemeen 
Handelsblad, April 25, 1968, 2.
CITIzeN exPerTISe: urbAN AC TIvISm SHAPeS LoCAL CYCLING PoLICY IN THe 1970S 255
for detailed information: “It is important for action groups not to aim their 
actions at city-wide issues, but at issues they have to deal with in their 
street.”171 Hoogenboom believed activism was important. He also warned 
activists should be both patient and persistent if they wanted to get anywhere 
with the government. By and large, engineers believed that it was impossible 
“to turn back the clock” by introducing car-limiting measures.172 His article 
in De Tijd (the newspaper promoting Stop the Child Murder) advised activists 
to develop expertise and do as much groundwork as possible for cycling 
path construction: by talking to property owners, activists could prepare 
time-consuming expropriation procedures and design alternative routes 
for cycling paths. “If you take up a part of the preparatory work and remove 
obstacles, you can accelerate the preparation.”173 In other words, he actively 
encouraged the “outsourcing” of the government’s cycling policies to citizens 
and activists. And the Cyclists’ Union developed in this direction to such 
an extent that in 1985 new chairman Jaap Rijnsburger pushed back on the 
sometimes-heard claim that activists functioned as “unpaid civil servants.” 
He repeated the idea that the Cyclists’ Union had as much expertise as 
municipal engineers, but also that some form of external pressure was often 
needed to make their ideas a reality.174
Local policymakers felt compelled by citizen pressure, admitting that 
urgent calls for better cycling facilities and safer traff ic led them to action. 
The Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) concluded in an illuminating 
study on traff ic safety policy in the late 1970s that many local authorities 
were f inding it hard to cope with mounting citizen pressure. Citizens were 
becoming more assertive when it came to traff ic safety. Eindhoven reported 
that many citizens insisted the city create speed bumps in their neighbor-
hoods. The city was “extremely hesitant” to do so but “the pressure from 
local society – one street constructed speed bumps without authorization 
– has contributed to a reassessment” and the city complied with citizens’ 
demands.175 Jan de Ruiter, council member for a confessional party in the 
well-to-do town of Heemstede, noted in 1972 that it was “no surprise that 
precisely the topic of traff ic had established such an interesting dialogue 
with sections of the population.” Because it affected everyone directly, the 
171 “Zo wil Amsterdam zijn verkeersknooppunten doorhakken,” Het Parool, February 23, 1974, 3.
172 G.H.A. Hoogenboom, “Actie is zinvol maar vereist veel geduld,” De Tijd, October 24, 1972, 3.
173 Ibid.
174 Henk Dikker Hupkes, “ENFB heeft inhoudelijk net zoveel in te brengen als ambtenaren,” 
De Vogelvrije Fietser 10, no. 2 (1984/85): 8.
175 NA 2.19.185 (Archive VNG), inv. no. 2428, Concept-eindrapport Gemeentelijk Verkeersvei-
ligheidsbeleid: Een inventariserende case-study van tien gemeenten, 11.
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traff ic issue generated a lot of interest among citizens. For this council 
member it was “of paramount importance” to listen to local action groups 
like The Troublesome Cyclist (De Lastige Fietser).176 The head of the ANWB’s 
traff ic department De Regt also thought that democratization had led to a 
greater focus on cycling. He believed the growing interest in cycling “has 
been stimulated by the greater attention to the opinions that road users 
themselves express through public surveys … Democratization has had a 
clearly positive impact here.”177 According to Albert de la Bruhèze, in the 
old textile town Enschede, citizens’ vocal demands in the media created 
pressure that was impossible for policymakers to ignore.178
Dutch urban planners too felt ambivalent about the car already in the 
1960s. According to historian Tim Verlaan, “the shift from car-centered 
to traff ic-calming policies was already well underway when urban social 
movements came to the fore.”179 The 1963 publication of Colin Buchanan’s 
report Traffic in Towns, addressing the deteriorating quality of life in British 
cities due to automobility, generated concern in the Netherlands as well.180 In 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, prominent Dutch experts like traff ic engineer 
Hendrik Goudappel, transport economist Geurt Hupkes, and urban planner 
Niek de Boer advocated the pedestrianization of urban areas by banning the 
car from city centers.181 Livability as a concept became popular: the threat 
of unrestricted economic growth to living conditions led policymakers to 
commission numerous reports on the topic.182 The input from the Cyclists’ 
Union in Amersfoort was due to dissatisfaction with the city’s cycling 
memorandum. This might not have been a good memorandum – written 
by car-driving off icials with little understanding of cyclists’ needs – but 
a plan existed. At a minimum, it implied that off icials, too, had begun to 
take cycling a bit more seriously.
176 Krantenviewer NHA, Raadsnotulen Heemstede, December 14, 1972, 390. https://nha.
courant.nu/issue/RNH/1972-12-14/edition/Notulen/page/19?query=%22lastige%20f ietser% 
22&sort=relevance
177 “Verkeerstechnische leergangen 1976: Samenvattingen lezingen,” Verkeerskunde 26, no. 12 
(1975): 614-15. Italics in original.
178 Albert de la Bruhèze, “Enschede: An Experiment in Cycling,” 46-47.
179 Verlaan, “Mobilization of the Masses,” 9.
180 Colin Buchanan, Traffic in Towns: A Study of the Long Term Problems of Traffic in Urban 
Areas (London: HM Stationery Off ice, 1963).
181 Mom and Filarski, De mobiliteitsexplosie, 347-48. On Traffic in Towns, see Marco Bianconi and 
Mark Tewdwr-Jones, “The Form and Organisation of Urban Areas: Colin Buchanan and Traff ic 
in Towns 50 Years On,” Town Planning Review 84, no. 3 (2013): 313-36; Gunn Simon, Introduction 
to Traffic in Towns (2015).
182 Kaal, “A conceptual history of livability,” 540-42.
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A younger generation of politicians in cities like Groningen also pioneered 
traff ic-calming measures. A social democrat politician in Groningen, 
twenty-five-year-old Max van den Berg, became councilor for traff ic in 1970. 
Strongly advocating democratization and politicization of urban planning, 
politicians tried to involve the public in designing a new traff ic circulation 
plan, although planning scholar Tsubohara argues that ultimately a more 
technocratic, authoritarian approach pushed through traff ic-calming 
measures in Groningen.183 In 1974, a citizen action group published its 
survey on how Groningen citizens moved through the city. The largest 
group (37 percent) cycled while 60 percent wanted to see a car-free city 
marketplace. After a bicycle demonstration in September 1974, activists 
handed this report to Van den Berg. And in Amsterdam, the city’s urban 
planner, Hoogenboom, went even further, arguing for restricted car traff ic 
in the capital. In 1972, he had launched a new traff ic plan to concentrate car 
use on certain roads and implement traff ic-calming measures on others.184 
Car drivers “will now say that they have not been considered.” His message 
was loud and clear: Amsterdam offered good public transit and if drivers 
“don’t want to use it, then that is up to you, but I have built rows of stationary 
cars into my plan.”185 Hoogenboom was saying no to unlimited automobil-
ity – drivers had alternatives and if they chose not to use them, so be it. He 
hoped that slowing down drivers would ultimately make them so fed up that 
they would choose the tram or no longer try to reach the city center by car.186 
This convergence of a new generation of progressive planners with a wave 
of activism generated momentum for new traff ic policies in Dutch cities.187
In the prevailing positive political climate, a pragmatic approach made 
more sense than antagonistic strategies. Looking for cooperation, one early 
183 S. Tsubohara, “Democracy through political parties and public participation: the case of the 
planning history of Groningen, The Netherlands,” PhD diss., University of Groningen, 2010, 65.
184 The car lobby disliked these measures: car industry lobby group RAI asserted that Hoogen-
boom’s plan would cause drivers to fall into a trap ( fuik) when they tried to reach the city 
center: “Geen gefundeerde visie op verkeer: Secretaris RAI kraakt verkeerscirculatieplan,” NRC 
Handelsblad, April 21, 1972, 2.
185 “Ir. Hoogenboom: Bloed, zweet en tranen,” NRC Handelsblad, January 19, 1972.
186 Hoogenboom’s experience with urban traffic in Amsterdam (and before that in Nijmegen) mat-
ters because he then became an important figure within the national Public Works administration as 
secretary for the Stuurgroep Verkeer en Vervoer. There he continued to spread his critical perspective 
on unbridled car use and support for better public transport and cycling, informed by f irst-hand 
experience of governing urban mobility. See Willem de Bruin, “Nationaal verkeersveiligheidscongres: 
Belangen f ietsers en voetgangers voorop,” De Waarheid, April 23, 1980, 4.
187 In Enschede, 1974 elections returned a left-wing city council working with local action 
groups: Albert de la Bruhèze, “Enschede: An Experiment in Cycling,” 44.
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activist in the Amsterdam Cyclists’ Union, André Guit, soon started to think 
strategically. In 1978, he helped compile memoranda listing all the major 
and minor cycling bottlenecks in the capital. Social democrat councilor 
Michael van der Vlis, a trained econometrist, supported cycling. His party 
had prepared a similar memorandum, creating synergy between activists 
and policymakers.188 The activists were divided: when invited to join the 
municipal Working Group Cycling, some members wanted to remain a more 
activist, outsider group, leading to “principled and fierce” debates.189 Looking 
back on these years, Guit remarked that while the activists were “very much 
anti-car,” for strategic reasons they “prudently did not spread this message.”190 
Dooievaar activist Van Beek also opposed radical and swift change, believing 
that “through education and discussion the mentality has to be adjusted” 
before implementing sweeping measures.191 Being pragmatic in order to 
achieve as much as possible was how many activists operated in Dutch cities.
Most but not all Cyclists’ Union figures preferred to work with the govern-
ment, strengthening the Dutch polder model of governance. Initially they 
disagreed on action strategies. In 1976, the Maastricht branch was disap-
pointed with how “we are being completely taken in [ingepakt] by the cycling 
path plans in many cities.”192 It was one thing getting issues solved for cyclists, 
but to what extent should the group be taking action against cars? This Dutch 
mobility strategy of trying to do it all, avoided making hard choices. Car levels 
in Maastricht were 180 per 1,000 residents. According to the local Cyclists’ 
Union, the city considered it progressive policy to limit that number to 340 
by 1990.193 Similarly, in traffic action groups outside the Netherlands, such as 
Transportation Alternatives in the US, there were debates about the ideology 
between “those who wanted to continue with anti-automobile advocacy and 
those who wanted TA to pursue a more positive direction that emphasized 
the benefits of cycling and a less contestatory anti-car rhetoric.”194 While 
many branches of the Cyclists’ Union chose to work with local government 
by participating in working groups and committees, some rejected this close 
188 Anne-Mariken Raukema, “Meter voor meter f ietspaden bevechten,” Op eigen kracht: Blad 
van de afdeling Amsterdam van de Fietsersbond, no. 77 (2009): 12-13, here 12.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid., 13.
191 “Dooievaar wil Hagenaar weer laten f ietsen,” 39.
192 “ENWB afd. Maastricht,” De Ketting 1 (1976): 5. Eventually some members who preferred 
action became disillusioned and left the organization: Gert van Engelen, “Overleggen is niet 
fout, ingepakt worden wel,” De Vogelvrije Fietser 16, no. 1 (1990): 24-25.
193 “ENWB afd. Maastricht.”
194 Furness, One Less Car, 63.
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relationship. The Nijmegen branch for instance, in 1980, preferred to stay 
outside the system so that it could still organize street protests. Participating 
in committees was time-consuming and, as one activist said: “the municipality 
doesn’t expect tough action because you sit on the committee.”195 Over time, 
the more oppositional Cyclists’ Union voices lost out. As a result, protest 
activities declined markedly over the group’s f irst decade.
The Cyclists’ Union activists did establish a good working relationship with 
local policymakers, in part because there was a lot of social mobility between 
activism and government. Within the wider world of environmental activism 
in the Netherlands, this was not uncommon.196 Although young, the activists 
were from a similar socioeconomic background as their interlocutors within 
the professional bureaucracy. Cities like Delft hired young traff ic engineers 
with new ideas about urban planning (Woonerf), traffic calming, and cycling 
facilities. Activist Michael van der Vlis co-authored a memorandum on Cycling 
in Amsterdam in 1978, the same year he became the alderman responsible for 
traffic on behalf of the social democratic party.197 Pax Kroon, a civil engineer 
for Rotterdam’s traffic department, was also a Cyclists’ Union board member 
in the 1970s.198 Eisse Kalk, an important inspiration for cycling action groups, 
joined Amsterdam’s city government in 1981 to make policymaking more 
participatory from the inside out. He reasoned that citizens were willing 
to take part, thanks to groups like Werkgroep 2000 raising more political 
awareness. By working inside the government bureaucratic apparatus, Kalk 
hoped to achieve more.199 Steven Schepel, a prominent member of Stop the 
Child Murder in the 1970s, became a government off icial in traff ic (safety) 
in the 1980s, f irst in Rotterdam, later in Amsterdam. He ended his career at 
the Ministry of Public Works, working on traff ic safety programs.200 Again, 
the Danish case was remarkably similar. Martin Emanuel argues that 
Copenhagen city lacked planning expertise and turned to “former bicycle 
activists” who got jobs in the city’s planning off ice.201 Bringing their focus 
195 Paulien Osse and Theo de Jong, “’Als je in de commissie zit, verwacht de gemeente dat je 
geen harde acties meer voert’,” Vogelvrije Fietser 5, no. 4 (1980): 18-19, here 19.
196 Cramer, De groene golf, 100.
197 Feddes and De Lange, Fietsstad Amsterdam, 86
198 Other examples in the early 1980s: Olaf Ostendorf was a traff ic civil servant in Deurne and 
Cyclists’ Union activist in nearby Venray; prominent board member Jos Vernooy became an 
Amsterdam civil servant in 1982. “Ambtenaar in Deurne, actievoerder in Venray,” De Vogelvrije 
Fietser 11, no. 1 (1985): 12-14.
199 “‘Burger moet echt kunnen meespreken’,” Het Parool, March 24, 1981, 7; “Eisse Kalk: ‘In dit 
werk is een brede rug nodig’,” Het Parool, April 13, 1983, 6.
200 Interview Author with Steven Schepel, November 13, 2019.
201 Emanuel, “Making a Bicycle City,” 515.
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and expertise on cycling within city halls created a more cycling-friendly 
planning culture at every traff ic department level.
This mutual willingness to cooperate in transforming Dutch cities helped 
establish many (informal) contacts. Bureaucracy did not always move as fast 
as activists wished and implementing their vision was a time-consuming 
and gradual process, as the next two chapters will discuss.202 In addition, 
despite the widely circulating ideas about democratization and participation 
at the time, citizens and cyclists’ real influence over planning procedures 
remained limited. Still, in countries like the Netherlands and Denmark, the 
lines between citizens and urban policymakers were relatively short, cycling’s 
status was rising, and more got done for cyclists as a result than elsewhere.
Participation did have its limitations. Good contacts with policymakers 
were relatively easy to come by. It did not immediately lead to concrete 
results. Activists wanted results fast, and civil servants’ slow response 
frustrated them. Despite many statements of support for cycling policies 
in city councils, the actual implementation of policies lagged behind. At 
a Cyclists’ Union study day in 1980, the pro-cycling The Hague council 
member R.W. Heus (a VVD conservative liberal and engineer by training) 
and his social democrat colleague Burgers-Molendijk both acknowledged 
the gap between political ambitions and implementation: “The plans that 
civil servants at city hall design do not connect enough to the ideas in the 
city council.” The true “promotion of slow traff ic” by public works engineers 
did not conform with the wishes of legislators and activists.203 By 1982, 
the Amsterdam cycling action group Amsterdam Fietst, supported by 
the Cyclists’ Union, organized its f irst mass demonstration in four years: 
Their ideal bicycle city was still a (distant) ideal because a “lack of political 
will” and the inertia of the municipal bureaucracy stood in the way of 
change. The (young) activists had to learn how (local) politics worked and 
not let themselves “be brushed off with pseudo commitments [pseudo-
toezeggingen].”204 The choice to cooperate with city government had been 
deliberate because the Cyclists’ Union wanted “to get out of the phase of 
hollow phrases” to achieve something. But change was slow to come.205
Results were not just slow; citizens’ roles in shaping policy did not 
go very deep either. Kalk held a lecture on “Communication between 
202 Oldenziel and Albert de la Bruhèze, “Amsterdam: World Bicycle Capital, By Chance,” 24.
203 “Fietsers hebben weinig aan de politiek,” Trouw, June 10, 1980.
204 Paul Godefrooij and Toni Niël, “’Rijkswegen, dat is de grootste prioriteit in Brabant’,” De 
Vogelvrije Fietser 9, no. 3 (1984): 18-19, here 19.
205 “Fietsvriendelijke stad is nog toekomstmuziek,” Trouw, May 14, 1982; Jan Ploeger, “De komende 
tien jaar zouden wel eens oogstjaren kunnen worden,” De Vogelvrije Fietser 11, no. 1 (1985): 6-7.
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Citizen and Government” at the 1978 National Traff ic Safety Congress.206 
Here he criticized the government’s idea of participation, distinguishing 
“participation-for-the-government” from “participation-for-residents.” 
According to Kalk, the government used the former, seeing participation 
as a “social technique” to gain insight into public opinion, a process that 
took place on the government’s terms and meant citizens joining in the 
conversation but not the decision-making. Ideally, in Kalk’s view, experts 
should service citizens who design their own plans with experts’ help. In 
this way, “the weakest groups of society” in particular are not only heard 
but allowed a direct role in decision-making. Through the Cyclists’ Union 
surveys, Dutch traff ic planners gained valuable insight and data without 
having to use their manpower or hire expensive consultants. But was this 
more than tweaking a system, whereby the basic tenets were only indirectly 
open to participation through elections?
The Cyclists’ Union was also worried about its own eff icacy. It identif ied 
four sources of power: position, expertise, numbers, and publicity. Posi-
tion meant having a place in the “circuit of organizations and committees 
involved with traffic policy in the Netherlands.”207 A seat at the policymakers’ 
table allowed them direct influence, a timely awareness of new policies, 
and the possibility of harmonizing activities with other actors involved 
in cycling. Lack of manpower made it diff icult for the Cyclists’ Union to 
fully utilize these possibilities. It had no complaints about access: within 
a decade, members had gained access to the relevant policy circles.208 For 
expertise power, the process was similar. The Cyclists’ Union had built up a 
lot of (user) expertise and was regularly asked to join local working groups 
or committees. Finding knowledgeable volunteers with time on their hands 
who also could function well in governmental circles was harder. Regarding 
power in terms of numbers, the Cyclists’ Union membership at 14,000 around 
1985 was modest and declining. The organization faced the limited power 
of membership support (which the ANWB could claim) as well as revenues 
from membership fees.209 The massive street protests and many local actions 
206 E. Kalk, “Communicatie tussen burgerij en overheid,” in Congresverslag: de veiligheid van 
voetgangers, fietsers en bromfietsers binnen de bebouwde kom. Verslag van het Eerste Nationale 
Verkeersveiligheidscongres, gehouden op 19 en 20 april 1978 in het RAI-congrescentrum te Am-
sterdam, ed. Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Verkeersveiligheid SWOV (’s-Gravenhage: 
Koninklijke Nederlandse Toeristenbond ANWB, 1978), 40-41.





throughout the 1970s demonstrated the huge public support – as did the 
stable cyclists’ modal share of 20-30 percent (in cities). The Cyclists’ Union 
believed it could credibly claim to represent a much larger share of the 
population than its membership numbers suggest. Publicity came from 
street protests, though in recent years “the willingness to carry out (street) 
actions within the ENFB is declining,” an internal document acknowledged 
in the late 1980s.210 Media attention for this type of activism, moreover, was 
harder to generate: the novelty had worn off.
After a successful decade of public protests, the Cyclists’ Union concluded 
there was no longer need for street happenings and protests by 1985. Drawing 
attention to the positive aspects of cycling and the negative impact of cars 
had been achieved as government policy documents started to resemble 
the Cyclists’ Union view – at least on paper.211 Certainly, implementation of 
solutions for the bottlenecks it identif ied, or the cycling paths it requested, 
was slower than expected. But the Cyclists’ Union’s Tom Godefrooij believed 
that his organization had changed policymakers’ willingness to consider 
cycling in traff ic planning.212 Other members, looking back at this f irst 
decade, concurred: a change in mentality was taking place among traff ic 
engineers, a new generation of more bicycle-friendly traff ic engineers 
came into off ice, and some activists became civil servants.213 From the 
start, the organization had been “an assembly and breeding ground for 
(cyclist) traff ic expertise [( fiets)verkeersdeskundigheid].”214 And in time, 
the Union expected the demand for such expertise to increase. Politicians 
no longer needed much convincing but (local) traff ic engineers often tried 
to block change by arguing that the Cyclists’ Union preferred solutions 
were technically impossible. Activists believed they needed to provide 
detailed traffic expertise rather than organize street actions to combat these 
arguments.215 While this expertise was important for solving bottlenecks 
and, importantly, traff ic deaths were decreasing, by 1985, the Cyclists’ Union 
was dissatisf ied with its failure to truly convince both the authorities and 
drivers of the need to limit car use. Facilitating both car and bicycle use 
was, to an extent, contradictory. If car and bicycle interests clashed, the 
210 Ibid.
211 Ibid., 5.
212 Cees van den Berg, “Op de barricaden voor de f ietser,” Algemeen Dagblad, April 17, 1986.
213 Jenny Schoemaker, “Uitzicht op succes is geen voorwaarde om door te zetten,” De Vogelvrije 
Fietser 11, no. 1 (1885): 9-11.
214 IISG, Archive Cyclists’ Union, inv. no. 22, Kruipolie magazine, October 1985, ‘Concept 
beleidsplan 1896-1988’, 5.
215 Ibid.
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car still usually won.216 Politicians also saw “spending 3 million on the car 
as a bargain, but 1 million for the bicycle as outrageously expensive.” As a 
result, cycling in Dutch cities in the late 1980s was still a matter of hopping 
on and off the sidewalk, maneuvering past bollards and parked cars, and 
struggling to f ind a parking space.217 Transforming streets and mobility 
patterns was a long-term process. In short, the Union may have moved 
relatively quickly from its oppositional position into policy circles, but it 
meant giving up more militant anti-car protesting.
6.4 Conclusion
In a political system where non-governmental organizations could be part 
of the policymaking – and in a decade when the car came under heavy f ire 
– the Cyclists’ Union quickly carved out a major role in cycling governance. 
As a key intermediary between state off icials, users, and other interest 
groups locally, the federated Cyclists’ Union became an important player 
in the local Dutch cycling policy network.218 It successfully led the social 
questioning of the distribution of (urban) road space (and traff ic risks), and 
the reappraisal of urban cycling as a public good.
Activists made several claims. First and foremost, they denounced the 
state’s negligence in failing to protect vulnerable road users, and cyclists were 
particularly at risk. Concerning the causes of these risks, activists pointed to 
the lack of safe cycling infrastructure in cities and villages – a consequence 
of prioritizing automobility when allocating road space and infrastructure 
budgets. The activists also claimed that more cycling would have major 
benefits for society as a whole. Bicycles took up much less space than cars 
and did not produce noise or exhaust fumes. The bicycle was a primary 
vehicle for transforming the car-dominated city into a livable cycling city.
In terms of chronology, different waves of activism inf luenced and 
complemented each other. Groups like the anarchist Provo and the Kabout-
ers succeeded in alerting policymakers to the fact that citizens had their 
own voice and demanded to be heard – and also introduced the bicycle 
as symbol to imagine an alternative future. The many local protests in 
216 Niek Schenk, “Fietser wil meetellen,” Algemeen Dagblad, May 6, 1989.
217 Schenk, “De f iets als redding.”
218 Similarly, environmental interest group Stichting Natuur en Milieu was a spider in the 
environmental actors’ web. H.A. van der Heijden, “Zandzakken, notenbomen en een taart. 
Nederlandse sociale bewegingen en mondiale klimaatverandering,” Jaarboek voor Ecologische 
Geschiedenis 2008 (2009): 117-143, here 137-38.
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the 1960s and 1970s lent the parent-teacher organization Stop the Child 
Murder considerable political leverage: the parents and teachers could 
not be dismissed as a bunch of extremists. It became the fountainhead for 
widely supported Dutch anger over traff ic conditions for their children. The 
young Dooievaar activist-architects pioneered a counter-expertise-based 
method of translating this anger into practical and user-based designs for 
improving the urban space. All these currents came together in the Cyclists’ 
Union’s activism after 1975.
Some aspects of Dutch cycling activism can also be found in Denmark 
and Switzerland. In particular, an expertise role for cycling activists also 
emerged in other high-cycling-level countries with consensual political 
traditions. According to Emanuel the Danish cyclist federation DCF, like 
its Dutch counterpart, developed a bicycle plan for Copenhagen, and while 
not off icially adopted, “planners did use the proposal as a blueprint to 
develop the bicycle network in Copenhagen in the following years.”219 The 
capital’s pro-bicycle mayor helped the cause; historically, the Danish case 
also shows how good relationships between action groups and (local) govern-
ment have played a crucial role in creating bicycle cities. In Switzerland’s 
similarly consensual political model, cycling activists also enjoyed good 
relationships with local government.220 The Zurich cycling action group 
IG Velo (Interessengemeinschaft Velo) participated in the “Velopicknick”: 
regular meetings between city representatives, public works, and police 
departments. Initiator of these meetings in 1980 was Ruedi Aeschbacher, a 
politician who took an interest in cycling.221 Looking back on this coopera-
tion, Aeschbacher described IG Velo as a “decent but persistent” lobby which, 
like the Dutch Cyclists’ Union, contributed to the governance network by 
providing expertise local governments lacked (Facharbeit).222 Relationships 
between the cyclists and authorities professionalized quickly like in the 
Dutch case.223
In many countries, such as the US, cycling activism was (and remains) 
much more confrontational and antagonistic.224 Dutch activists were well-
219 Emanuel, “Making a Bicycle City,” 512.
220 The Netherlands and Switzerland differ in other aspects: Kriesi, “Federalism and Pillarization: 
The Netherlands and Switzerland Compared,” 539-56.




224 In a telling statistic cited by cycling historian Evan Friss, New York City spent twice as 
much on policing Critical Mass bicycle activists in the early 2000s than on actual cycling path 
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informed about cycling and worked with state off icials and engineers to 
spread engineering knowledge on cycling, for instance by writing a design 
manual. There was less cycling knowledge in the US and New York city’s 
Department of Transportation only started working on this around 2009.225
From an international perspective, it is also worth noting that the differ-
ent cycling conditions from where Dutch activists started also influenced 
their strategies and discourse. American cycling advocates, whom Zack 
Furness analyzed, mainly focused on environmental issues. In Dutch 
activism, the safety argument was much more powerful because there 
was a much larger group of active (and endangered) cyclists. This is not to 
say that ecological arguments were absent from the Dutch action scene; 
cycling advocates constantly used those arguments to make a case for 
cycling. The safety argument made Dutch cycling activism simultaneously 
more urgent and political: the image of endangered children and concerned 
parents was explosive in ways that no politician could ignore. In another 
sense, it was also less political because almost everybody could get behind 
it. Pragmatic cooperation with the government paid off for Dutch activists. 
In lower-cycling-level contexts, protest seems a much more apt strategy.226 
American cycling activists of the 1970s recall being firmly outside the system 
or even being marginalized.227 We cannot say the same about Dutch cycling 
activists in the same period.
In the 1970s, the consensus in the Netherlands about cycling was that 
it was far from disappearing as travel mode. Instead, it was valuable and 
should be promoted. This chapter has shown that the political process of 
making a claim for cycling, then convincing policymakers and engineers 
to take cyclists more seriously, was crucial. However, turning convictions 
into reality – and changing the distribution of road space – took decades 
and required an arduous governance process. We turn to this topic in the 
next chapter.
construction (Friss, On Bicycles, 153). Policies redistributing space away from cars to bicycles 
are extremely controversial. When in 2010 Janet Sadik-Khan’s Department of Transportation 
proposed a bike lane in New York City to replace a car lane and parking spots, a powerful coalition 
of opponents sued the department (ibid., 164). This coalition consisted of Brooklyn borough 
president Marty Markowitz, Iris Weinshall, Sadik-Khan’s predecessor at the DOT, former deputy 
mayor Norman Steisel, congressman and aspiring mayor Anthony Weiner, and prestigious law 
f irm Gibson Dunn LLP, who worked pro bono to sue Sadik-Khan.
225 Ibid., 159.
226 Furness repeats this argument for the Montréal-based action group Le Monde à Bicyclette, 
which tried to work the government by letter-writing and other off icial means, but whose 
protests and street actions were much more successful: Furness, One Less Car, 64.
227 Furness, “Biketivism and Technology,” 67.

7 Catching Up: The State Acknowledges 
Urban Cycling as Public Good , 1975-1990
“Citizens couldn’t care less whether the national or provincial government 
provides a solution, but a solution has to be found.”1 With these words, 
Christian democrat MP Pam Cornelissen drew attention in 1975 to the urgent 
need for new cycling infrastructure – and the lack of understanding citizens 
had for governments looking at each other to take up this task. Ten years 
later, in 1985, at another parliamentary meeting, social democrat MP Hessel 
Rienks sympathized with parents in rural areas where school children had 
to use dangerous and poor roads without cycling paths. Meanwhile, in these 
same regions there were new, comfortable asphalt paths for recreation, which 
only attracted cyclists in the summer. Unaware of the governance system 
producing this outcome, locals could only conclude that for the government, 
“our daily existence is less important than attracting money-spending 
recreational cyclists.”2 What governance struggles were Cornelissen and 
Rienks highlighting? And why were more pressing utilitarian cycling paths 
sometimes built later than these recreational ones?
From the mid-1970s onward, policymakers at the national, provincial, 
and urban level tried to address cyclists’ demands. Giving voice to these 
demands in parliament, the national Public Works department invested 
more in cycling. Wresting these concessions from the national government 
was a tough battle for national politicians. As a result, cyclists saw that 
the changes to the streets they used daily were slow to come. Behind the 
scenes, civil servants and Public Works engineers were arguing about the 
division of cycling governance responsibilities. Which role should each of 
the three government levels take? Who would govern recreational cycling 
and utilitarian cycling? Finetuning was a long process, and sometimes led to 
puzzling outcomes, when more urgent issues were addressed later or not at all.
Historians have shown how in the 1970s and 1980s urban policymak-
ers sought to reverse car-centered policymaking. The implementation of 
measures to make cycling safer and more attractive, however, was a gradual 
and challenging process. Dutch urban policymakers responded to citizens’ 
1 Permanent Committee for Public Works (Vaste Commissie Verkeer en Waterstaat), meeting 
minutes February 3, 1975, 523. All parliament records are available at https://zoek.off iciel-
ebekendmakingen.nl/uitgebreidzoeken/historisch.
2 Vaste Commissie voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting November 11, 1985, 5.
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demands for cycling policies by experimenting with new traffic measures and 
cooperating with activists. In contrast, we have little insight into what role, if 
any, provincial and national governments played in supporting or obstructing 
these urban policy goals. This chapter places our existing knowledge of urban 
cycling governance in the 1970s and 1980s in a wider context of provincial 
and national authorities as well as interest groups. It does this by using new 
material, including records from parliamentary committees, the Ministry 
of Public Works, and provincial and municipal agencies.
The chapter demonstrates the problematic relationship between govern-
ment levels in cycling governance. As politicians demanded engineers 
step up their investment in and engagement with cycling, national Public 
Works off icials remained reluctant to take up a larger role. The records 
show that politicians put pressure on the civil service to take cycling more 
seriously. Civil servants found translating that into actual policies more 
problematic. While the Ministry did subsidize cycling for some time – and 
with concrete results – it never f irmly believed that cycling fell under 
the mandate of the central government and that funding should not be 
made permanent. Investments in automobility were of a different order of 
magnitude and remained a larger concern for state engineers than cycling. 
Deeply rooted Dutch policy beliefs about decentralized and local govern-
ance influenced this. When neoliberal ideas about a smaller government 
became internationally dominant in the 1980s, the modest national role in 
cycling governance temporarily disappeared altogether. I also show that 
the cooperation between various ministries was diff icult because of the 
distinct funding streams and governance procedures engineers insisted 
on making between utilitarian and recreational cycling. The chapter ends 
in the late 1980s, when the national government decided to withdraw from 
cycling policy and leave it to lower government.
7.1 Expanding National Cycling Governance, 1975-1985
By the mid-1970s, social movements from Stop the Child Murder and Cyclists’ 
Union to environmental groups, particularly in cities, had created broad 
public support for prioritizing cycling over driving. The pressure from 
activists, with broad backing from society, reached parliament, where many 
MPs pushed the Ministry of Public Works to invest more in cycling. In these 
debates and the wider public discourse, no one opposed doing something 
about the lack of traff ic safety. What that something should be, and more 
importantly, who should do it, were less clear. Having reduced their role 
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in cycling governance mid-century, the national government’s engineers 
and civil servants faced a challenge. Historically, national engineers had 
little involvement in infrastructure policies within city limits. The national 
cycling policies engineers created in the 1920s only applied to national and 
provincial authorities’ roads, not in cities. Now, society and politicians 
demanded national engineers also adopted a supportive role in urban 
cycling policies. It was a new role. Creating new governance links proved 
demanding in this multi-level governmental setting where traditionally 
few ties existed. Additionally, the competing frames of recreational and 
utilitarian cycling complicated governance arrangements in practice.
The calls for cycling funding, which were eventually heeded, took place 
in a worsening economic context. After the fall of the progressive Den Uyl 
coalition in 1977, the following governments were more conservative in 
orientation. Both the ideological and the economical background explain 
why the national government increasingly favored austerity measures in 
the 1980s. During the f irst Van Agt government (1977-1981) and second one 
(1981-1982), national investments in cycling put in place during the Den 
Uyl government continued. It was only in the mid-1980s under the Lubbers 
I and II governments (1982-1989) that ideas about small government and 
privatization led to the national government’s (temporary) withdrawal from 
the cycling governance coalition.3 In this period, the responsible ministers of 
Public Works were Tjerk Westerterp (1973-1977), Danny Tuijnman (1977-1981), 
Henk Zeevalking (1981-1982), and Neelie Smit-Kroes (1982-1989). They had 
to grapple with a parliament which often denounced the ministry’s minor 
role in stimulating cycling.
MPs took up the defence of cycling infrastructure as a public good in the 
1970s. They had come to acknowledge utilitarian cycling facilities as a public 
good in the 1970s and demanded more state funding and cycling policies. In 
some respects, this was reminiscent of the 1920s, when many MPs extolled 
the virtues of cycling for the nation in protest against the bicycle tax. This 
time policymakers were motivated by the negative effects of driving, not 
just on cyclists but also pedestrians, urban livability, and the environment. 
The start of this check on the almost unlimited growth of automobility 
became visible in 1976 when, in a highly symbolic move, parliament voted to 
forbid car parking in its own historic Binnenhof (Courtyard) at The Hague’s 
parliament buildings.4
3 Remieg Aerts et al., Land van kleine gebaren: Een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland, 
1780-1990 (Nijmegen: SUN, 1999), 315-24.
4 Handelingen II 1975/76, 89 (June 9, 1976), 4537.
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Politicians argued that cycling should be part of the state’s mobility plans. 
In 1976, under the left-wing ruling coalition of Den Uyl, with Tjerk Westerp 
as Minister of Public Works, the national government increased its focus on 
traff ic safety. The Permanent Committee for Public Works – a committee 
of MPs who had mobility in their portfolio – discussed the Multi-Year Plan 
for Personal Transport (Meerjarenplan Personenvervoer), a programmatic 
policy document discussing the future of automobility. According to MP 
Koningh, of the small left-wing DS’70 party, the Plan ignored the bicycle. 
A former dockworker and union organizer, Koningh asserted that his own 
trajectory through transport modes was quite typical: when he started with 
the union he rode a bicycle, which he exchanged for a moped, and ended 
up driving a car; this was “about common practice.”5 Despite using a car, 
Koningh advocated limiting the car’s access to the city. The car threatened 
to make all other forms of transport impossible and “the government has 
to put a check on [paal en perk stellen] car use in the city.”6 According to 
Koningh, the car “takes up a disproportional amount of space for the number 
of people it moves,” while in the form of the bicycle, the solution was already 
at hand. Sales of bicycles were on the rise and cycling was still very much 
common practice, he said.7 This opinion was widely shared in the Public 
Works committee – left-wing and centrist parties talked about cycling in 
a very positive light. Tjerk Westerterp, the Minister responsible for a series 
of safety measures to stem traff ic accidents at the time such as the moped 
helmet and seatbelt rule, rightly concluded in 1975 that “the general opinion 
emerging from this committee is that we have to urge lower government 
to prioritize cycling paths and other facilities for the weaker road users.”8 
This meant a novel role for national government.
Partly from personal experience, MPs insisted the Ministry of Public 
Works do more to help local government make cycling a better option. MPs 
on the Permanent Committee for Public Works, who consistently lobbied 
for the bicycle, included the social democrats Van der Doef, Rienks, and 
Castricum (PvdA), the progressive liberals Imkamp, Zeevalking, and Tommel 
(D’66), as well as members of smaller left-wing parties like Koningh (DS’70) 
and Van der Heem-Wagemakers (PPR).9 This advocacy is illustrated by one 
5 Vaste Commissie voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting May 10, 1976, 968.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Vaste Commissie voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting February 3, 1975, 521.
9 Meeting November 11, 1973, 1-2, 8; Meeting February 2, 1975, 507, 520-21; Meeting October 27, 
1975, 177-84; Meeting May 10, 1976, 968; Meeting May 17, 1976, 989, 1001-1002; Meeting February 2, 
1978, 120; Meeting October 16, 1978, 73, 78-80.
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of the most vocal supporters of cycling, MP Pam Cornelissen of the Catholic 
KVP party (which merged with other Christian parties to form CDA in 1980). 
A civil engineer, Cornelissen was a project manager before entering the 
Lower House (Tweede Kamer) in 1967. He also served as councilor for the 
municipality of Best (1966-1974) and on the regional Eindhoven board (1966-
1970).10 Cornelissen’s allegiance to cycling has something to do with the fact 
he went everywhere by bicycle.11 He had also cycled 800 km recreationally 
throughout the country and “experienced that all is not well with the Dutch 
cycling paths.”12 Cornelissen was very concerned about traff ic safety. He was 
from Noord-Brabant, the founding location of Stop the Child Murder and 
a province where traff ic casualties were relatively high during the peak of 
traffic-related deaths in the Netherlands. Cornelissen’s local research showed 
that 20 percent of the fatalities among cyclists and moped riders were in his 
province. Among the victims was a considerable number of schoolchildren 
because many of them had to cross busy roads.13 All this made him one of 
the most persistent cycling advocates in Dutch parliament.
Cornelissen often advocated more national cycling funding in the 
Permanent Committee for Public Works.14 In the late 1970s, he initiated 
several parliamentary resolutions demanding a larger budget for cycling 
paths. As the important 1980 national policy document Structural Scheme 
for Traff ic and Transport (Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer) failed to 
mention bicycles, Cornelissen proposed adding a section on cycling.15 The 
Lower House accepted this proposal and it became officially part of the f inal 
document.16 In 1980, he called for a national “policy plan for slow traff ic.” 
Arguing that the Netherlands “is still a cycling country and should remain 
so,” he emphasized the importance of different types of cycling. Besides 
recreational, he mentioned cycling as the dominant school transport, and 
10 Data kindly provided by Parlement.com: (https://www.parlement.com/id/vg09lkzd26zc/
p_a_m_pam_cornelissen)
11 Bijzondere Commissie voor het Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer (14 390) en het Meer-
jarenplan Personenvervoer 1980-1984 (15 885), meeting March 10, 1980, 1208.
12 Vaste Commissie voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting October 27, 1975, 177.
13 ‘“Brabant is onveiligste provincie’,” Het Vrije Volk April 9, 1975, 7; “In het kort,” Verkeerskunde 
26, no. 6 (1975): 318.
14 See minutes of following committee meetings: November 26, 1973, 1-2; February 3, 1975, 520; 
October 27, 1975, 177-78, 182; February 27, 1978, 120; October 16, 1978, 78.
15 Kamerstukken II, no. 14390, sub-no. 67. See Bijzondere Commissie voor het Structuurschema 
Verkeer en Vervoer (14 390) en het Meerjarenplan Personenvervoer 1980-1984 (15 885), meeting 
two, 1001.
16 Handelingen II 1980/81, 23 (November 18, 1980), 1332. Government’s proposal of SVV was 
part D, while Parliament’s approved f inal version was part E.
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as before-and-after transport for railway passengers.17 An integral policy 
plan to support these activities – which Cornelissen called “friendly to the 
environment, requiring little space or oil, and healthy” – was lacking. The 
Cyclists’ Union had already written a document laying out such a policy 
plan, which Cornelissen recommended the national government used.18 
The majority support in Parliament for many of these proposals shows how 
cycling’s status as a public good increased in the 1970s.
The lack of formal institutions and rules on cycling governance meant the 
national government tried to devolve the responsibility to local authorities. 
Cyclists were not aware of these internal debates. On multiple occasions, 
Cornelissen confronted Public Works Minister Westerterp with the lack of 
cycling paths in his province.19 Westerterp’s response was that he did not 
have authority over provincial roads. Lower government autonomy had to 
be respected at all costs. Cornelissen did not accept this, arguing that the 
25-million-guilder subsidy for 1976 was not nearly enough to address “the 
enormous backlog we have in the Netherlands” in cycling path construction. 
It was “insuff icient if the minister says he is willing to consult with the 
province about spending funds. I believe as Minister of Public Works, he has 
a clear responsibility and should be willing to stimulate the construction 
of cycling paths.”20
The parliamentarians repeated pleas for the national government’s more 
proactive role were met with reluctance from the Public Works ministry. 
Nevertheless, politicians voted for national funds during this period that 
helped lower government’s cycling policy with subsidies paid from the na-
tional Public Works roads budget, the National Road Fund (Rijkswegenfonds). 
The progressive Den Uyl government (1973-1977) jumpstarted the process. 
Between 1975 and 1985, Parliament facilitated local investments in cycling, 
prompting Minister Westerterp at the start of the period to remark that “we 
[national Public Works] are starting an entirely new project.”21 Compared 
to the 1950s and 1960s, the minister believed this national involvement 
constituted a signif icant break in cycling governance. Apparently he was 
17 Bijzondere Commissie voor het Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer (14 390) en het Meer-
jarenplan Personenvervoer 1980-1984 (15 885), meeting February 18, 1980, 998. Cornelissen cited 
numbers showing 30 per cent of train passengers traveled to the station by bicycle. In the city 
of Gouda, it was even more than 50 per cent.
18 Ibid.
19 Vaste Commissie voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting February 3, 1975, 523; Vaste Commissie 
voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting October 27, 1975, 182.
20 Vaste Commissie voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting October 27, 1975, 182.
21 Ibid., 181.
CATCHING uP: THe STATe ACkNoWLedGeS urbAN CYCLING AS PubLIC Good 273
unaware of the government’s history or his own agency’s role during the 1920s 
and 1930s, when national politicians and engineers had already engaged with 
cycling as a result of the bicycle tax controversy and political compromise. 
Since then, the national Public Works departments had increasingly left 
cycling to lower authorities and were now facing the problem that the 
national government lacked the knowledge to create policies. Westerterp 
admitted that it had taken a long time for the ministry to gain insight in 
each province’s specif ic situation and problems: decentralization created a 
problematic knowledge gap at national level, particularly regarding cycling.22 
Similarly, when MPs requested data on cycling safety or progress with cycling 
path construction, the ministry often did not have these numbers, and had 
to turn to the provincial public works departments.23
The national government employed cycling subsidies for lower govern-
ments as its main policy tool in response to pressure from the country’s 
activists and politicians. Local government had always been able to construct 
cycling paths along new or reconstructed highways because they had control 
over regional and local road design and engineers considered cycling paths 
next to these roads an integral part of the road. The new subsidy indicated 
that lower authorities should prioritize constructing cycling paths where 
these were still missing but urgently needed.24 In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, cities could request a 50 percent subsidy for traff ic projects, including 
cycling. In 1974, under Terpstra’s direction, this level increased to 80 percent 
for cycling paths and a new subsidy of 50 percent for paths along roads 
outside built-up areas. The funding scheme reinforced the Dutch decentral 
model: the national government had limited options to steer the provinces 
and municipalities’ policies, but did control almost all revenue and its 
distribution. By creating favorable subsidy conditions for certain policy 
objectives like cycling infrastructure, national policymakers could shape 
local priorities.
As f igure 27 shows, from 1975 to 1985, the national government spent 
between 25 and 50 million guilders annually on local cycling facilities. In 
1976, the Ministry approved 30 projects for cycling paths and a few cycling 
tunnels and bridges, averaging from 50,000 to 2.5 million guilders per 
project. Many local cycling projects were realized thanks to this national 
22 Vaste Commissie voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting February 3, 1975, 520.
23 See Tweede Kamer, Aanhangsel van de Handelingen, 1974-1975 no. 607 and 1975-1976 no. 728.
24 NA 2.27.5215 (Archief Ministerie CRM, Beleidsterrein Recreatie), inv. no. 2167, document 
“Aantekeningen naar aanleiding van een gesprek bij het Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 
op 10 september 1974 over rijksbijdragen in aanlegkosten rijwielpaden,” 1-2.
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subsidy (see 7.3 and Appendices 2 and 3).25 In 1977, the national government 
subsidized local communities for 30 million guilders and gave provincial 
engineers another 25 million to construct separate cycling paths alongside 
provincial roads.26 Compared to the highway budget (f igure 28), however, 
these numbers were still negligible.
Under pressure from politicians, who in turn reacted to social and activist 
pressure, national state involvement came about but remained limited to 
modest national subsidies and centralizing expertise. National politicians 
strongly supported more (national) cycling policies within the Public Works 
department, but regarded civil servants and engineers’ policy response as 
half-hearted. Despite the efforts of people like Cornelissen, the Ministry of 
Public Works never fully committed to a central role in cycling governance. 
Labor MP Henk de Hamer (PvdA), a former councilor for the successful 
cycling city Groningen, criticized the ministry in 1981 for failing to address 
“policy” for cyclists and pedestrians: “There is coordination, regionaliza-
tion, research, and awareness, but still no policy.”27 In 1980, De Hamer, like 
Cornelissen, had demanded that the ministry compile a Multi-Year Plan 
for Slow Traff ic (Meerjarenplan Langzaam Verkeer) while debating the 
Structural Scheme for Transport (Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer) and 
the Multi-Year Plan for Personal Transport (Meerjarenplan Personenvervoer) 
of 1980-1984. When Parliament demanded cycling policy, De Hamer argued, 
the Public Works minister tended to produce “beautiful phrases” but “no real 
policy.”28 In practice, cyclists were still discriminated against, for instance by 
giving car drivers plenty of parking spaces at shopping centers but providing 
no bicycle parking. De Hamer’s plan for a separate cycling (and walking) 
policy document won majority support from the political left and the middle 
(PvdA, CDA, D’66, and PPR), and was adopted in November 1980. However, 
these resolutions were not binding. Under prime minister Van Agt’s new 
and more right-leaning government coalition, Public Works minister Danny 
25 Kamerstukken, no. 13711, sub-no. 6, 16-17.
26 “In het kort,” Verkeerskunde 29, no. 6 (1978): 274-75. The distribution over the provinces (in 
guilders) was:
– Groningen 1,262,000 – Utrecht 1,840,000
– Friesland 933,000 – NH 2,544,000
– Drenthe 2,710,000 – ZH 7,113,000
– Overijssel 1,000,000 – Zeeland 769,000
– Gelderland 2,329,000 – Noord-Br. 5,105,000
This distribution was related to the provinces’ population density and road network.
27 Handelingen II 1980/81, 24 (November 19, 1980), 1374.
28 Bijzondere Commissie voor het Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer (14 390) en het Meer-
jarenplan Personenvervoer 1980-1984 (15 885), meeting February 18, 1980, 1017-18.


























National Road Fund Budget for Cycling (in Millions)
Figure 27 The annual amount reserved for cycling in the National Road Fund budget. Clearly visible is 
the decentralization in the mid-1980s. Small sums were invested due to prior agreements, but in the late 
1980s, national government contributed very little to cycling infrastructure. Source: Annual budgets 









National Road Fund Budget for Highways (in Millions)
Figure 28 Investments in cycling fluctuated, but the national highway budget remained stable in the 
1980s. The cycling budget is shown here in dark, illustrating the very minor investments in cycling 
compared to highway budgets. Source: Annual budgets National Road Fund (Rijkswegenfonds) until 
1993, when its name changed to Infrastructure Fund (Infrastructuurfonds).
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Tuijnman (VVD) objected, stating his off icials were already overburdened. 
His remark revealed that cycling and walking were not that much of a priority 
after all for national engineers – and as minister of a pro-car liberal party, 
he was not going to push either.29
Some politicians opposed a national role in cycling governance. Few 
if any, however, openly contested the social value of either utilitarian or 
recreational cycling in the Netherlands. Vocal opposition to bicycle planning 
was negligible. Occasionally members of the conservative liberal VVD, the 
party most closely associated with pro-car policies, argued that money spent 
on cycling would be better spent on cars.30 However, another Permanent 
Committee member for the VVD, Herman Lauxtermann, a builder from the 
Catholic south, made it known he was a keen recreational cyclist. He may 
not have used the bicycle for other purposes, but his extensive recreational 
cycling made him question how the various ministries coordinated their 
cycling subsidy programs.31 Lauxtermann demonstrates that (recreational) 
cycling survived the 1960s in the Netherlands much better than in sur-
rounding countries and made a difference to garnering a wider support 
base for pro-cycling policies in the 1970s, even among the most car-minded 
politicians.
The new subsidies concerned traff ic needs, and what engineers and 
politicians considered utilitarian cycling paths. Older funding schemes 
for recreational cycling infrastructure continued to be in place to boost 
provincial tourism and recreation. The Ministry of Culture and Recreation 
(CRM) program funded recreational cycling infrastructure. The Ministry of 
Agriculture – responsible for the heavy agricultural machinery traffic on nar-
row country roads – funded a small subsidy program for rural (quaternary) 
roads.32 According to the ministry in 1978, the situation on rural roads had 
received “heightened attention” recently “especially with regard to the 
safety of school children.”33 In all likelihood, the many protests by parents 
of school-going children, described in the previous chapter, contributed 
to this sense of urgency. The Land Use Service (Landinrichtingsdienst), 
29 Kamerstukken II 1979/80, no. 14390/15885, sub-no. 90; Vaste Commissie voor Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, meeting November 3, 1980, 2; Handelingen II 1980/81, 25 (November 20, 1980), 1489.
30 Smit-Kroes (later minister of Public Works) at meeting May 10, 1976, 954; De Beer at meeting 
October 18, 1976, 2.
31 Bijzondere Commissie voor het Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer (14 390) en het Meer-
jarenplan Personenvervoer 1980-1984 (15 885), meeting February 18, 1980, 1004.
32 NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, letter Minister of Agriculture to Minister of Public Works, June 5, 
1978.
33 Ibid.
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the agency dealing with land consolidation and spatial planning in the 
countryside, awarded these subsidies. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
Ministry of Agriculture spent 5 million guilders on constructing roughly 
20 km of cycle tracks every year.34
The varying subsidies also tell us something about priorities. Politicians 
and off icials presumed they could classify cycling infrastructure based 
on whether its main function was recreational or utilitarian. The higher 
level of subsidy for recreational cycling infrastructure shows that national 
policymakers attached great importance to providing recreation facilities. 
The underlying idea was that the facilities would attract tourists – and 
as government spending, the investment in cycling paths would provide 
a good return. Some politicians disapproved, arguing that citizens were 
justif ied in criticizing this logic. That is why social democrat MP Hessel 
Rienks concluded, “our daily existence is less important than attract-
ing money-spending recreational cyclists.”35 The subsidy program for 
recreational cycling was rarely contested politically and never really 
disappeared. In contrast, the focus on utilitarian cycling infrastructure 
only returned after the heavily contested political process when city 
activists put it on the agenda. The diverse subsidies created conf licts 
between national ministries as well as confusion between national and 
local authorities.
These subsidies were not integrated, despite pleas by politicians and activ-
ists. The Ministry of Public Works rejected activists’ calls for it to function 
as national cycling policy coordinator. Action group Stop the Child Murder 
wrote to the Ministry of Culture and Recreation (CRM) proposing a national 
cycling path plan to connect all the existing subsidy arrangements.36 They 
argued that the subsidy system “led municipalities to construct cycling paths 
in the strangest places, depending on their inventiveness.”37 Indeed, it was 
almost a game for local policymakers to hunt down funding – not necessarily 
connected to cyclists’ actual needs. The activists were particularly appalled 
by the numerous recreational cycling paths constructed in forests and 
34 Kamerstukken II 1982/83, no. 17745, sub-no. 2 (Nota Fietsverkeer), 39.
35 Vaste Commissie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting November 11, 1985, 5.
36 MP Cornelissen asked the minister whether he had responded. Minister Westerterp had 
addressed the group in person but told them he considered cycling paths a task for lower govern-
ment. The National Road Fund was meant for highways, and a national cycling path plan would 
also need funding, which he did not want to provide (Vaste Commissie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 
meeting November 26, 1973, 1-2, 8).
37 NA 2.19.198 (Archief Stop de Kindermoord), inv. no. 233, press communiqué “Staatssecretaris 
Meijer wil nationaal f ietspadenplan.”
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national parks, ignoring the much more urgent school routes for children. 
In response, the Culture and Recreation Ministry (CRM) supported this 
idea in principle and wrote to the Ministry of Public Works requesting 
“a certain form of coordination and synchronization.” It also made clear 
that these “coordinating measures would have to be taken primarily by 
you, the member of government responsible for traff ic.”38 In other words, 
responsibility for cycling governance should lie with the Ministry of Public 
Works. This overture resulted in a meeting in September 1974 between the 
three Ministries – Public Works, Culture and Recreation, and Agriculture 
– to “explore the mutual f ields of activity regarding the construction of 
cycling paths.”39 Prior to 1974, at a national level, each department had 
worked in relative isolation. This illustrates the prevailing lack of central 
guidance and coordination in Dutch cycling governance as well as the lack 
of communication between Dutch ministries.40
CRM Ministry officials continued to be critical of Public Works engineers’ 
refusal to work more closely throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s: 
separating utilitarian and recreational cycling was misplaced, as each 
cycling path should combine these features. “Concretely this would mean, 
from the perspective of outdoor recreation, that a cycling path constructed 
for a ‘utilitarian’ function like commuter or school traff ic would also be 
made as attractive as possible, both for specif ic recreational use as for the 
recreational experience during ‘utilitarian’ use.”41 After specifying how to 
do this (route choice, embedding in the landscape, and attractive greenery), 
the Ministry concluded that “a cyclist, while cycling, should not be able to 
tell whether they were on a utilitarian or recreational path.”42 According to 
the off icials, cycling paths should not have a predetermined function and 
cycling commuters would also benefit from pleasant routes. As the agency 
responsible for traff ic, the Ministry of Public Works would have to take the 
lead on this. The procedures and organization of the subsidy arrangements 
had to be synchronized.43
38 NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, letter State Secretary CRM to Minister of Public Works, January 8, 
1974; letter State Secretary CRM to Stop de Kindermoord, January 8, 1974.
39 NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, document “Aantekeningen naar aanleiding van een gesprek bij het 
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat op 10 september 1974 over rijksbijdragen in aanlegkosten 
rijwielpaden,” 1.
40 Andeweg and Irwin, Governance and Politics of the Netherlands, 149, 59.
41 NA 2.27.5215 (Archief Ministerie CRM, Beleidsterrein Recreatie), inv. no. 1971, document 
“Notitie van het secretariaat n.a.v. de nota f ietsverkeer van Verkeer en Waterstaat.”
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
CATCHING uP: THe STATe ACkNoWLedGeS urbAN CYCLING AS PubLIC Good 279
Other agencies also attempted to convince the Ministry of Public Works to 
take on a larger role in cycling governance – and failed. In 1977, for example, 
the Dutch provinces lobby organization (IPO) argued that it was strange 
that both Public Works and Agriculture ministries subsidized cycling 
infrastructure for traff ic safety reasons. According to IPO, improving traff ic 
safety was the Ministry of Public Works’ mandate. It should f ind more 
flexible ways to subsidize cycling infrastructure. The provinces proposed 
closer cooperation between ministries without the non-sensical boundaries 
between subsidies.44 The Minister of Public Works refused to budge; while 
admitting that the logic of the subsidies overlapped, he also argued that 
the well-funded Ministry of Agriculture should deal with municipalities’ 
funding requests: there was no need for Public Works to cooperate with 
this Ministry.45 Parliament questioned the lack of central coordination in 
1980, during discussions about the Multi-Year Plan for Personal Traff ic. 
Three MPs remarked that since the proposal was an integrated, holistic 
approach to transport, no other ministries could subsidize transport 
facilities.46 The Minister of Public Works persisted: cycling subsidies had 
“clearly demarcated areas” and where there was an overlap, “consultation 
takes place on an ad-hoc basis” so that “a separate coordination agency is 
deemed unnecessary.”47
Consequently, recreational and utilitarian cycling governance remained 
separate spheres within national government – an artif icial institutional 
arrangement that clashed with the reality of cycling. Cyclists had little 
patience for distinguishing between utilitarian and recreational paths. 
The two emerging forms of cycling path networks somehow had to be 
interconnected. Policymakers observed that safe cycling facilities leading 
out of urban centers to recreational areas were particularly lacking.48 The 
government off icial responsible for outdoor recreation, engineer K. Kuyken, 
realized his ministry, CRM, had to come up with a strategy to convince Public 
Works to fund the construction of these mixed-use paths. One problem was 
that CRM subsidized 75 percent of the costs but Public Works only 50 percent. 
Potentially, municipalities and provinces would all frame their cycling paths 
44 NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, letter IPO to Ministry of Public Works, December 23, 1977.
45 NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, letter Ministry of Public Works to IPO, September 20, 1978.
46 Kamerstukken II 1979/80, no. 15885, sub-no. 53.
47 Kamerstukken II 1979/80, no. 15885, sub-no. 201, 5.
48 NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, document “Aantekeningen naar aanleiding van een gesprek bij het 
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat op 10 september 1974 over rijksbijdragen in aanlegkosten 
rijwielpaden,” 2; NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, letter Minister of Public Works to Minister of Culture 
and Recreation, June 23, 1975.
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as recreational in order to obtain the higher CRM subsidy.49 This was the 
unequal f ight for subsidies that Stop the Child Murder activists already 
observed at local levels in the early 1970s. In short, national politicians, 
responding to the electorate, demanded the government coordinate cycling 
policy, but the state engineers at the Public Works administration did not 
heed this call.
7.2 Frictions and Distrust: Struggles with Multi-Level Cycling 
Governance
By the mid-1970s, cycling’s social status as a public good was high. So 
was political support on the highest levels. Yet controversy ensued about 
(multi-level) cycling governance: who was to be responsible for policy im-
plementation? In the 1930s, national politicians had decided cycling should 
be governed locally – and because the Dutch administration was strongly 
decentralized, national policymakers resisted national governance of issues 
like cycling. Since the state controlled funding, and its allocation of funds 
could indirectly steer policy priorities, it still made sense for politicians to 
demand a national role.
How workable was this system for provincial and local engineers? It 
turned out those willing to improve cycling facilities but in need of funding 
locally found the government’s rules, regulations, and funding schemes 
confusing and laborious. At a meeting between national government and 
the provinces in 1976, a member of the Utrecht Provincial Executive pointed 
out “the artif iciality of the proposed distinction between different categories 
of cycling path, the various overlapping functions of cycling paths, and 
the fact that there are different subsidizers each with different subsidy 
arrangements.”50 Cities and provinces often struggled with the complex-
ity and laboriousness of the subsidy system. The provinces, interceding 
between municipalities and the national government, played a crucial role 
in coordinating cycling governance.
Provinces expanded their role in cycling governance in response to the 
new financial opportunities created in the 1970s combined with the national 
49 NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, letter Minister of Public Works to Minister of Culture and Recrea-
tion, June 23, 1975.
50 NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, document “Verslag gesprek tussen de minister van Verkeer en 
Waterstata en de colleges van Gedeputeerde Staten inzake de aanleg van f ietspaden, op 19 februari 
1976,” 2.
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government’s lack of coordination. They assisted municipalities in raising 
awareness of subsidies as well as in administrative procedures. The confusing 
mix of subsidies, spread over no fewer than four ministries, required the 
provinces to take the lead in coordinating municipal funding requests as 
well as building plans, to ensure a connected provincial network.51 The 
chief-engineer-director of the Utrecht Provincial Public Works department 
proposed that municipalities could be informed of new subsidies. They could 
pass on their requests to the province, which would collect and submit them 
at the national level.52 In 1975, only 3 municipalities utilized the subsidy, 
rising to 18 in 1976, and peaking with 35 in 1979. Up to 1980, between 80 and 
90 of the country’s 811 municipalities had made use of the subsidies.53 By 
the time local policymakers found their way to the funding, it was already 
abolished (see 7.4).
The central government’s functional and f inancial separation of cycling 
types clashed with the municipalities’ more integrated approach. Provincial 
policymakers and politicians repeatedly criticized the unworkability of the 
system at provincial lobby IPO meetings. They complained that the central 
government’s system was “obscure because of the different state support 
arrangements concerning the subsidizing of cycling paths.”54 Provinces 
and cities had to translate their local needs into the various ministries’ 
terms to comply with subsidy applications. To maintain their negotiation 
position with the national government, the provinces had to come up 
with a unanimous counterproposal. That proved diff icult. Some provinces 
favored further decentralization of cycling policy and wanted to confront 
the national Public Works Ministry. Others were hesitant to stir up trouble 
given the considerable efforts to secure the current subsidy system.55
The Cyclists’ Union activists backed the provinces and municipalities 
in their critique of the ponderous procedures. In a letter to parliament in 
1978, the activists formulated three criticisms. First, the Ministry wrongly 
undertook an unnecessary and time-consuming technical check of munici-
pal plans.56 The subsidy’s only condition should be whether the proposed 
51 HUA 1205, inv. no. 5065, letter GS Utrecht to municipalities, January 14, 1977.
52 HUA 1205, inv. no. 5065, letter PWS Utrecht to GS Utrecht, February 2, 1976.
53 Kamerstukken II 1982/83, no. 17745, sub-no. 2 (Nota Fietsverkeer), 40; Trudy Lisci-Wessels, 
“Ontwikkeling van het aantal gemeenten sinds 1900,” Bevolkingstrends. Statistisch kwartaalblad 
over de demografie van Nederland 52, no. 1 (2004): 56-57, here 56.
54 NA 2.19.063, inv. no. 1826, meeting minutes, IPO committee for Traff ic August 28, 1980.
55 NA 2.19.063, inv. no. 1826, minutes meetings IPO committee for Traff ic October 29, 1981.
56 Criticism from the provincial cooperative body IPO in 1976/1977 resulted in discussions 
with the Ministry of Public Works when engineers acknowledged that the strict Rijkswaterstaat 
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cycling facility fit into a larger program of cycling-promoting and car-limiting 
measures. The implication was that municipalities had enough technical 
expertise to design their own cycling facilities to a standard agreeable to 
the cycling activists, maybe even more so than to the national government. 
Second, the exact conditions and timeline for subsidies were unclear. This 
made it hard for local government to plan ahead: potential funding was 
unreliable and the national government did not actively explain the subsidy. 
Third, the subsidy was too one-sidedly geared to cycling infrastructure 
(paths), “when cycling traff ic is better served with a reorganization of the 
total traff ic space.”57 It was not feasible to construct cycling paths every-
where. Cycling conditions could often be improved with much cheaper, 
car-limiting measures, they argued. The national government’s cycling 
policy did not make these radical decisions.
The ANWB likewise complained about the distinctions between utilitar-
ian, recreational, and mixed cycling paths. Depending on the time, place, 
and season, cyclists used paths for commuting and going to school, as well 
as recreation. The related division of subsidies over different ministries was 
“illogical” and “forms an obstacle to an energetic policy.”58 In addition, the 
crucial lanes leading out of the city did not f it this categorization. Because 
of the paths’ mixed use (people coming into the city for school or work, and 
those leaving it for recreation), it was hard to know where to get subsidies; 
as a result, ministries ended up pointing at each other.
Local government and action groups recommended a solution: give the 
provinces a sum of money to spend on cycling in cooperation with munici-
palities and activists. Eliminating national bureaucracy would speed up and 
simplify the process. A 1982 letter from all outdoor recreation stakeholders 
complained about the slow implementation of cycling path plans due to the 
technicalities of the subsidy arrangements. “By omitting the distinction 
in types of cycling path, the differently earmarked ministries’ payments 
can be combined into one subsidy fund.” Then, local actors “do not have to 
rack their brains over unwieldy ‘dominantly recreational’ and ‘utilitarian’ 
concepts.”59 The large cycling governance role the national government 
technical test would be cancelled and provinces would be more independent (NA 2.19.063, 
inv. no. 1826, meeting minutes, IPO committee for Traff ic, February 27, 1976, October 14, 1976, 
June 9, 1977 and December 8, 1977).
57 NA 2.02.28, inv. no. 6267, letter ENWB/R.B. van Putten to Parliament, November 7, 1978.
58 F. van Schelven and G. Bakker, “Overzicht belangrijkste f ietspadenplannen in Nederland,” 
Recreatievoorzieningen 12, no. 8 (1980): 373-77.
59 NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, letter Stichting Recreatie to Ministry of Culture and Recreation, 
June 9, 1982.
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envisaged for provinces would be much easier if the provinces received 
a lump sum that they could divide over lower authorities as they saw f it. 
This decentralization of cycling funding (and mobility funds in general) 
eventually happened in the late 1990s.
During the progressive Den Uyl government, the Minster tried to end 
the impasse. In order to streamline the new forms of cycling governance, 
many meetings took place between national and local policymakers in 
the 1970s and 1980s. In July 1975, a high-level delegation from the Ministry 
of Public Works – Minister Westerterp and high-ranking Rijkswaterstaat 
officials – met with representatives of the provinces to discuss cycling 
policy.60 Most provinces delegated a politician from the Provincial Executive, 
an engineer from the Provincial Public Works department, and a public 
administration expert from the Provincial Registry (griffie). The Public 
Works Ministry initiated the meeting as it started to develop an interest 
in (cycling) traff ic safety and the promotion of cycling and public transit 
as alternatives to automobility in the mid-1970s.
National off icials were surprised to discover that the provinces were 
already creating cycling policies. G. Ph. Brokx, a provincial politician 
in Noord-Brabant as well as the IPO, pointed to his province’s plan to 
construct 100 km of cycling paths over a f ive-year period along major, 
so-called secondary roads. Joop Borgman, the labor politician who had 
promoted cycling in Zuid-Holland since 1974, explained that 320 of the 
350 km of major secondary roads in his province already had cycling paths. 
He and other provincial representatives also pointed out that they struggled 
particularly with making crossings safer. To also address problems on 
smaller roads and in cities and villages required more money. A follow-up 
meeting in 1976 discussed “whether and to what extent an improvement 
in the coordination of the activities of the national government and the 
provinces is possible.”61 In short, it was in the mid-1970s that the national 
government became aware that for decades, cycling policy had been carried 
out largely locally without much support from or contact with the national 
government.
This opening up of plan-making had to do with the increased call for 
more democratic and participatory politics, discussed more fully in the 
next chapter. It led to participation procedures (inspraakprocedures) for 
60 NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, document “Verslag oriënterend gesprek tussen de minister van 




the public’s input in local transport and spatial planning proposals. The 
scope for participation since the 1970s included informative consultations 
and written reactions. And while citizens complained that they could only 
comment on completed plans, the reality was that their input did bring about 
changes: the 1976 Urbanization Report was revised in 130 places after public 
consultation.62 In the same vein, the provincial government published the 
revised concept of the Zuid-Holland cycling path plan in newspapers and 
invited comments from the public. The almost 300 respondents ranged 
from municipalities to interest groups and individuals.63 In the context of 
new cycling activism emerging in that period, local cycling activists also 
critiqued the plan, resulting in alterations.64 Some municipalities also 
reacted critically. Dordrecht was “disappointed” with the program’s lack of 
ambition and wanted “more attention for environmentally-friendly traff ic 
solutions like cycling paths for inter-local and recreational use.”65 Another 
community also hoped for more cycling paths, expecting “that the bicycle 
will fulfil a larger role in the near future.”66 Opening up plans to participation 
(albeit not in the design phase) was in sharp contrast to the 1950s plan.
Still, the national government refused to trust local off icials with cycling 
policy and decentralize funding entirely. Instead, it tried to steer policy 
through subsidy rules. This became clear at a second meeting of all the 
(governmental) stakeholders on February 19, 1976.67 In addition to the 
Ministry of Public Works and provincial delegations, this time there were 
also off icials from the other subsidizing ministries (Culture and Recreation; 
Agriculture). On behalf of the provinces, the Noord-Brabant representative 
Brokx welcomed a rise in national cycling subsidies but also demanded that 
the provinces should take on the coordination of cycling policy and the 
distribution of the money. In addition, he demanded more than a 50 percent 
subsidy: provinces did not have the funds to come up with the other half.68 
62 Arjen van der Burg, Odette van de Riet, and Bert Toussaint, “Contested Spatial Planning: 
Ca. 1965-1985,” in Builders and Planners: A History of Land-Use and Infrastructure Planning in 
the Netherlands, eds. Jos Arts et al. (Delft: Uitgeverij Eburon, 2016), 222.
63 NA 3.02.46, inv. no. 2915-2917. Letters from citizens in no. 2916, e.g., M. de Visser-Ameling 
(July 23, 1975), C. Skov Hansen (July 26, 1975), and A.J. Wtenweerde (August 19, 1975).
64 Ien Deltrap, “Er is nog hoop voor Zuid-Holland,” De Vogelvrije Fietser 3, no. 1 (1977): 9.
65 NA 3.02.46, inv. no. 2915, letter Dordrecht municipality to Zuid-Holland Provincial Executive, 
September 3, 1975.
66 Ibid., letter Hazerswoude municipality to Zuid-Holland Provincial Executive, August 28, 
1975.
67 See HUA 1205, inv. no. 5065 for list of attendees.
68 NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, document “Verslag gesprek tussen de minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat 
en de colleges van Gedeputeerde Staten inzake de aanleg van fietspaden, op 19 februari 1976,” 1.
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Minister Westerterp rejected the provinces’ attempt to gain more influence. 
While acknowledging that cycling facilities were a local and provincial policy 
matter, he also argued that the allocation of funds over the provinces fell 
under the Public Works department based on a justif ication of what the 
provinces intended to do with the money and why.69 The state’s strategy 
of controlling policy indirectly rather than with top-down directives was 
also known as the “golden strings” approach. This was not unique to cycling 
policies. According to political historian Harm Kaal, the Ministry of Public 
Housing and Spatial Planning funded urban renewal projects in the 1970s 
and 1980s, “the national government was prepared to invest heavily in 
urban renewal projects, but in exchange demanded that projects were 
subject to governmental approval.”70 By keeping control over subsidies, the 
national government could to some extent influence the shape of cycling 
infrastructure, even in a decentralized system where local government had 
considerable autonomy.
In the case of cycling, this meant that national engineers developed 
quantif iable, seemingly neutral, and technical guidelines for where cy-
cling infrastructure was most needed. National Public Works engineers 
developed the RONA norms (Richtlijnen Ontwerp Niet-Autsnelwegen, 
“Design Guidelines for Non-Highways”). RONA included a working group 
tasked with formulating basic design criteria. This in turn had a Cycling 
Paths subcommittee, which attempted to formulate a more scientif ic basis 
for cycling path construction in three stages. First, the engineers would 
formulate preliminary norms based on a literature study. Secondly, an 
external engineering consultancy (DHV) would investigate what types of 
cycling infrastructure correlated with the lowest accident rates. In the long 
run, thirdly, the Scientif ic Organization for Traff ic Safety (SWOV) would 
investigate the results of the measures.71 A concept version of the f irst 
stage – determining which roads were most in need of cycling paths – was 
sent to the provinces in January 1976. Ideally, prioritizing these roads 
would be based on a wide range of data: the intensity of car traff ic, the 
types and speed of motorized traff ic, the intensity of bicycle traff ic, the 
types of cyclists (schoolchildren, older people), the width of the existing 
road, the level of obstruction of the view, and the type of road surfacing. 
Since most of the data was not available, a more practical measure was to 
69 Ibid., 4.
70 Kaal, “A Conceptual History of Livability,” 541.
71 A. Wilmink, “Onderzoek betere richtlijnen f ietsvoorzieningen,” Verkeerskunde 28, no. 2 
(1976): 76-77.
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combine the intensity of car and bicycle traff ic and the width of the road. 
The formula for this was “Pi = IEMI x IEFI x fBi” where Pi stands for Priority 
of road section I, IEMI stands for Intensity motorized traff ic, IEFI stands 
for Intensity bicycle traff ic, and fBi for the Factor width (see f igure 29).72 
The development of these engineering norms marked a new stage in the 
standardization of cycling planning in the Netherlands. It also ushered in 
a governance phase that led the national government to consider its role 
in cycling governance to be only producing and disseminating engineering 
knowledge.
In practice, local conditions and cyclists’ subjective experience turned 
out to be as important in planning cycling facilities as these engineering 
norms. One example comes from the conurbation board (agglomeratieraad) 
for the Eindhoven region – a regional cooperation between municipalities 
below the provincial level. In 1980, the board subsidized a cycling path 
that policymakers scored relatively low on RONA’s “danger index” – f ifteen 
72 NA 2.27.5215, inv. no. 2167, letter Ministry of Public Works to Provincial Executive provinces, 
January 26, 1976, attached concept, 4-5. The formula could be f inetuned by giving truck traff ic 
a higher weight in motorized traff ic counts or giving very young or very old cyclists a higher 
weight in cyclist counts.
Figure 29 Policy guideline for the cycling path priorities set by Dutch engineers around 1975. The 
y-axis shows the number of cyclists per 24 hours, the x-axis the number of car drivers. Engineers would 
consider a cycling path if the numbers exceeded 500 cyclists and 2,000 drivers. [Source: Kamerstukken II 
1982/83, no. 17745, sub-no. 2 (Nota Fietsverkeer), 23.]
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projects were supposedly more dangerous. Cycling advocates had little 
patience with this kind of ranking. School directors had pressed for the 
construction of this path since children used it intensively. One board 
member speculated that there might be more dangerous situations in 
the conurbation than RONA’s norms showed, “but everything is more or 
less subjective after all.” Another member mentioned the hard numbers 
but also asserted that “you should not only rely on such numbers.” The 
responsible off icial acknowledged that it was the “exerted pressure … 
from the side of the users” that had led them to not strictly follow the 
engineering norms in this case.73 The fact that so many school children 
used this route and that school directors demanded it trumped the path’s 
low “objective” score. On a local level, the Cyclists’ Union succeeded in 
countering these norms by gathering input from cyclists who influenced 
policymakers’ decisions. Here, the activists’ belief that cyclists’ everyday 
(qualitative) experience should be the foremost consideration in planning 
cycling infrastructure could and did take precedence over more impersonal 
(quantitative) norms.
At the same time, national engineers formulated guidelines for cycling 
path design with less input from the Cyclists’ Union. Municipalities duti-
fully followed suit to ensure they would receive the subsidies. In 1979, 
theoretical physicist Hendrik van Ouwerkerk, active in several nature 
conservation groups, wrote a critical article about the RONA norms in 
the action group’s journal Natuur en Milieu (Nature and Environment). 
The RONA framework led to wide road prof iles and straightened curvy 
roads. Both interventions were detrimental to the attractive quality 
of rural roads.74 Van Ouwerkerk found this deplorable, but recognized 
that provincial engineers were not keen to depart from the norms out of 
“subsidy-fear.”75 The off icial rules did not stipulate RONA as a condition 
for receiving subsidies, but in practice functioned this way: “the designers 
prefer not to take any risks, so the RONA norms are being followed in 
practice as much as possible.”76 He criticized the conflict between the 
road users and nature and recreation users’ interests, but also how the 
RONA norms delayed cycling path construction: the norms made (re)
constructing roads and cycling paths so expensive that a large province 
73 RHCE 10884 (Agglomeratieraad Eindhoven), inv. no. 151, excerpt from meeting minutes, 
conurbation board June 19, 1980.
74 Hendrik J. van Ouwerkerk, “Fietspaden of RONA-banen? Norm over de schreef,” Natuur en 




like Noord-Brabant could only construct about 20 km yearly.77 Likewise, in 
a meeting between Public Works minister Zeevalking and the Association 
of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) in 1982, the social democratic mayor and 
VNG member Henk de Wilde also thought the requirements regarding 
width and quality of cycling paths were too high, implying that municipali-
ties were only willing to invest in cycling if the subsidy conditions were 
lowered.78 This problem was compounded by the fact that legally, municipal 
governments were not allowed to run budget def icits.79 On paper, the 
Dutch government was strongly decentralized, giving lower government 
considerable autonomy in designing traff ic facilities. In practice, the 
national government exercised signif icant control over lower government 
through its f inancial power.
A measure of distrust characterized the relationship between local 
policymakers and the national government in the 1970s and 1980s. Local 
policymakers experienced national intervention in cycling govern-
ance in the 1970s as both heavy-handed and insuff icient. The national 
government distributed cycling funds sparsely yet required an arduous 
bureaucratic procedure that local policymakers found hard to master. 
According to the Public Works ministry, municipalities showed a lack of 
initiative and stamina in applying for subsidies and constructing cycling 
infrastructure. In 1978, Public Works minister Tuijnman said that he could 
not spend all the money he had reserved for cycling because local authori-
ties failed to submit enough projects.80 MPs faced the problem they could 
not judge who was right: what went on behind the policymaking scenes 
at the Ministry and in municipalities was hard to gauge.81 All the same, 
the national subsidies formed a major share of the money provinces and 
municipalities invested in cycling, as tables 6 and 7 show. The differences 
are also visible though: some cities relied for a large majority of their 
cycling funding on national money. Others, like Eindhoven, received 
almost none. This might have had to do with different knowledge of the 
subsidy system or adroitness at manipulating it.
77 Ibid., 20.
78 NA 2.19.185 (Archive VNG), inv. no. 2431, meeting VNG with Minister Zeevalking, January 13, 
1982.
79 Kickert, The History of Governance in the Netherlands, 28.
80 Vaste Commissie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting October 16, 1978, 80; “Onzeker of 
provincie aanleg paden met geld kan steunen,” Leeuwarder Courant, November 6, 1978.
81 Vaste Commissie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting October 16, 1978, 102.
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Table 6  City investments in cycling infrastructure in built-up areas, 1975-1980, 
in millions of gulders


















Source: kamerstukken II 1982/83, no. 17745, sub-no. 2 (Nota fietsverkeer), Table 3.8, 41
Table 7  Total amount that provinces spent on cycling paths along secondary and 
tertiary roads between 1975 and 1985, in millions of guilders













Source: Nota fietsverkeer, 37
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7.3 Governing the Redistribution of Urban Road Space
Most innovations came from cities, however. In the mid-1970s, a combination 
of factors created critical momentum for a change in urban mobility policy. 
The wide social unrest over traffic safety, growing environmental awareness, 
increasing knowledge about the health benef its of cycling, and general 
unease about the car’s dominance of public space, triggered a strong wave 
of activism. A new generation of urban planners experimented with ways 
of limiting the car’s access to living areas and public space. The historical 
development of cycling in the Netherlands as a practice, in infrastructure, 
and embedded in personal networks and engineering norms, provided a 
great starting point. Rather than having to create a cycling culture from 
scratch, activists could build on and upscale an existing practice that made 
it easier than elsewhere. The provincial recreational cycling path plans, for 
instance, could be extended to include utilitarian cycling. The design and 
engineering knowledge as well as the bureaucratic procedures were already 
in place. Drawing up province-wide plans including both types of cycling was 
possible – getting national funding for these required addressing different 
national governmental bodies. Provincial planning experience facilitated 
cycling planning, but funding structures stalled progress.
Local engineers and planners undertook many experiments. They worked 
with local cycling activists to f ind the best ways to redesign the city for 
non-motorized transport. Having allowed cars an ever-larger place in city 
centers, planners now had to pioneer ways to undo this situation. Partly with 
national government subsidies (see tables 6 and 7), urban planners created 
new traff ic circulation plans which included more measures for cyclists and 
the f irst tentative traff ic-calming measures.82 Making it impossible for cars 
to traverse city centers but forcing them to go around is one example. The 
wider application of the Woonerf concept, where the speed of pedestrians 
rather than cars or cyclists is the norm, is another. Gradually policymakers 
realized that cycling could solve parking and congestion issues caused by 
the car. According to Drenthe public works engineer and cycling advocate 
Van den Muyzenberg in 1973, this could only happen if the quality of cycling 
facilities improved: once “there are perfect cycling facilities, it will be easier 
for the government to responsibly limit car use.”83 In his own province, the 
82 Oldenziel and Albert de la Bruhèze, “Amsterdam: World Bicycle Capital, By Chance,” 23-24; 
Buiter, “Utrecht: Bicycles Rule – Again,” 35-36.
83 G.A.M. van den Muyzenberg, “De f iets en het verkeer: Pleidooi voor het maken van voor-
zieningen voor de f ietser,” Tijdschrift voor Verkeerstechniek 24, no. 5 (1973): 239-42, here 242.
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town of Assen had already started this: by 1973, the city had built nine cycling 
tunnels to eliminate the barriers and safety risks that cyclists faced when 
crossing major roads or railway tracks. In other words, at least some urban 
policymakers and engineers were already working on improving cycling 
conditions when activists were still getting organized.
Famously, the government sponsored experiments involving the construc-
tion of two highly visible and expensive main cycling routes in government 
city The Hague and textile town Tilburg in 1975. The government’s large 
investments signaled it appreciated urban cycling – though in the end the 
pilots failed to attract more cyclists to these routes. The experiments did 
generate attention for cycling in the engineering community and helped 
engineers develop new expertise regarding urban cycling infrastructure.84 
Nevertheless, cycling activists in The Hague criticized these high-publicity 
pilots because they masked “structural underfunding of cyclists in the 
national Structural Plan for Traff ic and Transport (Structuurplan Verkeer en 
Vervoer).”85 Indeed, these incidental, expensive, and high-publicity policies 
did not solve cyclists’ disadvantaged position in Dutch cities. As activist Eisse 
Kalk pointed out, the investments in cycling were still dwarfed by those 
in automobility and public transit – and were in no way proportional to 
cyclists’ actual modal share.86 Neither activists nor government evaluations 
considered these pilots cost-effective. Each recommended a more piecemeal, 
street-by-street approach. The Cyclists’ Union complained that the projects in 
The Hague and Tilburg were so expensive that they would deter other cities 
from implementing cycling path plans.87 The cycling paths in The Hague 
would cost about 1 million guilders per kilometer. Thus the government’s 
84 A.A.J. ten Broecke and J. Hoekwater, “Kwalitatieve evaluatie van de demonstratie f ietsroutes 
in Den Haag en Tilburg (1),” Verkeerskunde 30, no. 9 (1979): 417-21, and A.A.J. ten Broecke and 
J. Hoekwater, “Kwalitatieve evaluatie van de demonstratie f ietsroutes in Den Haag en Tilburg 
(2),” Verkeerskunde 30, no. 10 (1979): 492-96; A. Dersjant and C. Wentink, “Het gebruik van de 
demonstratie f ietsroutes in Den Haag en Tilburg,” Verkeerskunde 30, no. 8 (1978): 358-61; P.B. 
van Gurp and R.A. Sangen, “Tilburgers op de f iets: een demonstratieproject,” Verkeerskunde 
26, no. 11 (1975): 550-56; P.B. van Gurp and R.A. Sangen, “De f ietsroute Tilburg,” Verkeerskunde 
28, no. 4 (1977): 170-71, 191; Tilburg and Stoovelaar, “De f ietsroute Tilburg: verkeerstechnische 
aspecten,” 163-69; Dienst Gemeentewerken ’s-Gravenhage, Demonstratie-fietsroute Den Haag 
1975-1979 (Den Haag: Dienst Gemeentewerken ’s-Gravenhage, 1978).
85 Berkers, Botma, and Oldenziel, Cycling Cities: The Hague Experience, 39.
86 Metselaar, “De vuist van de gemangelde f ietsers.” According to Kalk that national government 
had reserved 13.5 billion up to 1990 for automobility, 3 billion for public transit, and 350 million 
for cycling, a proportion of 40:10:1 despite cycling’s much larger share of commuter transport. 
Interview Author with Eisse Kalk, May 18, 2021.
87 IISG, Archive Fietsersbond (ARCH01969), inv. no. 24, letter ENWB to Ministry Public Works, 
November 20, 1975.
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extra budget for cycling would cover at most 30 km of cycling paths. Instead, 
the Cyclists’ Union preferred to do more with less. The organization pointed 
to its local chapters in The Hague, Leiden, Groningen, Amersfoort, and 
Utrecht, who had made cycling path plans.88 These cities combined their 
high-cost separated cycling paths on major streets with traff ic calming, 
cycling and pedestrian underpasses and bridges, along with other solutions, 
to create a f ine-grained network of safer cycling routes. In this mix, the 
national subsidies for building expensive traff ic separation infrastructure 
were crucial. By contrast, traffic calming was cheap. Yet, this meant reducing 
car space, not always the case with cycling facilities. Cyclists’ Union activists 
sometimes deplored the lack of political will to take this approach.
The government’s policy goal was not just to make cycling safer – some-
thing engineers knew how to do: it had always aimed to reduce the potential 
for conflict on busy streets or at junctions. Now politicians and activists 
also wanted to make cycling inherently more appealing. Their next goal was 
convincing people to hop on a bicycle rather than drive their car, by providing 
shorter connections between home, work, and recreation. Civil engineer 
Rodenburg observed in 1975 that engineers previously only built cycling 
infrastructure in places where potential conflicts could arise between drivers 
and cyclists. Increasingly, cycling infrastructure like tunnels was built in 
places with low cycling levels, but where this infrastructure could offer 
more comfortable cycling and create more direct downtown connections.89 
This shift from a more reactive to a more proactive stance illustrates the 
changing public status of utilitarian cycling: no longer a necessity but the 
better mobility option.
Cyclists’ Union activists and volunteers introduced a new strategy. 
Identifying the most urgent blackspots and bottlenecks in the city, they 
often worked closely with traff ic planners to create a list of priorities. Before 
the 1979s, urban cycling policy – if it existed at all – was largely ad hoc. 
Now local planners and engineers had to pay more sustained attention to 
cycling, activists thought, preferably working with them. Urban planner 
Poelstra noted in 1977 that the planning procedures for car infrastructure 
or public transit were “professional” while cycling had to make do “with 
wishy-washy planning guidance [halfzachte planmatige begeleiding].”90 
88 Ibid.
89 R.H.J. Rodenburg, “Enkele voorbeelden van f iets- en voetgangersvoorzieningen in en rond 
woonwijken,” Verkeerskunde 26, no. 5 (1975): 256-68.
90 H. Poelstra “De (brom)fietser: zijn plaats in de plannen en planvorming. 4e preadvies: Plannen 
maken voor de f iets; enkele kanttekeningen,” in Congres fiets- en bromfietsvoorzieningen Tilburg 
1977 (Den Haag: ANWB, 1978), 28.
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Poelstra’s point was illustrated by fellow engineer M. Slop at Utrecht’s Traffic 
Department. He acknowledged the many enthusiastic attempts by “private 
persons” (particulieren) to place cycling higher on the agenda: “The political 
pressure on the traff ic engineer to do a bit more for cyclists/moped riders, 
is undeniable.”91 Cyclists and urban citizens’ everyday experiences formed 
the input for policy. As a result of public-private cooperation, almost every 
community developed a cycling policy document in the 1970s or 1980s. Two 
Rotterdam Traff ic Service (Verkeersdienst) off icials stated bluntly in 1974, 
that “every self-respecting municipality is currently involved in making plans 
to improve cycling facilities” citing the energy crisis as to why awareness 
of cycling’s potential was increasing.92
91 M. Slop, “De (brom)f ietser: zijn plaats in de plannen en planvorming. 5e preadvies: Waarom 
niet meer groene golven voor (brom)fietsers?,” in Congres fiets- en bromfietsvoorzieningen Tilburg 
1977 (Den Haag: ANWB, 1978), 30.
92 H. Been and G. van der Kolk, “Fietsverkeer in steden,” Tijdschrift voor Verkeerstechniek 25, 
no. 4 (1974): 164.
Figure 30 Action groups like the Cyclists’ Union, Stop the Child Murder, and the Pedestrian Associa-
tion collaborated to convince politicians and engineers to introduce traffic calming measures like 
lowering the speed limit in urban areas. At this 1980 press conference they argued about reducing the 
50 km/h maximum speed in built-up areas (the banner reads “50 is too much”). Within a few years, 
the national government allowed municipalities to create zones with a 30 km/h speed limit. Action 
groups and politicians converging on these issues from 1975 to 1985 made this an important decade 
for reducing the car’s place (and speed) in the city [Source: Nationaal Archief, Rob Bogaerts/Anefo, 
no. 931-1415]
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In the 1980s, the Cyclists’ Union consolidated and extended its user-based 
expertise.93 Apart from local activism, national study and working groups 
were created around a specif ic topic, including stimulating bicycle parking 
(at train stations and shopping centers), combating bicycle theft, cycling in 
shopping areas, and collecting and recording cycling engineering expertise 
in design manuals for policymakers. In lobbying, the Cyclists’ Union strove 
for lowering maximum speeds in built-up areas and more focus by local 
government on the maintenance of cycling paths.94 Regarding traff ic rules, 
the Cyclists’ Union also wanted to allow cyclists to turn right when traff ic 
lights were red. The Cyclists’ Union strongly supported improving the bicycle-
train combination in multiple ways. They worked with Dutch Railways (NS) 
in 1980 to assess problems with cycling routes to stations, parking facilities, 
and the possibility of taking the bicycle on the train.95 Bicycle parking in 
general was a major talking point.96 Cyclists’ Union f igures like Pax Kroon 
thought about the bicycle’s role in before-and-after transport.97 The Union 
also considered a national registration system to prevent bicycle theft, and a 
better cycling signposting system.98 Much of this pioneering work returned 
in Bicycle Masterplan experiments and pilot projects in the 1990s (see 8.1).
Cyclists’ Union activists contributed much to the production of urban 
planning design knowledge for cyclists. True to their belief that cyclists 
were the true experts, they came up with the essential qualities of a good 
cycling network: cohesion, directness, safety, comfort, and attractiveness. 
Directness, for instance, could be improved by building bicycle bridges or 
tunnels where cyclists previously had to take detours. Reducing traff ic 
distances would make cycling routes shorter than competing car routes. The 
Groningen Cyclists’ Union observed this in the early 1980s and contacted 
the Twente Technical High School, where students developed ideas for 
93 Bram Duizer, “In het nut van actie moet je geloven”: Dertig jaar actievoeren door de Fietsers-
bond (Utrecht: Wetenschapswinkel Letteren Universiteit Utrecht, 2005), 15-22; Interview Tom 
Godefrooij and Jaap Rijnsburger, June 2, 2021.
94 Dick Ringlever, “De deskundige is de f ietser zélf,” Trouw, Oct 18, 1980.
95 “NS inventariseert knelpunten voor f iets bij stations,” Nederlands Dagblad, March 12, 1980; 
“Fietsverkeer trein te weinig gestimuleerd,” Leeuwarder Courant, November 1, 1980; “ENFB 
organiseert actie ‘Fiets en trein’,” Het Vrije Volk, October 21, 1982.
96 “ENFB wil meer stallingsgelegenheid bij leeszaal,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, April 10, 
1982; “In hart Rotterdam tóch bewaakte f ietsenstalling,” Algemeen Dagblad, August 25, 1982.
97 Wim Bont, “Fiets met bus en trein mee,” Het Vrije Volk, December 24, 1980.
98 “Plan om f ietsendieven te remmen,” Algemeen Dagblad, January 31, 1981; “Politie lost maar 
1pct f ietsendiefstallen op,” Het Vrije Volk, November 9, 1984; Jacques de Jong, “‘Aangepaste 
wegwijzers nodig voor f ietsers’,” De Volkskrant, September 27, 1982; “ENFB wil speciale wegzijzers 
voor f ietsers,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, October 6, 1983.
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cheaper bicycle bridges. Groningen alderman Jacques Wallage used these 
in the city’s subsidy applications to the national government.99 Comfort 
included providing maintenance: the Cyclists’ Union also lobbied for this 
often overlooked task.100 A 1984 memorandum noted that tiles were often 
used as paving (for the city’s easier access to underground pipes rather 
than for cyclists’ comfort) and that budgets for the maintenance of these 
paths were insuff icient and not likely to be increased.101 These road-users’ 
perspectives of the built environment were novel.
The Cyclists’ Union also formalized their cycling engineering documenta-
tion. The experience gathered in Amsterdam on the width of cycling lanes, 
paving types, junctions, and so on, was too valuable to lose. Amsterdam 
subsidized the Cyclists’ Union in 1987 to document design knowledge 
in a manual. As cycling policy was about to be decentralized from the 
municipality to neighborhood councils, cycling activists feared the 
knowledge would be lost. The design manual would help safeguard the 
quality of cycling infrastructure.102 Amsterdam eventually published the 
manual in 1991.103 It was well-received and – with a national subsidy – 
became a national manual.104 Published in 1993, Drawing for the Bicycle: 
Design Manual for Bicycle-Friendly Infrastructure (Tekenen voor de fiets: 
ontwerpwijzer voor fietsvriendelijke infrastructuur) contained the knowledge 
garnered by engineers and local activists.105 Not every member of the 
Cyclists’ Union supported the move away from street actions. Duizer has 
shown how some members did not believe in writing memoranda and 
working with authorities. They wanted to be physically present in the 
streets. As one activist explained the rationale: “You have to believe in the 
usefulness of activism … you cannot prove it … an action forces a choice, it 
polarizes.”106 But it was precisely this polarization that was not welcomed 
99 “Groningen ziet wel iets in f ietsbruggen,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, January 16, 1981.
100 “‘Fietspad langs Stadsweg vertoont tal van gebreken’,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, October 20, 
1983; “ENFB in actie voor onderhoud f ietspaden,” Nederlands Dagblad, May 8, 1984.
101 Marc van den Broek, “Pad voor f ietser is hobbelig en slecht aangegeven,” De Volkskrant, 
August 28, 1984.
102 Marnix Bruggeman, “Handboek laat wegbeheerder door een f ietsbril kijken,” Trouw, 
October 9, 1987.
103 “Amsterdam publiceert handboek f ietsbeleid,” NRC Handelsblad, July 23, 1991.
104 Duizer, “In het nut van actie moet je geloven”, 25. See Jan Ploeger, Wegwijzer fietsvoorzieningen: 
Uitgangspunten en planvorming (Ede: Stichting CROW, 1990).
105 Jan Ploeger, “Tekenen voor de f iets,” Verkeerskunde 44, no. 11 (1993): 22-25. Updated versions 
appeared in 2006 and 2016, in Dutch and English.
106 Vogelvrije Fietser 7, no. 1 (1981): 6. Cited in Duizer, “In het nut van actie moet je geloven”, 16. 
Duizer took the title of his study from this quoted passage.
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by the majority of Cyclists’ Union members: the Amsterdam branch, for 
instance, had identif ied no fewer than 400 bottlenecks in the city, and 
wanted to focus on working with city off icials to solve these.107 With the 
growth of occasional project subsidies from the government, the Cyclists’ 
Union’s national bureau could professionalize and hire staff members. At 
the same time, the local chapters remained entirely voluntary and their 
performance and character differed from place to place. The gap between 
these local chapters’ activities and the national organization widened 
steadily.108
The Cyclists’ Union 1980s focus on improving cycling facilities did not 
directly address the issue of rising automobility. Not all cycling-facilitating 
projects reduced car space or the conflict between drivers and cyclists. 
According to social democrat MP De Hamer – a former council member 
in the pioneering cycling city of Groningen – the state could not solve 
the fundamental power imbalance between car drivers and vulnerable 
cyclists with subsidies for cycling paths. Politically, the government could 
construct cycling paths because drivers appreciated how removing cyclists 
from the road improved the flow of cars. But the funding structure neither 
allowed for, nor was it applied to the task of making junctions safer, as 
shown in f igure 31. Consequently, the conflict between driver and cyclist 
returned at crossings. More effective would be cycling tunnels or facilities 
that shorten travel time, which the cycling paths alongside major arteries 
did not necessarily achieve. Despite investments in such infrastructural 
solutions, safety was still an issue.109
Local policymakers repeated throughout the 1970s that they, more so 
than national authorities, were willing to make the more fundamental 
political choice: restrict automobility. When applying for national gov-
ernment funds, local engineers found it hard to convince state engineers 
of the need to facilitate “slow traff ic.” According to the municipality of 
Sassenheim in a 1979 Association of Dutch Municipalities (VNG) report: 
“there is a signif icant difference in point of view between an agency like 
the Public Works Department … and the municipality. These agencies 
primarily consider the interests of motorized traff ic f low (doorstroming) 
and the like. You could say that the weaker the road user, the harder it is 
for municipalities to get a facility for them from national or provincial 
107 Ibid.
108 Interview Tom Godefrooij and Jaap Rijnsburger, June 2, 2021.
109 Bijzondere Commissie voor het Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer (14 390) en het Meer-
jarenplan Personenvervoer 1980-1984 (15 885), meeting February 18, 1980, 1018-1019.
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Figure 31 Cycling tunnels like these near Vreeland, Utrecht, enabled cyclists to cross larger roads safely 
and prevent detours, making cycling a more attractive option. Since the 1970s, cities increasingly 
invested in such tunnels in response to broad public demand for cycling and safety. Part of the budget 
came from national governmental subsidies. [Source: Collectie HUA, fotograaf Provincie Utrecht, 
nr. 847441]
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Public Works.”110 In the same report, the cities of Amersfoort and Eindhoven 
mentioned how the national government prioritized flow over traff ic safety. 
At points where nationally or provincially owned roads crossed local roads, 
this could lead to conflicts with Public Works engineers, like the funding 
request from the municipality of Etten-Leur for a cycling tunnel.111 The 
nationally administered road, also a major traff ic artery for cyclists, ran 
right through the center of the built-up area. Plans to construct a bypass 
had been postponed indefinitely. According to the local policymakers “the 
safe and fast crossing of traff ic on the national road onto local roads in our 
municipality is a primary responsibility for the national government.”112 In 
other words, these local policymakers believed the town was responsible for 
traff ic safety, but if national roads created the problems, the state should 
provide the funds to mitigate them.
The conflict between investments in infrastructures or making politi-
cal choices only increased. As the urban cycling landscape changed, the 
investments in separate infrastructure along suburban and rural roads that 
had started back in the 1920s and 1930s, continued gradually even in the 
1950s and 1960s. At the same time, the national and provincial government 
investments in car infrastructure kept on rising after the 1970s. And despite 
the change of direction in urban mobility policy, urban policymakers still 
supported driving. The state built more and wider roads. So cyclists alongside 
these roads were now only safe on separate cycling paths. Table 7 shows 
that the provinces, partly with national subsidies, but predominantly using 
their own funds, spent 266 million guilders on paths between 1975 and 
1985. They generally paid much more for cycling paths than their nominal 
50 percent subsidy entitlement. The part the province paid indirectly still 
came from national government, in the form of the general roads budget 
that provinces received under state funding (Wet Uitkering Wegen).113 This 
money could have been spent on roads rather than cycling paths: the fact 
that provinces also invested in cycling infrastructure shows engineers still 
thought they were necessary. However, in the context of the mid-1980s, 
where decentralization and small government were key ideas, the national 
engineers’ old idea that cycling was a local concern returned with a venge-
ance and ended the subsidy program.
110 NA 2.19.185 (Archive VNG), inv. no. 2428, Concept-eindrapport Gemeentelijk Verkeersvei-
ligheidsbeleid: Een inventariserende case-study van tien gemeenten, 20.
111 NA 2.02.28, inv. no. 6268, letter municipality Etten-Leur to Rijkswaterstaat, November 24, 
1978.
112 Ibid.
113 Kamerstukken II 1982/83, no. 17745, sub-no. 2 (Nota Fietsverkeer), 37.
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7.4 Decentralizing Cycling Governance (Once Again), 1985-1990
The 1980s changing political climate led to decentralization of the 1970s 
experimental national cycling governance and funding. In 1982, a new 
center-right government came into off ice. Facing economic problems and 
influenced by neoliberal ideas, it introduced austerity measures and privat-
ized some state agencies. Decentralization also became popular again.114 
The national cycling subsidies, hard fought by activists and MPs, were 
prime candidates for cuts. National government off icials had argued many 
times over the years that cycling governance belonged at the local level. 
As a result, in the mid-1980s, conservative liberal Public Works minister 
Neelie Smit-Kroes (VVD) ended the cycling subsidy program.115 Although 
the agency did not question cycling’s status as a public good, it reduced 
funding and slowed down the implementation of cycling policies. The agency 
now devoted more attention and budgets to rising car congestion issues.116
The break in policy came in 1983, when the government announced 
its intention to decentralize governance. The off icial document Cycling 
Traff ic Memorandum (Nota Fietsverkeer), dedicated entirely to cycling, was 
written when Smit-Kroes headed the Ministry of Public Works (1982-1990). 
This f irst national cycling policy document represented the culmination 
of f ifteen years of activists and politicians working hard to put (urban) 
cycling higher on the agenda. The memorandum also emphasized that, 
going forward, the national government considered cycling governance 
exclusively a matter for local government – and significantly – in cooperation 
with action groups.117 National policymakers still envisioned playing a large 
part in cycling governance, even when Smit-Kroes refused a coordinating 
role: the provinces should solve any friction themselves without national 
intervention.118 The only remaining national tasks would be knowledge-
centered like sponsoring research on cycling safety. Citing a commitment 
to decentralization, by stressing in her report to Parliament the national 
114 Michiel S. de Vries, “The Rise and Fall of Decentralization: A Comparative Analysis of Argu-
ments and Practices in European Countries,” European Journal of Political Research 38, no. 2 (2000): 
193-224, here 206. Subsidies for urban renewal projects were also scaled back in the 1980s: Kaal, 
“A Conceptual History of Livability,” 541; De Liagre Böhl, Amsterdam op de helling, 403.
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government’s limited role, Smit-Kroes was indicating how little involvement 
the Ministry wanted in cycling in the 1980s.119
Arguing that national cycling subsidies were no longer necessary, the 
Ministry of Public Works replaced them with a general deposit in the Pro-
vincial and Municipal Funds. Without being explicitly earmarked, however, 
there was no guarantee the money would be spent on cycling facilities. In 
the meantime, MPs tried to continue the subsidies, but failed.120 To defend 
its decision to discontinue the funding, Public Works agency argued that 
the subsidies had always been a temporary measure to stimulate local 
government to rapidly improve cycling safety. According to Minister Smit-
Kroes: “The aim of this contributory arrangement for constructing cycling 
facilities was incentivizing lower government to implement an active policy 
that would promote safe cycling traff ic and bicycle use.” She believed that 
“we have achieved this policy goal.” Stimulus was no longer necessary as 
“bicycle traff ic has an important place in local government traff ic policy.” 
And as a result of the subsidies, “improvements to infrastructure have 
strongly increased the potential for using bicycles safely and comfortably.” 
She summed up: “The need for national government to provide a f inancial 
incentive for constructing cycling facilities has diminished, which was the 
background to dismantling the contribution arrangement.”121 That was not 
entirely correct. The early 1970s policy documents did not say that goading 
local engineers and planners into cycling policy was the purpose of the 
cycling subsidies. It seems Smit-Kroes presented this narrative to boost the 
case for decentralization – the subsidies had always been intended as “an 
injection to address the municipalities politically,” to point out “their own 
responsibility” for cycling.122
MPs and policymakers denounced the decentralization of cycling funding 
as thinly veiled austerity cuts. The small left-wing PSP party leader, André 
van Es, considered the end of the subsidies was “shifting poverty from the 
national government to the provinces and municipalities.”123 Tommel, of 
the center liberal party D’66, criticized the claim that this policy f itted into 
decentralization and that cycling governance belonged at the local level, 
as a transparent lie: “This has nothing to do with decentralization but is all 
119 Kamerstukken II 1982/83, no. 17745, sub-no. 1, letter Minister of Public Works Smit-Kroes to 
Lower House, January 19, 1983.
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121 Vaste Commissie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting November 2, 1983, 26. See also meeting 
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122 Vaste Commissie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting December 5, 1983, 13.
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about prioritization within the national government’s f inancial policy. Or, 
to put it bluntly, with this government, the cyclist pulls the short straw [het 
kind van de rekening]. Children are often the victims.”124 The end to cycling 
subsidies was even harder to swallow because cities could still request 
national funding for large infrastructural projects. This in effect excluded 
cycling facilities that were too small to qualify.125 According to Tommel, 
the relatively small amounts made it all the harder to understand why this 
subsidy was stopped in the f irst place, citing a total annual spend of 500 
million guilders on new car infrastructure (f igures 27 and 28). Under the 
guise of decentralization, the minister’s austerity cuts and political decisions 
hit cyclists. According to labor MP Rienks (PvdA), traff ic safety and pro-
cycling subsidies had been “interred in the deregulation graveyard, without 
opposition from the governing parties.”126 These MPs did not necessarily 
oppose decentralization. Rienks trusted provinces and municipalities were 
interested in providing better facilities for cycling, but feared that without 
extra funds, this policy would stall.127 He pointed out how many parties had 
repeatedly requested funds, implying that they should f ind some middle 
ground, as was common in Dutch political culture. Minister Smit-Kroes, 
backed by the right-wing VVD and CDA majority, refused any concessions.
Still, it was not an easy right-left wing divide. Though the VVD came to 
be a pro-car party, prominent members advocated funding for cycling. Smit-
Kroes’s fellow party member MP Annemarie Jorritsma-Lebbink criticized 
the decentralization of cycling policy.128 She wondered “whether the catching 
up is really suff icient to justify the dismantling of the national contribu-
tion,” adding that she wanted to know how the Ministry would continue to 
incentivize lower government because “the backlog is still large.”129 Another 
prominent VVD politician, Hans Wiegel, at the time Royal Commissioner 
in Friesland, echoed this criticism. At a regional meeting of entrepreneurs 
and roadbuilders, Wiegel called the abolition of the subsidies “a painful 
development.” After a slow start, local authorities were now developing 
cycling path projects in greater numbers, so money was urgently needed. 
Worse, the minister lied about her true motives: according to Wiegel, she 
intended to transfer the cycling subsidies to the National Road Fund, where 
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other provinces.130 Wiegel believed national policies marginalized both 
the province of Friesland and cyclists.
Cities and provinces also objected to the notion that cycling facilities 
were adequate, requiring no further state support. The provincial lobby 
organization IPO, for example, criticized the idea that the cycling path 
backlog had been solved. The provinces, having aimed to provide 90 percent 
of secondary and 70 percent of tertiary roads with cycling paths in 1987, did 
not reach this target. The subsidy had to continue.131 The provincial lobby 
found the prospect of the provinces going from sharing 24 million for cycling 
infrastructure in 1984, to sharing only 5 million in 1985, “plainly alarming.”132
The national government’s refusal to coordinate cycling governance 
created a governance vacuum, once again. It allowed non-governmental 
actors to continue their central role. In the 1980s, many European coun-
tries privatized public sector domains or placed them under independent 
regulatory bodies. The neo-corporatist notion that advisory bodies of social 
group representatives could balance interests was discarded.133 For cycling 
governance in France, as Maxime Huré shows, advertising companies like 
JC Decaux and Clear Channel jumped into this governance gap and played 
a large role in establishing urban bike-share systems.134 Industry actors’ 
role was less prominent in the Netherlands. Still, since the 1960s, Dutch 
bicycle producers had collaborated through Bicycle Foundation (Stichting 
Fiets). It published brochures advocating more cycling infrastructure in an 
attempt to make cycling more attractive and sell more bicycles.135 In the 
late 1980s, it also established a working group for utilitarian cycling, with 
major interest and industry groups on board.136
The Cyclists’ Union continued to lobby at a national and local level. 
Increasingly, professional local branches established permanent working 
130 “Nieuw pleidooi Wiegel voor snelweg Midlum naar Zurich,” Leeuwarder Courant, October 25, 
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relations with local policymakers.137 Leading members believed acquiring 
traff ic expertise to become a legitimate and useful governance partner had 
been a successful strategy, because “the public and policy world recognize 
the ENWB [Cyclists’ Union] as an expert advocate for cyclists.”138 Like the 
ANWB, the Cyclists’ Union gained access to most policymakers and traff ic 
committees. National and local government repeatedly invited them to advise 
on cycling issues.139 In a different context from fifty years before, the Cyclists’ 
Union nevertheless managed something similar to the ANWB: enter into the 
policy coalition by employing expertise as a source of power and legitimacy.
Looking back at the period between 1975 and 1985 and examining the 
policy landscape, the Union believed it had managed to raise cycling’s 
status as a public good. More politicians considered the bicycle a valuable 
transport mode worthy of promotion and enhancement. Importantly, traff ic 
engineers took bicycle plans seriously as an integral part of mobility and 
infrastructure planning.140 The Cyclists’ Union denounced the national 
government’s refusal to decide once and for all whether to back the bicycle, 
however. The same corporatist governance model (poldermodel) that gave 
cycling activists the opportunity to influence policy also meant the state 
was unwilling to antagonize car drivers. Measures limiting car use were 
much rarer than those favoring bicycle use with no overly negative impact on 
drivers. Even as the national government invested more in cycling facilities, 
the highway budget continued to rise throughout the 1970s. The Cyclists’ 
Union differentiated three government level approaches. The national 
government invested increasingly more in the maintenance and construction 
of national roads and cut unprofitable public transit lines. Provinces on the 
other hand “create cycling path plans, but they do not provide a network 
of low-traff ic [autoluwe] roads, a much more fundamental way to create 
safe cycling connections.”141 The Union found the municipalities the most 
innovative in their choice of a different, more bicycle-friendly policy, “often 
forced by practical necessity.”142 As elsewhere, Dutch urban policymakers 
were at the vanguard of bicycle planning.
The state’s retreat from cycling governance created alternative formats to 
f ill the national governance gap. To ensure a national network of recreational 
137 Duizer, “In het nut van actie moet je geloven”.
138 IISG, Archive Fietsersbond (ARCH01969), inv. no. 22, Kruipolie magazine, October 1985, 






cycling infrastructure in the absence of strong state guidance, for example, 
stakeholders founded the National Cycling Platform (Landelijk Fietsplat-
form) in 1987.143 Both the ANWB and the Cyclists’ Union held prominent 
positions in this platform. Next, citizens played a national role: Cyclists’ 
Union volunteers were involved in designing – and organizing road signage 
for – long-distance recreational routes (so-called LF-routes) across the 
country.144 The Ministry of Agriculture, which had taken over the role from 
the CRM Ministry after that ministry was dismantled in 1982, subsidized 
these recreational routes.145 In many of these instances, national politicians 
and engineers showed through their subsidies they considered these types 
of cycling a public good, but the initiative for such projects had to come 
from non-state actors or local policymakers. In short, at the prompting 
of a cycling-friendly electorate during the 1970s and 1980s the national 
government created complicated and laborious funding instruments. It left 
cycling governance and innovations to lower governments and non-state 
actors, however.
7.5 Conclusion
Cycling’s rising status as a public good in the 1970s and 1980s led to a prolif-
eration of policies and initiatives. Many national politicians addressed the 
social protesters’ concerns about the unacceptable dangers and prioritization 
of car traff ic in extensive discussions in Parliament and parliamentary 
committees. They accepted and promoted the framing of cycling as a solu-
tion to increasingly pressing issues caused partly by automobility, such 
as environmental pollution, congestion, and the deteriorating quality of 
urban public space. Cycling remained enduringly popular as a recreation 
mode. As a result, policymakers and activists worked together at a local 
level to unmake the car-centered city. Provincial policymakers coordinated 
these efforts and mediated between local and national government. At the 
national level, MPs put serious pressure on the Ministry of Public Works 
to not only invest more in cycling, but also take on a larger directing role.
In short, the division of tasks and responsibilities was the most conten-
tious aspect of 1970s and 1980s cycling governance. Historically averse to 
143 Ad Snelderwaard, Eric Nijland, and Anita Bakker, eds., Landelijk Fietsplatform 1987-2012: 
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interfering with local transport and mobility planning, and preoccupied with 
automobility and highway planning, national engineers resisted the idea they 
should also steer cycling governance. Paradoxically, they insisted on retain-
ing control over awarding individual cycling subsidies to municipalities. 
Local policymakers experienced this form of micromanagement as a sign of 
distrust in their pro-cycling intentions. This was hard to swallow because 
local policymakers were often proactive, innovative, and forerunners with 
their cycling policy initiatives. Alongside these multi-level conflicts, national 
agencies were involved in inter-departmental struggles. Because cycling 
was def ined as utilitarian, recreational, or rural-agricultural, different 
ministries were involved. Relations between these ministries were fraught 
and attempts to assign each other responsibilities failed. In short, while 
national civil servants all paid lip service to the value of cycling, few were 
willing to take up a new or larger role in this policy domain.
Despite these problems on the national level, the large coalition of cycling 
stakeholders made cities signifcantly safer for urban cyclists in the 1970s and 
1980s. For all the struggles over the “rules of the game,” cycling grants existed 
at all levels. The national government spent some 500 million guilders on 
cycling subsidies between 1970 and 1990, while local governments reserved 
sizeable shares of their road budgets for cycling projects and utilized national 
subsidies. Perhaps made more creative by ever scarcer funds, local engineers 
and planners also implemented cheaper measures for traff ic safety than 
building infrastructure. Lowering speed limits or closing streets to traff ic 
cost little and were as effective, even though such measures required political 
courage and willingness as they limited car access to parts of the city.

8 Self-Evident: Mainstreaming Cycling 
Policy and Practice since 1990
“A swimming pool attracts more voters than a cycling path. Before you know 
it, the money has been spent on something else.” Speaking to Dutch MPs in 
1991, Public Works minister Hanja Maij-Weggen expressed her doubts that 
transferring funds to municipalities for cycling would work without strong 
guarantees: “Provinces and municipalities might then spend the money too 
easily on different matters. I, too, have worked in a municipality.”1 But she 
was also critical of how her predecessor Neelie Smit-Kroes had terminated 
the national cycling subsidies. On a provincial level, after 1985, “cycling 
path policy has quite often collapsed.” The country needed a new, national 
cycling policy with a “booster function” (aanjaagfunctie).2 Maij-Weggen 
was suspicious of lower government’s commitment to cycling policies: “it 
would be a sign of overconf idence if I just as merrily [ jolig] transferred 
the funds in question to the provinces and municipalities. After all, last 
time they did not do the things they were supposed to do with them,” she 
thought.3 A role for national governance was called for. It was a remarkable 
turn of events. Just a few years after the national government had decisively 
ended its funding role in cycling governance, Maij-Weggen put national 
cycling governance back on the agenda. After seventy years of government 
involvement in cycling policies, the policy coalition still had no stable form. 
It kept changing. How has this developed and stabilized in the thirty years 
since? Is there a governance equilibrium now?
Cycling’s status, coupled as it is to the f ight against climate change, has 
now reached a new peak. Cycling infrastructure has a higher status as public 
good than before. The traff ic separation system, however, once instigated to 
give drivers more space, is reaching its limits. Urban policymakers – facing 
overcrowded cycle lanes – no longer want to prioritize drivers over cyclists in 
the city. Yet they are still working within this system established in the 1920s. 
The growing popularity of traditional bikes as well as new developments 
in mobility like the rise of the e-bike as well as the continuing presence of 
mopeds, are making cycling paths overcrowded. As cars are increasingly 
banned from city centers and automobility is declining, new questions 




arise about equal space distribution. In cities, off icials have focused on 
speeding up cycling infrastructure construction, raising car parking fees, and 
blocking car access to inner cities. These measures have reinforced the rise 
in cycling levels. In the suburbs, provincial funders have helped build cycling 
highways to boost commuter cycling and promote regional recreational 
cycling networks. A large policy coalition, increasingly also with a European 
dimension, now shapes cycling policy. Given the increasing amount of 
cycling policies and policy documents (and greater availability of sources), 
“Self-Evident: Mainstreaming Cycling Policy and Practice since 1990” takes 
a different direction. It discusses recent governance developments and 
puts them in a historical perspective. Though by no means an exhaustive 
overview of the last three decades of Dutch cycling policy, it takes stock of 
traff ic separation ideology and cycling policy after a century of governance.
8.1 National Government Settles on Expert Role
The national government, having backed away from cycling governance in 
the mid-1980s, introduced new cycling policies already in the early 1990s 
under May-Weggen. Again, this intervention would be short-lived. We 
could describe the state’s role in Dutch cycling governance since the 1970s 
as occasional bursts of high activity followed by little to none. National 
Public Works off icials frame these interventions as attempts to stimulate 
and energize cycling policy at the local level, where it belongs in their view, 
but not as a structural commitment.
The Ministry of Public Works introduced a policy document in the early 
1990s called Bicycle Masterplan (Masterplan Fiets) – a misleading title 
given that the plan entailed funding for many small cycling projects like 
pilots, and increasing bicycle expertise.4 The plan exemplif ies the national 
government’s conviction that its role was to foster innovation and expertise 
rather than coordinate or implement cycling policies. The government 
sought to create new ways to improve cycling safety. For the f irst time, the 
national program also tried to convince drivers to switch to cycling or the 
bicycle-train combination by making cycling more attractive.
National concerns about growing automobility in the late 1980s inspired 
components of the Bicycle Master Plan. It formed part of the major policy 
document Second Structural Scheme for Traff ic and Transport (SVV-II), 
4 This also funded the 1999 study by Albert de la Bruhèze and Veraart, pioneering Dutch 
cycling historiography.
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which the national government introduced in 1988 – and Parliament ap-
proved in 1991. The state committed to large investments in public transit 
(the Rail21 program) and put the brakes on constructing new roads. Despite 
the Netherlands’ reputation as a nation of cyclists, it is also very much a 
nation of drivers. The Dutch Institute for Public Health and the Environment 
(RIVM) reported in 1988, that the Netherlands geographically had the 
highest car density in the world, with 128 cars per square kilometer.5 And 
although local governments facilitated cyclists to some extent, these same 
authorities did not hesitate to build more roads for cars, with the number of 
roads outside built-up areas increasing by 15 percent between 1970 and 1988, 
and within them even by 40 percent.6 As long as separate cycling facilities 
were present alongside these roads, policymakers f irmly believed that high 
cycling levels were compatible with high car levels. This avoided having to 
make a clear choice between either mode.
Nevertheless, there was a limit to growth. The 1991 national mobility 
plan SVV-II sounded the alarm bells: welfare, wellbeing, and prosperity 
were at risk from ever-rising automobility levels.7 The policy document 
represents a period (the late 1980s and early 1990s) when the Dutch national 
government was most willing to take anti-car measures. Both before and 
after, this willingness was at a much lower ebb nationally. By contrast, 
cities have been consistently more committed to curbing car access since 
the 1970s.8 Congestion threatened the accessibility of Dutch cities and 
annoyed car commuters; air and noise pollution plus the fragmentation of 
the Dutch landscape threatened the quality of life; and traff ic deaths were 
on the rise again after a period of decline. To address these issues, the Dutch 
government embraced the definition of sustainable development in the 1987 
Brundtland commission report A Common Feature, as “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.”9 Employing a railway metaphor, 
policymakers formulated a number of “tracks” aiming to reduce pollution 
as well as mobility, through spatial planning – and “Track 15” of SVV-II was 
5 Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiene, Zorgen voor morgen: Nationale 
Milieuverkenning 1985-2010, ed. F. Langeweg (Alphen aan den Rijn: Samson H.D. Tjeenk Willink, 
1988), 44.
6 Ibid., 44-45.
7 Kamerstukken II 1989/90, no. 20922 (Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer), sub-no. 16 (Deel 
D: Regeringsbeslissing), 5.
8 Interview Author with Koos Louwerse, August 12, 2019.
9 Kamerstukken II 1989/90, no. 20922 (Structuurschema Verkeer en Vervoer), sub-no. 16 (Deel 
D: Regeringsbeslissing), 8.
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promoting bicycle use.10 In these policy articulations, the status of cycling 
had fundamentally changed. It had turned into a vehicle to attain the 
government’s overall policy goals.
Cycling could counter automobility’s excess. According to the national 
policy designers, the bicycle was ideally suited to trips up to 5-10 km. The 
campaign’s key aim was to convince drivers to switch to cycling for these 
short trips. National engineers and planners needed to take measures that 
made cycling more and driving less attractive. Track 9 of SVV-II focused 
on the reconstruction of urban space: citing successful experiments in 
the historic city of Groningen and the Utrecht commuter town of Houten, 
policymakers encouraged making city centers more or less car-free.11 Bicycle 
policies revolved around more attractive cycling routes, more parking 
facilities, new measures to prevent bicycle theft, and ways to improve the 
bicycle’s image. From a governance perspective, the national government 
def ined its role as “supporting municipalities and provinces in creating 
attractive and safe cycling route networks” through increased funding. 
To stimulate recreational cycling, policymakers envisioned increased 
cooperation between the Ministries of Public Works, Economic Affairs, 
and Agriculture, as well as between provinces, municipalities, and citizen 
organizations.12
Bicycle Masterplan encompassed several projects, many of which included 
a component to increase cycling expertise and innovations. In Houten, a 
pilot with wind protection screens along a cycling path tested whether they 
could make cycling more attractive. Other projects encouraged bike-public 
transit connections with innovative bicycle parking facilities at bus stops. 
In total, the national Masterplan sponsored thirty-one research projects, 
forty-one pilots, and forty projects to develop and disseminate cycling 
expertise for instance with design manuals.13 The national plan provided 
local policymakers with a more solid foundation for making cycling a safer 
and more appealing option – the national government’s preferred knowledge 
role in cycling governance.
Non-governmental actors played a major role in implementing Bicycle 
Masterplan and cycling policy more widely in the 1990s. For an evaluation 




13 Eindrapport Masterplan Fiets. Samenvatting, evaluatie en overzicht van de projecten in het 
kader van het Masterplan Fiets, 1990-1997, (Den Haag: Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 
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Cyclists’ Union representatives.14 Its local branches possessed the knowledge 
and expertise to comment meaningfully. According to the municipalities, 
the Cyclists’ Union was an “useful ad hoc contact” because of its long and 
active role in cycling governance.15 Representatives of the cities Alkmaar and 
Vlissingen commented that the lack of an influential local Cyclists’ Union 
branch had a negative impact on their ability to promote cycling.16 Their 
own planners lacked the user expertise that cycling activists provided as 
policy input elsewhere. In contrast, Hengelo reported poor relations with 
the local Cyclists’ Union, complaining that the organization’s “details of 
cycling policy (like maintenance) are often lagging behind.” A remarkable 
comment: apparently, the city expected detailed knowledge about the local 
cycling situation would come from activists rather than its very own traff ic 
department.17 The Flevoland municipality Noordoostpolder reported that 
its good relations with the local Cyclists’ Union was a key factor in local 
cycling policy.18 At least one journalist expressed surprise about this close 
relationship: after all, the national government’s investments in cycling 
were a pittance compared to road budgets. So why not adopt a more critical 
perspective? The Cyclists’ Union did not want to jeopardize this relationship, 
considering the state’s early 1990s investments an improvement over the 
1980s situation.19
Minister Maij-Weggen, cited in the opening of this chapter, expressed her 
ambivalence about national cycling subsidies. She believed municipalities had 
not done enough after subsidies ended in 1985, so national investments could 
serve as a kick starter. At the same time, she was suspicious if the money would 
actually be invested in cycling. National Public Works officials wanted to make 
sure local communities did this. In the eyes of Public Works officials, cycling 
should be governed locally. The national contributions to cycling funding 
reinstated in the early 1990s were meant to be just as temporary as those of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. Still, Maij-Weggen, supportive as she was of cycling, 
believed that ultimate responsibility did lie with lower governments; the danger 
with a large role for national government would be “a certain laziness” and 
14 Dirk Ligtermoet et al., Gemeentelijk fietsbeleid: stand van zaken (Rotterdam: Ministerie van 
Verkeer en Waterstaat, Directoraat Generaal Rijkswaterstaat, Adviesdienst Verkeer en Vervoer, 





19 Joop Bouma, “Fooi voor f iets, maar tòch een omslag,” Trouw, September 27, 1991.
312 CYCLING PATHWAYS
a “backing away” by lower government.20 These words show that in the early 
1990s, the national Public Works Ministry had faith in a strong national impetus 
for cycling, even as she continued to frame cycling – like her predecessors had 
done – as a local affair. It also highlights the sometimes-strained relationship 
between national and local government. We can see this as a result of the 
informal, unclear nature of the cycling governance arrangement. The rules 
of the game were constantly changing – and fiercely contested.
For Dutch policymakers and engineers, with their strong belief in de-
centralization, the reintroduction of cycling subsidies was controversial. 
According to MP Jan De Graaf in 1991, Maij-Weggen’s colleague in the CDA 
party, decentralization was government policy – and the minister had to 
stick to that policy. He even commented that “eventually, as far as we are 
concerned already in 1992, no national funds will go to cycling paths.”21 
20 Vaste Commissie Verkeer en Waterstaat, meeting November 8, 1993, 22.
21 Ibid., meeting October 28, 1991, 62.
Figure 32 This (ultimately unsuccessful) experiment with a wind protection screen along a bridge 
was part of the Bicycle Masterplan, a policy document devised in the 1990s. It illustrates how with this 
plan and since then, the Dutch national government has encouraged and boosted innovation and 
knowledge production in cycling, leaving the implementation of pro-cycling and car-limiting measures 
mostly to local government. [Source: Collectie Het Utrechts Archief, Fotodienst GAU, no. 823903]
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In response, the minister spoke out passionately against decentralizing 
cycling subsidies. Pleading for common sense, she said she was “against 
decentralizing for its own sake.”22 She correctly noted that compared to 
highway budgets, the cycling subsidies represented “a relatively small sum.” 
Maij-Weggen insisted on the subsidies because they impacted traff ic safety 
and human lives. What she considered failed decentralization in cycling 
governance had cost lives. Others agreed and attacked De Graaf for his 
proposal to cut cycling subsidies entirely. De Graaf defended this by blaming 
the provinces and municipalities for inactivity, framing his proposal as a 
punishment.
Many national politicians, however, believed that cycling subsidies 
worked. Cancelling them had caused cycling policies to stall in the late 
1980s. According to left-wing MPs Wilbert Willems (green party Groenlinks) 
and Rob van Gijzel (labor party PvdA), no matter who was to blame, cyclists 
should not be the victim of this intergovernmental conflict.23 Van Gijzel 
emphasized that under the Bicycle Masterplan, lower authorities had in-
vested twice as much in cycling while the subsidies were in place, proving 
that “the money in the national budget is an incentive.”24 Van Gijzel also 
pointed out that many communities had submitted projects for subsidies: 
in his view, the national government could and should bear part of lower 
government’s f inancial burden. In general, left-wing parties supported 
cycling, together with a sizeable contingent of the major conservative and 
even pro-car parties (liberal VVD and religious rural CDA).
Indeed, the government’s decision to discontinue a national role for 
cycling policies after the Masterplan concluded in the late 1990s was 
controversial. The independent national advisory board for Public Works 
(Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat) protested vigorously.25 Its report cited 
leading traff ic experts who insisted the government set concrete targets 
for lower governments. These would have to include measurable quality 
improvements and the national government’s commitment to enforce goals, 




25 This advisory council included traff ic scientists. See: Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat: 
Commissie Personenvervoer & Commissie Verkeersinfrastructuur, Advies Rijk op de fiets: advies 
over de rol van de rijksoverheid in het fietsbeleid (Den Haag: Raad voor Verkeer en Waterstaat, 
1995). Cover letter from Committee to Minister Jorritsma-Lebbink, October 31, 1995. The policy 
goals were formulated in the Second Structural Scheme for Traff ic and Transport around 1990. 
Bicycle Masterplan was a product of this policy document.
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the board’s report, Bicycle Masterplan had not achieved its policy goals – now 
left entirely to lower government. The independent experts considered this 
poor governance.26 Achieving policy goals like lowering congestion and CO2 
emissions required promoting environmentally friendly transport modes.
Without strong national government direction, the sustainability goals 
were unattainable. The traff ic experts agreed with the national government 
that constructing cycling paths was lower government’s responsibility. At 
the same time, they argued that cycling was a means of achieving certain 
national policy goals. From a governance standpoint, it was problematic 
to formulate these goals then expect others to work towards them without 
a major national role.27 Lower government, for example, could receive a 
subsidy for their regional traff ic plans, without the national government 
strictly checking the amount of cycling facilities in the plans. Moreover, the 
national government spent perhaps 1 percent of its infrastructure budget 
on cycling.28 In short, critics argued the national government made “paper 
policy” – it paid ample lip service to cycling, yet did not put its money 
where its mouth was.29 The national ambitions became ensnarled in the 
decentralization politics of the 1990s.
The issue of decentralization occurred in a wider political context. In 
the late 1990s, the central government decentralized transport budgets 
entirely to local government under a key policy called the VERDI covenant. 
The Dutch acronym refers to the policy’s aim: make traff ic policy Regional, 
Decentral, and Integral. What made this covenant different to the earlier 
discussed transfer of responsibilities was that the national government now 
created a new funding structure whereby control over funds shifted to the 
provinces and city regions.30 In 1996, the national government introduced 
GDU (Gebundelde Doeluitkering) to replace various national transport 
subsidies with one lump sum of un-earmarked money: provinces could 
divide this money as they saw f it between smaller infrastructural projects, 
including cycling. In 2004, this arrangement was extended. Now called 





30 In recent decades, the Dutch government like elsewhere has experimented with an intermedi-
ary level of government between the province and the municipality: urban region. Variously 
called kaderwetgebieden, stadsregio’s and plusregio’s, these were short-lived.
31 The GDU was meant for projects up to 25 million guilders (11.34 million euros), while the 
BDU was for projects up to 500 million guilders, or 225 million euros.
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the introduction of these measures, the previous “golden strings” method, 
when national government could steer local policy priorities through 
funding allocation, disappeared. Provinces and municipalities became 
more autonomous, prompting a truly new phase in cycling and mobility 
governance. While this went some way to creating a clearer division of 
tasks in cycling governance, in practice, all layers of government remained 
involved in some capacity. Commentators feared the lack of specif ic cycling 
funds would put a halt to lower government investments in cycling. This 
fear proved unfounded, as I discuss in the next section.
Despite this funding decentralization, the national government has 
occasionally been involved in cycling policy since 2000 as more than a 
knowledge broker. As national involvement in automobile and public transit 
planning is vastly larger, national policies tackling congestion or promoting 
rail transport bring extra funding for cycling as well. The extra funding 
came about because the government embraced door-to-door mobility. It 
began to see cycling as ideal to bridge the f irst and last kilometers of people’s 
journeys. This is part of a conceptual shift from transport to mobility as a 
leading planning principle. In this model, individuals’ actual travel choices 
and routes instead of the infrastructure steer the provision of transport 
facilities.32 As Jan Ploeger argues, it was decades-long activism by train users, 
who traveled to and from the station by bicycle, that brought this type of 
integrated travel to the attention of government and railway companies, 
who lacked an integral, bird’s eye view of mobility.33 Having divided up 
tasks and responsibilities, few policymakers or businesses had a systemic 
overview from the traveler’s perspective of their door-to-door experience. It 
required user practice and expertise to point out the door-to-door potential 
of bicycle-train-bicycle journeys.
Since 2000, the role of cycling in chain mobility put the bicycle on the 
national radar in two main ways. First, the national government f inances 
and coordinates the construction of more bicycle parking facilities at train 
stations to boost multi-modal bicycle-train journeys as a substitute for car 
journeys – responding to a long-standing social practice.34 For decades, 
Dutch people have traveled to stations by bicycle. Engineers and planners 
discovered this only belatedly and have applied concepts like multi-modal 
or chain mobility to this old practice. The journey from the station to the 
32 Ploeger and Oldenziel, “The Sociotechnical Roots of Smart Mobility,“ 15.
33 Jan Ploeger, “Waar laat ik mijn f iets?,” Working Manuscript 2021.
34 For the insights to this issue and history, I thank Jan Ploeger whose forthcoming book 
discusses the mutual shaping of train-bike policy and practice.
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destination (places of work, schools) is now also often made by bicycle as 
Dutch Railways have built a successful system of rental bicycles at train 
stations, the public transit bike (OV fiets). Second, recent investments in 
cycling highways between towns are increasing. These wide, high-quality 
cycling routes have priority crossings and cater for (e-)bike commuting as 
a solution for car congestion. What were the governance arrangements for 
these policy goals?
Bicycle parking is essential to encourage commuters to travel by train, 
with the bicycle as before and after transport. Policymakers consider the 
public-transit combination with cycling a premier alternative to car traf-
f ic. Since 2003, the highly successful introduction of shared bicycles at 
train stations, taken over in 2008 by Dutch Railways, has only reinforced 
people’s habit of combining the bicycle with the train for their commute.35 
Where national policymakers often frame cycling as a local mode (to 
be governed locally), trains form a national network and fall within the 
national government’s remit. To policymakers, the hundreds of haphazardly 
parked bicycles at major Dutch train stations presented a chaotic sight. In 
order to relieve overburdened facilities, the national government invests 
heavily in bicycle parking. Policy implementation is left to another national 
stakeholder, state-owned company ProRail, that is responsible for rail 
infrastructure. In 2011, the Ministry of Public Works launched Action 
Plan for Cycle Parking (Actieplan Fietsparkeren). As with previous plans, 
the policy document makes it very clear that national funding is only a 
temporary stimulus. Again, the state believed that long-term responsibility 
for planning and constructing bicycle parking facilities at stations should be 
fully decentralized.36 Local government could sometimes count on national 
subsidies in order to speed up the construction of bicycle parking.37 Utrecht, 
with its central position in the country’s railroad network, completed 
the world’s largest bicycle parking garage at its central train station in 
35 Ploeger and Oldenziel, “The Sociotechnical Roots of Smart Mobility.” For the more recent 
history of commercial bike-share operators, see Brett Petzer, Anna Wieczorek, and Geert 
Verbong, “Dockless Bikeshare in Amsterdam: A Mobility Justice Perspective on Niche Framing 
Struggles,” Applied Mobilities 5, no. 3 (2020): 232-50, and “Cycling as a Service Assessed from a 
Combined Business-Model and Transitions Perspective,” Environmental Innovation and Social 
Transitions 36 (2020): 255-69.
36 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, no. 32 404 (Programma Hoogfrequent Spoorvervoer: Actieplan 
Fietsparkeren [Program High Frequency Rail Traff ic: Action Plan Bicycle Parking]), sub-no. 53, 
3.
37 The ministry heavily subsidized Amsterdam’s construction of extra bicycle parking facilities 
around its Central Station. While entirely local, the project was deemed worthy of investment 
in the 2010s.
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2019 (see f igure 33). The nation’s capital Amsterdam pledged to spend 15 
million euros annually between 2012 and 2020 for the same purpose.38 In 
2020, ProRail announced its goal to increase the current 490,000 bicycle 
parking places at train stations to 600,000 by 2030, depending on local 
and national government’s willingness to co-f inance.39 In 2016, another 
governmental agreement transferred national funds to local policymakers 
to increase bicycle parking places at train stations and strengthen the 
bicycle-train combination.40 In recent years, the railroad authority has 
signif icantly upgraded and expanded many major Dutch bicycle stations.41 
We should note that these measures are in response to cyclists’ demand 
and long-standing social practices. This is not necessarily the case with 
the second national policy.
The e-bike put cycling on the national governance radar as well. National 
policymakers have been promoting long-distance (e-)bike commuting as 
another solution to traff ic congestion.42 This forms an extension of the 
38 Oldenziel et al., Cycling Cities: The European Experience, 26.
39 https://www.prorail.nl/reizen/stations/f ietsen [accessed February 11, 2020].
40 Letter Ministry of Public Works to Lower House, November 26, 2020, 29. https://www.
rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/11/26/bestuurlijke-overleggen-mirt-25-en-
26-november-2020-voortgang-mirt-moties-en-toezeggingen [accessed November 27, 2020]
41 Folkert Piersma and Wout Ritzema, Fietsparkeren bij stations. 20 jaar ontwikkeling, ontwerp 
en realisatie (Bussum: THOTH, 2021).
42 I take these insights from the work of Matthew Bruno, George Liu and Sun Qi, undertaken 
within the Bicycle Challenges and Smart Cycling Futures research programs at Eindhoven 
University of Technology. Matthew Bruno’s work on cycling governance and innovations like the 
bicycle highway or fietsstraat, George Liu’s work on design norms and cycling infrastructure in 
Figure 33 Masses of parked bicycles at Utrecht Central Station in 2009 show the importance of the 
bicycle-train connection for Dutch commuters. Utrecht has since constructed the world’s largest 
underground bicycle parking garage. The national government supports and invests in these facilities. 
[Source: Wikimedia Commons]
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by now time-honored Dutch tradition of constructing separate cycling 
infrastructure. It presents new challenges. The national government 
coordinates and funds the construction of cycling highways, emerging as 
focal point of cycling policy in the Netherlands. Engineers design these 
cycling paths for longer-distance (and often higher-speed) trips, so the 
dimensions are more generous, with right-of-way at crossings.43 While the 
bicycle is typically useful for 5-10 km distances, e-bikes and good cycling 
connections enable longer trips. Noteworthy is that bridging longer distances 
by bicycle represents a return to older mobility practices, common before 
the car made its breakthrough for commuting: until the 1950s, workers often 
commuted over an hour one way by bicycle.44 The government’s policy to 
fund bicycle highways aims to combat car congestion by offering cycling as 
an alternative to drivers – in other words not to help current cyclists, but, 
as Matthew Bruno argues, to create a new group by seducing car drivers 
to choose the bicycle for their commute.45 In the multi-year program for 
infrastructure published in 2019, the Ministry of Public Works announced 
its aim to convince 200,000 car drivers to commute by bike (and train) 
before 2021.46 In a push-and-pull model, the Dutch government prefers to 
make cycling more appealing rather than come up with politically sensitive 
car-limiting measures.
The Ministry of Public Works also formalized its role in cycling expertise 
by creating the central knowledge institution Cycle Council (Fietsberaad) 
in 2001. Combining representatives of municipalities, Dutch Railways, 
the Cyclists’ Union, consultancy, and educational agencies, this national 
institution coordinates the production and exchange of cycling knowledge. 
It disseminates expertise through its magazine Bicycle Traff ic (Fietsverkeer, 
2002-2018, since then entirely online) and a website with a report database.47 
the built environment, and Sun Qi’s comparative work on the rise of e-bikes in the Netherlands 
and China have all benef ited me enormously.
43 George Liu, Marco te Brömmelstroet, Sukanya Krishnamurthy, and Pieter van Wesemael, 
“Practitioners’ perspective on user experience and design of cycle highways,” Transportation 
Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives 1 (2019): 1-8.
44 Bek, “Governing Workers’ Mobility,” book manuscript, 2021.
45 Matthew Bruno and Anna Nikolaeva, “Towards a Maintenance-Based Approach to Mode 
Shift: Comparing Two Cases of Dutch Cycling Policy Using Social Practice Theory,” Journal of 
Transport Geography 86 (2020): 1-11.
46 MIRT Overzicht. Meerjarenprogramma Infrastructuur, Ruimte en Transport 2019, (Den Haag: 
Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Waterstaat, mede namens het Ministerie van Economische 
Zaken en Klimaat, het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2019), 41. See 
https://www.mirtoverzicht.nl/.
47 https://f ietsberaad.nl/
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This reflects the government’s core policy belief that cycling, as a local mode 
of transport, can best be governed locally. Investment in cycling expertise 
also reflects the government’s belief that it is more eff icient in supporting 
research and coordinating policy at a higher level. Over the course of the 
twentieth century, the cycling (engineering) expertise or bottom-up cycling 
user knowledge produced by the non-governmental tourist organization 
ANWB and the Cyclists’ Union has always provided extensive expertise. This 
has informed the more evidence-based cycling policies in the Netherlands. 
In short, the national government has now also adopted that role.
At a national level, recent research points out, engineers are also 
interested in gathering expertise about cyclists’ behavior and choices, 
along with their traditional interest in all kinds of pilot projects around 
infrastructural innovation. Most policies aim to turn drivers into cyclists, 
however, rather than facilitate cyclists already on the road. Only some 
national policy initiatives facilitate existing cyclists.48 One example is the 
Keep on Pedaling (Doortrappen) program that f inds ways to keep senior 
citizens cycling longer – a program financed by the Ministry of Public Works 
and supported by consultancy agencies and NGOs.49 Another example is 
a 2020 best practices report identifying how to use large infrastructure 
projects for automobility to simultaneously improve cycling infrastructure 
in a cost-eff icient way.50 According to the report, “linkage opportunities” 
(meekoppelkansen), refer to the large (highway) projects requiring extensive 
groundwork that offer the opportunity to construct a bicycle tunnel or 
path in the process at much lower cost.51 For instance, the agency plans to 
use the renovation of bridges on the A27 highway to create an extra river 
crossing for cyclists.52 In a way, this is a continuation of older practices: 
48 Bruno and Nikolaeva, “Towards a Maintenance-Based Approach.” Between 2006 and 2009, 
the Ministry of Public Works launched the program FileProof. Like Bicycle Masterplan, its 
smaller projects aimed at reducing congestion. One was Fiets Filevrij (“Bicycle Congestion-Free”), 
encouraging substituting car journeys under 15 km with bicycle trips.
49 https://doortrappen.nl/default.aspx. The potential for higher cycling levels among senior 
citizens is signif icant: Lucas Harms, Luca Bertolini, and Marco te Brömmelstroet. “Spatial and 
Social Variations in Cycling Patterns in a Mature Cycling Country: Exploring Differences and 
Trends.” Journal of Transport & Health 1, no. 4 (2014): 232-242.
50 Bike-minded Design Consulting, M. Lopes Cardozo, and M. Bielderman, Voorbeeldenboek 
fiets: toewerken naar het structureler meenemen van de fiets in rijksprojecten (s.l.: Ministerie van 
Infrastructuur & Milieu, Rijkswaterstaat, 2020).
51 Ibid., 11.
52 Ibid., 50. Other examples are ways to keep cycling routes open during major road works, 
including temporary cycling paths and bridges to prevent people from switching from cycling 
to driving.
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twentieth-century engineers often saw the reconstruction of a road as an 
opportunity to simultaneously upgrade existing cycling infrastructure 
or construct new paths. It also exemplif ies how Dutch engineers have 
historically tried to facilitate cycling and driving in tandem – with varying 
levels of success. When push came to shove, the bicycle also lost out often 
even in the Netherlands.
The national government is also facing legislative issues surrounding 
cycling paths: (e-bike) commuters, sport cyclists, and recreational cyclists are 
using the country’s cycling paths in ever larger numbers, creating potential 
conflicts and prompting questions about who belongs where. The issue of 
overcrowding on the dedicated cycling infrastructures is a return to the 
1950s debate surrounding the moped’s place on cycling paths. Today, this 
debate has returned, prompting f ierce debates about where moped riders 
(brom-versus snorfiets) belong. Cities like Amsterdam are now experimenting 
with banning these mopeds on paths and moving them to the roads.53 In 2015, 
Parliament asked the minister of Public Works to investigate this issue. The 
ministry organized network meetings to discuss pilot projects and solutions 
with numerous stakeholders. These included governmental branches and 
agencies (provinces, municipalities and transport regions, traff ic police, 
CROW central knowledge center), industry lobby organizations (RAI and 
BOVAG), interest groups (ANWB, Cyclists’ Union, recreational cycling union 
NTFU), and traff ic safety lobby group VVN and the scientif ic institute for 
traff ic safety SWOV.54 Cycling (at different speeds) is so popular that it is 
presenting congestion and safety issues in certain areas and on cycle paths 
inside and outside cities. The overcrowding of the country’s existing cycle 
path system represents a new challenge for policymakers, but most of all 
highlights the limits of the traff ic-separation model of engineering. After 
almost a century of following this model, urban planners are now exploring 
a return to the mixed spaces that were the norm before engineers adopted 
traff ic separation in and outside cities.
Based on the analysis in previous chapters, national policymakers’ 
involvement in the cycling policy coalition demonstrates a wave-like 
pattern. The national government’s interest in cycling is currently on an 
upward trend as evidenced by rising investments. Until 2017, Dutch coalition 
agreements rarely mentioned cycling. But the 2017 center-right coalition 
agreement announced – again – a one-time sum for cycling: “Because cycling 
53 E.g., at a traff ic safety committee meeting with MPs on June 13, 2019 (Kamerstukken II 
2018/19, no. 29398, sub-no. 735).
54 Kamerstukken II 2014/15, no. 29398, sub-no. 465.
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can be a good alternative for public transit and the car, the government 
invests a once-only sum of 100 million euros for co-f inancing municipal 
and provincial investments in cycling infrastructure and bicycle park-
ing at public transport junctions.”55 This funding went mainly to bicycle 
parking facilities at train stations and cycling highways.56 As part of the 
country’s Climate Agreement (Klimaatakkoord) to fulfil the Paris Agreement 
concluded in 2019, the government set aside an extra 75 million euros for 
bicycle parking.57
The national government’s role in cycling remains contested: the different 
types of cycling are not all governed at the same level. In November 2020, two 
MPs called on the national government to take more “system responsibility” 
for recreational cycling and walking routes, to (economically) stimulate 
tourism. According to the MPs, “recreational cycling routes often coincide 
with utilitarian use and contribute to sustainable mobility goals.”58 It is 
f itting to close our f inal discussion on cycling governance with this example 
as it sums up the national government’s historical role. In response to con-
stant calls and political pressure from social organizations and politicians 
in parliament to play a greater part in cycling governance, the national 
government has been heeding these periodically. Permanent institutional 
embedding has not happened.
8.2 Provinces and Municipalities Double Down
The decentralization of transport funding to the provinces in the late 
1990s strengthened their already signif icant intermediary role in mobil-
ity and cycling governance. The mandate allows provinces to coordinate 
cycling networks at the level just above the city and local communities. 
Still, a 1996 report on decentralization and cycling policy shows how the 
provinces were struggling to f ind their role in cycling governance. The 
experiments to establish so-called transport regions as regional governance 
networks between the municipality and the province were, in most places, 
55 “Vertrouwen in de toekomst: Regeerakkoord 2017-2021, VVD, CDA, D66 en ChristenUnie,” 
p. 40. [https://www.parlement.com/9291000/d/pdfs/Regeerakkoord20172021.pdf, accessed 
February 11, 2020]
56 74 of the 100 million euros are dedicated to bicycle parking facilities at train stations.
57 Klimaatakkoord, p. 77 https://www.klimaatakkoord.nl/klimaatakkoord/documenten/
publicaties/2019/06/28/klimaatakkoord [accessed February 12, 2020]
58 Kamerstukken II 2020/21, no. 34 682 (Nationale Omgevingsvisie [National Environmental 
Vision]), sub-no. 59.
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short-lived.59 At f irst, the provinces thought they could withdraw from the 
cycling policymaking process and leave it to these regional administrative 
bodies. When this was not successful, the provinces had to step in again, if 
only to distribute funds over municipalities.60
National policymakers were not confident about how provinces would 
spend the funds, fearing that local policymakers would perhaps focus on 
large infrastructural or public transit projects, leaving little for cycling.61 
This fear proved unfounded. According to different assessments, local 
government spent 30-35 percent of the transport lump sum (GDU) funds 
on cycling facilities. Of the other 65-70 percent, half went to projects that 
indirectly benefited cyclists like implementing 30 km/h zones and construct-
ing roundabouts and safer junctions.62 Moreover, decentralization was a 
wider political trend. National policymakers have also increasingly made 
provinces responsible for traff ic safety.63 All in all, the suspicion some 
national politicians expressed about lower government’s traff ic policy 
priorities was unfounded.
Regional autonomy meant that the focus on cycling varied widely from 
place to place. In 2003, the Dutch cycling expertise center published a 
policy evaluation in its Cycling Traff ic magazine. It found that eleven of the 
nineteen recipients of GDU funds used them to achieve their own traff ic 
policy goals. The regional authorities in Amsterdam, Utrecht, Eindhoven, 
and the province of Brabant, spent more on cycling facilities than on other 
traff ic measures. Some municipalities had guidelines reserving signif icant 
amounts of GDU funding for cycling.64 The absence of national rules for 
spending GDU funds did not mean that municipalities neglected cycling 
– quite the contrary. This also shows the remarks by Ministers of Public 
59 Thirty transport regions (vervoerregio’s) were planned in the 1990s, but quickly disappeared 
again. Only Rotterdam-Den Haag and the region around Amsterdam still form a formal transport 
region.
60 Menno Post, Decentralisatie van het fietsbeleid: Stuurloos naar de toekomst? (Amsterdam: 
Adviesburo voor Mobiliteit, 1996), 45-46.
61 Lower government had an obligation to contribute f inancially to large infrastructural projects 
for which they received national funding. Contributions to costly projects might swallow up 
the GDU funds, which, however, does not seem to have been the case.
62 “Jaarlijkse GDU-bestedingen vanaf 1996: Aandacht voor f ietsvoorzieningen houdt stand,” 
Fietsverkeer 2, no. 5 (2003): 11. This was also concluded in an evaluation study from 2001: H.W. van 
Altena and B. Rakic, GDU subsidies: Inventarisatie van probleemgebieden en maatregelcategorieën, 
nu en in de toekomst (Veenendaal: Traff ic Test, 2001).
63 Charlotte Bax, Pieter Leroy, and Marjan P. Hagenzieker, “Road Safety Knowledge and Policy: 
A Historical Institutional Analysis of the Netherlands,” Transportation Research Part F 25 (2014): 
131-33.
64 “Met GDU (f iets)verkeersbeleid regisseren,” Fietsverkeer 2, no. 5 (2003): 10-11.
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Works in the late 1980s and early 1990s in a different light: they argued that 
municipalities had spent little on cycling and that further subsidies would 
likely be misspent. The recent history does not bear out their misgivings.
In governance terms, the provinces opted for multi-disciplinary teams 
instead of making one person or provincial body responsible for cycling as 
most cities did. According to policymakers, from a governance perspective, 
civil servants in such teams should come from different departments and 
devote only part of their time to cycling, to integrate it with other aspects of 
their work like spatial planning and recreational policies.65 In other words, 
cycling policy should not be cast in the narrowly defined traff ic policies.66 
These provincial teams worked in informal ways with municipalities to 
coordinate cycling on a regional level. According to a Gelderland off icial in 
2002, the province subsidized municipal cycling paths and solved blackspots, 
while its contact with municipalities was “indirect” and limited to the 
occasional nudge, with no binding agreements.67 In 2003, Stan Lauret, 
a provincial coordinator for cycling in Zeeland, called its role in cycling 
governance a “search for the exact position of the bicycle in the larger whole 
of traff ic and transport, spatial planning, tourism, and recreation.”68 He 
believed that a stimulating and coordinating role for a relatively small 
provincial government like Zeeland was important, if only because most 
off icials lacked traff ic design expertise for cyclists.69 Provinces were com-
mitted to coordinating a provincial cycling route network with local cycling 
networks through subsidies for municipal infrastructure. However, the 
relationships with municipalities often consisted of non-binding agreements, 
mirroring the national attitude towards provincial and local policymakers. 
The rules of the game in this cycling governance coalition remained by and 
large informal.
At the urban level, cities have intensif ied their already active engagement 
in promoting urban cycling since the 1990s. According to a consultancy 
report, municipalities increasingly and innovatively shaped (intensive) 
65 “Linda de Klein-Bevers, provincie Brabant: ‘Wees realistisch: de wereld verandert niet in 
één keer’,” Fietsverkeer 1, no 2 (2002): 9.
66 Around 2000 these provincial teams of civil servants existed, for example in Gelderland 
(Unit Fiets), Noord-Brabant (FietsAdviesTeam) and Zeeland (Zeeuws Coördinatiepunt Fiets).
67 “Johan Leferink, provincie Gelderland: ‘Behoefte aan uitwisseling met andere provinces’,” 
Fietsverkeer 1, no 2 (2002): 8.
68 “Coördineren en stimuleren: Het f ietsbeleid van de provincie Zeeland,” Fietsverkeer 2, no. 5 
(2003): 8.
69 Lauret notes how not all off icials were aware of CROW guideline publications, partly 
explained by the fact that only 25 percent of traff ic policy off icials had a traff ic engineering 
education.
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cycling policy.70 Since the early 1990s, cities have continued to implement 
pro-cycling measures by addressing the blackspots activists mapped out, 
while simultaneously intensifying car-limiting measures in city centers.71 
The researchers concluded that history matters: communities and cities 
that started a cycling policy earlier, had a more mature cycling network 
than others.72 Policymakers in cities like Den Bosch or towns like Emmen 
and Hengelo considered the longer local tradition of cycling policy a plus.73 
Civil servants confirmed the value of a stable, long-term commitment to 
cycling by building cycling cities. In a series of interviews with the cycling 
expert magazine Cycling Traff ic, the experts believed the winning formula 
for creating cycling cities consisted of good design principles coupled with 
continuous f inancial and individual support. In 2005, Zwolle’s government 
off icial for cycling policy, Willem Bosch, asserted that the principles and 
routes in the city’s 1978 Cycling Traff ic Plan still guided its policy. The 
city invested every year in cycling and its traff ic off icials spent half their 
time on cycling infrastructure: realizing something like the 1978 Zwolle 
plan was costly and its implementation was only gradual. It required a 
long-term commitment from policymakers. As a result, Zwolle boasts an 
extensive network of cycling paths and traff ic-calmed streets, including 
many cycling tunnels.74
Local policymakers generally approve of their national counterparts’ 
focus on producing cycling expertise. Civil servants, particularly in smaller 
municipalities, do not always have the resources or relevant knowledge to 
adequately design cycling facilities. Here the provinces and national govern-
ment can play an important role in promoting the expertise of institutes like 
the cycling expertise center CROW.75 Before the formal founding of such 
nationally funded expert centers, policymakers shared expertise and best 
practices informally. A case in point is the town of Veenendaal, which in 
the 1970s adopted the Delft-pioneered network design principle, providing 
cyclists with a f ine-meshed network of safe cycling infrastructure and 
limiting detours as much as possible. Veenendaal’s version – many other 
communities applied the Delft principle less strictly – included cycling 
tunnels at several hundred-meter intervals in a new railway embankment. 
70 Ligtermoet et al., Gemeentelijk fietsbeleid, 7.
71 Ibid. in Utrecht: Buiter, “Utrecht: Bicycles Rule – Again,” 36.
72 Ibid., 10.
73 Ibid., 34-35.
74 “De lange adem van Zwolle: Perfecte f ietsroutes,” Fietsverkeer 4, no. 11 (2005): 1-7.
75 “Coördineren en stimuleren.” Lauret noted that 40 percent of Zeeland’s civil servants had 
a background in tourism and recreation, a key sector in this coastal province.
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Cyclists no longer had to make detours.76 Cities also discovered that compact 
urban expansions resulted in shorter distances for cyclists: planners often 
designed new neighborhoods close to their town centers to keep distances 
to the city center cyclable.77 Sharing and producing these insights centrally 
might create more uniformity in the future than the earlier history of Dutch 
cycling governance.
For now, local dif ferences remain signif icant. And, as they have 
throughout the twentieth century, the right people at the right time can 
still make a major difference, especially at the provincial and city level. 
According to historian Hans Buiter, it was not until the 1990s that the city 
of Utrecht actually started constructing a city-wide network of cycling 
paths.78 Pro-cycling policies were implemented more enthusiastically and 
speedily under left-wing traff ic councilors like Hugo van der Steenhoven 
in the mid-1990s, he wrote.79 According to Adri Albert de la Bruhèze, in the 
case of Enschede, the presence of an active social democratic councilor, 
Dick Buursink, made all the difference in curtailing car traff ic and giving 
back road space to cyclists.80 Other cities considered cycling so crucial 
that policymakers could implement policies for cyclists regardless of the 
ruling parties’ political color.81 The Cyclists’ Union, on the other hand, has 
criticized such dependence on a local councilor’s stance. The organization 
wants more long-term guarantees that local government will provide safe 
and attractive cycling facilities regardless of elections and who happens to 
be in power.82 Importantly, it presents cycling as a non-partisan issue and 
public good. In the Union’s view, a stable bureaucracy consisting of off icials 
who remain in function when political coalitions change, guarantees some 
continuity to protect cycling.
Cities may have the freedom to promote cycling as they see fit. Urban poli-
cymakers occasionally articulate their frustration at the state’s inconsistent 
attitude and the lack of f irm backing. Echoing the national advisors’ critique 
of decentralization in the late 1990s, they criticized the lack of national 
support in 2004. In a decentralized mobility governance structure without 
76 “Het comfortabele netwerk van Veenendaal: Verwennerij per 300 meter,” Fietsverkeer 4, 
no. 12 (2005): 4-7.
77 Dirk Ligtermoet, “Het f ietsklimaat van Culemborg: waarom Nederland zo’n f ietsland is,” 
Fietsverkeer 10, no. 27 (2011): 10-14.
78 Oldenziel et al., Cycling Cities: The European Experience, 36-39.
79 Ibid. Van der Steenhoven later became chairman of the Cyclists’ Union.
80 Ibid., 47.
81 E.g., Eindhoven: ibid., 60-61.
82 Post, Decentralisatie van het fietsbeleid, 75.
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clear national support for anti-car measures, municipalities will conceivably 
end up competing in attracting business and residents by presenting their 
area as the most accessible by car. After all, the national government, citing 
economic motives, keeps on investing in Dutch highway infrastructure and 
encouraging high car use levels that impact cities. This leads to conflict 
between government levels. As of 2021, for example, the Dutch national 
government has committed to widening a highway through the Amelisweerd 
woodland near Utrecht – scene of a half-century-long protest starting in 
the 1970s (see 6.2) – over both the city and the province’s objections. Urban 
authorities f ind it hard to achieve traff ic calming outside city centers even 
after designing downtown areas for cyclists and pedestrians.83 Increasing 
evidence shows that it is hard to promote cycling levels without simultane-
ously discouraging car use.84 According to a civil servant in The Hague, like 
elsewhere, policy documents on cycling multiplied, for example with the 
Multi-year Bicycle Program 2003-2007. In the end, he argued, what truly 
made a difference for cyclists was the adoption of strict car restrictions in 
the city center in 2009 under the new Traff ic Circulation Plan.85 Has the 
Dutch mobility policy tradition of facilitating both driving and cycling 
reached its limits? Or can further shifts from driving to cycling only be 
achieved by making driving more expensive or otherwise less attractive?
Urban cycling governance has recently come to mean more than just 
infrastructure provision. For most of the twentieth century, cycling govern-
ance equated almost exclusively to the construction of cycling paths. Theft 
prevention and bicycle parking have been part of urban cycling policy since 
the 1950s. Fifty years on, local policymakers are working hard to make cycling 
more inclusive and accessible in order to improve the mobility of groups 
with few options (the so-called “traff ic poor”). Around 2010, Amsterdam 
earmarked funds to boost cycling among groups of people who normally 
do not cycle much.86 With low levels of cycling (for Dutch standards) and 
many immigrants, Rotterdam’s policymakers in particular have committed 
to making cycling more inclusive and combat transport poverty.87 The 
port city is particularly sensitive to how a lack of mobility options can 
hamper citizens’ ability to access jobs or recreational possibilities and 
83 “De plek van de f iets in gemeentelijk verkeersbeleid,” Fietsberaad 3, no. 9 (2004): 15-17.
84 Lucas Harms, Luca Bertolini, and Marco Te Brömmelstroet. “Performance of Municipal 
Cycling Policies in Medium-Sized Cities in the Netherlands since 2000.” Transport Reviews 36, 
no. 1 (2016): 134-62.
85 Berkers, Botma, and Oldenziel, Cycling Cities: The Hague Experience, 49.
86 Oldenziel et al., Cycling Cities: The European Experience, 25.
87 Berkers et al., Cycling Cities: The Rotterdam Experience, 55.
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is working to solve this through cycling.88 These initiatives highlight “a 
broader approach” to cycling policies instead of the almost exclusive focus 
on building cycling paths in earlier decades. Today, investments in aspects 
like bicycle parking and broadening user groups are part of cycling policy. 
This policy now comprises more than just safe infrastructure, showing 
that it has met cyclists’ basic needs and that cycling has become a normal 
and mature activity in most Dutch cities.89 It f its into a larger trend of 
policy attention for door-to-door mobility rather than a narrower focus on 
(physical) infrastructure.
A f inal governmental development to discuss here is the role of regional 
governance as an intermediate level between the city and the province. This 
is, in a sense, not new. The citizen cycling path organizations in the f irst 
half of the twentieth century also operated on a regional scale. When their 
operations were incorporated by provinces and municipalities in the 1950s, 
they often chose a regional scale of operation. This level f its quite well with 
providing primarily recreational cycling path networks. With the increasing 
popularity of commuter journeys by e-bike, policymakers recognize the 
regional scale as also appropriate for governing this type of cycling.
One outcome is that regional authorities jumped on the idea of cycling 
highways as their new mandate: wide cycling routes with priority at cross-
ings, allowing (suburban) commuters on (e-)bikes to get to work quickly. The 
longer distance and cost of these routes require multiple municipalities to 
collaborate in the construction beyond their boundaries. Today, provinces 
play a key role in creating regional cycling routes, often in the form of 
cycling highways. The province Gelderland, for example, is very active.90 
In the Arnhem-Nijmegen region, policymakers have targeted drivers more 
explicitly than before, aiming to get more of them on bicycles. Facing rising 
automobility, the town of Arnhem, traditionally focused on public transit 
rather than a specif ic cycling policy, came up with a more dedicated cycling 
policy in 2013. This included regional cooperation to set up more cycling 
highways.91
Other policymakers invested in regional cycling networks. Policymakers 
in The Hague, which already has high rates of interurban cycling in the 
region, consider bicycle highways a solution to traff ic congestion. According 
to Berkers, Botma, and Oldenziel, the investment represents a departure 
88 Ibid., 55-56.
89 Ibid., 57.
90 https://www.snelf ietsroutesgelderland.nl/ [accessed 07-02-2020].
91 Berkers and Oldenziel, Cycling Cities: The Arnhem and Nijmegen Experience, 45-46.
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from older ideas about cycling as an urban mode associated with “traff ic 
calming, urban livability, relaxation, and fun.”92 They suggest that these 
paths, and the increasing popularity of e-bikes and speed pedelecs, facili-
tate a new kind of fast cycling more akin to car driving than traditional 
cycling – in this region, interurban commuting by bicycle had a long history. 
Research in the busy Rotterdam-The Hague region showed that on the A20 
highway, a third of all cyclists rode no more than 15 km each time. With the 
extended radius of the e-bike, these distances are bikeable, if the barrier 
of the highway can be solved with cycling bridges and tunnels.93 In 2008, 
Enschede started a regional program for a 60-kilometer-long, 4-meter-wide 
cycling highway.94
From a governance perspective, these networks involved several mu-
nicipalities that required regional cooperation. Arnhem, Nijmegen, and 
the surrounding communities started to collaborate regionally in 1988.95 
Such cooperation between city regions and the non-governmental Cyclists’ 
Union succeeded in convincing the Ministry of Public Works to fund cycling 
highways.96 Partly because of the many e-cyclists’ longer range, Rotterdam is 
also working in the Metropolitan Region Rotterdam-The Hague to complete 
a regional cycling path network.97 Rather than seeing these collaborations 
as a true innovation, they are the return of older but forgotten governance 
practices.
8.3 Cyclists’ Union Professionalizes Further
In the 1970s and 1980s, cycling activists established themselves as impor-
tant stakeholders in the Dutch cycling governance coalition. Increasingly 
throughout the 1980s, policymakers at various levels welcomed their input in 
cycling policymaking. Local branches, albeit to a varying extent, maintain 
good contacts with local policymakers and sometimes receive subsidies. 
The Cyclists’ Union has become a part of the governance network that is 
taken seriously by other stakeholders. During parliamentary debates on 
the Bicycle Masterplan in 1992, MPs often invoked the Cyclists’ Union 
92 Berkers, Botma, and Oldenziel, Cycling Cities: The Hague Experience, 51.
93 Bike-minded Design Consulting, Lopes Cardozo and Bielderman, Voorbeeldenboek fiets, 98.
94 Oldenziel et al., Cycling Cities: The European Experience, 48. Total projected costs were 45 
million.
95 Berkers and Oldenziel, Cycling Cities: The Arnhem and Nijmegen Experience, 44.
96 Ibid., 50.
97 Berkers et al., Cycling Cities: The Rotterdam Experience, 56.
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opinions and comments on the proposed policy.98 With a view to this plan, 
the national government awarded the Cyclists’ Union a modest subsidy to 
“professionalize” its activities. According to the parliamentarians, these 
subsidies were valuable for improving the quality of regional and local 
cycling policies as “local branches of the ENFB usually have a good idea of 
how (local) interests of cyclists are best served.”99 Like the ANWB in the 
1920s, the Cyclists’ Union had legitimacy as a professional actor. Indeed, so 
valued was its input, that it became a semi-public institution – still nothing 
like the ANWB which employs several thousand people. The ANWB also 
has an independent source of income from its large member base as well as 
its commercial activities selling goods and services for tourism.
Feeling the competition from the Cyclists’ Union and the general shift 
in public opinion, the tourist organization ANWB has increased its focus 
on cycling in the past thirty years. Due to the alternating evaluations of 
automobility and cycling since the 1970s, the ANWB has to some extent 
rediscovered its roots. In 2011, MPs noted that the ANWB had called for 
transferring money from car infrastructure budgets to cycling infrastructure. 
Socialist MP Paulus Jansen (SP) called this “revolutionary” because it was 
hard “to suspect the ANWB of leftist sympathies.”100 The organization has 
also undergone signif icant changes. Throughout the twentieth century, the 
ANWB developed more and more commercial activities. Unifying these 
business activities with lobbying and advocacy work in one organization was 
too diff icult. In 1996, the organization split into a commercial branch and 
a foundation. Having jettisoned commercial activities, the foundation had 
to redefine its role. In the past twenty years, volunteer activities, including 
in cycling, have increased again.101
The Cyclists’ Union continues to call on national government to direct 
and support lower government more robustly in providing better and safer 
cycling environments, and to formulate concrete policy framework and 
intervene if local government fails to achieve its goals.102 Traff ic safety and 
the quality of cycling infrastructure have advanced dramatically over the 
past f ifty years, and the Cyclists’ Union keeps pushing for further improve-
ments. In particular, it would like to lower maximum speeds in built-up 
areas from 50 to 30 km/h. For drivers this is a controversial issue. However, 
98 Kamerstukken II 1991/92, no. 20922 sub-no. 120.
99 Kamerstukken I 1991/92, no. 22300 XII/22 300 A/22 300 G, sub-no. 177b, 19.
100 Kamerstukken II 2010/11, no. 32660, sub-no. 15, 4.
101 Buiter and Staal, Het avontuur van de ANWB, 156-81.
102 Post, Decentralisatie van het fietsbeleid, 75.
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the activists point to the data showing that many accidents happen on 
50km/h roads. In 2020, the Dutch Parliament accepted a motion to make 
30km/h the default speed in these areas and only allow 50 km/h on certain 
roads. Lobbying at the national level is combined with continued pressure 
from local branches.
While developing professional expertise, the Cyclists’ Union still col-
lects cyclists’ local experiences as input for better cycling policy. First, an 
alternative means of stimulating municipalities to undertake pro-active 
cycling policies is the Cyclists’ Union tool Cycling Balance (Fietsbalans, 
introduced in 2000). From the start in 1975, the Cyclists’ Union defended 
user expertise as an indispensable source of good cycling policy. Second, 
through its innovative “bottleneck memoranda,” it relayed this user expertise 
of where cyclists encountered diff iculties in their journey to local engineers. 
With the publicly visible Cycling Balance tool, the Cyclists’ Union ranks 
Dutch cities’ cycling environments on a host of issues. Third, coupled to 
this is the election of the best cycling city in the Netherlands – the fact 
that this is a coveted annual title is further proof of the improved status of 
urban cycling over the past f ifty years.
This initiative also shows that the Cyclists’ Union upholds the value 
of gathering user-based expertise: via Cycling Balance, it collects a large 
amount of data, using among other things a specially equipped bicycle 
to measure the maintenance quality of cycling infrastructure. Instead of 
leaving this measuring to civil servants, the Cyclists’ Union puts pressure on 
cities to raise their standards and make themselves invaluable as governance 
partner.103 In 1990, Gelderland province, in a memorandum on a provincial 
cycling path plan, wrote that “there is a need for structural contact with 
the Cyclists’ Union” because they had “local knowledge” and “know what 
problems occur in practice.”104 As early as 1994, Union volunteers did a 
quality check on cycling infrastructure in the province Flevoland. The 
province processed the results in policy documents.105 And in 2006, the 
province Noord-Holland asked the Cyclists’ Union to make an inventory 
of its problems, resulting in a report with 190 points of improvement.106
103 Veraart, Emanuel, and Oldenziel, “Eindhoven: Engineering a Path for Bikes?,” 60.
104 Jan van den Broek, “Op de f iets de provincie in!,” (Fietsersbond ENFB, 1990), 40.
105 “Fietsersbond ENFB keurt f ietsroutes in Flevoland,” Fietsverkeer no. 4 (1994): 3.
106 “Provincies willen meer grip op besteding gemeentelijke subsidies,” Fietsverkeer 6, no. 17 
(2007): 23. The reporters are Fietsersbond Landelijk Bureau and afdelingen Noord-Holland, 
Top 10 knelpunten op de hoofdfietsroutes per regio in Noord-Holland (Haarlem: Fietsersbond, 
2008). An update appeared in 2016: Piet van der Linden, Knelpunten in het hoofdfietsnetwerk 
in Noord-Holland 2016 (Utrecht: Fietsersbond, 2016). For online access, see respectively https://
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In all these instances, provincial policymakers could have asked their own 
engineers to do this research or hired a consultancy agency. Instead, they 
looked to the Cyclists’ Union for expert advice. In an evaluation of a Bicycle 
Masterplan study, many municipalities mentioned their relations with the 
local branch, proactive or otherwise, as a key factor in their extensive cycling 
policy success.107 Because of the Cyclists’ Union structure, its relationships with 
policymakers differ, depending on local branches’ visibility and activity.108 
Increasingly, working with local policymakers is hampered by the fact that 
(smaller) municipalities possess ever less in-house expertise and outsource 
many of their tasks to consultancy agencies. This makes it harder for the 
Cyclists’ Union to lobby local government: who to address in the absence of 
knowledgeable and influential civil servants? Where in the past these civil 
servants served for a long time in one place, allowing activists to build lasting 
personal relationships and gain influence, this has changed in recent decades.109
In short, the Cyclists’ Union maintains its role as intermediary between 
users and government off icials. The bottleneck memoranda idea still exists 
in digitized format. In 2005, the local Arnhem branch created a “digital 
hotline” to forward complaints about dangerous or annoying situations: by 
2009, the city had solved 95 percent of these cases.110 Local policymakers 
mostly take such citizen complaints seriously. Although one civil servant in 
the village of Hardenberg opined in 2010 that a new separated cycling path 
was not strictly necessary since no traff ic accidents had occurred on this 
road, he believed “too many cyclists feel unsafe” and “keep insisting.” It was 
sometimes “public pressure” that led to the reconstruction of a road junction 
or crossing.111 This relationship between cyclists and local government 
through the Cyclists’ Union, dating back to the 1970s, remains a workable 
governance arrangement at local level. As of 2020, the Cyclists’ Union had 
150 local branches across the country.
With the state’s decentralized approach to cycling governance and 
municipalities spreading cycling policy over various departments, the 
Cyclists’ Union believes it is the guardian of coordination. According 
to Fred Feddes and Marjolein de Lange, Amsterdam’s Cyclists’ Union 
www.noord-holland.nl/Onderwerpen/Verkeer_vervoer/Fiets/Beleid/Knelpunten_in_het_hoofd-
f ietsnetwerk_in_Noord_Holland_2016.org [last accessed March 16, 2020].
107 Ligtermoet et al., Gemeentelijk fietsbeleid, 34-35.
108 Van den Broek, “Op de f iets de provincie in!” 53, 56, 70.
109 Interview Author with Tom Godefrooij and Jaap Rijnsburger, June 2, 2021.
110 Berkers and Oldenziel, Cycling Cities: The Arnhem and Nijmegen Experience, 45.
111 Dirk Ligtermoet, “De geleidelijke weg naar een prettig f ietsklimaat,” Fietsverkeer 9, no. 26 
(2010): 24-28, here 25.
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illustrates this role very well. In 1979, the city created a cycling working 
group with different department off icials as well as local Cyclists’ Union 
representatives.112 When Amsterdam decentralized its civil service into 
district councils, Feddes and De Lange claim that the Cyclists’ Union 
safeguarded the coherence of urban cycling policy. Just as the ANWB did 
at an earlier stage, civil society activists thus served as experts and inter-
mediaries safeguarding policy uniformity. Amsterdam funding enabled 
the local Cyclists’ Union to employ Clasien Slebos, a social geographer, 
to serve the city’s Bicycle Working Group. One journalist remarked how 
the “once so radical action group has now been taken up by the off icial 
bureaucracy.”113 Reflecting on this experience in 1990, Slebos acknowledged 
that there were objections to this close relationship, but she thought, “we 
could achieve more by shaping policy from the inside,” adding that there 
was nothing wrong with “going pragmatic if it is fruitful.”114 The slow 
workings of the off icial bureaucracy frustrated the Cyclists’ Union at times, 
but as Slebos said, ultimately it improved life materially for Amsterdam 
cyclists.115 In short, cycling activists are still happy to work with urban 
policymakers despite the drawbacks. There is enough common ground 
for a fruitful cooperation.
8.4 Conclusion
At present, cycling is thriving in the Netherlands – both as a practice 
and in policies. While the governance status of cycling has remained the 
same, there has been a subtle but marked shift in the status of cycling. No 
longer are policies only geared towards protecting cyclists; they are now 
also considered a tool for achieving sustainability goals. Some policies 
respond to the demands and needs of existing cycling practices like bike 
parking for train commuters, others serve the government goals of reducing 
automobility like cycle highways. The numerous governance coalitions 
that have grown historically and are still being created, mirror the many 
types of cycling and cyclists. The policies attempting to make Dutch city 
centers less accessible to cars and more accessible to cyclists and pedestrians 
112 Feddes and De Lange, Fietsstad Amsterdam, 98.
113 Kees Beekmans, “Amsterdam werkt aan ‘f ietssnelwegen’,” NRC Handelsblad, March 13, 1990, 
7.
114 Peter Kee, “Amsterdam moet de f iets nog ontdekken’,” Het Parool, February 20, 1990, 12.
115 Beekmans, “Amsterdam werkt aan ‘f ietssnelwegen’,” 7.
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– in part based on the continuing cooperation between policymakers 
and the Cyclists’ Union over many decades – are successful. In the most 
urbanized areas of the Netherlands, car usage declined between 2005 and 
2015, while cycling and walking are increasing.116 Between 2004 and 2014, 
statistics show a 9 percent increase in the total kilometers cycled in the 
Netherlands.117 Researchers have also found, however, that the increase 
in cycling kilometers is limited to urban areas.118 Car trips in rural areas 
may also be in decline, yet the average trip length is increasing.119 People in 
rural areas are cycling more kilometers, but much more moderately than 
in cities. Looking at the overall trends, mobility researchers conclude that 
the modal split direction is in line with Dutch cities’ policy goals.120 Bicycle 
sales number around one million a year; increasingly, consumers are leaning 
towards more expensive (e-)bikes.121 Based on the entrenched principle 
of traff ic separation, ever busier cycling paths, with speed differences 
between traditional bicycles and e-bikes or mopeds present new policy 
challenges. Can one type of cycle path, although wider than before, serve 
the needs of all these different cyclists? Fundamentally, cars still have 
priority and cyclists have to cope with the margins – though with cycling 
paths wider, more comfortable, and more ubiquitous than elsewhere. 
Further limiting maximum speeds is another way to make cities safer and 
more attractive for non-motorized traff ic. Increasingly, this also means 
that more policymakers are considering abandoning the longstanding 
commitment to traff ic separation for an approach centered around traff ic 
calming and shared space. Can we turn back the clock on an engineering 
model that has become so literally ingrained in the Dutch landscape over 
the past century?
116 Kennisinstuut voor Mobiliteitsbeleid, Mobiliteitsbeeld 2019 (Den Haag: Ministerie van 
Infrastructuur en Waterstaat, Kennisinstutuut voor Mobiliteitsbeleid, 2019), 39.
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118 See Oldenziel and Albert de la Bruhèze, “Amsterdam: World Bicycle Capital, By Chance,” 24.
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This chapter has shown that Dutch cycling governance still functions 
relatively well despite suffering problems likely to occur in a decentralized 
governance arrangement, where the state has only a minor role. The state’s 
historical role in cycling governance involves constantly questioning whether 
cycling is as much a public good as automobility, and whether state engineers 
are obliged to provide facilities for cyclists. Local government’s involvement 
in  building cycling paths dates from the 1930s. The state only tends to take 
an interest in cycling when it is linked with bigger issues like traff ic safety, 
congestion, or environmental concerns. As soon as the political urgency of 
these issues wanes slightly, national state agencies come up with arguments 
to devolve responsibility for cycling governance to local authorities. Local 
governments often push back. This is no different in the period since 2000. 
However, as local government now has more control over the spending of 
mobility budgets, it can and does shape local cycling conditions, in close 
cooperation with the highly professionalized world of Dutch cycling activists.
 Conclusion Part III
The sharp rise of motorization in the Netherlands in the 1960s created the 
same problems as it had elsewhere in the industrialized West. But a still-
sizeable bicycle culture meant that combatting the negative effects of auto-
mobility played out differently in the Netherlands. Many policymakers still 
considered cycling a practical and typically Dutch mode of transport around 
1970. Activists then added the claims that promoting cycling was a way to 
address pollution issues and the scarcity of (urban) space. What is more, the 
staggering numbers of fatal road accidents, particularly among cyclists and 
children, stirred widely shared outrage and protest. Consequently, cycling 
became a political priority in the mid-1970s. The facilitation of suburban 
commuter cycling, moped riding, and recreational cycling promotion were 
already policy goals, and now urban cycling joined the list of priorities.
In a wider context of environmental and anti-car activism, cycling expe-
rienced a revival in the 1970s and beyond. In the Dutch case, this activism 
was extraordinarily successful. Policies promoting cycling had been in 
place for decades and as policymakers were more positive about cycling 
in the Netherlands than elsewhere, activists could work with the state to 
win back street space from cars. Added to the mix was the bicycle-train 
combination, a popular alternative to the car. Combining bicycle parking, 
and more recently bicycle sharing with the train, was a convenient option for 
long-distance commuting. As congestion and car parking fees rose, driving 
by car to urban centers lost its appeal. Culturally, the always popular but 
unremarkable Dutch bicycle acquired new positive connotations such as 
health and environmental benefits, making the humble two-wheeler even 
more attractive.
Since the 1970s, the major change in cycling’s status as Dutch public good 
has been the more positive evaluation of urban cycling. The 1950s and 1960s 
saw a mixed discourse: certain urban planners, engineers, and police officials 
complained that cyclists were unruly and disobedient road users. Others 
realized that bicycles were more space-efficient than cars and deserved a place 
in urban mobility. They received little or no protection. This changed around 
1970. With cyclists and urban policymakers daily experiencing the congestion, 
air pollution, and hazards caused by automobility, central policy shifted to 
believing that cycling’s place had to be expanded at the cost of driving.
More recently, the value of recreational and suburban commuter cycling 
has come under the spotlight. Throughout the twentieth century, f irst private 
actors and then regional state actors worked on providing infrastructure for 
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recreational cycling networks. With mounting concerns over the importance 
of an active lifestyle, as well as the ever-growing popularity of cycling as a 
sport, facilitating recreational cycling is as important as ever. As to suburban 
cycling, the existing network of separate cycling paths alongside Dutch 
roads is even more important now that the increasing use of e-bikes has 
extended the distances cyclists can cover. Municipalities and provinces are 
promoting this form of mobility as alternative to car journeys.
These shifts in the cycling discourse have had consequences for cycling 
governance. The belief that cycling should be governed locally has been the 
key governance theme since the 1970s. At the same time, many activists and 
politicians demanded that national government supported this local policy 
f inancially and with expert advice. Acknowledging activists’ demands, 
which came out of broader social unrest, national politicians called on the 
Ministry of Public Works to take on cycling policymaking. This call scored 
success in the general political climate of the 1970s and up to 1985. However, 
at national level, the underlying policy belief remained that cycling was 
the provinces and municipalities’ responsibility. Criticism that limiting 
automobility required national support for cycling as an alternative, evoked 
very little response.
Without a clear, responsible institution, cycling governance remained 
dispersed over the various national departments and government layers. 
This obviously created friction and disagreements. Some national ministries 
wanted Public Works to take over the coordination of all cycling policies, but 
this never happened. The subsidies arranged in the 1970s and 1980s also led 
to infighting between municipal and national policymakers. Nevertheless, 
overall investments in cycling at all government levels rose sharply and have 
led to more and safer cycling infrastructure. In addition, the autonomy that 
municipalities enjoyed allowed them to initiate traff ic-calming measures 
and ban cars from city centers regardless of the level of national support.
We cannot overestimate the role of activists in creating these pro-cycling 
policies. Like the tourist organization ANWB f ive decades earlier, the 
Cyclists’ Union has been the bedrock for (urban) cycling policies. Armed 
with detailed knowledge of local road and traff ic conditions, and thanks 
to good media contacts, these activists successfully put pressure on local 
policymakers. Belief in the value of the expertise everyday cyclists possessed 
has paid off: this knowledge of local road conditions and mobility patterns 
was indeed useful for local policymakers and helped the Cyclists’ Union 
gain a place in the cycling policy coalition.
In the Netherlands, 1970s activism found an attentive audience because 
popular opinion, political and engineering developments, and a wave of 
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activism all converged. Firstly, the wider public was experiencing a changing 
mentality and cultural perception of traff ic safety and environmental 
degradation. Parents – mothers in particular – organized many spontaneous 
and local protests against unsafe cycling routes for children, demonstrating 
the widespread support for better cycling infrastructure. It is a sign of a 
functioning democracy that local off icials listened to these calls. Crucially 
important too was cycling’s broad-based modal share: many Dutch men, 
women, and children still used the bicycle for everyday mobility in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Consequently, activism did not aim to create better conditions 
for future cyclists, but for safer, possibly life-saving conditions for people 
who were already cycling. It was about maintaining an existing and vibrant 
culture of cycling under threat. This lent cycling activism a much greater 
sense of urgency and made the claims on local policymakers so much more 
powerful. Environmental awareness was also growing: the Club of Rome 
1972 report Limits to Growth had a huge impact in the Netherlands, more 
so than elsewhere, and followed by the 1973 Oil Crisis, increased many 
people’s resistance to the car.
Secondly, government engineers traditionally already built cycling 
infrastructure outside cities: believing in the model of separating traff ic 
streams as the best solution, engineers started constructing separated 
cycling paths along major roads in the 1920s and continued this model 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s. There were some but not many cycling 
lanes in cities. Nevertheless, the start-up costs of constructing urban cycling 
infrastructure were relatively low because provincial engineers could extend 
a tradition of rural cycling path construction to the city, with national 
subsidies. The Dutch government was also used to working on cycling 
policies with non-governmental partners because of the major role the 
ANWB played historically. While the character of the new action groups 
differed initially, their pragmatic and constructive approach worked well 
with the urban Public Works administrations. The Dutch political culture of 
compromise and consensus helped the action groups. It was not diff icult to 
access advisory boards or local policymakers. Again, the ANWB provided a 
precedent thanks to its presence in numerous traff ic-related governmental 
institutions since the 1920s. Finally, there have always been politicians and 
engineers interested in cycling – this is inevitable given the high numbers 
of cyclists in the Netherlands. In the early 1970s, many local governments 
were making cycling policies. These were perhaps not all great policies, nor 
informed by extensive knowledge of cyclists’ behavior and preferences, but 
they demonstrate an intention to foster cycling. And they greatly increased 
activists’ chances of f inding a willing ear at their local city hall.
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Over the past f ifty years, Dutch activists, engineers, and planners have 
worked towards implementing a vision of mobility that dates from the late 
1960s. Central to this vision are aspects such as improving traff ic safety 
(especially for vulnerable cyclists), enhancing urban livability through the 
redistribution of space, and combating pollution by substituting car trips 
with bicycle trips. This process requires time, money, and effort. Implementa-
tion cannot happen overnight as urban streets and neighborhoods must be 
transformed in turn. Over a f ifty-year time span however, with policymakers 
committed to this vision, and activists continually guarding its progress, 
this ongoing process has achieved a remarkable transformation in how 
Dutch public and traff ic spaces are designed.
 Conclusion
In the 1930s, an accountant by the name of Duyts from the village Loosdrecht 
decided to build a cycling commuter path himself, because the government 
had failed to provide one. Today’s Dutch cyclists do not think twice about 
having a state-built network of infrastructure at their disposal, allowing 
them to travel safely through and between cities and tour nature over a dense 
network of cycling infrastructure. Few cyclists stop to wonder how this net-
work came about. What made the government realize that providing cycling 
infrastructure was a public task? Cycling Pathways argues that contested 
political compromises, unintended consequences, and path-dependent 
developments all played a role. As with any material infrastructure, creating 
a network depended on signif icant investments and political effort. Prior 
to the 1920s, non-state actors invested in dedicated cycling infrastructure 
before making the case for cycling infrastructure as a public good. By putting 
cycling on the agenda – and providing road engineers with user-based and 
lay expertise – cycling citizens played a key role. Within state circles, much 
energy and manpower have gone into creating this system – even though 
the f inancial instruments, while larger than elsewhere in the world, are 
dwarfed by public investments in automobility.
In Cycling Pathways, I set out to address a wider question: why the Nether-
lands has become one of the world’s leading cycling nations. While there are 
multiple explanatory factors, this project focuses on the governance processes 
behind cycling, asking: to what extent has Dutch cycling governance since 
1880 contributed to the Netherlands’ success as a cycling country? By taking 
a long-term view covering over a hundred years, as well as a multi-level view 
of governance, this book adds to our knowledge of Dutch cycling history 
from an international perspective. It shows how provincial and national 
policymakers, as well as non-state actors and advocacy groups, played a crucial 
role. The study also ref ines our insight into the key role of urban politics. 
Some aspects of these findings are more novel than others. The research here 
builds on established scholarship, confirming many of its conclusions with 
new evidence for some of its claims. It also offers several original arguments.
Explaining Dutch Cycling Success
Remarkably perhaps, there never was a masterplan for building Dutch 
cycling infrastructure. It is the product of a general positive attitude towards 
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cycling and a gradual accumulation of material infrastructure, built over 
a period of decades by several different, partially overlapping coalitions. 
Cycling Pathways examines the role of politics and social movements in 
creating this habit among Dutch engineers of constructing cycling infra-
structure. Still, explaining the historical trajectory of Dutch cycling from 
an international perspective is no easy task. There is no single factor that 
explains everything. While this book’s focus is politics and social move-
ments, other causal factors proposed by Albert de la Bruhèze, Oldenziel, 
and Veraart are also crucial: the availability of mobility alternatives, the 
(urban) landscape, and the cultural status of cycling. The late adoption of 
automobility, the compact nature of the Dutch (urban) landscape, and the 
bicycle’s positive cultural connotations are major reasons why the Dutch 
have always cycled so much. However, each factor matters, and each shapes 
cycling policy. The way these different factors have reinforced one another 
goes a long way toward explaining cycling’s success as a mode of transport 
and recreation in the Netherlands. Compared to other countries, there were 
few obstacles and many factors favoring cycling.
A potentially vibrant cycling culture needs a material infrastructure 
consisting of roads, cycling paths, and other facilities. Together, these 
should make it possible to ride a bicycle in a way that cyclists perceive 
as suff iciently safe and comfortable to make it preferable to alternatives 
such as the car or public transit. In other words, the governance of space 
distribution, risk, and traff ic safety, and of cycling as a public good, needs 
to be a positive factor. This infrastructure – a key topic in this project – is a 
necessary condition for achieving high cycling levels, but not the only one. 
I trace how stakeholders shaped this process of governance over more than 
a century. The central theme running through all the chapters is that the 
Netherlands has benefited from an evolving pro-cycling coalition, consisting 
of influential interest groups from all levels of society on the one hand, and 
on the other, state off icials who have taken the bicycle seriously as a mode 
of transport and recreational vehicle.
The politics of infrastructure discussed here are hard to disentangle from 
other factors. Cycling advocates’ successful claims for cycling infrastructure 
as a public good have a cultural component: the high status of cycling – not 
framed as working-class, outdated, for children, or purely recreational 
– partly explains why these claims were successful. The normalization 
of cycling and its framing as a typically Dutch activity made the reasons 
engineers would study it, formulate design norms, and build infrastructure 
around it self-evident. As we have seen, for much of the twentieth century, 
this attention was also limited to certain groups like recreational cyclists 
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or suburban commuters. At no point, however, did a majority of cycling 
policymakers come to see cycling as an outlandish activity unworthy of 
government attention. We could say that cultural factors underlie the politi-
cal and governance outcomes and are a fundamental explanatory factor.
There is also a positive feedback loop connecting cycling practices to 
infrastructure provision in the Netherlands, a process we could term path 
dependent. The growing network of cycling infrastructure supported 
cycling as a practice by making it a safer and more comfortable option, 
even when mobility alternatives became more widely available. As a result, 
more people continued cycling and forced policymakers to keep taking 
cycling seriously. This also meant that by 1970, social movements had a 
large power base in the Netherlands. Again, this process of infrastructure 
provision was uneven, and engineers implemented it slowly over decades. 
A combination of separate infrastructure outside cities and relatively low 
car ownership levels within cities made cycling during the mid-twentieth 
century such a practical option that the Dutch did not need to think twice 
about it. The subsequent rise in car ownership, coupled with the neglect 
of urban cyclists, led to waves of protest in the 1970s resulting in policies 
which have once again made cities more welcoming to cyclists. Cycling is 
now often faster, cheaper, and more pleasant than driving or taking public 
transit. This is partly an outcome of infrastructure: cycling routes creating 
shortcuts where cars need to take detours, bicycle parking facilities next 
to stations and shopping centers, and so on. The bike-train combination 
kept cycling relevant as commuter distances grew and more citizens kept 
on cycling. The interlocking and reinforcing factors of politics, culture, and 
the practice of cycling itself created a positive spiral in the Netherlands but 
led to the rapid decline of cycling in other countries.
The Dutch have incrementally built a country-wide cycling path network 
that we can consider – uniquely in an international context – a national 
network. Up until the 1970s, this network ended at the urban fringe. Since 
then, urban policymakers have also gradually implemented it in cities. The 
many interactions between local, provincial, and national policymakers, 
stimulated by activists and lobby groups, have connected networks created 
by a variety of actors. Journeys between cities, along rural roads, or in nature, 
are all possible in a network that cyclists experience as one and the same 
national network, which has in fact been built with very different sources 
of funding by many different government and non-government actors.
Historians have studied the politics of urban cycling, the role of the tourist 
organization ANWB, and the early history of bicycle paths and bicycle taxa-
tion to find answers to the question: what has made cycling in the Netherlands 
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so unusual? Missing from this history is the part national government and 
state engineers played in Dutch cycling governance and the provinces’ crucial 
role in mediating between the city and national government. And while 
the authors of the comparative research project Cycling Cities underline the 
significance of the Cyclists’ Union for the urban revival of cycling in the 1970s, 
what is lacking is an analysis of this movement’s origins, its strategies, and its 
relationship with policymakers at different governmental levels. Drawing for 
the first time on rich archival material to fill this gap, my multi-level analysis 
of cycling governance, with a specif ic focus on non-governmental actors, 
constitutes a step forward as we seek to explain the trajectory of Dutch cycling.
Theoretically, the core concepts of the policy arrangement approach and 
path dependency ideas informed my work. I operationalized the concept of 
cycling governance by asking how the provision of cycling infrastructure 
came to be considered a public task. This involves a discursive move: framing 
specif ic types of cycling infrastructure as public good. It also concerns 
policy: how were these discursive beliefs translated into material realities by 
specif ic actors, operating with certain power sources according to specif ic 
rules of the game? The concepts of the policy arrangement approach have 
guided my research questions and chapters. To recap, this approach defines 
a policy arrangement as “the temporary stabilization of the organization 
and substance of a policy domain at a specif ic level of policy making.”1 Ac-
cording to this political science theory, such an arrangement includes policy 
discourse, policy coalitions, power and resources, and rules of the game. In 
what follows, I tease out the main f indings regarding these aspects of policy 
arrangement, focusing in the next section on the discourse on cycling over 
time (cycling politics) and then on the implementation of cycling policies, 
to obtain a bird’s eye perspective of the policy coalitions, their power and 
interactions. After some f inal reflections on the path-dependent elements 
of this process, I then place these f indings within the larger historiography 
on cycling and note the book’s contributions to different f ields.
Making the Case for Cycling Infrastructure
Dutch cyclists were a heterogeneous group. They came from urban, subur-
ban, and rural backgrounds, with social differences between commuting 
1 Bas Arts, Jan van Tatenhove, and Pieter Leroy, “Policy Arrangements,” in Political Modernisa-
tion and the Environment: The Renewal of Environmental Policy Arrangements, eds. Jan van 
Tatenhove, Bas Arts, and Pieter Leroy, 53-69. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), 54.
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and leisure. Throughout its policy history, the government treated them 
differently. Only recently has the state seen and taken all or most cyclists 
into account. The struggle to get cycling recognized as a public good 
has been a political contest: conflicting visions of the right to mobility 
are a source of contention. Starting from the idea that traff ic should be 
separated, driving, cycling, walking, and public transit require different 
infrastructures and therefore compete for public resources: often for the 
same road space and always for funding and politicians’ or planners’ atten-
tion. Traditionally, recreational cycling managed to lay a potent political 
claim – something historians have not yet suff iciently recognized. Later, 
utilitarian cycling – that is, commuters and children cycling to school 
– were even more powerful sources of political claims. For this group, 
historians have not yet systematically studied national and provincial 
politicians’ attitudes towards cycling, nor the records of ministerial and 
provincial engineering committees and working groups. Based on this 
new primary material, my research ref ines and expands our knowledge 
of cycling’s political status since the nineteenth century. Compared to 
the rapid marginalization of cyclists elsewhere, Dutch policymakers 
supported cycling enough to keep it on the agenda in one way or another 
for over a century, and to ensure it would survive until the 1970s came 
around and reenergized political support for cycling. For policymakers, 
cycling was – and is – rarely a goal in itself, but a means to different 
policy ends. Dutch cycling advocates’ success in linking cycling to what 
were salient policy goals at certain times have led to larger investment in 
cycling in the Netherlands than elsewhere. Ultimately, the alignment of 
social movements with cycling policymakers led to a pro-cycling coalition 
more powerful and effective than it was anywhere else, with the possible 
exception of Denmark. From the perspective of cycling advocates, this 
has been a long and hard struggle. Cycling Pathways tells the story of that 
historical contest.
In Part I, “Roots,” I showed how linking cycling f inancially to roadbuild-
ing for cars led to a model of traff ic separation, with engineers providing 
separate cycling paths for rural or suburban cyclists. At a time when public 
transit was either not available or too expensive, and before the car broke 
through, Dutch politicians and engineers acknowledged that utilitarian 
cycling should be a public good: they recognized that cycling gave access 
to employment, schools, and social gatherings. Non-governmental groups 
like the tourist organization ANWB – having transformed from a cycling 
organization to one that, by the 1920s, was also for cars – actively promoted 
this discourse and presented cycling as an activity for the entire nation. 
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Infrastructure that facilitated this was something the state should consider 
funding. Still, the argument only became politically relevant in the context 
of car-centered policies. The introduction of the bicycle tax – and the 
public statistics it generated – meant politicians felt compelled to also 
acknowledge the millions of cyclists, who formed a much larger group 
than drivers. This discourse around giving cyclists something in return 
for their tax money was powerful. The vast number of cyclists brought 
in substantial revenue, unlike car drivers who existed mostly as a future 
projection and in the imagination of policymakers and engineers than 
on the actual road. It is hard to say how positively other countries viewed 
cycling. What historians have shown, however, is that car infrastructure 
became a more highly valued public good in other countries. Economic 
and cultural arguments helped prioritize automobility: motorized vehicles 
were the engines of economic growth and symbols of modernity. In the 
ensuing conflict over road space and funding allocation, cyclists often lost 
out. When supplying car infrastructure became a public concern for the 
Netherlands in the 1920s, commuter cyclists’ place on major roads came 
into question. As a compromise, Dutch politicians and engineers created 
a system of separation that provided both car and cycling infrastructure 
on these roads. The tax-paying status of cycling citizens reinforced the 
general perception among engineers and politicians that cyclists had 
some rights.
Advocates of recreational cycling also made the case for the public status 
of a cycling path network independent of the country’s road network. The 
ANWB promoted a national culture of tourism and recreation. The tourist 
organization helped to make cycling popular and lobbied for a separate and 
different type of cycling infrastructure. The national government, however, 
refused to become involved – at f irst. Non-governmental organizations 
f illed the gap. While these organizations’ ability to obtain subsidies from 
local policymakers represented recognition of their public service, before 
the 1930s most of their funding came from private sources. Reacting to 
public funding of utilitarian cycling, advocates of the tourist club and 
aff iliated cycling path organizations emphasized that both commuters 
and tourists used their paths – particularly during the economic crisis of 
the 1930s, when funds were more precarious and the government created 
public works projects to solve unemployment. While clearly exaggerated 
for strategic reasons, the claim that both tourists and commuters used the 
non-urban roads was nevertheless based on truth. National policymakers 
refused, however, to respond to the demands for investment in the rural, 
interurban, and suburban network.
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Part II, “Divergence,” discussing the 1950s and 1960s, showed how engi-
neers viewed cycling in an era when policymakers facilitated automobility. 
Not all engineers, but certainly the key group of Public Works engineers 
considered the car a greater public good than public transit, let alone cy-
cling. The engineers’ cycling discourse no longer rested on the bicycle tax 
logic of giving cyclists something in return. Instead, realizing that cyclists 
might solve the urban congestion caused by cars – engineers introduced a 
new element, albeit with few practical results, in the form of facilities for 
urban cyclists. Rather than a negative attitude towards cycling, there was a 
certain “benign neglect”: (national) policymakers and engineers no longer 
engaged in public discussions about cycling because they were preoccupied 
with the vision (or nightmare) of mass car use. Despite the ambivalence 
in policy and political circles, the traff ic separation compromise of the 
1920s, acknowledging that the provision of car and commuter cycling 
infrastructure was a public task, still held sway in the 1950s and 1960s. 
It was not contested and was even reinforced by the decision to consign 
mopeds to cycling paths. After that decision in the early 1950s, engineers 
became even more committed to separating traff ic on the nation’s major 
roads – and in the process provided some infrastructure for cyclists and 
moped riders. The rhetoric of fairness and giving the numerous cyclists 
at least some protection still weighed suff iciently on engineers’ minds to 
make a difference in this period, even if they now only paid lip service to 
this ideal.
This crucial period also saw an important development in recreational 
cycling. Where there was previously little (local) to no (national) interest in 
this category, around 1950, provincial and municipal policymakers started 
to see recreation in general, including cycling, as a core element of their 
mandate. Provincial policymakers publicly coupled cycling to public health, 
recreation, and tourism, depending on the province’s background and 
political color at the time. Even as cycling’s modal share declined in the 
Netherlands (as elsewhere) due to increasing competition from cars, public 
transit, and mopeds, the Dutch cycling path network kept on expanding. 
Engineers and politicians were much less convinced than their international 
counterparts that cycling was about to disappear and still discussed cycling 
in more positive terms than public off icials elsewhere. Indeed, Part II re-
vealed that this is when the direction of Dutch cycling started to diverge, 
although the roots of this shift date back even further, to the 1920s.
Part III, “The Dutch Model,” showed how activists and politicians suc-
cessfully – and in line with developments outside the Netherlands – linked 
cycling discursively to pressing issues: safety, pollution, and urban livability. 
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From the mid-1960s, urban cycling became a focal point, not just in urban 
politics but also on a provincial and national level, importantly among 
activists. Policymakers discussed cycling much more than they had from 
the late 1940s onwards, and tirelessly stressed the many advantages they saw 
resulting from higher cycling levels. Activist citizens made the case that the 
state had allowed automobility to invade cities unchecked. The government 
had a responsibility for traff ic safety, which it ignored. Urban cyclists, or 
cycling schoolchildren throughout the country, suffered as a result. The 
argument for giving cyclists their due – in this case a minimum level of 
protection – struck a chord with people because it aligned with a decades-old 
discourse on the bicycle tax that went back to the 1920s. Cyclists had always 
been acknowledged at some level as citizens with certain rights – which 
policymakers had come to neglect. This fact also struck a particularly raw 
nerve when activist parents rallied to argue that children had a right to be, 
play, and feel safe on the street. Under pressure from social groups, many 
politicians at all levels of government, as well as a new generation of urban 
planners and engineers, took up this call.
Activists also argued that livability and quality of life, along with 
environmental protection, were public goods the state should provide, 
and all required support for cycling (infrastructure). As Adri Albert de la 
Bruhèze and Frank Veraart have already shown, political support for cycling 
among key aldermen or city council members helped to revive cycling in 
the 1970s. My research shows that something similar applies to provincial 
and national policymakers, whose involvement in cycling governance has 
not been studied. MPs often demanded in plenary and special meetings 
that the Ministry of Public Works invest more in utilitarian cycling. I have 
also shown that national and provincial engineers were sometimes slow to 
fulf il these demands or react to information inquiries. No doubt without 
this political pressure, investments in cycling would have been significantly 
lower. Politicians in turn translated (perceived) social demands for better 
and safer cycling infrastructure. In short, this is a successful example of 
democracy in action.
This chronological – diachronic – treatment of cycling governance thus 
shows the historical process of how policy came about. Cycling Pathways 
also reveals some enduring – synchronic – themes. Throughout the book, 
particularly in Parts I and II, I show that recreational cycling, both as a 
practice and in governance terms, has thus far not received the attention 
it deserves. Partly overlapping with governance coalitions for utilitarian 
cycling, it nevertheless formed a largely separate tradition. Throughout the 
twentieth century, recreational cyclists could count on political support 
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and funding, mainly at a provincial and regional level. This is somewhat 
speculative: the continued support for recreational cycling might also have 
to do with its enduring popularity among elites and groups who switched 
to commuting by car but could still receive political support for cycling 
through this avenue. More important, perhaps, was the recognition of the 
economic value of bicycle tourism and ideas about public health. Historians 
have amply studied the recreational bourgeois cycling culture of the late 
nineteenth century; studies of various national (professional) sport cycling 
cultures are also increasing. However, scholars have neglected recreational 
cycling as a key element of governance arrangements for the twentieth 
century. Cycling Pathways shows that recreational cycling, as contributing 
factor to cycling’s persistent place on the political agenda, remained popular 
as a practice, became a source of engineering expertise, and merits more 
attention.
That Dutch engineers built so much cycling infrastructure during the 
twentieth century without strong national state governance provides an 
important lesson. While there were guidelines and soft policies “nudging” 
engineers in a certain direction, policymakers could have taken cycling 
less seriously. The institutional arrangements for mobility allowed this 
– and in many European countries, that is exactly what happened. The 
difference in cycling’s development in the Netherlands has to do with 
its more positive status there. This f luctuated over time and differed 
according to government level and type of cycling. Still, the general trend 
is clear. Cycling infrastructure had the status of a public good, whether 
utilitarian or recreational. Even when engineering norms for cycling 
infrastructure were more like guidelines than formal requirements, the 
construction of separate cycling paths alongside roads never stopped. 
When national traff ic funding for provinces and municipalities was no 
longer earmarked, cycling advocates feared investment in cycling would 
drop, which did not happen.
Understanding the mentality, beliefs, and even cycling practices of key 
policymakers – politicians and engineers – is crucial for explaining cycling 
policies and therefore cycling’s success in the Netherlands. Many of them 
had a familiarity with and aff inity for the bicycle, which explains their 
susceptibility to cycling advocacy. The cycling discourse I have reconstructed 
based on archival material, trade journals, and other publications, provides 
insight into why policymakers and engineers have consistently seen it as 
their task to “do something” for cyclists. Which group of cyclists, and what 
this “something” had to be, were subjects for discussion, as was the question 
of who should provide that something.
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Turning Beliefs into Infrastructure
Turning cycling beliefs into a network of infrastructure has been a piecemeal, 
gradual process that has taken well over a century. A large, decentral-
ized policy coalition of social movements, politicians, and engineers has 
contributed to this. How did they do it? Governance scholar Rod Rhodes 
argues that network governance “evokes a world in which state power is 
dispersed among a vast array of spatially and functionally distinct networks 
composed of all kinds of public, voluntary, and private organizations with 
which the center now interacts.”2 This is also a fair description of the Dutch 
situation. In terms of the policy arrangement approach – policy coalitions, 
power and resources, and rules of the game – Dutch cycling governance 
had several key characteristics: it involved a policy coalition that had a 
crucial role for non-governmental organizations, in particular the ANWB 
(since the 1890s) and the activist group Cyclists’ Union (since the 1970s), 
plus a dynamic relationship with multi-layer policymakers; it involved a 
powerful role for cyclists both through sheer numbers and also via their 
representation in citizen organizations employing engineering or user 
expertise; and it involved a political tradition where the rules of the game 
revolve around accommodation, consensus-seeking, and interest trade-offs 
in the polder model.
In Cycling Pathways, I drew attention to some major governance themes. 
First, I indicated throughout how the proper place for cycling was not just 
contentious when it came to the distribution of road space. It also involved 
the issue of governance. The national government’s role was particularly 
contested. Second, jumping in the gap created by the lack of national co-
ordination, interest and activist groups played a crucial role – not least in 
producing and coordinating cycling expertise. Third, the success of these 
groups in cycling advocacy is partly thanks to Dutch political traditions 
of accommodating outside groups in the country’s governance. Fourth, 
their use of expertise (engineering expertise in the case of the ANWB, lay 
expertise in the case of the Cyclists’ Union) was a highly successful strategy. 
Finally, while there are path-dependent elements to this story, it also should 
be considered as the outcome of a process of contestation, negotiation, and 
compromise.
The policy coalition for cycling in the f irst half of the twentieth century 
consisted of national engineers, politicians, and the national tourist and 
2 R.A.W. Rhodes, “Waves of Governance,” in The Oxford Handbook of Governance, ed. David 
Levi-Faur (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 34.
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lobby organization ANWB, which put recreational cycling on the political 
map. In the 1950s and 1960s, the ANWB’s role remained significant, while the 
center of gravity within the government shifted from national to provincial 
policymakers and engineers. When the focus on cycling governance moved 
more towards urban cycling in the 1970s, a new urban coalition emerged to 
put utilitarian cycling on the political agenda: the new cycling activist group 
Cyclists’ Union worked with urban engineers, planners, and politicians. The 
role for national and provincial engineers and politicians also continued, 
making the policy coalition larger and more complex than before.
The examination of the national government’s role in cycling governance 
shows how national policymakers were pulled into the cycling governance 
policy coalition time and again, despite their reluctance. This reluctance 
had as much to do with political ideas about decentralization and local 
government as with the national government giving priority to automobility, 
a recurring theme. National policymakers considered the bicycle a mode 
of transport for shorter distances. This is a myopic governance view: once 
combined with the train or bus, the bicycle becomes a viable alternative 
to long-distance car traff ic. Still, the perception of the bicycle as a vehicle 
for short trips has affected its place in Dutch mobility governance over the 
last century. Opponents of national involvement in cycling governance 
continually insisted that a local transport mode like the bicycle should be 
governed locally. Meanwhile, car transport supposedly transcended the 
local and caught the interest of the national government. These attempts 
at making cycling governance the exclusive domain of local governance 
did not entirely succeed, for two main reasons. First, activists and local 
politicians demanded that national government address major safety is-
sues with cycling. Second, as national policymakers recognized at times, 
the bicycle was a solution to congestion, air quality, and climate change 
problems, which are not the sole responsibility of local government but 
also key concerns for national government.
Cycling Pathways thus shows that a cycling history of the Netherlands 
needs to consider national and provincial policymakers (both politicians 
and engineers). Due to the lack of historical international scholarship – with 
the exception of Maxime Huré’s work on the French national government’s 
role in cycling governance since the 1970s – it is hard to determine whether 
this applies to other countries. Dutch provinces played a major role, and 
not just as the authorities responsible for major provincial roads. They 
supplied a large part of the Dutch road network with cycling infrastructure 
from the 1920s onward, initiated recreational cycling plans, and, after 1970, 
coordinated similar plans for utilitarian cycling. Provincial authorities also 
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served as intermediaries between municipal and national policymakers in 
subsidy procedures and other multi-level issues. Together with the recent 
creation of urban areas and other regional forms of governance, provincial 
policymakers have become key actors because their operational level is 
well-suited to cycling’s action radius.
Other historians have described the importance of the tourist organiza-
tion ANWB and the city-based Cyclists’ Union. My main contribution is to 
take our knowledge of the Cyclists’ Union’s strategies a step further. Using 
new source material, the analysis of the Cyclists’ Union presents new insights 
and arguments on its governance role. The role of private initiatives in Dutch 
cycling governance has fluctuated but has always been strong. Governments 
around the world have not been very proactive in launching cycling policies. 
The efforts by activists and lobby groups to put cycling on the agenda seem 
signif icant everywhere. Groups in the Netherlands, however, were more 
successful than anywhere else in gaining access to government circles and 
contributing to cycling governance. Until the 1920s, the ANWB played an 
even more important role in national cycling governance than the state. 
Thereafter, it was on equal footing with state engineers. In the 1950s and 
1960s, the ANWB continued to fulfil a less visible but still crucial (gatekeeper) 
role in the production and dissemination of traff ic engineering knowledge. 
In this role, while advocating car use as much if not more than cycling, 
the organization remained signif icant in the cycling governance network. 
In the 1970s, a new group of urban cyclists entered the frame and quickly 
gathered momentum. Dutch cycling governance coalitions have always 
been a mixture of state and civil society actors.
This close cooperation is a choice: writing in the late 1980s, Jacqueline 
Cramer warned that environmental action groups increasingly carried out 
(free) work for the government. In line with the international trend to reduce 
governmental bureaucracies, outsourcing tasks to volunteer organizations 
operating with small subsidies was an attractive option. The access to poli-
cymaking gave action groups like the Cyclists’ Union the opportunity to 
work with the government while remaining outside it. Radical critique of the 
system becomes harder in such a close co-governance model, as some Cyclists’ 
Union branches observed and deplored. However, the majority chose to go 
down this route. Pragmatism and compromise produced enough concrete 
results and were a more attractive option than standing on the sidelines.
Cycling Pathways argues that both the ANWB and the Cyclists’ Union 
were able to achieve success because they functioned as experts present-
ing themselves as knowledgeable about cycling. The ANWB did this by 
employing its own civil engineers, who knew as much if not more about 
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cycling infrastructure as state engineers. In contrast, the Cyclists’ Union 
claimed that its members, everyday cyclists, provided a different kind of 
user or lay expertise which should be taken into account for transforming 
cities. We could say these non-state actors functioned as what transport 
historian Marcus Popkema calls a “free consultancy agency” for state 
agencies.3 Knowledge served as a bargaining chip for these organizations. 
Without costing the state anything, they provided valuable input for cycling 
policymaking. In return, the organizations had a seat at the discussion table 
and received certain concessions.
Cycling Pathways offers a novel, multi-level perspective on state agencies. 
Earlier works tend to focus on urban governance. Without detracting from 
this perspective – urban governance is indeed crucial in cycling governance 
everywhere – the provincial and national levels also deserve attention. 
They are responsible for the policy frameworks within urban policymakers’ 
operations, and crucially steer these through f inancial instruments.
The recurring analysis of the ongoing struggle over cycling governance 
should not be read as an indictment or evaluation of its eff icacy. If anything, 
the analysis shows how widespread the concerns for cycling have been at 
different levels. The ever-present debate over the extent of the national 
government’s involvement, the struggles to coordinate policies, and the 
attempts to shift the responsibility for cycling onto other actors, seems 
ineffective and negative regarding cycling. Yet cycling’s current position in 
the Netherlands remains undeniably strong. It is f irmly embedded in the 
material infrastructure, engineering norms and practices, and culture. Has 
this been achieved because of or despite Dutch cycling’s form of governance? 
Without engaging in too much counterfactual speculation, the centralization 
of cycling governance probably did more harm than good. A 1997 report 
on municipal cycling policies notes that besides Utrecht and Amsterdam, 
only one other municipality (Arnhem) had a designated bicycle coordinator, 
which had “the logical negative effect: the others forget about the bicycle.”4 
The dispersal of responsibility for cycling among diverse actors may have 
contributed to the survival of cycling policies throughout the twentieth 
century. If knowledge, funding, and advocacy are present in many different 
decision-making bodies, their loss in one location does not endanger the 
commitment to cycling as a whole.
Once they were represented by these civil society actors in the Dutch 
policy coalition, cyclists gained a powerful position. What were the sources 
3 Marcus Popkema, “Tussen techniek en planning,” 79.
4 Ligtermoet et al., Gemeentelijk fietsbeleid, 18.
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of this power? Engineers’ focus on cyclists may have fluctuated, as it did 
in traff ic counts, but for most of the twentieth century they were aware of 
cycling’s popularity. The often-repeated assertion that cycling was typically 
Dutch, which also appeared in engineering trade journals, reinforced this 
perception. Consequently, the sheer number of cyclists was a constant source 
of pressure. Perhaps even more importantly, cyclists had lobby and action 
groups on their side: f irst the ANWB and later the Cyclists’ Union. Both 
used expertise as a source of power to justify their position in governance, 
allowing them to lobby more effectively for cyclists’ interests.
There are important differences and similarities between the national 
tourist ANWB and the urban-based Cyclists’ Union. A key difference is that, 
while the ANWB had power through its board members’ prominent social 
standing, the organization had no knowledge of traffic; however, it developed 
this over time. Initially the Cyclists’ Union did not have this power, but 
from the start it possessed traff ic knowledge. The Union gained power over 
time. Both had sprung from a f ine-meshed network of local organizations: 
the ANWB from its system of local representatives or consuls, the Cyclists’ 
Union through its organizational structure based around local chapters. 
Both are rooted locally, although the ANWB has become an interest group 
that operates nationally. The Cyclists’ Union also lobbies nationally, however. 
What sets both organizations apart from many cycling groups outside 
the Netherlands is their activism in a context with a high proportion of 
cyclists. Much non-Dutch activism concentrates on getting non-cyclists on 
bicycles by sharing knowledge and tips about everyday cycling. The Dutch 
organizations offer their members this kind of practical advice, but more 
important is their advocacy for the interests of existing cyclists.
How well were everyday cyclists represented by the ANWB and Cyclists’ 
Union? While these organizations were founded by active cyclists, over time 
they professionalized and day-to-day leadership was in the hands of a smaller 
group of activists. Nevertheless, their claim to represent all or most cyclists 
was certainly acknowledged in their access to politics and policymaking on 
behalf of the cycling public. Cyclists came closest to directly participating 
in politics in the early stages of the Cyclists’ Union’s activities in the 1970s 
and 1980s. By contributing information about local blackspots, bottlenecks, 
and other barriers to cycling, relayed by the chapters to local policymakers, 
the Cyclists’ Union made sure cyclists were heard. Later, as the organization 
professionalized, a small core of volunteers established more permanent 
relationships with local policymakers. Policymakers increasingly recognized 
leading activists as experts in their own right. As cyclists, they represented 
users, but the broad social movement character of early activism has declined 
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over the past twenty to thirty years. How these activists influenced cycling 
policies in the Netherlands requires further research.
The Dutch cycling policy coalition, consisting of multiple actors with a 
prominent role for citizen groups, knows the rules of the game within the 
Dutch polder model of governance. The relationship between national, 
provincial, and municipal government – part of the “rules of the game” – is 
not top-down or coercive. At no point in history has the national govern-
ment forced lower-level authorities to construct cycling infrastructure, for 
example. Engineering guidelines, sometimes a precondition for subsidies, 
allow opportunities to steer policy quite strongly. This “golden strings” 
approach allowed the national government to ensure local authorities 
spent money on cycling in light of MPs’ demands to create these budgets. 
After decentralization of this funding in the late 1990s, cities still invested 
signif icantly in cycling, proving that national suspicions of local spending 
patterns were unfounded. In recent decades, the national government has 
decided that producing and disseminating cycling expertise is its primary 
role in cycling governance. Nevertheless, as MPs push for cycling invest-
ments, they still reserve budgets for (local) cycling policies.
The polder model is an important factor in understanding negotiations 
over public space in the Netherlands. According to Carstensen and Ebert, “[t]
he avoidance of antagonisms between the bicycle and the car is an important 
explanation of the successful mass cycling cultures in the Netherlands and 
Denmark.”5 Cycling and mobility historians – Veraart, Albert de la Bruhèze, 
Mom – have previously stated that Dutch politicians do not f irmly choose 
or reject the car. Dutch politicians try to do it all: promote a high-capacity 
railway network, a dense road network, and cycling all at once, even though 
some of these are easier to combine (bicycle and train travel) than others. 
With its dense (car) road network, car ownership and use, the Netherlands is 
just as much a car country as any other in Western Europe. Despite ongoing 
discussions since the 1960s, road pricing measures to f ight congestion have 
continually failed to pass parliament. Out of fear that they are accused 
of bullying car drivers, many political parties eschew any overt anti-car 
rhetoric.6
The concepts of policy coalitions, resources, and rules all have to do with 
the way stakeholders employ their agency to shape cycling governance. 
There are also more structural, path-dependent elements to the story of 
5 Carstensen and Ebert, “Cycling Cultures in Northern Europe,” 53.
6 Smaal, Politieke strijd om de prijs van automobiliteit: de geschiedenis van een langlopend 
discours, 1895-2010, 581, 96, 618, 720.
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cycling infrastructure construction. Cycling Pathways shows how many 
individuals and organizations crucially shaped cycling policies. All the same, 
infrastructural systems often create lock-in patterns that limit the possibility 
to introduce change at a later stage. Critics usually cast such systems in 
a negative light, as obstacles preventing the transition from car-based to 
more sustainable mobility. In the case of Dutch cycling, certain lock-in 
patterns may have contributed to cycling’s long-term perseverance. The 
interaction of cycling policies and practice can trigger feedback processes 
that put cycling on either a downward or upward trajectory in the long run. 
Fortunately for Dutch cyclists, it was an upward spiral: in the f irst half of the 
twentieth century, users, interest groups, and state off icials all in their own 
way contributed to a strong cycling culture and an extensive infrastructure 
network. That material network enabled a large proportion of Dutch citizens 
to continue cycling in the 1950s and 1960s – engineers and traff ic experts 
could no longer ignore them. Path dependency and crucial policy choices 
played a key role: the traff ic separation model had created safe cycling 
conditions but also high cycling numbers. We can consider this a positive 
feedback process for cyclists. It was hard for planners to stop focusing 
on cycling infrastructure, since cyclists were not going anywhere, and 
engineers certainly did not want them on roads where cars were supposed 
to have an uninterrupted flow. Combined with the important decision to 
consign mopeds to cycling paths, there was plenty of incentive for Dutch 
traff ic experts to keep on planning cycling infrastructure. Dutch bicycle 
planning is as old, if not older, than planning for cars, and the two have 
always progressed in tandem.
For my f inal analysis, I do not intend to present an overly deterministic 
account of cycling governance in the Netherlands. Within the structural 
limitations, individual actors and organizations were able to operate with 
a degree of agency. In terms of path dependency, there were many critical 
junctures when this agency made a difference. Indeed, there was no grand 
design for Dutch cycling infrastructure. Instead, different elements were 
built at different times, for different reasons, and by different actors. 
Cycling lobbyists and advocates like ANWB off icials, (social democrat) 
politicians, (local) engineers, and activists managed to carve out a space 
for cycling throughout the twentieth century. That there is currently a 
comprehensive system of cycling infrastructure tells us that cycling did not 
just have a higher cultural status in the Netherlands than in many other 
countries; it also carried weight with policymakers. As in any large-scale 
historical process, structural constraints nevertheless leave some scope 
for agency.
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Contributions, Limitations, and Further Research
First of all, Cycling Pathways contributes to the growing international 
historiography on cycling. What other cycling historians could take from 
this study is timescale: few cycling studies have as broad a scope. By covering 
such a large period, this study can observe long-term developments. While 
this approach certainly has its limitations and drawbacks – as I discuss 
below – it suggests that we can only understand the fate of attempts to revive 
cycling since the 1970s in the context of earlier decades. Many studies of 
the cycling revival since the 1970s would benefit from closely considering 
the f ifty years or so of road planning that went before. Decisions made then 
and cycling levels as a result are key factors that explain cycling activists’ 
success or lack thereof in the 1970s and beyond. Cycling did not reappear in 
Europe ex nihilo some f ifty years ago. If anything, the 1950s and 1960s “car 
decades” are crucial for understanding the diverging national trajectories in 
cycling. Too often, the actual process of cycling’s decline is not studied in any 
detail but just ascribed to the car’s ascendancy and planners’ single-minded 
focus on cars. This study has shown there is a lot more of the story to tell, at 
least with regard to the Netherlands. Studying these disparate trajectories 
of disappearance is an important avenue for future research.
In addition to the broad timescale, the novel contribution of this book 
also stems from the use of a large body of new archival sources, supple-
mented with trade journals, newspaper articles, and interviews, allowing 
triangulation. This approach was fruitful: provincial and national archives 
had not been used much (if at all) in previous studies. The exploration of 
other provincial archives might offer an even richer picture. It turns out 
that engineers discussed cycling regularly in committees, wrote about it 
in trade journals, and left a large paper trail on the many cycling paths in 
the Netherlands. It will be very interesting to see if future historians can 
uncover similar sources that tell the story of cycling in other countries in 
more detail.
This observation brings us to one of the major limitations of the present 
study. A study with such a broad approach necessarily sacrif ices depth for 
breadth, in the process perhaps raising as many questions as it answers. 
The suggested positive political developments in the Netherlands are cau-
tiously framed in an international context. The historical scholarship on 
automobility and cycling in other European countries suggests pro-cycling 
policies were much stronger in the Netherlands. While this is plausible, given 
what we know about cycling’s central place in Dutch culture and mobility, 
it is only a suggestion. Further research in other state archives might well 
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nuance this picture. A comparative approach to cycling activism since 
the 1970s could enrich our understanding of Dutch cycling activism. It is 
necessary to put this broad research project in an even broader context. At 
the opposite end of the spectrum, a very specif ic analysis of the material 
transformation on one or more Dutch city streets, while taking into account 
the role of activists and policymakers, would add a new level of detail that 
I cannot provide due to space constraints.
This study is relevant for scholars of contemporary cycling and practition-
ers as well as historians of mobility and cycling. In popular narratives and 
accounts of cycling promotion, the Dutch story since the 1970s is often 
invoked as the ultimate example. The transformation of Dutch cities in this 
period from car-centered to bicycle-friendly is often presented as proof that 
“it can be done elsewhere.” However, as noted earlier, how to achieve this is 
not clear. Do we really understand how cities transformed over the past f ifty 
years? And to explain this, do we not also need to understand what happened 
before the 1970s? The historical perspective is not something that otherwise 
interdisciplinary cycling studies take suff iciently on board.7 For scholars 
studying contemporary cycling politics and activism, this study offers 
insight into one pathway to a cycling society. The Dutch case demonstrates 
that the historical constraints at play limit the range of pathways to the 
(near) future. At the same time, it shows us how a vibrant civil society can 
achieve success if it manages to establish good working relationships with 
an interested (local) government.
It is important to focus on policymaking processes and their history, 
since a growing body of policy-oriented research is attempting to come up 
with strategies that will increase cycling levels. The challenge is to connect 
this practice-oriented body of scholarship to historical bicycle research. 
A good strategy is to focus on the tenacity and persistence of long-term 
developments, such as the evolution of certain mobility cultures and the long-
lasting impact of completely forgotten policy choices.8 Very few people know 
about the debates regarding cycling and motorization in the Dutch political 
world of the 1920s and 1930s, yet the decisions taken then have changed the 
course of mobility ever since, as have the choices other countries made. On 
the one hand, historical work can make us more aware of the weight and 
importance of decisions in infrastructure policy now, because they set us 
on a certain course that will be hard to change in the future. On the other 
7 See Peter Cox and Till Koglin, eds., The Politics of Cycling Infrastructure: Spaces and (In)
Equality (Bristol: Polity Press, 2020).
8 Oosterhuis, “Bicycle Research between Bicycle Policies and Bicycle Culture,” 35.
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hand, understanding choices in the past and the particular road taken 
to arrive at the present moment might also offer us ideas and inspiration 
as to how to “unmake” these decisions and create more sustainable and 
equitable mobility systems. Contemporary policymakers can learn from 
historical examples, as Bert Toussaint has argued for mobility policy.9 For 
instance, as a governance process, cycling policymakers are exploring the 
use of living labs to study user experiences.10 Chapter 6 showed how social 
movements pioneered bottom-up approaches to cycling governance where 
user knowledge formed a source of counter expertise.
In analyzing Dutch cycling policy, I have borrowed concepts and ideas 
from governance scholarship and Dutch political history, a third body of 
scholarship to which this project contributes. Scholars in this f ield could 
draw on my work as a rich empirical case study of how coalitions, networks, 
and the Dutch “polder model” function. Contemporary governance scholar-
ship acknowledges that non-hierarchical forms of governance have a long 
history, yet tend to focus on the past f ifty years. This study goes back further 
in time to show how, without a clear center of power, a varied stakeholder 
coalition produced Dutch cycling infrastructure. This understudied case 
supports Dutch political history ideas about the “polder model.” The role 
of the Cyclists’ Union and ANWB on many government committees, but 
also the efforts to accommodate and balance the interests of drivers versus 
cyclists in policymaking, are themes of scholarship that recur in my work. 
Dutch historiography on social movements and politics has not engaged 
with the politics of mobility. This is a real surprise and oversight, since it 
represents a successful and influential form of activism.
From a wider perspective, this work deals with the relationship between 
technologies, politics and users, themes familiar to historians of technology. 
Here as well, we learn about the governance of everyday technologies. The 
way users shape technologies and technological systems is a well-established 
9 Bert Toussaint, “Using the Usable Past: Reflections and Practices in the Netherlands,” 15-27; 
and “(Transport) History as Policy Lab for Democratic Governance,” The Journal of Transport 
History 40, no. 2 (2019): 270-80.
10 Yuliya Voytenko et al., “Urban Living Labs for Sustainability and Low Carbon Cities in 
Europe: Towards a Research Agenda,” Journal of Cleaner Production 123 (2016): 45-54; Matthias 
Mück, Christoph Helf, and Miriam Lindenau, “Urban Living Labs Fostering Sustainable Mobility 
Planning in Munich,” Transportation Research Procedia 41 (2019): 741-44; Matthew Bruno, “The 
Challenge of the Bicycle Street: Applying Collaborative Governance Processes while Protecting 
User Centered Innovations,” Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives 7 (2020); Julian 
Alexandrakis, “Cycling towards Sustainability: The Transformative Potential of Urban Design 
Thinking in a Sustainable Living Lab,” Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives 9 
(2021): 1-9.
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theme in the literature. This work showcases this process, how users (can 
claim to) possess counter-expertise to dominant engineering knowledge, 
making them indispensable partners in shaping mobility systems. Mobility 
“system-builders” should take note: engineers tend to simplify systems for 
their own purposes until a certain stakeholder comes along to complicate 
this view.11 Conceptualizing the city as a f low of vehicles could not be the 
norm for very long in Dutch cities because of citizens’ and activists’ efforts. 
The scholarship on the life and/or decline of technologies discarded by 
engineers and elites as obsolete, exemplif ied by Edgerton’s Shock of the 
Old, also resonates with this book. The ongoing practice of cycling requires 
further study from the user perspective.
Here ends our story of more than a century of Dutch cycling politics, policies, 
and governance. Where does this leave Dutch cyclists, benefiting from all 
these years of cycling policies and governance, in 2021? In March 2021, the 
Dutch Ministry of Public Works announced its National Future Vision for 
the Bicycle (Nationaal Toekomstbeeld Fiets) in the period 2020 to 2040.12 
This is the Ministry of Public Works’ response to parliamentary requests 
for national government to be more proactive in cycling governance.13 The 
minister announced that the “primary responsibility” lies with “decentral 
governments.” She also emphasized that a state coalition with “provinces, 
transport regions, municipalities,” as well as the intergovernmental body 
on cycling (its so-called Tour de Force) together shape cycling policy in the 
Netherlands.14 This is a symbolic moment: governmental cycling policies 
were established roughly a century ago. In the meantime, much has changed, 
yet much has stayed the same. The bicycle is enduringly popular, both for 
recreation and commuting. The governance process remains a coalition 
without a clear center. But perhaps this is not such a problem – after all, 
regional and local policymakers believe in cycling, and activists make sure 
they keep the government on its toes. More than ever before, cycling enjoys 
11 See Michel Callon, “Society in the Making: The Study of Technology as a Tool for Sociological 
Analysis,” in The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology 
and History of Technology, eds. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 1987), 83-103.
12 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2021/03/08/bijlage-nationaal-
toekomstbeeld-f iets-op-hoofdlijnen
13 Kamerstukken II 2019/20, no. 35300 A, sub-no. 109; no. 35300 XII, sub-no. 104; no. 35426, 
sub-no. 16.
14 Letter Ministry of Public Works to Lower House, March 8, 2021. https://www.rijksoverheid.
nl/documenten/rapporten/2021/03/08/bijlage-nationaal-toekomstbeeld-f iets-op-hoofdlijnen
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policymakers’ support. The urgent action required on climate change, the 
attempts to reduce traff ic deaths to zero, along with many other areas of 
policy, all point in one direction: we need to make cycling an even more 
attractive and safe option for everyone. The National Future Vision for the 
Bicycle promises large investments in cycling. Whether it signals a truly 
new chapter in cycling governance remains to be seen.

 Appendix 1




Along Leekstermeer (Lettelbert) 1961-1962 1966
Friesland
3 cycling paths Ameland 1963 Not (yet)
from youth hostel ‘us blau Hiem’ to Appelscha 1965 Not (yet)
In land consolidation (ruilverkaveling) Haskerveenpolder 1963 1963
In ‘de kleine Wielen’ 1965 1965
To ‘de kleine Wielen’ 1965 1966
In land consolidation koningsdiep 1962 1963
‘West a/zee-midsland a/zee’ 1966 Not (yet)




bunne-frisian border 1965 1964
Assen-Spier 1966 23 percent in 
1966
Assen-roden (Nietap) 1965 Contracted 
out in 1967
Near zuidwolde 1965-1966 Not (yet)
Near Sleen-odoorn 1966 Not (yet)
Hoogeveen-Pesse 1967 Not (yet)
Near Assen 1967 Not (yet)
Gelderland
barneveld-Putten (6.5 km) 1966 Not (yet)
Alongside Hessenweg (reconstruction) 1965 1967
Utrecht
In land consolidation Harmelen-kockengen 1963 1964
Noord-Holland
Huizen-Naarden 1962 1963
Texel (to Westerslag) 1963 1964
Texel (Waalenburgerdijk) 1961-1963 unknown




recreation area markiezaat bergen op zoom (10 km) 1967 Not (yet)
recreation area de kempen (phase one, 26 km) 1965-1966 unknown
Pannenhoef-bremberg 1963 1964
breda-dongen 1963 1964
forestry St. Anthonis 1965 unknown
recreation area brabants Centrum (27 km in Loonse 
dunes)
1964-1965 70 percent in 
1966
recreation area brabants Centrum (3 paths) 1966 Not (yet)
recreation area baronie van breda (17 km) 1966 Not (yet)
List of cycling paths the ministry of Culture and recreation subsidized in the 1960s. Not all 
subsidized paths were constructed, possibly because the local government could not or would 
not pay its share, which they had to since national cycling subsidies never awarded the full 
100 percent of costs. Some paths, like those in Noord-brabant and drenthe, were part of the 
provincial recreational plans discussed in Chapter 3. Source NA 2.27.5111, inv. no. 60.
 Appendix 2
Provinces’ Cycling Projects Subsidized with National Investments, 1975-1980
Groningen Urban Groningen eikenlaan Cycling path
Groningen korreweg Cycling path
Non-urban Secondary road 5 Westervalge at 
Warffum
Cycling path
Secondary road 10 Jan bronsweg at 
Appingedam
Cycling path
Secondary road 18 oostwedde-
vlagtwedde
Cycling path + 
bridges




Tertiary road 29 Near Holwierde Cycling tunnel
Tertiary road 30 ruischerbrug-klein 
Harkstede
Cycling path
Tertiary road 33 Ten 
Post-Wittewierum
Cycling path
Tertiary road 34 Siddeburen-
Wagenborgen
Cycling path
Tertiary road 52 Graaf 
Adolfbrug-Heiligerlee
Cycling path




nection with bridge 
dongjumervaart
franeker Noordergracht Cycling/pedestrian 
bridge
Sneek Groenedijk Cycling path
Non-urban Secondary road 9 Galamadammen Cycling tunnel








Tertiary road 22 oosterwolde-Hoeve 
de driesprong
Cycling path
Tertiary road 33 Nes-rallum-Hollum 
on Ameland island
Cycling path
Tertiary road 35 kromten-koaibosk Cycling path




Drenthe Urban No projects
Non-urban Secondary road 4 rolde-borger Cycling path


























Non-urban Secondary road 6 zwolle-vollenhove Cycling path
Secondary road 19 den 
Ham-vroomshoop
Cycling path





Secondary road 69 Losser-overdinkel Cycling path 
including bridge over 
dinkel
Gelderland Urban Arnhem Thomas à kempislaan Cycling path
Nijmegen energieweg Cycling path
Nijmegen Grootstalselaan Cycling path
Nijmegen Scheidingsweg Cycling path
Wijk bij duurstede Groene 
Woud-vikinghof
Cycling connection
zevenaar de methen Cycling path
Non-urban Secondary road 104 buren-tertiary road 
110
Cycling path
Tertiary road 7 valkseweg at 
barneveld
Cycling path
Tertiary road 17 Halfweg-vierhouten 
at Nunspeet
Cycling path
Tertiary road 19a Garderenseweg at 
uddel (Appeldoorn)
Cycling path




Tertiary road 63 Aalten-dinxperlo Cycling path
Tertiary road 64 ulft-varsselder Cycling path




Tertiary road 103 bemmel-Gendt Cycling path
Tertiary road 109 Ingensesteeg-
secondary road 101
Cycling path
Utrecht Urban mijdrecht Industrieweg Cycling path
zeist de dreef Cycling path
zeist Geroplein Cycling path
zeist dijnselburgerlaan Cycling path
Non-urban Secondary road 9 maarten 
maartenshuis-doorn
Cycling path
Tertiary road 2 zandheuvelweg at 
baarn
Cycling path
Tertiary road 27 kockengen-breukelen Cycling path
Tertiary road 27 Along de dreef in 
kockengen
Cycling path





Urban Amstelveen vierlingsbeeklaan Cycling path

















Cycling path + 3 
tunnels + bridge













Heerhugowaard Westtangentweg and 
zuidtangentweg
Cycling paths






Purmerend Hoornselaan and van 
IJssendijkstraat
Cycling paths
velsen Schoterkerkpad Cycling path
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zaanstad vincent van 
Goghweg
Cycling path
Non-urban Secondary road 6 Niedorperverlaat-
national road 7
Cycling path
Tertiary road 1 Nieuwlanderweg and 
kogerweg on Texel 
island
Cycling path
Tertiary road 5 doggersvaart-
Julianadorp
Cycling path
Tertiary road 12 Nieuwesluizerweg at 
Wieringermeer
Cycling path
Tertiary road 12 medemblikkerweg at 
Wieringermeer
Cycling path
Tertiary road 21 kanaalweg at 
Schoorldam
Cycling path
Tertiary road 24 middenweg at 
Heerhugowaard
Cycling path




























Cycling path + bridge 
+ 2 underpasses
Gouda Access northern side 
station




krimpen a/d IJssel Nieuwe Tiendweg Cycling path

















rotterdam Cliostraat Cycling path
rotterdam rozenlaan Cycling path
rotterdam Schieweg Cycling path
rotterdam mathenesserweg and 
square
Cycling path
rotterdam van Cittersstraat Cycling path
rotterdam bunschotenweg Cycling path











voorschoten Trompweg (section) Cycling path
Non-urban Secondary road 19 Pijnacker Cycling path
Secondary road 21 berkel en rodenrijs Cycling path
Secondary road 43 Alongside 
merwedebrug
Cycling path
Tertiary road 11 voorschoterweg at 
valkenburg
Cycling path
Tertiary road 16 Second section oud 
Adeselaan Alkemade
Cycling path
Tertiary road 20 Hoogmade-
Woubrugge
Cycling path
Tertiary road 21 Schilkerweg (section) 
Ter Aar
Cycling path
Tertiary road 24 Nieuwkoop-Noorden Cycling path




Tertiary road 65 oudeweg (section) at 
Nootdorp
Cycling path
Tertiary road 107 Langeweg (Watersch. 
de Groote Waard)
Cycling path
Zeeland Urban No projects
Non-urban Tertiary road 23 Wolphaartsdijk-
National road 258
Cycling path
Tertiary road 46 Aagtekerke-
Westkapelle
Cycling path
Tertiary road 73 Graauw-zandberg Cycling path
Noord-
Brabant
Urban bergen op zoom zuidzijde zoom Cycling path + bridge









oss Phase 1 and 2 
routeplan
Cycling paths














Secondary road 8 Nieuwe 
molen-Stampersgat
Cycling path
Secondary road 9 Hoogerheide-Putte Cycling path
Secondary road 12 Alphen-baarle 
Nassau
Cycling path
Secondary road 21 Schijndel-St. 
oedenrode
Cycling path
Secondary road 23 Nuenen-Gerwen Cycling path
Secondary road 23 Gemert-elsendorp Cycling path
Secondary road 25 veghel-erp Cycling path
Secondary road 30 Nistelrode-uden Cycling path
Tertiary road 12 Lieshout-Aarle rixtel Cycling path
Tertiary road 13 Aarle rixtel-Helmond Cycling path
Tertiary road 15 rips-oploo Cycling path
Tertiary road 17 bakel-Helmond Cycling path
Tertiary road 25 bergeijk-Luyksgestel Cycling path
Tertiary road 31 oisterwijk-moergestel Cycling path
Limburg urban area No projects
Non-urban 
area
Secondary road 1 Horst-venraij Cycling path
Secondary road 9 echterbosch-Putbroek Cycling path
Tertiary road bergen-German 
border
Cycling path
Tertiary road venraij-overloon Cycling path
Tertiary road Haelen-roggel Cycling path
Tertiary road Helden-Neer-roggel Cycling path
Tertiary road meijelsedijk at 
Nederweert
Cycling path
Tertiary road budel-Weert Cycling path
Flevoland Urban dronten bisonweg Cycling path
Non-urban No projects
Source: Kamerstukken II 1979/80, 15 885 (Meerjarenplan Personenvervoer [multi-Year Plan Personal 
Traffic]), no. 4, 19-22.
 Appendix 3
National Public Works Subsidies Awarded to Municipalities, c. 1975-1980
Awarded to Amount 
(guilders)
Purpose
Geldropa 350,000 Cycling paths in kleine dommeldal
delftb 67,000 extension Componistenpad as cycling and 
pedestrian path
dokkumb 216,000 Cycling path along Harddraversdijk
krimpen aan de IJsselb 418,000 Cycling paths along Nieuwe Tiendweg
Amsterdamc 2,340,000 Cycling route Slotervaart-duivendrecht
Hengeloc 400,000 Cycling path along deldenerstraat




rotterdame 55,000 Cycling path Slinge-harbor railway 
rotterdam-zuid
rijswijke 60,000 Cycling path along Admiraal Helfrichsingel and 
Hammarskjöldlaan 
den boschf 800,000 Cycling tunnel in orthenseweg/Grondelweg
roosendaal and Nispeng 252,000 Separate cycling path along rucphensebaan
Haarlemmermeerg 96,000 Cycling path Lijnden-badhoevedorp (between 
veldweg and keizersweg)
examples of urban cycling infrastructure construction costs in the 1970s and 1980s Sources: (a) 
Verkeerskunde 27, no. 1 (1976): 40-41; (b) Verkeerskunde 27, no. 12 (1976): 608; (c) Verkeerskunde 28, 
no. 1 (1977): 10-11; (d) Verkeerskunde 28, no. 2 (1977): 62; (e) Verkeerskunde 28, no. 4 (1977): 162; (f) 




Digitized Parliamentary Records (Handelingen) and Documents (Kamerstukken) of the Neth-
erlands (1814-1995). https://zoek.off icielebekendmakingen.nl/uitgebreidzoeken/historisch
National Archives of the Netherlands, The Hague (NA)
Ministry of Public Works (V&W)
Inspecteurs van de Waterstaat, 1849-1930 (2.16.07)
Raad van de Waterstaat, 1892-1992 (2.16.11)
Commissie inzake Wegbelasting, 1924-1925 (2.16.19.10)
Commissie Motor- en Rijwielverkeer (2.16.19.31)
Commissie van Overleg voor de Wegen, 1915-1940 (2.16.59)
Ministerie van Waterstaat: Directie van de Waterstaat (DW), 1930-1949 (NA 2.16.22.01)
Centrale Commissie van Advies en Bijstaand voor het Verkeersfonds, 1935-1939; Subcommissie 
voor de Kosten van de Weg, 1935-1938 (2.16.51.02)
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat: Stuurgroep Verkeer en Vervoer, 1941-1983 (2.16.5113)
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat: Directoraat-Generaal van het Verkeer, 1947-1980 (2.16.5117)
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat: Dienst Weg- en Waterbouwkunde (DWW), 1961-1994 (2.16.5285)
Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat: Permanente Internationale Commissie van de Permanent 
International Association of Road Congresses (PIARC), 1908-1989 (2.16.5287)
Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work (CRM)
Interdepartementale Coördinatiecommissie voor de Openluchtrecreatie en het Toerisme 
(INCORET), 1958-1976 (2.27.5111)
Ministerie van Cultuur, Recreatie en Maatschappelijk Werk, Beleidsterrein Recreatie, 1949-1982 
(2.27.5215)
Ministry of Public Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM)
Centrale Sector van het Ministerie van VROM, 1940-1981 (2.17.03)
Rijksdienst voor het Nationale Plan (RNP), 1941-1965 (2.17.04)
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (LNV)
Cultuurtechnische Dienst/Landinrichtingsdienst, 1935-1995 (2.11.5006)
Coördinatiecommissie Openluchtrecreatie (2.11.5164)
Other National Governmental Bodies
Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 1945-1989 (2.02.28)
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken: Afdeling Binnenlands Bestuur, 1879-1950 (2.04.57)
Rijkscommissie Werkverruiming, 1922-1946 (2.06.081)
Interprovinciaal Overleg (IPO), 1947-2003 (2.19.063)
Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten (VNG), 1912-1989 (2.19.185)
Action and Interest Groups
Veilig Verkeer Nederland, 1932-2000 (2.19.197)
Pressiegroep Stop de Kindermoord/Stichting Pressiegroep Kinderen Voorrang, 1973-2000 (2.19.198)
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Industry
Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Rotterdam, 1922-2013 (3.17.17.04)
Provincial Government Zuid-Holland
Rijkswaterstaat in Zuid-Holland, 1849-1980 (3.07.11)
Rijkswaterstaat: Directie Zuid-Holland, 1981-1989 (3.07.5018)
Rijkswaterstaat: Directie Zuid-Holland: Dienstkring Leiden, 1911-1998 (3.07.5069)
Provinciale Waterstaat in Zuid-Holland, 1945-1986 (3.02.27)
Griff ie van de provincie Zuid-Holland, 1946-1975 (3.02.22)
Griff ie van de Provincie Zuid-Holland, 1976-1986 (3.02.46)
Others
Personal archive Mr. H.J. Smidt, 1851-1921 (2.21.026.08)
Provincial Archives Drenthe, Assen (Drents Archief; DA)
Bestuursarchief provincie Drenthe, 1950-1987 (0923)
Provinciale Staten, 1814-1951 (0025)
Gedeputeerde Staten, 1814-1951 (0031)
Provinciale Waterstaat, 1845-1945 (0029)
Provinciale Waterstaat Drenthe, 1945- (0924)
Centrale Vereeniging voor den Opbouw van Drenthe, 1925-1970 (0196)
Collectie Zwinderman, 1693-1847 (0635)
Provincial Archives Gelderland, Arnhem (Gelders Archief; GA)
Gedeputeerde Staten, 1814-1950 (0039)
Provinciale Staten en Gedeputeerde Staten 1950-1979 (3204)
Provinciale Waterstaat, 1864-1955 (0244)
Provincial Archives Noord-Holland, Haarlem (Noord-Hollands Archief, NHA)
Provinciaal Bestuur van Noord-Holland, 1851-1943 (18)
Rijkswaterstaat Directie Noord-Holland te Haarlem, 1931-1951 (228)
Provinciale Waterstaat van Noord-Holland te Haarlem, 1911-1942 (553)
Provinciaal Bestuur van Noord-Holland, Wegen, Verkeer en Waterstaat en bijbehorende com-
missies te Haarlem, 1943-1989 (639)
Digitized Council Minutes Heemstede (https://nha.courant.nu/periodicals/RNH)
Provincial and Municipal Archives Utrecht, Utrecht (Het Utrechts Archief, HUA)
Gedeputeerde Staten van Utrecht, 1920-1954 (1201)
Gedeputeerde Staten van Utrecht, 1955-1988 (1205)
Provinciale Staten van Utrecht, 1954-1987 (1204-1)
Commissies uit de Provinciale Staten Utrecht, 1956-1988 (1204-2)
Provinciale Waterstaat van Utrecht, 1830-1925 (1208)
Dienst van de Provinciale Waterstaat van Utrecht, 1955-1988 (1210)
Provinciale planologische dienst van Utrecht, 1943-1989 (1211)
Gemeentebestuur van Utrecht, 1813-1969, deel 2, 1813-1910 (1007-2)
Gemeentebestuur van Utrecht, 1813-1969, deel 3: 1911-1969 (1007-3)
Gemeentebestuur van Utrecht, 1970-1989 (1338)
Gemeente Nieuwegein, secretarie 1971-1990 (1651)
Verzamelingen betreffende spoorwegen, 1839-2000 (971)
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Regional Archives Amersfoort, Amersfoort (Archief Eemland, AE)
Eerste Enige Echte Wielrijdersbond (E.N.W.B.), afdeling Amersfoort, 1975-1996 (0242)
Regional Archives Eindhoven, Eindhoven (Regionaal Historisch Centrum Eindhoven, 
RHCE)
Gemeenschappelijke regeling Agglomeratie Eindhoven, 1977-1985 (10884)
Intergemeentelijke organisatie voor rijwielpaden in de Kempen, 1953-1985 (10091)
Municipal Archives Amsterdam, Amsterdam (Gemeentearchief Amsterdam; GAA)
R.A.I., 1894-1994 (1302)
Collectie Stadsarchief Amsterdam: persdocumentatie op onderwerp (30486)
Municipal Archives The Hague, The Hague (Gemeentearchief Den Haag; GADH)
Werkgroep Dooievaar, 1970-1985 (0772-01)
Municipal Archives Zeist, Zeist (Gemeentearchief Zeist; GAZ)
Rijwielpadvereniging Utrecht met omstreken Umo, 1918-1968 (8020)
International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam (IISG)
Archief ENFB (ARCH01969)
Archief Amsterdam f ietst (ARCH02118)
ANWB Foundation Archives, The Hague (ANWB)
Interviews
January 8, 2018, André Pettinga – Former traff ic engineer Delft 1970s; currently cycling consultant
January 15, 2019, Peter Plantinga – Founding member of Eindhoven chapter of Cyclists’ Union
February 5, 2019, Hans van Beek and Leo Hamer – Founders of Dooievaar
August 12, 2019, Koos Louwerse – Involved in Masterplan Fiets; currently cycling consultant
December 12, 2018, Jan Ploeger – Former traff ic engineer at multiple levels
July 16, 2019, Jan Ploeger
November 13, 2019, Steven Schepel – Former chair of Stop the Child Murder
June 5, 2020, Maartje van der Putten – Founding member of Stop the Child Murder
June 9, 2020, Wim Bot – Policy advisor/lobbyist for Cyclists’ Union
May 18, 2021, Eisse Kalk and Annemarie Wijn – Founding members of Werkgroep 2000
June 2, 2021, Tom Godefrooij and Jaap Rijnsburger – Leading members of Cyclists’ Union, 
1980s/1990s
Audio Sources
NTR/NPO Radio 1, De Spaak, podcast, Stop de Kindermoord, August 1, 2019. https://www.
nporadio1.nl/podcasts/de-spaak [accessed September 2, 2019].
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